

**The Politics of Development and Identity in the
Jharkhand Region of Bihar (India), 1951-91**

Amit Prakash

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Abstract

This is a study of the process by which public policy implementation influences the crystallisation of political identities premised on ethnic, lingual, religious or other similar grounds. It argues that the failure of development policy to intervene in socio-economic conditions encourages societal groups to articulate themselves as political identities. The Jharkhand movement in south Bihar has been studied to substantiate the theoretical formulations.

After briefly outlining the historical roots of the Jharkhand movement, the study locates the tribal policy of the colonial and post-colonial Indian state in the dynamics of the colonial and nationalist discourses. The thesis then focuses on the changing development profile of the Jharkhand region and correlates it to the fluctuating electoral support for Jharkhandi political formations. This correlation has been studied with the help of a Modified Resource Dependence Model (Echeverri-Gent, 1993). This model argues that both the State and the societal groups control resources which are vital to the other. As the State in India controls a vast array of resources, disadvantaged societal groups articulate themselves as a self-conscious ethnic identity in order to augment their political resources and influence the policy process in their own favour. The case of Jharkhandi identity and the movement around it is one example of such articulation of a politically significant self-conscious identity in order to gain a better bargaining power. To a certain extent, it has been successful in influencing the State's response in terms of securing a development council for the area. The Jharkhandi identity, in turn, has been shaped by the response of the policy machinery to local needs and demands. This two-way interaction between the State and the Jharkhandi identity has also significantly altered the character of the identity itself. The 'politics of development and identity' thus born has been discussed and changing approaches of the various political parties towards the Jharkhandi identity and its demand for autonomy have been analysed.

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Abbreviations

AIFB	All India Forward Bloc
AJJP	All India Jharkhand Party
AJSU	All Jharkhand Students' Union
BCKU	Bihar Colliery Kamgar Union
BJP	Bharatiya Janata Party
BJS	Bharatiya Jan Sangh
BLD	Bharatiya Lok Dal
BPHJ	Bihar Prant Hul Jharkhand
BSD	Birsa Sewa Dal
CDM	Community Development Movement
COJM	Committee on Jharkhand Matters
CPI	Communist Party of India
CPI-ML	Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist)
CPM	Communist Party of India (Marxist)
CSPJ	Chotanagpur and Santhal Pargana Janata Party
DDP	Doordarshi Party
DPSP	Directive Principles of State Policy
FBM	All India Forward Bloc (Marxist)
HJD	Hul Jharkhand
HYV	High Yielding Variety (of seeds)
ICJ	India Congress (J)
ICS	Indian Civil Service
INC	Indian National Congress (Congress Party)
INCI	Indian National Congress (Indira)
INCO	Indian National Congress (Organisation)
INCUI	Indian National Congress (U)
IND	Independent (candidate in elections)
IPF	Indian People's Front
ITDP	Integrated Tribal Development Programme
JAAC	Jharkhand Area Autonomous Council
JCC	Jharkhand Co-ordination Committee
JD	Janata Dal
JHP	Jharkhand Party
JKD	Jana Kranti Dal (in the 1967 elections)

JKD	Jharkhand Dal (in the 1989 elections)
JMM	Jharkhand Mukti Morcha
JNS	Jan Sangh
JP	Janata Party
JPJP	Janata Party (JP)
JPS	Janata Party (Secular)
LKD	Lok Dal
LKDB	Lok Dal (Bahuguna)
MADA	Modified Area Development Approach
MCC	Maoist Communist Centre
MCOR	Marxist Co-ordination Committee
MLA	Member of Legislative Assembly
MP	Member of Parliament
NWFP	North-west Frontier Province
PHJP	Progressive Hul Jharkhand Party
PSP	Praja Socialist Party
PWD	Public Works Department
RHJP	Rajya Hul Jharkhand Party
RJD	Rashtriya Janata Dal
SC	Scheduled Castes
SP	Socialist Party
SRC	States Reorganisation Commission (1953-55)
SSP	Samyukta Socialist Party
ST	Scheduled Tribes
SWA	Swatantra Party
TRIFED	Tribal Co-operative Marketing Development Federation
TSP	Tribal Sub-Plan
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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
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Map 1: Location of Bihar and the Jharkhand Region in India




Source: Devalle, Susana B. C., *Discourses of Ethnicity: Culture and Protest in Jharkhand*, New Delhi: Sage, 1992.

Map 2: Districts of Bihar
(Shaded Area Represents the Jharkhand region)



Source: Devalle, Susana B. C., *Discourses of Ethnicity: Culture and Protest in Jharkhand*, New Delhi: Sage, 1992.

Map 3: Lok Sabha Constituencies in Bihar - 1989
 (Shaded Area Represents Constituencies in the Jharkhand region)



Source: Butler, David, Lahiri, Ashok and Roy, Prannoy, *India Decides: Elections 1952-1991*, New Delhi: Living Media India Ltd, 1991.

Chapter I

Introduction: Theoretical Concerns and the Problem

The contemporary world is witness to a wave of ethnic conflict, causing widespread misery and bloodshed. This phenomenon has been threatening the very existence of many States and has resulted in the emergence of new nation-states premised on ethnic lines. Such ethnic revival has also significantly altered the premises of the relationship between societal groups and the States in which they reside. Therefore, the issue of ethnicity has also emerged as a major issue in international politics. The growth in ethnic politics – both at national as well as at international levels – has led to the demolition of the notion that, with increasing modernisation and communication, more particularistic identities would eventually be eroded or would be submerged into national identities. In reality, “instead of abandoning their traditional ethnic identities in the quest for socio-economic and political equality”, ethnic groups “have retained them along the way, even when they have made it to the top – ethnicity continues to be an important and meaningful source of identity for millions of people in the world”.¹ Hence, political and socio-economic issues are being increasingly identified on ‘ethnic’ or ‘ethno-religious’ lines. Some instances of ethnic persistence or revival in the present-day world are Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland, Sikhs and Hindus in Punjab, India, Muslims and Christians in Lebanon and the Philippines, Whites and Blacks in South Africa, Tamils and Sinhals in Sri Lanka and multiple ethnic cleavages in eastern Europe and central Asia. The bases of ethnic solidarity may depend on a diverse number of factors ranging from cultural, linguistic and regional contiguity to religious, caste and historical similarity.

¹ George M. Scott, ‘Group Solidarity: Towards an Explanatory Model’ in *Journal of Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 13 no. 2, April 1990, p. 148.

Ethnicity does not operate in circumstances that are independent of other identities. In a multi-ethnic country like India, individuals can and do have a number of identities that they don and doff depending on the interaction to which they are exposed at a certain point of time. As the term ethnic identity carries a different set of meanings to different individuals, it becomes important to clearly define the term. It is also important to distinguish between ethnicity and nationalism, since the two concepts have often been used as synonyms.

Ethnic Identity and National Identity

Broadly, there are two strands of political identity articulation in the world today. The first kind of identity articulation is an over-arching identity which supports the State,² its policies and the status quo. This identity is more inclusive and seeks to subsume all other identities by employing a wide variety of methods such as co-option, coercion and incentives and might be referred to as national identity defined as an over-arching identity which claims precedence over all other identities.

Secondly, the grassroots often throw up³ narrower, more ascriptive, particularistic and much more region-specific identities which may be referred to as sub-national or ethnic identities. These identities are not always and necessarily⁴ antagonistic to the over-arching national identity and are often a part of the latter. Sub-national identities usually take two forms of articulation. They may crystallise into a national identity and seek political recognition (even a sovereign State) or may end up as one of the many ethnic or sub-national identities competing for control of

² In this study, State with an upper case has been used to refer to the political concept of a State and to the collection of institutional and discursive structures that comprise a State. For all other uses of the term state (such as the states, i.e. provinces, of India or for reference to the Indian or colonial state) lower case has been used.

³ These sub-national identities may be articulated due to a variety of reasons. For example, some sub-national identities may be articulated to seek greater political recognition whereas others may be articulated to skew the authoritative allocation of resources in the favour of the societal group that they claim to represent. Still others may be articulated due to a combination of factors.

⁴ Ethnic or sub-national identities are not always by definition, against the national identity although sometimes they may compete with the latter for political recognition or control over resources.

resources in a multi-ethnic State. However, this does not necessarily imply that all national identities begin as an ethnic identity.

Undoubtedly, these two identities are closely related and often overlap as in the case of nation-states that are largely ethnically homogeneous. However, it would not be correct to hold that both kinds of identity articulation are the same.

Ethnic groups may be defined as a "collective within a larger society that claims common ancestry, a shared past, and shared subjective identifications".⁵ They are a historical entity whose members in large part, conceive of themselves as being alike by virtue of shared common stable features located in history, language, culture, stereotypes, territorial ancestry (real, fictitious or imagined), specific nomenclature and/or endogamy and are regarded so by other such groups. However, none of these constitute indispensable differentiating ethnic features. Ethnic Identities are groups of individuals that perceive one or more of the above similarities as paramount in the self-definition of their individual identities and organise around it in order to acquire political resources. Such ethnic identities might be unstable, ad hoc, shifting, sometimes opportunistic and often related to political necessities and demands. Thus, the phrase *ethnic group* pertains to a sociological category whereas an *ethnic identity* refers to a politically pertinent identity.

Besides, identities are either latent⁶ or conscious. When an identity is latent, it continues to serve merely a descriptive purpose. Such an identity is not politically, very significant (for instance, man, woman, Indian, Scot, Hindu, etc.).⁷ When an

⁵ Neil Nevitte and Charles H. Kennedy, eds., *Ethnic Preference and Public Policy in Developing States*, Colorado, 1986, p. 2.

⁶ Identities may be latent in the sense that although they may be seen as a distinct sociological category by outside observers, they are not self-conscious political identities.

⁷ Each of these terms is a descriptive term to refer to the relevant individual. However, any of these terms have the potential to become a politically relevant identity. For instance, the term woman may be used to distinguish between genders and remain a descriptive term. However, during the last few decades it has also acquired a certain degree of political currency and has emerged as a politically relevant identity. Similarly, the term Hindu pertains to the relevant individuals belonging to a religious group in the society. However, the mobilisation of a large numbers of

Contd.

individual (or a group of individuals) consciously perceives a certain descriptive identity as indispensable to the definition of his/her (or their) personal identity and accepts that descriptive identity as predominant and paramount over other such descriptive identities and seeks to acquire political resources on the basis of this identity, that conscious identity becomes politically significant.⁸ Thus, a term that refers to an ethnic group may remain a descriptive category used to refer to certain individuals who are distinct on the basis of their ancestry, culture, stereotypes, and other such factors. Such an ethnic group, however, is not a politically self-conscious identity. When the individuals concerned translate this descriptive identity into a self-conscious political identity (by whatever process, premised on any attribute of the group), they emerge as an ethnic identity.⁹ Thus, self-consciousness is a crucial factor in the articulation of an identity.¹⁰ Self-consciousness is not inherent amongst members of an ethnic group. It is created by intellectuals from the ethnic groups deprived of the desirable positions in society by the dominant ethnic group. Consequently, the frustrated intellectuals of the minority ethnic group may invoke common ethnicity as a political instrument.¹¹ Any societal group that is not a self-conscious identity remains a sociological category and is not a politically relevant identity.

Contd.

persons on the grounds of *Hindutva* in the recent years by the Bharatiya Janata Party in India has led to its emergence as a politically significant identity.

⁸ There may or may not be a clash between any two identities of an individual or a group of individuals.

⁹ A good example of such an articulation is the case of Muslim French citizens whose ancestors had migrated to France from North Africa. Some of these people, despite being French citizens and having been born and brought up in France, recently came to see the Islamic identity as paramount over their French identity (or, for that matter, North African/ Arab identity). At that point of time, their religious identity, which until now was merely a descriptive identity, started acquiring ethnic status.

¹⁰ Walker Conner is of the view that "an ethnic group may be readily discerned by the outside observer, but, until the members are themselves aware of the group's uniqueness, it is merely an ethnic group and not a nation", Walker Conner, 'The Politics of Ethno-nationalism' in *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 27 no. 1, 1973, p. 3. Also see W. Conner, 'Ethnonationalism in the First World' in Esman M. J., ed., *Ethnic Conflict in the Western World*, Ithaca, New York, 1977, pp. 19-45 in which he uses the terms 'ethno-nationalism' and 'nationalism interchangeably with the implication that ethnicity and nationalism are similar, politically relevant identities.

¹¹ A. D. Smith, *Theories of Nationalism*, London, 1971, pp. 186-7.

As far as the differentiation between an ethnic identity and a national identity is concerned, the area is of a much-contested nature. Various writers have attributed primacy to different factors.

Anthony Smith emphasises the idea of equal citizenship rights and vertical economic integration as factors that differentiate a nation from an ethnic group.¹² These however, cannot be valid grounds for distinction. Direct membership with equal group rights offered by a nation is not substantially different from similar rights offered by ethnic groups to its members. Further, the criterion of vertical economic integration is also flawed because federal nation-states (as well as multi-ethnic nations) exist which show varying degrees of vertical economic integration. Moreover, certain ethnic groups, despite a substantial degree of economic integration with other societal groups, nevertheless, retain their ethnic character.¹³ In fact often, the ethnic groups are very conscious of their distinctiveness only because of their economic and trade-related interaction with other ethnic or societal groups.

Further, the emphasis on territoriality is also flawed.¹⁴ No doubt, a sense of association with a territory – mythological, actual, symbolic or commemorative¹⁵ – is important for an ethnic group to crystallise into an ethnic identity but this sense of association is hardly the same as “territorial contiguity with free mobility”. This

¹² Smith's formulation may be summarised as follows:

Cultural Differentiation	+	Territorial contiguity with free mobility		+	Common Kinship Network		=	<u>Tribe</u>		
Cultural Differentiation	+	Territorial contiguity with free mobility	+	A relative large scale	+	External political relation of conflict and alliance with similar groups	+	Considerable group sentiment	=	<u>Ethnic Group</u> (Identity)
Ethnic group	+	Direct membership with equal group rights		+	Vertical economic integration		=	<u>Nation</u>		

A. D. Smith, *Theories of Nationalism*, London, 1971, pp. 186-7.

¹³ Fredrik Barth, ed., *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organisation of Cultural Difference*, London, 1970, pp. 9-11.

¹⁴ 'Territorial contiguity with free mobility' has been emphasised for the emergence of an ethnic identity, Smith, op. cit.

¹⁵ A. D. Smith, *Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Cambridge, 1986, pp. 28-9.

phrase implies an actual physical association, which in turn is not as important as a sense of association. In fact, actual physical possession of a territory is not indispensable for either an ethnic identity or a national identity. Israel is a good example where the Jewish community was hardly in actual possession of the territory now called Israel but that did not deter the process of national identity formation amongst them.¹⁶ Moreover, a sense of association with the territory of Israel (often imaginary) plays a crucial role in the sustenance of the ethnic identities of Jewish communities in many European countries.

Moreover, none of the 'ethnic factors'¹⁷ are indispensable for an ethnic group to crystallise into an ethnic identity. An ethnic identity may utilise any number of such factors or invent new factors¹⁸ to mobilise political support. Besides, nations also draw upon similar factors to forge a distinct identity. Thus, national identity and ethnic identity may share certain common features but this does not make them identical political concepts.

Further, the formulation that "in order to forge a 'nation' today, it is vital to create and crystallise ethnic components, the lack of which is likely to constitute a serious impediment in 'nation-building'"¹⁹ is not unproblematic. This view implies that all nations emerge from the ethnic components which 'crystallise' into a national identity. However, in multi-ethnic nation-states such as India, the ethnic components can hardly be called as 'crystallised' but not much debate can focus on

¹⁶ Also noteworthy is the fact that the territory imagined by the Jewish community as an important premise in their identity articulation before the creation of Israel was significantly different from the geographical boundaries of the present Israeli state. This substantiates the argument that a sense of association is of greater relevance in identity articulation than actual possession of the territory concerned.

¹⁷ Smith lists the following factors that are important for an ethnic group to emerge as an ethnic identity: (a) A collective name; (b) A common myth of descent; (c) A shared history-actual or perceived; (d) A distinctive culture; (e) An association with a specific territory - sacred, commemorative or actual; and, (f) A sense of solidarity; at least amongst the elite, *ibid.*, pp. 28-30.

¹⁸ For instance, declining development profile of the Jharkhand region and resultant alienation has been used as an additional factor for political mobilisation by the Jharkhandi identity premised on tribal heritage and culture.

¹⁹ Smith, *Ethnic Origins of Nations*, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

whether there exists an Indian national identity. This can be substantiated by referring to a study by Walker Conner which points out that out of 132 States studied (many of which were nation-states), only twelve were ethnically homogeneous, representing only 9.1 per cent of the total. Another twenty-five, that is 18.9 per cent of the total, have one single ethnic community comprising over 90 per cent of the population. On the other hand, thirty-nine States (25 per cent of the total) had the largest ethnic group constituting less than half of their population while fifty-three States (40.2 per cent of the total) were comprised of more than 5 significant groups.²⁰ Thus, crystallisation of ethnic components is not indispensable for 'nation-building'.

The terms ethnicity and nationalism thus cannot and must not be used interchangeably because of the differing connotations of the two terms as well as the differences between the two categories. Therefore, it is important that a distinction be made between the two, at least for analytical purposes. Admittedly, both nationalism and ethnicity share a number of common features but ethnic identities are not the same as national identities. It cannot be denied that ethnic identities may and often do become national identities and that, at different points of time, the same individuals may respond to different identities, but it does not imply that all ethnic identities are *ipso facto* national identities. An ethnic identity may be translated into a national identity under a certain set of circumstances but they are not all necessarily potential national identities which often emerge as civic identities.

The two identities can also be differentiated in terms of the demands they make on the political process. Largely, national identities might be inclined to seek statehood whereas ethnic identities might seek autonomy and adequate representation within an existing State. Of course, examples like Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia exist where erstwhile ethnic identities do aspire for nationhood and statehood but this is not the dominant phenomenon.

²⁰ Quoted in A. D. Smith, *The Ethnic Revival in the Modern World*, New York, 1981, pp. 9-10.

Another distinction may be made on the basis of sovereignty although it is of limited use.²¹ An identity that is articulated close to the point of time when it attains sovereign status (e.g. Pakistan) rapidly transforms itself into a broad-based civic national identity. If the same identity had failed in attaining sovereign status so rapidly, it would probably have ended up as another competing ethnic identity.

Furthermore, we may attempt an analytical distinction between ethnicity-oriented nationalism and a broad-based civic nationalism. In actual terms, such a distinction would be painfully difficult since all national identities, inevitably, contain a number of 'sub-national' identities. Such a distinction can be drawn only to underline the fact that some national identities depend more on the ethnic differences than others on account of the relative homogeneity of the population. It is likely that a largely ethnically homogeneous nation would rely more heavily on the ethnic component to knit a coherent identity. On the other hand, an ethnically plural national identity would try to underplay the ethnic differences and focus on the non-ethnic similarities.

The process of conversion of cultural differences into bases for political mobilisation occurs only under specific circumstances. Ethnic identities are formed under a particular set of circumstances and a number of factors like myths, symbols, perceived history, geographical identification, role of elite, etc. play an important role in shaping these circumstances. Three propositions are central to the articulation of ethnic identities. First, ethnic identities are variable rather than a fixed or 'given' proposition. They interact with their socio-political and economic context and are continuously in a state of flux which alters the nature of demand which it places on the political system. Second, elite from the ethnic groups and their relationship of alliance or opposition vis-à-vis the State plays a central role in the character and intensity of articulation. Finally, the process of ethnic identity

²¹ The formulation that "when a 'mini-nationalism' wins independence, it is transformed into a full-blown nationalism" is relevant in some circumstances. Once an ethnic identity attains independence, it becomes a macro-nationalism which attempts to exert "nationalism on a wider political, economic, cultural, religious or ethnic grounds", L. L. Snyder, *Macro-nationalisms: A History of Pan-Movements*, London, 1984, pp. xv, xvii.

formation may have important consequences for the very self-definition of the ethnic group in question and its ability to persist.²²

An ethnic identity is therefore “a subjectively self-conscious community that establishes criteria for inclusion and exclusion from the group. This inclusion or exclusion from the group hence, involves explicit or tacit adoption of rules of endogamy or exogamy as well as a claim to status and recognition, either as a distinct group or as a group at least equal to other groups”.²³ Thus, ethnicity emerges as “an alternate²⁴ form of social organisation” but is a contingent and mutable status that may or may not be articulated in a particular context or time. Further on, ethnic groups may tend to seek a major say in the political system in order to protect, preserve and promote their interests. This may lead to an ethnic group aspiring for a national status and/ or political recognition, either within an existing State or as a new State.

A nation-state may be created by either the transformation of an ethnic group in a multi-ethnic State into a self-conscious political identity or by the formation of an inter-ethnic, composite and homogeneous civic national culture through the agencies of a modern State. A nation is “a particular type of ethnic community politicised, with recognised group rights in the political system”.²⁵

In the multi-ethnic national identity of India, the nationalism was articulated to act as a counter to a visible ‘opposition’, i.e. British colonial rule. This manifest ‘opponent’ factor succeeded in creating an overarching national identity, which has been described in a rather clichéd phrase as ‘unity in diversity’. However, the multi-ethnic context of the Indian national identity began emerging with the demand for Pakistan which exposed the fact that an over-arching political identity does not subsume or hinder other political identities. Other political identities (such as the

²² Paul R. Brass, *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison*, New Delhi, 1991, p. 14.

²³ *ibid.*

²⁴ As an alternative to being subsumed by the mainstream social organisation.

²⁵ Brass, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

one expressed in the articulation of the demand for Pakistan) had existed simultaneously with the Indian national identity throughout the nationalist struggle.

In modern times, most individuals have a number of identities that operate simultaneously. Under such circumstances, it is likely that an ethnic identity may be strongly articulated but remains a part of a larger national identity, as is the case in the Jharkhand region. In the independent Indian state, the various ethnic identities have articulated themselves at different points of time in different ways. However, these articulations were more like interest group politics for a better share in the redistributive potential of the State till the mid-seventies. From then on, the ethnic groups started to assert themselves and demand anything between more representation and complete autonomy. The bases of such articulation have been quite varied from language to region, religion, culture and tribal heritage. However, owing to the emphasis of the post-independence Indian state on development activities, most such identities have modified their bases of articulation to include the need for special development measures. Generally therefore, such articulations have focused on the demand for more political autonomy to efficiently implement the development policy. The thrust of the nationalist State on development has been utilised by the newly articulated political identities to redefine their mode of political articulation. They emphasise their ethnic features to demand a different approach to development, which in turn has meant a demand for more political and administrative autonomy and occasionally, at least rhetorically, complete independence.²⁶

The resource capacity of the Indian state being limited, development policies tend to be target-group/region oriented. Not all regions and societal groups have been equal beneficiaries of the positive action of the State.²⁷ Consequently, a number of region-specific or culture-specific identities have been thrown up by the grass roots. These identities have in some cases, been called ethnic identities and their

²⁶ For instance the case of Khalistan and Nagaland.

²⁷ It is not being implied that the State has attempted balanced development. It is merely being stated that developmental imbalances due to resource constraints and political reasons are a fact.

demands are largely in the category of demanding a greater share in the benefits of positive action of the State or administrative autonomy.

Hence, the State and its policies or the lack of them play an important role in precipitating the articulation of ethnic identities. The argument of this study therefore, is that public "policy implementation as the site of tangible exchanges between State and society provides a strategic point of developing the analysis"²⁸ of the role of the State in encouraging the crystallisation of ethnic identities.

Ethnicity and the State

In order to study the relationship between the State and society in the process of ethnic identity formation, differentiation must be made between three sets of struggles:

- (a) The struggle within the ethnic group itself for control over its symbolic and material resources, which in turn involves defining the group's boundaries and its rules of exclusion and inclusion.
- (b) The second set of struggles takes place between ethnic groups as a competition for rights, privileges and available resources.
- (c) The third takes place between the State and the groups that dominate it on the one hand and the population that inhabits its territory.²⁹

These three sets of struggles inevitably intersect each other but it is possible to separate the three for analytical purposes to study the role of the State vis-à-vis a selected ethnic group. The State is always engaged in the differential distribution of resources among various categories in the population. The State is not merely a policy-producing mechanism that simply balances conflicting societal interests. Instead, the State tends to "support particular groups, to distribute privileges

²⁸ J. Echeverri-Gent, *The State and the Poor: Public Policy and Political Development in India and the United States*, Los Angeles, 1993, p. 4.

²⁹ Paul R. Brass, ed., *Ethnic Groups and the State*, London, 1985, p. 1.

unequally, and to differentiate among various categories in the population".³⁰ Even when the State sets out to be "ostentatiously egalitarian", it must choose between types of "equalitarian" policies that invariably favour some groups or categories in the population and discriminates against others.³¹ The State may also choose to stand neutral but neutrality can also mean supporting the status quo.

Most modern States adopt policies of selective discrimination for a variety of reasons. Equalising policies such as "affirmative action" or "protective discrimination" are often seen as precipitating formation of new identities amongst various categories of social groups. However, such policies never precipitate identity articulation and mobilisation amongst all relevant categories of population. For instance, not all sections of the population which are facing the ill effects of unbalanced development mobilise to assert a politically significant sub-national/ethnic identity.

Thus, study of public policy as a site of tangible interaction between State and society can provide us with a valuable tool to interpret the processes by which public policy conditions the agency of societal groups and in turn is conditioned by them.

In the Indian context, a 'politics of rationality' exists under which a bureaucratic policy planning, implementing and monitoring apparatus operates. However, the rational policy planning by a centralised bureaucracy and implementation process often operates in a skewed manner owing to political considerations. Some scholars and planners argue for the insulation of the policy process from the political context to achieve an efficient policy implementation. Such opinions however, fail to note that the political context serves some very important functions:

³⁰ *ibid.*, p. 9.

³¹ D. Ray, quoted in Brass, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

- (a) It provides an avenue for demand-making to the under-privileged societal groups who have no other avenue available to them for influencing the policy process;
- (b) It provides a valuable channel to utilise the resources controlled by the societal groups which are salient in the development scenario of India; and
- (c) Last but not the least, the political process in principle serves an important democratic function by limiting the predatory influences of the State as well as the dominant societal groups.

Thus, any study of the state society relationship needs a model that has enough flexibility to account for the political context of development programmes. The Modified Resource Dependence Model is a modest attempt towards developing such a framework.

Modified Resource Dependence Model


This model³² attempts to examine the State-society relationship (especially vis-à-vis ethnic identities) through analysing the dynamics of public policy as a tangible interaction between the two. The basic premise is that the State's (and the political regime's) paramount concern is survival. In order to further this objective, the State must acquire resources from its environment constituted of societal groups. Societal actors that control the relevant resource exert influence on the State and its policy activities. Such transactions between the State and societal groups constitute the relationship of mutual dependence.

The relative dependence of the State and the ethnic identity or societal group on one another is determined by the following factors:

- (a) Importance of the resources controlled by the other;
- (b) Concentration of control over the resources;

³² J. Echeverri-Gent, *The State and the Poor: Public Policy and Political Development in India and the United States*, Los Angeles, 1993 developed the Resource Dependence Model to study the State-society relationship. The Modified Resource Dependence Model draws upon this model to analyse the relationship between ethnic identities and the State.

- (c) Uncertainty of supply of the resources; and,
- (d) Abundance of the resource.³³



Flow-chart of the Modified Resource Dependence Model

³³ Echeverri-Gent, op. cit., pp. 22-4.

Such factors do not constitute a relationship of dependence in itself. Dependence is a consequence of asymmetric exchange of resources. The importance of the resources controlled by the other goes a long way in determining the nature of State-society relationship. If the resources controlled by the societal actors (ethnic and other similar politically relevant societal identities) is paramount to the survival of the State, the State tends to be accommodative and weak. On the other hand, if the State is able to control most of the resources crucial to the societal actors, it tends to become dictatorial and can usually implement its will over the societal actors.

The concentration or dispersal of the resources and their relative abundance (or scarcity) also plays an important part in determining the relative positions of the State and societal actors. If the resources are concentrated in a relatively small number of societal actors and only they have access to such resources, the State-society relationship that emerges is quite different from the situation in which resources are widely dispersed and can be accessed by a number of societal actors. In the former case, the State may adopt policies of either co-opting or coercing (depending upon the size and political importance of the societal actor concerned) whereas in the latter case, the State is more likely to be a broad-based and consensual one.

The State usually has the capability to counteract any such dependence if it can control other resources that are important for the ethnic identity. However, the ethnic identities may also possess certain resources that are crucial to the State's survival. Both the State and the ethnic identities thus attempt to use the resources that they control in a strategic manner to reduce the dependence on the other.

Three types of resources are important in any public policy oriented study of the State-society relationship: (a) Political resources, (b) Economic resources, and (c) Information resources. In the context of the relationship of dependence between State and ethnic identities, the State in India (and developing countries in general) controls a vast array of goods and services crucial to the development and poverty

alleviation of the ethnic identity or societal group concerned. The economic resources controlled by the State can determine the future development profile³⁴ of the region or ethnic identity concerned. If the State chooses to ignore any one of them in its policy initiatives/ calculations, it would doom the prospects of the societal group or region concerned and if they are the targets of the State's policy agenda, they are likely to prosper.

On the other hand, the ethnic groups control a vast potential of economic resources in terms of locally available and already exploited resources and traditional technology. The societal actors also affect the State's control over the economic resources by extending their co-operation to enable the exploitation of local natural resources, the lack of which will seriously threaten the State's control over economic resources.³⁵ In view of the limited resource capability of the Indian state, such resources being under the control of ethnic identities can be of crucial importance to the future development scenario of India. The proponents of community-based participative development strategies have already recognised the potential of such resources. If the State is able to mobilise the economic resources controlled by the ethnic identities, it will lead to a better overall development profile and contribute to the legitimacy of the State. A failure to do so will intensify the competition for resources that may result in decreased legitimacy of the State/ regime and general political instability.

Political resources are also exchanged between the State and ethnic identities. These resources include the capacity of the State to exercise its authority, legitimacy

³⁴ This study defines development as an improvement in the living standards of the population (see chapter IV) and therefore, the term 'development profile' has been used to refer to the patterns emerging from an analysis of all the indicators of development for a region at any given point of time. For instance, the development profile of Jharkhand in 1951 refers to the broad patterns of development that emerge from an analysis of the development indicators available for that year such as the figures for infant mortality, public health, employment levels, educational levels and so on. Besides, the analysis also takes account of the potential of economic growth reflected in indicators such as changes in irrigation potential and land under major crops and the changes in the pattern since the last available comparable data.

³⁵ For instance, the lack of co-operation of the Jharkhandi population in exploiting the mineral resources of the region was expressed in the economic blockades during the 1980s and 1990s.

of the regime and its capacity to mobilise political support. Ethnic identities need a share in this political resource controlled by the State to legitimise their own claims as well as to skew authoritative allocation of resources in their own favour. The ethnic identities on the other hand, control the resource of political support for the State and obedience to its authority which in turn, is crucial to the State for legitimising its own actions. In a scenario where large sections of the populace are unwilling to share the political resources that they control with the State, there emerges a situation when resort to widespread coercion is the only avenue left to the State for its survival. This in turn undermines the political stability and legitimacy of the State.

The third important resource available to both the State and the ethnic groups is that of information. Both need to share this resource to further their respective aims. The State, by virtue of the vast economic resources at its command, is able to generate crucial and enormous amounts of information (e.g. flood and drought forecast, underground water availability, potential threats by natural catastrophes, scope of exploiting yet unexploited resources, etc.). Such information is crucial to the ethnic identities in more ways than one.

The ethnic identities on the other hand, might possess information that could be crucial for the survival of the State. Examples of such information resources are traditional methods of utilisation of locally available resources, availability of such resources, extent and levels of mobilisation in reaction to State's actions and policies, feedback on policy initiatives, potential unrest, etc. Such information enables the State to reorient its policies (or, probably frame new ones) and bring them closer to the target societal groups so as to contain social and political ferment.

The resources available with the ethnic identities appear microscopic when compared with the huge resource capability of the Indian state. However, it is not the case because the State needs the ethnic identities and other societal groups in the following manner.

Any State has two avenues available to it in order to enforce its will. These avenues are either coercion or policy initiatives. The State as the only actor having a monopoly over legitimate coercion (both physical and institutional), can very well

resort to the same in order to implement its will in the face of societal and political challenges. However, the State cannot go on employing coercion to contain dissent or conflict indefinitely. This is so because greater the use of coercion by the State to contain societal conflict, the lesser is the legitimacy of its authority and hence a much reduced capacity to command obedience. Hence, in order to increase its legitimacy and rally a larger political support for the regime and its policies, the State is forced to use policy initiatives to control a larger share of the resources and thereby ensure its survival.

These policy initiatives cannot succeed until and unless the ethnic identities and other societal groups are willing to share the resources that they control. The ethnic identities use this compulsion on the part of the State to make strategic use of the resources under their control to further their interests and demand a better policy initiative for themselves from the State.

However, it is likely that a certain ethnic group is faced with a situation in which the State has not been giving it due political and economic space on the policy agenda. Under such circumstances, the ethnic group concerned may organise and mobilise on ethnic lines to augment the political resource under its control.

Advantages of Modified Resource Dependence Model:

The Modified Resource Dependence Model provides a valuable tool to analyse the relationship between State and societal groups. This model facilitates the understanding of the dynamics of this relationship by offering enough flexibility to include the operation of the political context and enables the replacement of point to point comparisons or common sense analysis with meaningful theoretical generalisations. This model is also useful because it focuses on the two-way interaction between the State and societal groups. The process of identity articulation can be examined with the help of this model since it takes into account the compulsion on the part of the State to try and evolve policy measures in response to the demands placed on it by the political system. A fine balance must

exist between coercion and policy measures³⁶ for any meaningful exchange of resources between the State and the political identity. The dynamics of this balancing act by the State and societal groups concerned can be understood and a coherent understanding of the pattern can be developed with the help of this model.

Since the strength of this model is its flexibility to include most kinds of political activity within its framework, it would enable the understanding and explanation of most cases of the interaction between the State and societal groups. However, other cases will have to be examined in detail to categorically state the advantage of this model. It certainly enables us to understand the dynamics of public policy implementation and the articulation of Jharkhandi sub-national identity over the last fifty years in a coherent fashion.

Sub-national Political Movements and Marginal Politics in India

The articulation of sub-national identities in India is generally premised on lingual, racial, ethnic, historical and geographical bases. Under the British colonial rule, "these local and regional identities were accorded a position of dignity by the nationalist leaders within the broad church of the anti-colonial struggle".³⁷ After the transfer of power into the hands of the national leaders, the sub-national imagined political communities³⁸ began to assert themselves in order to generate political power to give concrete expression to their political aspirations. Apart from the cultural factors, "a feeling of deprivation, or neglect, resulting from the nature of national decision-making process . . . provide the logic for mass movement in most cases".³⁹ The feeling of neglect combines with the cultural factors to forge potent

³⁶ Depending on the numerical size of the societal group concerned and the political importance of the resources that it controls as well as the intensity of political mobilisation amongst its members.

³⁷ Subrata K. Mitra, 'Introduction' in Mitra, Subrata K. and Lewis, R. Alison, eds., *Subnational Movements in South Asia*, Oxford, 1996, p. 7.

³⁸ Identities are imagined in the sense of being adopted by those who see themselves as marginalised by the State.

³⁹ Madan P. Bezbaruah, 'Cultural Sub-Nationalism in India's North-east: An Overview' in Mitra, Subrata K. and Lewis, R. Alison, eds., *Subnational Movements in South Asia*, Oxford, 1996, p. 175.

sub-national political identities. The demands of these sub-national identities range from greater autonomy to complete independence.⁴⁰

Cultural factors combined with developmental issues and a feeling of alienation from the State and its policies, have led to articulation of sub-national identities in many parts of India. The sub-national identity articulation in the Gorkha regions of West Bengal combines the underdevelopment of the population in the region with the lingual/ cultural bases to demand political recognition.⁴¹ Similar patterns can also be noticed in other parts of India such as the tribal autonomy and socio-religious movement amongst the Bhil, the Dang, the Dhodia, the Gamit, the Naik, the Kokna, the Warli and the Kathodi tribes in south Gujarat.⁴² Instances of sub-national identity articulation can also be noticed amongst the 83 tribal groups in south India which include the Koya, the Malayali, the Irula and the Paniyan tribal groups. These sub-national identity articulations draw upon cultural and historical factors and include socio-economic considerations born out of imbalances in the development process as additional bases of mobilisation.⁴³

Other examples of such sub-national identity articulation in India are the cases of Khalistani⁴⁴ identity in Punjab and Kashmiri identity in Jammu and Kashmir where religious and cultural factors have led to powerful articulation of identity. These sub-national identities are demanding complete independence. As in other sub-national identity articulation in India, the socio-economic factors have also played a role in the articulation and character of these identities.

⁴⁰ *ibid.*

⁴¹ See A. R. Das, 'The Language and Script Movement in the Darjeeling Himalayan Area' in Singh, K. S. ed., *Tribal Movement in India*, vol. I, New Delhi, 1982, pp. 349-59.

⁴² See Desai, I. P., 'The Tribal Autonomy Movement in South Gujarat' in Singh, K. S. ed., *Tribal Movement in India*, vol. I, New Delhi, 1982, pp. 243-60 and R. B. Lal, 'Socio-religious Movement Amongst the Tribals of South Gujarat' in Singh, K. S. ed., *Tribal Movement in India*, vol. I, New Delhi, 1982, pp. 285-308.

⁴³ P. K. Misra, 'Tribal Mobilisation in Southern India' in Singh, K. S. ed., *Tribal Movement in India*, vol. I, New Delhi, 1982, pp. 325-37.

⁴⁴ See R. G. Fox, *Lions of Punjab: Culture in Making*, Los Angeles, 1985 for the dynamics of sub-national identity formation amongst Sikhs in Punjab.

The fact that the sub-national identities in most part of India draw upon socio-economic factors in addition to their cultural bases of mobilisation has also led to their inclination to adopt a radical Leftist idiom of politics in some regions, particularly in the tribal regions of West Bengal and Bihar and in some parts of Andhra Pradesh. Such mobilisations have come to be known as 'Naxalite' politics, which advocates radical action such as execution of 'exploiters' after trial in a 'people's courts', forcible harvest of fields alienated from the tribal peasants and violent overthrowing of the existing administration.⁴⁵

Amongst the many instances of such sub-national assertions in India, the case of the North-east is perhaps most significant due to the number as well as intensity of sub-national assertions.⁴⁶ This region includes seven states – Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura and has an extraordinary diversity of cultural identities. It contains 209 tribes⁴⁷ and the "linguistic diversity of the area contributes to the complexity of the nationality problem in the region" where "420 languages and dialects are spoken"⁴⁸. As the region is multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-religious, language often provides the criterion for the articulation of these sub-national identities.

The articulation of sub-national identities in the North-east can be classified into three broad categories. The first category includes those types of conflicts that arise out of a concept of distinct and separate identity leading to a secessionist movement and the inevitable clash with the Indian state.⁴⁹ Examples of this kind of

⁴⁵ Edward Duyker, *Tribal Guerrillas: The Santhals of West Bengal and the Naxalite Movement*, Delhi, 1987. Also see Ashim Kumar Adhikary and Ranjit Kumar Bhattacharya, 'The Extremist Movement: An Appraisal of the Naxalite Movement with Special Reference to its Repercussion Among Tribes' in Singh, K. S. ed., *Tribal Movement in India*, vol. I, New Delhi, 1982, pp. 119-28.

⁴⁶ See N. K. Das, *Ethnic Identity, Ethnicity and Social Stratification in North-east India*, New Delhi, 1989 for a full discussion of the dynamics of sub-national politics in North-east India.

⁴⁷ Bezbaruah, op. cit., p. 172.

⁴⁸ *ibid.*

⁴⁹ *ibid.*, p. 173.

sub-national identity articulation in the North-east are the Nagas,⁵⁰ some strands of the sub-national movement in Manipur and Tripura and the activities of the Mizo National Front.⁵¹

The second category of sub-national movement in the North-east is the demand of some groups for a distinct political identity, separate but within the broad framework of an existing one. Such sub-national movements in the North-east "are often professedly democratic, directed mostly against the central government who have the authority to bring in constitutional changes to give political recognition to sub-nationality aspiration."⁵² However, the disruption to law and order leads to their clash with the state government as well. Instances of such movements in the North-east is the Bodoland movement.⁵³

The third strand of sub-national identity articulation in the North-east includes those groups who are not numerically dominant nor live in geographically compact areas but nevertheless, are apprehensive of their identity being subsumed into the dominant political and cultural identity. Hence, they assert themselves to seek protection of their culture.⁵⁴

The States Reorganisation Commission had recognised the difficulty in drawing boundaries around such complex variety of cultural identities and seemed to have envisaged the state of Assam as a culturally mixed unit which would include all the seven states. However, the pressure exerted by the articulation of the above sub-national identities has led to the acceptance of the principle of culturally-defined states in the region, although after much struggle and socio-economic conflict and in some cases long-drawn insurgency.⁵⁵ For instance, the Naga Nationalist Council led

⁵⁰ See N. K. Das, 'The Naga Movement' in Singh, K. S. ed., *Tribal Movement in India*, vol. I, New Delhi, 1982, pp. 39-52 for a discussion of sub-national identity articulation amongst the Nagas.

⁵¹ Bezbaruah, op. cit.

⁵² *ibid.*

⁵³ *ibid.*

⁵⁴ *ibid.*

⁵⁵ *ibid.*, p. 174.

an insurgent movement between 1956 and 1966 leading to the creation of Nagaland. Similarly, the Mizo National Front led an armed rebellion from 1966 to 1986 when Mizoram was created as a separate state within the Indian Union. Similar examples can be found in all the states of the North-east. Manipur has been witness to extremist activities since 1947 whereas in Tripura the tribal population has been fighting to preserve their identity. Similar concerns of identity has led to a long-drawn insurgent movement in Assam spearheaded by ULFA. After Assamese was declared the state language of Assam in 1960, the hill tribes of Khasi, Jaintia and Garo hills fought for the creation of Meghalaya in 1971. However, the cultural complexity of the region ensures that socio-economic conflict and sub-national assertion continues.⁵⁶

Amongst the many instances of assertion of sub-national identities in India, the case of the Jharkhand movement is unique in character. It draws upon the tribal cultural heritage of the Chotanagpur region⁵⁷ but has evolved to include the socio-economic problems of the region as one of the primary bases of articulation of a sub-national identity. This has led to a regional basis for political mobilisation. The dynamics of articulation of this sub-national identity has been analysed in this study.

The Jharkhand Movement

The Jharkhand region according to the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM)⁵⁸ consists of eighteen districts in the south Bihar,⁵⁹ three in West Bengal, four in Orissa and two in Madhya Pradesh. However, over the last half century, by the avenue of political negotiation (exchange of political resources between the

⁵⁶ *ibid.*, pp. 174-5.

⁵⁷ Ram Dayal Munda, 'In search of a Tribal Homeland' in Chaudhari, Buddhadeb, ed., *Ethnopolitics and Identity Crisis*, New Delhi, 1992, pp. 377-86.

⁵⁸ *Election Manifesto of the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha for the Lok Sabha Elections 1996*, Ranchi: JMM Ranchi Central Office, 1996, p. 3.

⁵⁹ There has been a continuous reorganisation of districts in Bihar, ostensibly to improve development administration. The original 5 districts of Chotanagpur division have been divided and re-divided to lead to 18 districts by 1996.

Jharkhandi groups and the State), the Jharkhand movement has come to concentrate on the eighteen districts of south Bihar (see chapter VII). These districts are Bokaro, Chatra, Deoghar, Dhanbad, Dumka, East Singhbhum, Garhawa, Giridih, Godda, Gumla, Hazaribagh, Koderma, Lohardagga, Pakur, Palamau, Ranchi, Sahebganj, and West Singhbhum. Jharkhandi political groups and parties still claim that all the districts in the four states are within the geographical scope of their demands. However, the recent creation of the JAAC with its jurisdiction over only the eighteen districts of the Jharkhand region that lie in Bihar and the softer tone of the Jharkhandi political groups about the other three states suggests that politically, Jharkhand has come to mean the districts in Bihar only (see Map 2). The majority of the geographical area and population of Jharkhand lies in Bihar and consequently the Jharkhand movement is most active in Bihar. There is almost no significant movement for autonomy in the other three states. Hence, the districts of Bihar are the focus of this study.

The districts of the Jharkhand region have a population of 21,848,860 (1991 Census) living in an area of 79,732 square Kilometres. This represents 25.3 per cent of the total population and 45.85 per cent of the total land area of Bihar. There are 30 notified tribes in the region with a total population of 6,044,010 (1991 Census). More than ninety-one percent of the total tribal population of Bihar lives in the Jharkhand region. Today, only 25 per cent of the total population of the Jharkhand region is of tribal origin. Furthermore, the ST population is not evenly dispersed throughout the region. The districts of Dumka, East Singhbhum, Gumla, Palamau, Ranchi, Sahibganj and West Singhbhum accounting for 79.38 per cent (1991 Census) of the total ST population of the Jharkhand region. Besides, within these districts also, the ST population is not evenly distributed. Hence, there are only small pockets of high tribal concentration. Consequently, no political movement in Jharkhand can hope for success without the active co-operation of the majority component of the population of the region, i.e. the non-tribal residents.

The total Scheduled Tribes population of the whole of Bihar is 6,616,914 and represents 7.66 per cent of the total population of Bihar (1991 Census). The tribal component of the population of Bihar is divided into thirty different tribes. They "generally belong to the Proto-Australoid stock though traces of Mongoloid

strain have also [been] found . . .”⁶⁰ The main tribal groups are the Hos, the Santhals, the Oraons, the Mundas, the Asurs, Korwas, Birjhas, Chick Baraiks, Loharas, Karmalis, the Mahalis, the Bhumij Kols, the Cheros, the Kharias, Hill Kharias, Sauria Paharias and the Pahariyas.⁶¹ “The tribals differ widely among themselves in level of socio-economic development. The number of people living entirely by hunting and food gathering is very small . . . A few tribal communities [are] still devoted to shifting cultivation” (the main ones being the Asurs, Birjhas, Hill Kharias and Sauria Paharias). “The rest of the tribes who form 95% of the tribal population are settled agriculturists . . .”⁶²

The tribes in the Jharkhand region of Bihar have a number of languages but most of them fall into either the Austric or the Dravidian families. None of them have a written script though efforts have been made to develop one.⁶³ The tribal folklore has been communicated down the generations with the help of a strong oral tradition but the written form is increasingly popular with the help of the Devnagari or the Roman scripts. The interaction between tribals and non-tribals has been quite widespread and, consequently, most tribals also speak Hindi and a variety of related dialects.

The sub-national movement in the Jharkhand region in Bihar is a good example where the ascriptive features of the tribal heritage and culture have been combined with the poor development profile of the region to forge a politically significant ethnic identity. The movement began with the desire for the betterment of the tribal people and had a significant anti non-tribal component. However, the

⁶⁰ Sachchidananda, ‘The Tribal Situation in Bihar’ in Singh, K. Suresh, ed., *Tribal Situation in India: Proceedings of a Seminar*, Shimla, 1972, p. 168.

⁶¹ Ram Chandra Prasad, *Bihar*, New Delhi, 1983, p. 34.

⁶² Sachchidananda, op. cit., p. 170.

⁶³ In October 1997, in a conversation with Ram Dayal Munda, Vice-chancellor of Ranchi University at SOAS, London, it emerged that there are numerous proposals for a new script for the various tribal languages. Munda indicated that, due to the multiplicity of languages in the Jharkhand region and numerous contending proposals for the script, it is likely that the Devanagari script will be adopted. The main reason for this is to facilitate communicability between the tribal languages as well as with the Hindi-speaking population.

demographic reality of the region (only about a quarter of total population of the region today is of tribal origin, see chapter IV and V) forced the leaders to expand the rules of exclusion. Consequently, all people settled in the region came to be included within the definition of a Jharkhandi. The poor performance of the development bureaucracy in the region added to the tribal bases of mobilisation and popular support for the movement grew. The Jharkhand movement is demanding the creation of the state of Jharkhand within the Indian Union with all the federalist autonomous trappings of the Constitution. However until now, they have only been able to secure a development council for the region called the Jharkhand Area Autonomous Council (JAAC).

It is noteworthy that at the international level, some intellectuals and leaders of the Jharkhand movement have been projecting Jharkhandi identity in terms of a tribal identity premised on a forest culture. They seek recognition of the rights of indigenous people in forums such as the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Population.⁶⁴ However, this component is strongly underplayed in the Jharkhandi identity projected within the region. In fact, since 1950 the Jharkhandi leaders have been making great efforts to emphasise that a Jharkhandi is any person who resides in the region, irrespective of his/her tribal origins. The main reason for this gap is the political and demographic reality of the region where the tribal population is a declining minority.

The socio-economic condition of most tribals is poor with low literacy rates and employment (see chapters IV and V). Most tribal agriculturists have been engaged in subsistence agriculture. Since the colonial period, therefore, there has been a tradition of seasonal economic migration of the tribals as unskilled labourers to the tea gardens of Assam and to fields and construction projects in other parts of India. In the last few decades, growing industrialisation in the Jharkhand region has led them to unskilled jobs in the industries and mines of the region.

⁶⁴ Conversation with Ram Dayal Munda in October 1997 at SOAS, London.

The Jharkhand movement is rooted in the poor socio-economic condition of the region and draws its political symbolism from the tribal culture and tradition. The Jharkhandi leaders trace their struggle back to the tribal revolts of the 19th century which were sparked off by the oppressive land revenue arrangements under the Permanent Settlement. However, in a more analytical light, the Jharkhand movement can be traced back to the last two decades of colonial rule in India when socio-cultural organisations sought to bring about changes in the life of the Jharkhand region. The nationalist project of the creation of a community at the national level was repeated at a lower level in Jharkhand (as in many other parts of India). Just as the nationalists had used cultural factors to forge a national community, the leaders of the Adivasi Mahasabha (predecessor of the Jharkhand Party) tried to create a community in the Jharkhand region by throwing open its membership to all the residents of the Jharkhand region irrespective of their Adivasi origins or otherwise. The tribal heritage of the regions and its symbolism was construed to represent a geographical region instead of the social category of tribes. Thus, an ethnic identity was construed that was politically significant at the state as well as at the national level (see chapters II, III and VII).

Furthermore, by the time of independence, the Jharkhandi community thus created had already adopted the issue of poor development profile as a supplementary ground for popular mobilisation and was demanding an autonomous state of Jharkhand. In the integrationist-euphoric post-partition period after independence, the premise of an ethnic identity (tribal identity in the case of the Jharkhand region) would have sparked off fears of separatism and invited the State's repressive wrath. The 'secular' premise of poor development under the system of exclusion during the colonial rule would have found support across the political spectrum.

Consequently, since the 1950s, the leaders of the Jharkhand movement have increasingly emphasised the declining development profile of the region as the ground for the demand of an autonomous state. Leftist input and influence into the movement in the 1960s again emphasised the primacy of economic factors and played down the cultural facets (see chapter II). The demographic profile of the region led to a political reality where the leaders could hardly afford to over-play

the tribal-cultural attributes since it would have alienated non-tribal support. The emphasis on poor development in the region was also appropriated by the State. This in turn affected the character of the articulation of the demand by Jharkhandi societal and political groups. Over the past 50 years this development premise has almost completely displaced the cultural premise of the movement. As will emerge in the following chapters, the perpetually declining development profile of the region made the argument of poor scope for development under existing arrangements a convenient base for political mobilisation.

The Jharkhand movement suffered from perpetual divisiveness due to personality clash and political ambition amongst its leaders primarily. Their inability to forge a politically significant front meant that they were unable to engage in any meaningful exchange of resources with the State. The political resources required by the State to generate legitimacy for the regime were dispersed over a large societal space. Furthermore, the political resources controlled by the Jharkhandi groups were not of primary importance to the State since a relatively small number of Members of Parliament (MP) (out of the 54 Parliamentary seats in Bihar only fourteen are in the Jharkhand region) are elected from the region. Consequently, Jharkhandi political groups came to play only a marginal role in the project of legitimisation of the Indian state. Their dependence on the political, information and economic resources controlled by the State was much larger than that of the State on them. The result therefore, was that the Jharkhandi groups were unable to secure any meaningful exchange of resources. Faced with the political impotence of the Jharkhand political groups, the electorate (societal actors) began to experiment with other political parties in the hope of securing better resource allocation by the State. The failure of the public policy machinery (see chapters IV and V) contributed to the fluidity of the situation.

Beginning with the 1962 elections, the Jharkhandi electorate began to strategically use the political resources under their control and began to extend political patronage for the Parliamentary elections to the larger national parties which had some hope of forming the national government and thereby had the capability of fulfilling their demands. At the state level, electoral support has been

extended to a regional party that can influence actual policy implementation (see chapter VI).

However, this strategic sharing of political resources yielded limited results. The electorate realised that if they are able to disrupt the State's control over the economic resources of the region (mineral wealth),⁶⁵ they might be able to pressurise the State to take cognisance of their demands. They could then utilise the political resources at their command to influence the public policy agenda. Consequently, apart from a strategic use of the political resources, the population of the Jharkhand region also extended their support to the agitational politics of the Jharkhandi groups. This involved a blockade of mineral transportation from the region in the late 1980s and 1990s which had a two-fold effect. On the one hand, it challenged the State's control over the economic resources of the region and on the other it threatened to undermine the legitimacy of the State. The mineral wealth of the region is indispensable for the State in order to avoid societal conflict and preserve legitimacy of the regime in the rest of the country. Consequently, a threat to State's control over the economic resources of the region made it more receptive to the political demands of the Jharkhandi political groups.

Such agitational politics of the Jharkhandi group was met by a degree of coercion by the State. This in turn undermined the legitimacy of the State since it reflected its inability to resolve conflict without resort to violence. A dual strategy of agitational politics and shifting political patronage thus yielded better results. The State became eager to respond to the demands of the Jharkhandi groups with policy measures. A more meaningful exchange of political and economic resources followed. The result eventually was the creation of the Jharkhand Area Autonomous Council (JAAC).

⁶⁵ The Jharkhand region accounts for 48 per cent of coal, 48 per cent of bauxite, 45 per cent of mica, 90 per cent of apatite and all the kyanite produced in India. Moreover, "almost every kind of mineral including gold and atomic minerals, is found in this region", Victor Das, 'Where Oppressed Tribals Await True Liberation' in Chaudhari, Buddhadeb, ed., *Ethnopolitics and Identity Crisis*, New Delhi, 1992, p. 402.

This process will be elucidated, explained and analysed in the chapters that follow.

Chapter II will endeavour to locate the movement in its politico-economic context and document its trajectory over the last half-century. The effort in this chapter will be to highlight the fluidity of the Jharkhand movement in an effort to understand the patterns in its growth.

The tribal regions in India came under the integrationist thrust with the expansion and growth of the colonial enterprise. The economic potential or strategic importance of some of the tribal regions necessitated active direct administration by the colonial state. However, the unsettled political situation that emerged after the tribal revolts of the 18th and 19th centuries was hardly conducive to active economic enterprise. This, along with the 'civilising mission' of the colonial state, was the reason behind the emergence of a special system of administration in the tribal areas which came to be called the Excluded Areas. The main features of the system of exclusion are analysed in Chapter III. Moreover, since the colonial discourse had significantly affected nationalist discourse, some proclaimed goals of the colonial state were adopted by the nationalist discourse. Consequently, the independent Indian state went on to adopt the integrationist theme of the colonial state, especially with regard to the tribal regions. These issues have also been addressed in Chapter III in order to demonstrate the continuity of the colonial discourse into the postcolonial period.

The Jharkhand movement has conditioned the State's policy response and has been conditioned by it. The exchange of resources between the governmental machinery and the Jharkhandi groups has affected the course of both the public policy agenda in the region as well as the nature of political demand-making by the Jharkhandi political groups. Popular support for different political parties has been quite fluid and has responded to the performance of the public policy implementation machinery. Within the framework of the Modified Resource Dependence Model, an attempt has been made to analyse the shifts in the electoral support for the various political parties in the Jharkhand region. It has been noticed that popular support has been shifting between political parties depending upon their

capacity and promise to deliver better policy response. Chapters IV and V examine the dynamics of the changing development profile of the Jharkhand region. The effort in these chapters is to isolate patterns and trends in the development profile of the Jharkhand region in relation to Bihar as a whole. The trends and patterns thus isolated have been correlated to the electoral support for Jharkhandi political groups in Chapter VI. It has been noticed that the decline in the development profile has significantly affected the electoral support for Jharkhandi as well as other political parties.

The demand of autonomy for Jharkhand has been present ever since independence. By the 1970s, developmental issues had come to occupy the centre stage of political dynamics of the Jharkhand region. Faced with the ever-declining development profile, the issue of autonomy started to gradually find greater political support by the late 1970s and early 1980s. This demand for autonomy has changed character over the years, while the nature of political articulation around the demand for administrative autonomy has also been quite fluid. Various political groups have offered different options to the electorate. The dynamics of the demand for autonomy and its political context have been examined in Chapter VII. Conclusions have been summed in Chapter VIII.

Methodological Note:

A wide variety of sources have been utilised in the collection of material for this study. Apart from secondary works, the data used in this study have been taken from government sources including censuses, plan documents, statistical diaries, reports of the reviews of development programmes and district gazetteers. As the work covers the period 1951-91, the dependence on government data is inevitable. There is no other source which provides consistent and comparable data over such a long period of time as the volume of work required in collection and collation of such detailed data is beyond the capability of any other agency.

Keeping in mind the probable unreliability of governmental data, it must be pointed out that the patterns that emerge in the study are too stark to be affected by small errors in the available data. It must also be noted that the patterns of change which emerge in the analysis of the development profile of the Jharkhand region in

this study have been confirmed by the reports of the various committees⁶⁶ appointed to report on the state of development and by the experience during the field trip.

Moreover, as the government agencies are the only ones which generate this vast amount of data, it would be politically and administratively simpler for the government to alter the definition of the relevant category to hide its inefficiency than tamper with the collected data. This exercise of altering the categories can be noticed in the constant redefinition of the category of 'workers' since the 1951 census (this issue has been dealt with in greater detail in chapters IV and V while discussing the employment profile of the Jharkhand region).

As far as the development profile of the Jharkhand region is concerned, an analysis of any unit of India smaller than a state is a difficult task because very little data is available at sub-state and district level. This is particularly true of the data related to the allocation of development funds. The centralisation of the development planning process in India has led to a situation in which financial allocations are made on the basis of development heads such as agricultural activities, irrigation and so on. This sectoral allocation has not been published for any area smaller than a state. Hence, in the case of Jharkhand, details of financial allocation are unavailable. The only exception is the financial allocation for the Tribal Sub-Plan that is earmarked exclusively for the tribal areas (all the tribal area of Bihar lies within the Jharkhand region).

It must be noted that allocation of funds or expenditure does not necessarily mean that all the funds have been used for the betterment of the target population/region. The JMM leadership alleges that only four to six percent of the allocation is actually spent on developmental activities within the Jharkhand region. A government official in an interview during the fieldtrip confirmed this point of view. He privately estimated that only four to ten percent was all that was actually spent.⁶⁷

⁶⁶ The conclusions of the relevant committees have been discussed in chapters IV and V.

⁶⁷ Interview with the Regional Development Commissioner at Ranchi in January 1996.

The main reason for this is corruption, leakage of resources⁶⁸ and transaction costs, as well as the inability of the developmental infrastructure to utilise the ever-increasing allocations. As will emerge in later chapters, a number of committees appointed to review the development policies have expressed their displeasure over this state of affairs.

Due to these constraints, the decadal patterns of change in the developmental indicators⁶⁹ in the relevant category have been analysed to gauge the effectiveness of public policy. For instance, instead of the amount of money allocated or spent on literacy projects, the actual changes in literacy rates have been taken as an indicator of the development profile. Additionally, it can be argued with a substantial degree of accuracy that it is better to analyse the effect that a certain policy has had in changing the living standards of the population rather than an analysis of financial allocation and expenditures.

The Jharkhandi leadership and populace alleged during the field research that Jharkhand has emerged as an internal colony of Bihar and that there exists a north Bihar versus south Bihar divide as far as development activities are concerned. Hence, apart from calculating the percentage of persons in every category, the percentage share that the Jharkhand region represents in Bihar as a whole has also been calculated. This has been called 'Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar'. Jharkhand total has been calculated by adding the figures for all the districts of the Jharkhand region. Therefore,

$$\text{Jharkhand Percentage} = \frac{\text{The total of the relevant category in Jharkhand}}{\text{The total of all such categories in Jharkhand}} \times 100$$

⁶⁸ A classic case of leakage of funds due to corruption is what has come to be known as 'Animal Husbandry Scam' in Bihar in which Rs. 950 crores (9500 millions) were siphoned off from the governmental revenues ostensibly for maintenance of non-existent cattle and poultry. The ex-Chief Minister of Bihar, Laloo Prasad Yadav, a number of other officials and ex-ministers are facing criminal proceedings over the matter.

⁶⁹ Development indicators analysed include the pattern of employment, agricultural produce, irrigation potential, area under principal crops, educational standards of workers, availability of agricultural finances, infant mortality, birth and death birth rates, causes of death, revenue collection, etc.

$$\text{Bihar Percentage}^{70} = \frac{\text{The total of the relevant category in Bihar}}{\text{The total all such categories in Bihar}} \times 100$$

$$\text{Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar} = \frac{\text{Jharkhand total}}{\text{Bihar total}} \times 100$$

Thus, the data used in the study reflects the actual changes in the development profile of the population whose living standards are supposed to be improving due to the developmental policy initiatives.

The Field Study:

Perhaps the most enlightening and enjoyable aspect of this research was the field study during 1995-96. After a few months of library work at Delhi, field-study in the Jharkhand region was conducted in two phases during January and May 1996. The focus of the field research, apart from collecting available data from the relevant institutions,⁷¹ was on trying to meet and interview as many relevant persons as possible. In the process, the study was fortunate to benefit from interviews with many important political actors in the region across the political spectrum as well as from the opinions of a cross-section of general population in both urban areas as well as rural areas of the Jharkhand region. The purpose of interviewing was to

⁷⁰ In order to achieve clarity, while comparing 'Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar' or 'Jharkhand Percentage' with 'Bihar Percentage', 'Bihar Percentage' has also been referred to as 'Per cent in Bihar as a whole'.

⁷¹ Documents were collected from A. N. Sinha Institute of Social Sciences, Patna; Bihar Institute of Rural Development, Ranchi; the Bihar Tribal Welfare Research Institute, Ranchi; Sri Krishna Institute of Administration Library, Ranchi and Xavier Institute of Social Service Library, Ranchi during the field trip to Bihar.

elicit the views of political actors and the general population in order to gain a first-hand insight into the dynamics of development policy and the politics of identity in the region. It has enabled the utilisation of other material in a more accurate fashion.

The interviews were not framed with the objective of using them as a representative sample in the study owing to the fact that practical constraints precluded large-scale sampling. Since random sampling was not possible,⁷² a stratified sample was taken with a combination of snowballing and purposive methods. Purposive sampling was done to ensure that all important political actors in the Jharkhand region (such as the MP from Ranchi, Jharkhandi activists, office-bearers of the JAAC, local office-bearers of the Indian National Congress (INC), the Janata Dal and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the officials of the development bureaucracy) were included in the sample. The interviews were stratified into three strata: government officials, political activists, and general population. The interviews with the respondents were conducted with the help of an open-ended interview schedule⁷³ and the responses were recorded with the help of a tape-recorder which was later transcribed for use in the study.

In Patna, the purpose of the visit was to try and secure some statistical data. Hence, a senior civil servant was approached directly in the Directorate of Statistics and Evaluation, who was interviewed. He also suggested two of his colleagues in the Planning Department who agreed to be interviewed. A Director in the Planning Department gave part of his interview off the record during which he provided invaluable insights into the process of statistics tabulation in Bihar and gave reasons for the unavailability of comparable data over the years. He explained that complete data at the district level if published, would seriously threaten the stability and legitimacy of government of Bihar, as it would lay bare the enormous degree of inefficiency in the developmental administration in the state.

⁷² As time and resources available made it impossible to interview 10 per cent (the minimum sampling required for a true random sample) of the population of the region.

⁷³ The interview schedule has been included as Annex 2.

In the Jharkhand region, the first place of attention was Ranchi where the Regional Development Commissioner (officer in charge of all development activity in the Jharkhand region and a long-serving career bureaucrat) was approached. After being interviewed, he kindly suggested three other officers with experience of development administration in the Jharkhand region. The Secretary to the Jharkhand Area Autonomous Council (JAAC), another senior officer with years of development administration in the region, was also approached and interviewed.

With regard to the political actors in the Jharkhand region, the local offices of the various political parties were approached and efforts were made to interview the senior-most office-bearer. At the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha Central Office, Ranchi only two office-bearers could be interviewed. They were members of the Working Committee of the JMM and one of them was also a member of the Executive Committee. At the INC office, the District Head of the INC was interviewed and two more members of the District Congress Committee were interviewed. At the Janata Dal Office, only interviews with the JD candidates for the Assembly and Parliamentary elections could be managed. The BJP MP from Ranchi was also interviewed in his office. Other members of the BJP refused to be interviewed as they asserted that their MP had said everything that they may have to say. Efforts were also made to interview the JMM MPs from the region. Shibu Soren remained elusive until the end while Suraj Mandal flatly refused to be interviewed by a "PhD scholar or researcher".

As far as the Jharkhand region was concerned, 37 interviews with the general population were collected in urban areas such as Ranchi, Chaibasa, Hazaribagh, Jamshedpur and Dumka. While visiting these places, the first person available was approached who mostly agreed to be interviewed. After the interview, he was requested to recommend the most politically active person of the locality in an attempt to locate the local level political actors. In this way 11 local level political actors were interviewed.

After sampling in the urban areas, the rural interior was criss-crossed on a scooter in an attempt to reach the most far-flung places in the Jharkhand region. In every hamlet that passed, the exercise of approaching the first person available was

repeated in order to interview the general population as well as the local leaders. Apart from West Singhbhum and extreme south and north of the Jharkhand region, most places were covered in the sampling exercise. In the process, 42 members of the general population and 7 local village level political activists were interviewed in the rural areas.

While crossing block-headquarters, efforts were also made to locate the local level development actors. This effort did not always bear fruit, as very often these persons were unavailable for days at a time. However, three Block Development Officers and four Heads of local Panchayats were interviewed.

The sampling in the region was skewed in favour of the male population as the women were rarely willing to be interviewed. Only seven women in the urban areas and six women in the rural areas could be interviewed. Unfortunately, no women political workers were available for interview.

The sample thus collected cannot claim to be representative of the population but it served the purpose of providing valuable first-hand insight into the operation of the process of development as well as the dynamics of the politics of identity.

Chapter II

Changing Dimensions of the Jharkhand Movement

Socio-political movements such as the Jharkhand movement are dynamic in nature and undergo a series of changes over the years. These changes are brought about by the compulsions arising from the nature of the movement itself as well as by the efforts of the other political parties and the State to undermine, co-opt and support the movement, depending on the political contingencies. In this chapter, the changing dynamics of the Jharkhand movement have been delineated to locate the movement in its political context.

I

The Jharkhand region, due to its dense forests, inaccessible terrain and wild animals “appear never to have been completely subdued”¹ until the colonial period. Accounts of the Jharkhand region do not exist until the time of Hiuen Tsang who visited India around 645 AD. Hiuen Tsang talks of the kingdom of Kie-chu-u-khi-lo which seems to refer to the Jharkhand region. In the records of his travel, he mentions that the capital of this kingdom was about 117 miles from to the north-west of Tamarlipti.² The Mauryan Kingdom seems to have established its supremacy over the region but apparently, had never been able to completely subdue the region. Similarly, “it is debatable whether Chota Nagpur acknowledged the sovereignty of the Kushanas or the Guptas or it remained independent throughout Though the finds of gold coins of the Kushanas may not establish their lordship over it, it may be inferred that the region might have come under the pale of the Kushanas”.³ From mentions in inscriptions of the Gupta age, it can also be deduced

¹ *Bihar District Gazetteers: Ranchi*, Patna, 1970, p. 42.

² *Bihar District Gazetteers: Santhal Parganas*, Patna, n. d., p. 48.

³ *Bihar District Gazetteers: Ranchi*, op. cit., p. 41.

that "the Chota Nagpur region might have submitted to the might of the Guptas".⁴ After the Guptas once again, there are very few records of the region until the medieval period.

During the medieval period, the great kingdoms of north India had not been able to establish their sway over the Jharkhand region. This inaccessible tract "remained independent throughout the Turko-Afghan rule (i.e., 1206-1526 A. D.) The fortress of Rohtas was the farthest limit of actual penetration . . ." ⁵ In 1585, the Raja of *Kokrah* (as Chota Nagpur was known to the Mughals) was reduced to the nominal suzerainty of Akbar by an expedition under Sahbaz Khan and *Ain-i-Akbari* lists Kokrah as a part of the *subah* of Bihar. However, Kokrah "it seems regained independence during the disturbance that followed the death of Akbar in 1605 A. D." ⁶ There were repeated attempts by the Mughal Empire to re-establish its token suzerainty but the effective penetration was extremely limited. The "power of the Mughals was strictly limited in the hilly tracts of Chota Nagpur where their orders could not always be enforced".⁷

In pre-colonial India therefore, the tribal groups of south Bihar had been leading a life of relative seclusion with limited contacts with the rest of the world. They had developed a certain level of competence in crafts such as weaving and pottery, metallurgy and a certain level of agriculture. They were organised on the lines of *jati* or tribes; each tribe maintained its own socio-religious and cultural life, economic activity and identity, although a close parallel existed between the tribal and non-tribal communities.

In the pre-colonial period, there had existed powerful tribal kingdoms in which the majority of tribal population

⁴ *ibid.*

⁵ *Bihar District Gazetteers: Ranchi*, op. cit., p. 42.

⁶ *Bihar District Gazetteers: Singhbhum*, Patna, 1958, p. 72.

⁷ *Bihar District Gazetteers: Ranchi*, op. cit., p. 44.

lived comfortable lives, at least until the colonial period, having control over large areas of land, having armies, an aristocracy, tax collection, and judicial system of one sort or another, and often enjoyed lucrative trading relations with merchants (such as the Banjaras) and Hindu cultivators in the plains.⁸

These communities depended on an oral tradition and did not leave behind written records for the historians to analyse and document their glory. The colonial administration and its historians, with their dependence on written records and material remains as testaments to the bygone era of glory, often had a tendency to regard such communities as 'backward' and at a lower level of historical evolution. The colonial sense of racial and cultural superiority and hierarchy added to the stereotyping of the tribal communities and regions as primitive.⁹

Chota Nagpur region had come under British rule in 1765 as a part of the grant of Diwani Rights over Bihar, Bengal and Orissa after the Battle of Buxar, 1764. After a series of military expeditions and with immense difficulty, tribal chiefs were compelled to pay fixed revenue to the East India Company. These tribal chiefs were by and large, treated as zamindars made tributary by conquest.¹⁰ In 1789 it was pointed out that the Permanent Settlement should not be extended to the Chota Nagpur area because revenue collections from this area were "more in the nature of a tribute than a revenue proportioned to the produce of the soil".¹¹ Nonetheless, in the late 18th century, the Permanent Settlement was gradually introduced in the region. This development was perhaps, the single most important factor that integrated it into the British Indian Empire and the colonial mode of production. This integration was incomplete and was the main contributory factor which led to the pauperisation of the population.¹²

⁸ Crispin Bates, "Lost Innocents and the Loss of Innocence": Interpreting Adivasi Movements in South Asia' in Barnes, R. H., Gray, Andrew and Kingsbury, Benedict, eds., *Indigenous Peoples of Asia*, Michigan, 1996, p. 109.

⁹ *ibid.*, pp. 109-10.

¹⁰ J. C. Jha, 'History of Land Revenue in Chota Nagpur (c. 1770-1830 AD)' in Sharma, R. S., ed., *Land Revenue in India: Historical Studies*, Delhi, 1971, p. 72.

¹¹ L. S. S. O'Malley, *District Gazetteer: Manbhum*, Calcutta, 1911, quoted in *ibid.* p. 72.

¹² Jha, *op. cit.*

The first consequence of the introduction of a revenue settlement in the Chota Nagpur region was an increase in indebtedness and usury. The tribal peasants, who had been declared full proprietors of land, had the option to let their lands be auctioned off to recover overdue revenue or to borrow to pay the increasing revenue demand. The indebtedness of the tribal landowners worsened as their land was auctioned off to recover revenue arrears or outstanding debt. Thus the Permanent Settlement "tried to suddenly substitute contract for custom".¹³ The sum result of this policy was that

indebtedness and the operation of usurious capital became one of the pivots around which the land market revolved, with the result that land started passing into the hands of moneylenders. With regard to *adivasi* peasantry, there was no room in the new provisions for the customary land rights of the original settlers and the village office-holders. These omissions in the new system gave the zamindars increased power to evict peasants from their lands. Customary law was abruptly replaced by contract law.¹⁴

As the colonial administration entrenched itself, the increasing revenue demands began to affect all the rungs in the revenue collection ladder and gradually, the East India Company came to administer the region directly. With the establishment of judicial, military and administrative structures, the alienation of peasants' land and their exploitation continued, albeit under the garb of legality.¹⁵ The "introduction of an alien legal and tax system and administrative measures that aimed at attaining an effective system of economic exploitation"¹⁶ accelerated the process of land alienation and exploitation of the peasantry.

¹³ *ibid.*

¹⁴ Susana B. C. Devalle, *Discourses of Ethnicity: Culture and Protest in Jharkhand*, New Delhi, 1992, pp. 66-7.

¹⁵ For a full discussion of the process by which tribal population was incorporated into the colonial mode of production, see Jha, J. C., 'History of Land Revenue in Chota Nagpur (c. 1770-1830 AD)' in Sharma, R. S., ed., *Land Revenue in India*, Delhi, 1971, pp. 71-9; Kumar, Purushottam, *History and Administration of Tribal Chota Nagpur (Jharkhand)*, Delhi, 1994 and Sengupta, Nirmal, 'Background of Jharkhand Question' in Sengupta, Nirmal, ed., *Fourth World Dynamics: Jharkhand*, New Delhi, 1982, pp. 3-39.

¹⁶ Devalle, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

The pressures generated by a modern and little understood administrative system and new land relations¹⁷ did not go unprotested. The stirrings in tribal society took the form of revolts and disturbances in the 19th and 20th centuries. The Great Kol Insurrection 1831-32, the Santhal Rebellion 1855, and the Birsa Munda revolt 1895-1900 are some of the most important. These uprisings and revolts led by the traditional elite were always agrarian in origin but often acquired social and religious overtones. The revolts often began with attacks on government property such as police stations and public offices and involved attacks on European population. However, the brunt of the tribal revolts against the introduction of the colonial system in the region was borne by the exploiter classes of landlords and moneylenders who were seen as local representatives of the exploitative system. "No matter which one of their three main oppressors – *sarkar*, *sahukar* or *zamindar* [government, moneylender or landlord] – was the first to bear the initial brunt of a jacquerie in any particular instance, the peasants often showed a remarkable propensity to extend their operations widely enough to include among their targets the local representatives of one or both of the other groups too".¹⁸ The British administrative machinery always came down heavily on these revolts and insurrections and crushed them through sheer military superiority.¹⁹

The tribal unrest led to a series of legal enactments such as the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act (Act II BC, 1869), Chota Nagpur Landlords and Tenants Act, 1879 (Rent Law) and Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act 1908 (Bengal Act VI of 1908). However, by 1908 the process of land alienation was all but complete. The restriction on the transfer of lands from tribals to non-tribals in the Act of 1908

¹⁷ Similar situations existed in the other tribal areas as well as in large parts of rural India. However, the case of the tribal people was worse since they were quite different from the rest of the rural population in terms of the nature of their interaction with the rest of the people.

¹⁸ Ranjit Guha, *Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India*, Oxford, 1983, p. 26.

¹⁹ L. P. Vidyarthi and K. N. Sahay, *Dynamics of Tribal Leadership in Bihar 1967-71*, Allahabad, 1976, pp. 49-50. Also see Ranjit Guha, *Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India*, Oxford, 1983.

altered the situation only to the extent that some tribal farmers also became part-time moneylenders.²⁰

The new system of revenue, judicial, and police administration went on to transform these tribal areas. "The pervasive effect of a money economy, the creation of a market in land, the emergence of a moneylending landed sector and the development of chronic peasant indebtedness, were instrumental in producing fundamental transformations in agrarian economic relationships"²¹ in the region. A new class of revenue intermediaries was established who, along with the Christian missionaries, went further to integrate the tribal areas into a modern system of administration. These social, economic and political structures that emerged according to the logic of British policy in the tribal areas went on to create conditions that suited the colonial state as well as the intermediaries but were against the interests of the tribal people of south Bihar.²²

The integration of the tribal region into the colonial mode of production resulted in a restructuring that simultaneously undermined as well as preserved but distorted the pre-colonial system. The tribal regions became a subordinate part of the colonial state and the economy. Part of the dynamics was geared towards ensuring availability of a labour force at a subsistence level. The Chota Nagpur region (especially Hazaribagh and Ranchi) emerged as the best places for recruiting labour for the various economic enterprises in colonial India and abroad. One of the fundamental effects of the alienation of land rights of the *adivasi* peasants and their pauperisation was out-migration to the tea gardens of Assam and the fast developing coalfields of Bengal and Bihar and iron-ore mines elsewhere in the Chota Nagpur region.²³

²⁰ Devalle, op. cit.

²¹ *ibid.*, p. 70.

²² Niharranjan Ray, 'Introductory Address' in K. Suresh Singh, ed., *Tribal Situation in India: Proceedings of a Seminar*, Shimla, 1972, pp. 17-9.

²³ For instance, the migratory indentured labourers for Mauritius and Fiji were recruited from this region in large numbers, see Bates, Crispin and Carter, Marina, 'Tribal Migration in India and

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Apart from the economic impact, the new economic and legal system also had socio-cultural repercussions. The large number of out-migrations from the region contributed to changes in the social profile. For instance, birth rates fell which in turn helped to change the proportion of population that was of tribal origin.²⁴ Besides, the military operations launched to contain tribal protest movements generated a 'culture of repression'. Coercion, physical and institutional, was utilised with the result of "reproduction of indebtedness and extensive forced labour. It also used native institutions and forms of social organization, putting them at the service of the colonial system".²⁵

An important feature of this process of integration of Jharkhand as a subordinate partner in the colonial enterprise was the creation of stereotypes of the tribes. The tribal people were construed as a mass of socially undifferentiated population that could be utilised to extract labour and revenue. This process was supposed to 'civilise' them. Also important was the reinforcement of the *diku* versus *adivasi* (outsiders versus tribal) contradiction. The series of legal measures already mentioned had this contradiction built into them. In a way, this official reinforcement of the perceived relationship between the *adivasi* peasants and the *diku* landlords and moneylenders contributed to identity formation in the Jharkhand region.

Another important factor in the socio-cultural dynamics of the region was the role of the Christian missionaries. The German Evangelicals, Lutherans, Anglicans and Roman Catholics had established missions in this region which are important, even today. As a part of the larger colonial discourse (see chapter III), the Christian missions attempted to carry the 'civilising' influence of the word of God and western rationalist thought to these areas. These missions had an important impact because they introduced western education as well as western values to the

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Beyond' in Prakash, Gyan, ed., *The world of the Rural Labourer in Colonial India*, Delhi, 1992, pp. 205-45.

²⁴ *ibid.*

population of the Jharkhand region. The result was what has been termed the 'deculturation' of the tribes.²⁶ Ironically, as will emerge more clearly in chapter III, some of these missionaries also subscribed to the *adivasi* versus *diku* dichotomy.

Moreover, the Christian missions had considerable prestige amongst the people due to their social work. Consequently, they were able to persuade the population of the Jharkhand region to take recourse to legal means for the redressal of their grievances. This contributed to the legitimacy of the colonial rule by containing violent revolt in the region. The influence of the Christian missionaries had another impact. The people who had come in contact with the missionaries gained some level of western education and began to understand the dynamics of the colonial state better. Consequently, there started efforts to generate greater social consciousness resulting in efforts to organise the peasantry against exploitative economic relations.²⁷ This also contributed to the emergence of the Jharkhand movement. The nationalist thought in India had emerged due to the exposure of the Indian intelligentsia to western education (see chapter III). A comparable pattern can be discerned in Jharkhand as well.

Another strand in the complex set of factors that encouraged and facilitated the growth of the Jharkhand movement was more economic than cultural. As has been discussed, the integration of the Chota Nagpur region into the colonial economic system was such that it was incorporated as a subordinate partner. The region supplied a large workforce for colonial economic enterprises but the exploitative conditions in agriculture over time went from bad to worse. More and more tribal people were finding it difficult to earn their living from agriculture due to increased pressure on land resulting from the alienation of agricultural land from tribal agriculturists to non-agriculturists such as moneylenders. The surplus labour

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²⁵ *ibid.*

²⁶ Vidyarthi and Sahay, *op. cit.*, pp. 73-4.

²⁷ Devalle, *op. cit.*, pp. 73-4.

thus generated began to look for other means of employment.²⁸ This is where further exploitation of the region by industrial activity links up with the already bad conditions of livelihood.

The large mineral deposits in the region inevitably led to large-scale mining of coal, iron-ore, bauxite, limestone, etc.²⁹ All these minerals were important in the expansion of industry which had started in the second half of the nineteenth century. The working class created in the whole country by this expansion of industry also extended to the Jharkhand region that was by now established as the labour reserve of India. However, there was one important difference between many other regions in India and the Jharkhand region. Owing to the lower levels of skills of the tribal population, most people who found jobs in the newly emerging economic enterprise, especially in the mining sector,

gained entry into the working class as lowly paid unskilled workers, on a hire and fire basis. Every technologically sophisticated industry has a core of highly skilled workers. In the case of Jharkhand this core has mostly been drawn from other regions of the country. The local people or the indigenous inhabitants, both tribal and non-tribal, have been relegated to a very special section of the proletariat: *khalasis*, peons, scavengers, etc.³⁰

This resulted in serious socio-cultural implications. The dichotomy of *diku* versus *adivasi* was further reinforced. With the establishment of larger industries in the region beginning with the Tata Iron and Steel plant in the early part of this century, increasing numbers of skilled and managerial workers started to migrate to the region. The *diku* (outsider), who had until now been seen as the exploiter in the agrarian sector, was now seen as someone who cornered the more lucrative jobs in

²⁸ Victor Das, 'Where Oppressed Tribals Await true Liberation' in Chaudhari, Buddhadeb, ed., *Ethnopolitics and Identity Crisis*, New Delhi, 1992, p. 403.

²⁹ The first coal mine was started in the region in 1775 which was followed by a number of collieries such as Messers Bengal Coal Company which was established in 1843. The establishment of Tata Iron and Steel Company Limited in Jamshedpur in 1907 however, marked the beginning of large-scale industrial activity, *ibid.*, p. 403.

³⁰ Javeed Alam, 'The Category of "Non-historic Nations" and Tribal Identity in Jharkhand' in Chatterji, P. C., ed., *Self-images, Identity and Nationality*, Shimla, 1990, p. 158.

the industrial sector as well, with only the lower level jobs being left for local inhabitants.³¹ This factor further reinforced the growth of a Jharkhandi identity and movement.

It may be remarked that the popular perception towards outsiders who are able to secure better jobs in the industrial sector has not changed much till date. In the interviews with the general population of the region during fieldwork in 1995-96, it emerged that they still complain about persons from outside the region being able to secure better jobs. The only difference is that now the Jharkhandi population has also been able to acquire skills and when an outsider gets a job instead of a local inhabitant, they smell a conspiracy against them by the government of Bihar.³²

II

After independence, despite the adoption of a welfare State in India, the problems of the tribal population continued. The old problems of agrarian relations combined with those thrown up by a rapidly industrialising economy. The non-fulfilment of the aspirations of people in general and the tribal population in particular generated a sense of disillusionment which went on to sharpen differences and sense of identity in the Jharkhand region. The post-independence State in India could not offer a radically different framework for the treatment of the tribal population owing to its adoption of significant sections of the colonial tribal discourse and its emphasis on the same rationalist-bureaucratic model of administration and industry-led development (see chapter III for a full discussion of the colonial and nationalist discourses).

Moreover, a new type of political elite emerged in the Jharkhand region under a number of influences. The western-educated elites along with some concerned Britons who had settled in the region were the first to establish socio-

³¹ *ibid.* p. 159.

³² Interview conducted with a casual factory worker (educated till matric level) in the industrial suburbs of Ranchi and a foundry worker (holder of a diploma from a polytechnic institute) in Chaibasa in January 1996.

cultural organisations which found instant support among the masses. The leaders thrown up by organisations such as the Lutheran Students Association and the Dacca Society can be called the first Jharkhandi leaders. These leaders were largely, the tribal youths who had been exposed to western education and values by the Christian missionaries.³³ They did not start with a demand for administrative autonomy but with the aim of socio-cultural reform, not unlike the nationalist elite elsewhere in the country about a century earlier. The Jharkhandi community was created on the premise of the uniqueness of tribal culture and heritage.

Owing to the cultural premises of the Jharkhandi identity, the Indian state found (and still finds) it difficult to reconcile the demands of the Jharkhandi leadership with the nationalistic-rationalist-integrationist model of administration adopted in 1947. The Jharkhandi elite rejects the political space offered by the State in the form of a dichotomy between public and private, whereby the private is protected by way of constitutional provisions for the protection of the tribal population. They see the rules of political conflict resolution framed by the State as condescending benevolence.³⁴ They are conscious of tribal rights and have demonstrated a capability of making shrewd and calculated moves to gain their acceptance. In places where such an elite is weak, national political parties exploit the plank of a Jharkhandi identity to gain popular support.³⁵ Led by the vocal, educated and richer sections of the tribal population, the increased political activity in the tribal areas of south Bihar with an aim of securing better avenues for the tribal population has politicised all questions related to tribal development. Politics has emerged as the principal avenue through which the tribal people look forward for solutions to the numerous problems they have been facing.

The Indian state is faced with an impossible situation where it cannot ignore the Jharkhand movement due to the threat to its legitimacy from the political unrest

³³ Sachchidananda, 'The Tribal Situation in Bihar' in Singh, K. S., ed., *Tribal Situation in India: Proceedings of a Seminar*, Shimla, 1972, p. 175.

³⁴ Jaipal Singh's speech in the Constituent Assembly on 24 August 1947, see chapter III.

³⁵ Ray, op. cit., pp. 21-2.

born out of popular support for the movement. Besides, it cannot accede to the demands of the Jharkhandi political groups, since such demands go against the grain of its rationalist-bureaucratic model of administration and development.³⁶ It has therefore, tried a number of avenues to resolve the politico-economic conflict. It has tried open physical coercion to suppress the more manifest demonstrations as well as to marginalise the Jharkhandi political opinion with its emphasis on poverty alleviation and development. The efforts by the State to co-opt the Jharkhandi leaders have been of limited use, as has the effort to arrive at a compromise formula. All such efforts by the State and dominant political opinion in India have however, met with little or no success.

The Jharkhandi leaders have adopted the State's emphasis on poverty alleviation and development as even more reason for administrative autonomy. The shift in the Jharkhand movement in the 1950s from a movement that commanded only a tribal following to one that sought to bring all the residents in the region under its scope, further strengthened its political standing and helped it to create its own political idiom such as its slogan of *Jai Jharkhandi, Jai Bharat* [Glory to Jharkhand, Glory to India]³⁷. This slogan represents the movement's ability to combine the nationalist and ethnic idiom, something that has not successfully been tried elsewhere. The Jharkhand movement has successfully translated the academic issue of the unproblematic co-existence of multiple political identities into a successful political idiom.

The dynamics of this interplay between the process of autonomous community formation and integrationist efforts by the Indian state must be examined before undertaking an analysis of the role that development issues have played in sharpening the identity.

³⁶ The Indian state is unable to accede to the demands of cultural identities for political recognition because it seeks 'objective' and 'secular' criteria for the any political reorganisation (although some cultural identities in the North-east have succeeded in gaining political recognition with the creation of states such as Tripura, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland).

³⁷ *Manifesto of the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha for the Lok Sabha Election 1996*, Ranchi, 1996, p. 1.

III

Emergence and Growth of the Jharkhand Movement

There have been signs of vigorous political activity in the Jharkhand region since the beginning of the nineteenth century,³⁸ manifesting itself in the spontaneous peasant uprisings and revolts against unjust agrarian relations led by members of the traditional elite.³⁹ However, the beginning of a political movement in the modern sense of the term can only be traced back to the beginning of the 20th century. The Jharkhand movement and the related political developments began with the efforts of a student of St. Columbus College, Chaibasa – an institution that remains an important centre of tribal political activity in the region. J. Bartholmen⁴⁰ and some Anglican missionaries established the Dacca Students Union in 1910 to deal with the problems faced by poor tribal students. Early activity of this organisation was limited and ambiguous. It was a religious society, a cultural organisation, a discussion forum and students' union all rolled into one. The Dacca Students Union organised religious discourses, staged plays, and represented the interests of the students as well as organised discussions and seminars. After the success of a play staged to raise funds at Ranchi in 1912, a meeting of all Anglican and Lutheran students was called. In this meeting some degree of consensus was arrived at about the aims of the organisation. Consequently, the area of its operation was increased. A branch was established at Ranchi under the supervision of Peter Heward. Under the leadership of Bartholmen and Heward, the Union was successful in mobilising

³⁸ For instance, the Chota Nagpur Uprisings of 1801 and 1817, *Barasat Birodha* of 1831, Kol insurrection (1831-32), Santhal *hul* (1855-57) and Munda *ulgulan* (1895-1902), Guha, op. cit., pp. 2, 10.

³⁹ DN and GK, 'Some Agrarian Questions in the Jharkhand Movement' in *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. XXIV no. 27, 8 July 1989, p. 1505.

⁴⁰ It has not been possible to establish beyond doubt the origin of this person. I understand that most probably, he was a tribal student of the Anglican Missionaries at Chaibasa. The other important person who was active in the establishment of the Dacca Students' Union, Peter Heward, seems to have been one of the many sympathetic Britons settled in the region, possibly a missionary.

tribal students to demand better educational facilities, economic avenues, job opportunities, etc.⁴¹

When the question of constitutional reforms and protection and promotion of regional interests came up in 1918, the educated Christian tribal population with active help and encouragement from the Anglican Bishop of Ranchi, reorganised the Union and renamed it the Chota Nagpur Improvement Society. This new body championed the cause of adequate protection of the tribal population and their cultural identity and emphasised the pressing need to create avenues for rapid politico-economic advance of the region.⁴² In 1928, a deputation of this organisation met the Simon Commission and put forward what was perhaps, the first demand for the creation of a separate province in the Jharkhand area⁴³ (see chapter III).

In 1928, the Chota Nagpur Improvement Society was renamed Chota Nagpur Unnati Samaj. The membership of this organisation was limited to the Christian and non-Christian tribal population and no non-tribal could become a member. The aims of the Samaj were to secure reservation for the tribal population in government service and legislatures and employment for the educated tribal people, work towards removal of backwardness in Chota Nagpur and make efforts towards finding avenues for the social, economic and political advancement of the Chota Nagpur area.⁴⁴

Though the Chota Nagpur Improvement Society and the Chota Nagpur Unnati Samaj were not very successful in terms of mobilising the masses towards large-scale political activity, they represent the earliest political organisations in the Jharkhand region. The leadership of these organisations was unique in the sense that it was composed of a band of educated youth inspired by ideas which were radical

⁴¹ Vidyarthi and Sahay, op. cit., p. 86-7.

⁴² Upjit Singh Rekhi, *Jharkhand Movement in Bihar*, New Delhi, 1988, p. 135.

⁴³ 'Memorandum submitted by the Chota Nagpur Improvement Society' in *Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, vol. XVI: Selections from the Memoranda and Oral Evidence by Non-Officials*, Part 1, London, 1930.

⁴⁴ Vidyarthi and Sahay, op. cit., p. 87.

for their time such as the creation of a new state. The period of the activity of these organisations, along with their radical and progressive ideas, also saw the emergence of social reform amongst the tribal population on the lines of the Indian renaissance. It harked back to the bygone golden age of the tribes and stressed the need to restore that past although the need for eradication of undesirable features was also recognised. Educated tribal leaders such as Rev. Joel Lakra, Anand Mashi Topno, Theble Oraon, Paul Dayal and Bandi Oraon led the Samaj through its agenda of social reform.⁴⁵

The leaders of the Samaj were dissatisfied with the urban and middle-class bias of their organisation and were eager to make it a broad based and unified platform for the uplift and advance of the tribal society.⁴⁶ They realised that unless the land problem was made a central plank of their activities, the peasantry could not be mobilised. Some of them, like Theble Oraon and Paul Dayal, disassociated themselves from the Samaj and formed the Kisan Sabha in 1931⁴⁷. The Kisan Sabha and the Chota Nagpur Unnati Samaj differed on the means to be adopted for the amelioration of the problems faced by the tribal population. The Kisan Sabha believed in radical action by mobilising the peasantry to force the government to act whereas the Chota Nagpur Unnati Samaj sought deliverance through petitions and memoranda.⁴⁸ The difference in their approach was akin to that between the Moderate and Extremist groups in the Indian National Congress Party (INC) in the early 20th century. Except for this major difference, the leadership of the two organisations was similar, again like the INC leadership. Most of them were well-educated middle-class people who were acquainted with the areas outside the tribal belt and were of a rational bent of mind. They had little patience with the superstitions of the tribal population and regarded them as signs of backwardness.⁴⁹

⁴⁵ *ibid.*

⁴⁶ Rekhi, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

⁴⁷ Nirmal Sengupta, 'Background of the Jharkhand Question' in Sengupta, Nirmal, ed., *Fourth World Dynamics*, New Delhi, 1982, p. 30.

⁴⁸ Rekhi, *op. cit.*

⁴⁹ Shashishekhar Jha, *Political Elite in Bihar*, Bombay, 1972, pp. 108-9.

One important feature that severely restricted the effectiveness of the two organisations was the fact that till the 1930s, both of them in practice were restricted to the Lutheran and Anglican Christians. The non-Christian tribal elements were not involved in their activities. In addition to these, Baniface Lakra and Ignès Beck created the Chota Nagpur Catholic Sabha with the encouragement and support of the Archbishop of Chota Nagpur. The proclaimed aim of this organisation was the promotion of socio-religious and economic advance but it also took an active interest in the politics of the area. Ignès Beck and Baniface Lakra both contested the 1937 elections and were elected. The Kisan Sabha had also participated in the elections but was routed which resulted in its demise. Other tribal leaders like the candidates of the Chota Nagpur Unnati Samaj who had also contested the elections lost to the Catholic candidates, due to better organisation and popularity of the Catholic missions. Thus, the influence of the Christian missionaries on the early part of movement was sizeable.⁵⁰

The legislative experience gained by Beck during his term in the Legislative Assembly convinced him that pan Indian parties like the INC would not be able to serve the interests of the tribal people. It was up to the tribal people themselves to look after their own interests. He also realised that organisations with a narrow support base like the Unnati Samaj and the Catholic Sabha would not be able to secure their interests. He therefore aspired to create a pan-denominational organisation in the Jharkhand region to effectively promote and protect the interests of the tribes and bring about social, economic and political advancement.⁵¹ Besides, the sweeping of the 1937 elections by the INC convinced the tribal leaders of the need for denominational unity and they decided to float a joint body to ensure it. Furthermore, the grant of political autonomy to the provinces and creation of the

⁵⁰ *ibid.*, p. 109.

⁵¹ Vidyarthi and Sahay, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

province of Orissa under the Government of India Act 1935 strengthened their resolve to struggle for a separate province of Jharkhand.⁵²

However, creation of a pan-denominational body was a difficult task. Beck began by trying to convince the Chota Nagpur Catholic Sabha after persuading the Archbishop of Ranchi about the necessity of such an organisation. Then he tried to contact the leaders of other parallel organisations. After much debate they agreed to form a temporary alliance to contest the ensuing Ranchi Municipality elections. The preparations for this election were good and success in it prompted the leaders to maintain their alliances. This was the origin of the Adivasi Mahasabha created in 1938 which aspired to create a pan-tribal solidarity to solve the tribal problems. A major plank of this organisation was to fight the *diku raj*⁵³ in order to improve the socio-economic and political conditions of the tribal people, with the final goal being the creation of a separate province of Jharkhand.⁵⁴

At this time Jaipal Singh⁵⁵ entered the arena of tribal politics. He was invited to chair the meeting of the Adivasi Mahasabha in March-April 1939. Later he joined the Adivasi Mahasabha and became its President.⁵⁶

The Adivasi Mahasabha represented a substantial advance in the tribal politics of the Jharkhand region. It commanded a wider social support base and claimed to represent pan-tribal interests. This organisation was also supported by the

⁵² K. Suresh Singh, 'From Ethnicity to Regionalism: A Case Study of Tribal Politics and Movement in Chota Nagpur 1900-1975' in Mulick, S. C., ed., *Dissent, Protest and Reform in Indian Civilisation*, Shimla, 1977, p. 320.

⁵³ *Diku raj* means rule by outsiders. The linkages between the tribal population and exploiters from outside, first in the guise of moneylenders who became landlords and later as skilled workforce in the industrial enterprises has been discussed earlier.

⁵⁴ Vidyarthi and Sahay, op. cit., p. 158.

⁵⁵ Jaipal Singh was born at Takara, a village near Ranchi, in a *pahan* (priest) family of the Munda tribe. He was adopted and converted by an Anglican missionary. He was educated at Oxford where he excelled in sports and obtained a 'Full Blue' in Hockey before going on to Captain the Indian Hockey Team in the Amsterdam Olympics. His achievements in foreign lands convinced the tribals of their own abilities and he soon came to acquire a legendary stature. He came to be looked upon as an incarnation of Birsa Bhagwan (leader of the tribal revolt in the 19th century, Birsa Munda) and was later accepted as *Marang Gomke* (Supreme Leader) by the tribal people.

⁵⁶ Sachchidananda, op. cit., p. 175.

Muslim League which in the 1940s, was hoping to secure a corridor to connect East and West Pakistan passing via the tribal areas of south Bihar. Jaipal Singh and the Adivasi Mahasabha however, did not become a part of the mainstream nationalist politics. They supported the British war effort in the World War II and Jaipal Singh contributed in the recruitment of soldiers for the war from the tribal area with the hope that it would induce the British to look at their demand in a sympathetic manner.⁵⁷

Gradually, led by highly educated and articulate political workers, the Mahasabha became a pan-Chota Nagpur movement holding sway in both rural and urban areas. It now demanded a complete separation from Bihar and the creation of a separate state. At times it also became militant in pursuing its goals but lost popular appeal. It was defeated in the election to the Constituent Assembly in 1946 in which INC performed well. It also lost the support of the Muslim League.⁵⁸ However, the Mahasabha did enjoy the support of the Forward Bloc and the Congress Socialist Party.⁵⁹ In the INC dominated polity of the late 1940s, the Mahasabha was more eager to acquire the support of the INC and demanded representation in the Bihar Pradesh Congress Committee and the Congress Working Committee. This demand did not find favour with the INC. Further, the Mahasabha demanded reservation of seats for the *adivasis* in educational institutions and employment. This demand was extended to limiting all jobs in the industrial enterprises in the Jharkhand region exclusively for Chota Nagpuris.⁶⁰ The grievance of *dikus* cornering all the plush jobs had by now become a political issue.

However, Jaipal Singh lost the 1946 election for the state legislature and subsequently, he raised a militant slogan: "We shall take Jharkhand, Jharkhand is

⁵⁷ Rekhi, op. cit., p. 143.

⁵⁸ By this time, the future administrative arrangements for India had been decided and Muslim League's demand for a corridor to connect East and West Pakistan passing through the tribal areas of Bihar had been rejected.

⁵⁹ Vidyarthi and Sahay, op. cit., p. 159.

⁶⁰ K. L. Sharma, 'Jharkhand Movement in Bihar', in *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. XI nos. 1 & 2, 10 January 1976, pp. 41-2.

the land of *adivasis* and non-*adivasi* exploiters will be turned out of the region even by violence.”⁶¹

The social base of the Mahasabha also changed over the years. Until the 1950s, the membership of the Adivasi Mahasabha was restricted to the tribal (Christian and non-Christian) people of the south Bihar plateau. However, it was realised that if the support base of the movement was to be expanded and if the cause of a separate Jharkhand state was to be made a reality, non-tribal settlers in the region would have to be brought into the fold. This point of view was stressed by the organisation of a United Jharkhand Bloc by Justin Richard in 1948.⁶²

The reason behind this realisation was the side effect of colonial policy in the region. Alongside tribal out-migration as labourers, there was a sizeable in-migration by skilled workers to work the rapidly growing industries. Soon these ‘outsiders’ who had settled in the region outnumbered the tribals by almost two to one.⁶³ The political importance of the in-migration is attested to by the fact that, until the mid-1960s, the Statistical Diary published by the government of Bihar, as also the 1951 Census, had a section on the new settlers in the region classified by their respective places of origin. Besides, the formation of a non-tribal organisation at Daltonganj to represent their points of view in the Constituent Assembly necessitated the broadening of the social base of the Mahasabha.⁶⁴

It was not an easy task to accommodate the non-tribal population into the Adivasi Mahasabha because it meant the loss of a major plank of political activity and mobilisation. At the same time, without accommodating the non-tribal population, the prospect of a separate state of Jharkhand would remain a mere dream. Consequently, in its 1949-50 session at Jamshedpur, the Adivasi Mahasabha decided to rename itself the Jharkhand Party (JHP) and extend its membership to the

⁶¹ *ibid.*

⁶² Sachchidananda, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

⁶³ The demographic profile of the Jharkhand region in 1951 has been discussed in chapter IV.

⁶⁴ Rekhi, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

non-tribal population as well. It also succeeded in securing the support of the Chota Nagpur Separation League that was powerful amongst the depressed classes, especially the Muslim depressed classes and the Miners Association of Santhals.⁶⁵

The JHP became a full-fledged political party from 1950. The identity of the Adivasi Mahasabha was also preserved by retaining it as a cultural unit of the Jharkhand Party. Jaipal Singh became the President of the JHP and Ignés Beck was appointed its Secretary.⁶⁶ The creation of a new idiom by the Jharkhandi leaders was thus underway. They succeeded in retaining the essential premise of tribal heritage as the basis of their identity and simultaneously managed to extend membership to the non-tribal elements.

The history of the JHP in some ways is the history of the translation of this essentially tribal identity into a regional identity that drew its uniqueness from the region's tribal heritage. Its cultural aspects were successfully construed to represent a geographical region instead of a specific social group. All the supporters of the JHP, tribal as well as non-tribal, would soon come to see the tribal premise and symbolism as representing them all. It was able to bring together the various tribal denominations (Christian and non-Christian) within the region under a rather cohesive political platform.⁶⁷ The Jharkhand movement gradually evolved into a full-fledged regional movement commanding support from all sections of the population.

The JHP was thus successful in combining aspects of tribal culture and broad-based politics to put forward a viable political agenda. It drew upon tribal symbolism by making the cock its symbol,⁶⁸ which was able to achieve a great appeal in the tribal belt. It was a simple symbol to be used in elections and yet had a potent message for the Jharkhandi identity. Furthermore, the JHP insisted that all

⁶⁵ Sachchidananda, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

⁶⁶ Rekhi, *op. cit.*, p. 145.

⁶⁷ Vidyarthi and Sahay, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

⁶⁸ The cock was a revered tribal symbol since it was not only the favourite sacrificial animal but also signified the dawn of a new day as well as the creative God and His all pervading power.

tribal people were members of the party by birth and there was no membership fee for them.⁶⁹ All this added to a larger mobilisation of the people.

The redefinition of the *diku* and their relationship with the movement by the leaders ensured that it was strengthened by support of the powerful money-lending communities⁷⁰ as well as the *dikus*. The traditional opponents of the tribals, i.e., the *diku* moneylenders and skilled industrial workers, were now willing to support the Jharkhand Party, owing to the following broad reasons. Firstly, the JHP now underplayed its anti-*diku* stance because their political and monetary support was essential to emerge as a viable political opposition to the INC. This made it possible for the *diku* elements of Chota Nagpur to join the Party. Second, the *diku*, moneylenders and landlords on the other hand, were also keen to extend their support to the JHP because it offered them an avenue to emerge as the political elite of the region. Such a position would have enabled them to protect and promote their interests. Without any political association with the JHP, the *diku* moneylenders and landlords would have lacked any political legitimacy in the region and would be the target of opposition from the JHP that was going from strength to strength. Finally, In event of creation of a separate state of Jharkhand, this group owing to their better educational and financial station would have catapulted into the class of state level and even the national level elite. They would have been the first beneficiaries of the creation of a state in the Jharkhand region. Such a future necessarily required a gradual nurturing of their political association with the JHP.

The support of the *dikus* also had repercussions on the geographical scope of the movement. From being concentrated only in the tribal pockets of south Bihar, the movement now began demanding the creation of a new province from the areas once under the Chota Nagpur Division, i.e., parts of the provinces of West Bengal,

⁶⁹ Vidyarthi and Sahay, op. cit., p. 91.

⁷⁰ The financial position of the JHP improved with the contributions from the newly joined *diku* landlords, moneylenders and traders, (since no membership fee existed for tribal members to join the JHP). Consequently, it was able to extend its area of operation and found a sympathetic audience in other areas of the region that had been facing similar problems.

Bihar, Orissa and Madhya Pradesh.⁷¹ The Jharkhandi leaders had been talking of the entire region that was covered by the Chota Nagpur Division during the British rule as being within the geographical scope of their demand. They advanced economic, socio-political and cultural grounds for the creation of a new state. They argued that linguistically, culturally and ethnically the whole region was separate from other regions. An important basis for this demand was also that the entire region had been under a similar kind of administration during colonial rule. Consequently, there were similar problems born out of alienation of land, out-migration of the under-employed and unemployed labour, in-migration of skilled industrial labour and incomplete economic integration.

The redefinition of the geographical and societal scope of the movement resulted in a large following for the JHP. This expansion of the social base of the movement was an astute move since the Censuses of 1931 and 1951 showed that the tribal population were no longer the largest group in the region as a whole. In fact, over the years the tribal people had become a minority in the region due to economic and concurrent demographic developments that have been discussed earlier. The movement could not have lasted much longer without the inclusion of the various non-tribal groups onto the political platform.

IV

The Jharkhand Movement after Independence

During the early 1950s, Jaipal Singh campaigned for the creation of a province in Jharkhand as the only solution to the region's problems. While endeavours were underway to woo the non-tribal residents of the Chota Nagpur area, simultaneously, the support of the tribal people was sought under the slogan: "*Jharkhand abua, daku diku senoa*" [Jharkhand is ours and all robbers (exploiters)]

⁷¹ The area now demanded by the Jharkhandis included more than thirty districts between the four states including 9 (now 18 Districts created by the reorganisation of the earlier 9 Districts) of south Bihar.

and *dikus* will have to leave].⁷² It marks a rather fractured ideology but the first General Elections in 1952 represented the peak of the popularity of the JHP when it was able to secure a large-scale tribal as well as non-tribal support.

1. 1950-Early 1960s: The Period of Ascendance of the Jharkhand Party

After the first election the JHP firmly established itself as the dominant political factor in the region. This strengthened the party's bargaining power and it began an intensive campaign for the creation of a province in Jharkhand. The culmination of this campaign was a well-attended demonstration by the tribal population in 1955 at Ranchi and Dumka in the Santhal Pargana district to demonstrate the numerical support for a separate state before the States Reorganisation Commission (SRC).⁷³ The SRC also had to face counter-demonstrations that supported the integrity of Bihar and were against all talk of creation of a new state by hacking off a part of Bihar. The anti-Jharkhand camp accused the Jharkhandis of playing into the hands of foreign Christian missionaries.⁷⁴

The Executive Committee of the JHP submitted a memorandum to the SRC stressing the economic, socio-political and cultural grounds for demanding the creation of a new state. It emphasised that linguistically, culturally and ethnically the tribal population was separate from the non-tribal people and hence geographical contiguity and administrative separateness was required.⁷⁵ Here, it must be noted that while the JHP was trying to mobilise the people on the issue of the creation of a new state of Jharkhand and was eager to secure support of both tribal as well as non-tribal population, its memorandum to the SRC emphasised the tribal aspects (see chapter III). This fractured approach was to lead to its loss of large-scale support in years to come.

⁷² Rekhi, op. cit., p. 149.

⁷³ States Reorganisation Commission was appointed in 1953 and it reported in 1955 on the principles of reorganisation of the states of the Indian Union.

⁷⁴ Rekhi, op. cit., p. 152.

⁷⁵ *Report of the States Reorganisation Commission*, New Delhi, 1955.

The SRC did not pay any heed to the cultural distinctness of the region and built its case on purely lingual basis of reorganisation.⁷⁶ Hence, the claim of the Jharkhandis for a separate state was rejected on grounds that the multiplicity of tribal languages did not permit the creation of a new state in the Jharkhand region.

The failure of JHP in convincing the SRC surely reduced its popularity. Gradually the voters began to doubt the intentions of the JHP and its leaders, and a mood of disillusionment set in. The common perception began to view the slogan of Jharkhand as merely a device used by the leaders to gain power.⁷⁷ Some allegations of corruption amongst the leaders also acted to the detriment of their popular image.⁷⁸

However, during the period 1950-57, the JHP was able to set the agenda of politics in the Chota Nagpur region. It had the ability to gather thousands of people for rallies and processions at a short notice due to the remarkable unity amongst its leaders and virtually laid down the law for the region during this period.⁷⁹

This was set to change in the years that followed. The effort by the political establishment to blunt the edge of the Jharkhand movement yielded some results. It succeeded in dividing the movement and as some respondents in the interviews in the region pointed out, the INC utilised the bait of ministerial office, financial gains and co-option to discredit the leaders amongst the masses.⁸⁰ The effect of the modest successes of the development effort of the State in the region was also a contributory factor. A phase of ideological and political confusion in the Jharkhand movement was soon to set in.

⁷⁶ Chapter VII discusses the SRC's approach towards the creation of a separate state in the Jharkhand region in detail.

⁷⁷ Sharma, op. cit., p. 38.

⁷⁸ Vidyarthi and Sahay, op. cit., p. 99.

⁷⁹ Singh, op. cit., p. 322.

⁸⁰ Interview with a local schoolmaster and BJP political activist at Ranchi in January 1996.

2. Decline of the Jharkhand Party and the Rise of Other Parties

The last quarter of 1950s and the beginning of 1960s marked a gradual but decisive decline in the influence and power commanded by the JHP. A number of factors were responsible for this but probably the most important was the greater exposure of the people of the region to the government's developmental effort and the emerging split between the Christian and non-Christian sections of the tribal population.⁸¹ The ensuing competition for developmental resources led to a fracture in the unity of the tribal populace and sounded the death knell of the Jharkhand Party.

Many national parties such as the INC, Jan Sangh (JNS), Swatantra Party (SWA) and the Communist Party of India (CPI) became active in the region. These parties were able to successfully poach a section of the non-tribal voters from the Jharkhand Party.⁸² Moreover, the JHP leadership and the electorate, learning from the experience in other states where the INC was in office, realised that the interests of the tribal people could be better served by representation in the government and the Council of Ministers. This necessitated supporting, joining, or aligning with the INC.⁸³

Additionally, the leadership of JHP was largely composed of urban professional and it had few agrarian-based programmes. The urban bias of the JHP was working to its detriment, as was the poverty eradication thrust of public policy under the INC government. There was a need to provide a radical agenda to the growing restlessness of the tribal masses and the JHP could not afford to do so due to its links with the Janata Party⁸⁴ that represented the very class of people against whom it was to struggle, i.e. the zamindars and moneylender class.⁸⁵

⁸¹ Rekhi, op. cit., p. 155.

⁸² The changing electoral support for JHP and other Jharkhandi groups has been discussed in chapter VI.

⁸³ Rekhi, op. cit., p. 155.

⁸⁴ This Janata Party in Bihar was different from the national level Janata Party that was formed by an alliance between Bharatiya Lok Dal (BLD), Indian National Congress (Organisation) (INC (O))

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The influence of the JHP also declined due to its failure to convince the SRC of the necessity of creating the Jharkhand state as well as its failure to prevent the redefinition of the boundaries of the region by virtue of which a sizeable portion of the Jharkhandi area (the districts of Manbhum and Purulia) were given to West Bengal. This sparked off doubt in the ability of the leadership and internal dissension in the cadres of the JHP. Furthermore, the pressures of adequate funding for political activity had led the leadership of the JHP to align itself with the exploiters and *diku*. The party workers and the masses alike resented this.

Another factor that led to the loss of faith in the JHP was that the government policies and development activities were benefiting the Christian sections amongst the tribal people to a greater extent than the non-Christian ones. The Christian population was "on the one hand being properly educated in the different Mission schools, and on the other, enjoying the benefits provided by the government for the tribals".⁸⁶ Thus, there was emerging a kind of a 'dominant section' within the tribal society. The Christian sections who had benefited from government policies were evolving into a new landlord class and elite and consequently were able to almost monopolise the seats in the legislative assembly. These new elites were trying to divert the attention of the masses by pointing an accusing finger at the *diku* despite the fact that this new emerging elite was actively co-operating with the erstwhile dominant classes of the *diku*, Zamindars and money-lenders.⁸⁷ This elite was also trying to hijack the agenda of the creation of the new

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and Bharatiya Jan Sangh (BJS) in 1977. The Janata Party in Bihar was pre-dominantly a party representing the landed interests and had come to develop close links with the JHP. The JHP cherished its links with the Janata Party because the landed section offered it substantial financial support.

⁸⁵ Rekhi, op. cit., p. 157.

⁸⁶ Victor Das, *Jharkhand: Castle over the Graves*, New Delhi, 1994, p.103.

⁸⁷ Owing to the emerging dominance of the Christian tribal sections, two early organisations called 'Sudhar Sabha' and 'Parha' was formed in 1947-48 with Theble Oraon and Somnath Oraon as their Presidents, respectively. Their purpose was to organise the non-Christian tribal population and had a distinctly anti-Christian thrust. These organisations did not last long but Parha was revived in 1963.

state of Jharkhand since these sections, due to their better educational and material standing, would have been the prime beneficiaries of any such change.

The growing complacency of the leadership and their drift away from the actual tribal masses contributed to the downfall of the JHP. There was a growing impression, something that continues till today, that the leaders lived in luxury in Delhi and Patna and the only time they remembered the poor tribal people of the area was when another election was round the corner.⁸⁸ The failure of the JHP to locate itself in any effective way in the growing labour unrest and trade union activities in TISCO and other industrial installations in the area also contributed to the loss of influence. After the 1957 election, JHP's political activities started declining and the major outcome of this was its merger with the INC soon after the 1962 elections.

3. INC-JHP Merger and the Emergence of Multi-Party Politics

The factors that were responsible for the decline in the influence of the JHP were also responsible for its merger with the INC in 1963.⁸⁹ Additionally, some other important factors catalysed the merger. The INC realised that it could not hope to gain a firm electoral presence in the Jharkhand region without the support of the tribal population which in turn, traditionally voted for the JHP.

The leaders of the JHP on the other hand believed that they would be able to pursue the cause of tribal welfare and a separate Jharkhand state more effectively if they joined the government. The creation of the states of Andhra Pradesh (1953), Maharashtra (1960) and Nagaland (1963) led the leaders of the JHP to believe that the goal of a separate state would be easier to achieve from within the INC. The earlier ally of the JHP, the Janata Party, had also drifted away after its merger with the Swatantra Party and JHP was looking for new alliances.⁹⁰ It was felt that the

⁸⁸ Vidyarthi and Sahay, op. cit., p. 99.

⁸⁹ *ibid.*, p. 102.

⁹⁰ Earlier talks for an electoral alliance with the INC had broken down because the JHP was not ready to concede any share in the reserved seats in the area. The INC on the other hand, did not want to let the JHP influence the general seats in the region because such a move would have let

increasing influence of the Swatantra Party could be countered only with the help of the INC.

Moreover, tensions along religious lines were emerging amongst the tribal masses and it was thought that merging with the INC would contain them. The senior-most leaders of the JHP agreed to the merger since they were sceptical about the church's role in the politics of the region and wanted the issues to be discussed and settled in a more overtly political arena. Hence, they decided to pass the ball into the court of the INC.⁹¹

All these factors combined led to the merger between the INC and the JHP. The then Chief minister of Bihar, Binodananda Jha, played a key role in persuading Jaipal Singh to agree to the merger agreement which was finalised on 20 June 1963. It stipulated that (a) a development Board for Chota Nagpur and Santhal Pargana and parts of Bhagalpur, Monghyr and Shahabad districts would be established to accelerate agricultural, economic, industrial and general development of the region; (b) the INC and Jharkhand Party would merge; and, (c) a sub-committee of the Bihar Pradesh Congress Committee would be set up to co-ordinate political and organisational activities in the region.⁹²

The merger of the two parties was an act of political exigency and not common understanding on issues and goals. The merger survived only due to the political interests that it served. Hence, soon after the merger, several Jharkhandi factions within the INC emerged which were led by various leaders from the Jharkhand region. One was led by Jaipal Singh, another by S. K. Bage, while a

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down some members from the area who had taken considerable electoral risks by joining the Congress Legislature Party.

⁹¹ The inter-denominational and inter-tribal rivalries had always plagued Jharkhandi politics and the JHP itself was formed to contain such divisions. By this time, the individual leaders had started to patronise their own denomination/ tribe against the other in which the support of the Church was beginning to acquire a central role. A number of missionaries were also tribal leaders whose congregation provided a captive vote-bank to certain sections of the leadership. Allegations were also made that the Church was investing large amounts of money in the politics of the region to empower certain sections of the leadership, Vidyarthi and Sahay, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

⁹² Rekhi, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

third faction wanted to revive the old JHP. The factionalism was also a result of the rise of younger and newer leaders who challenged the older leaders. The merger itself was also considered ineffective because the general body of the JHP had not ratified it.⁹³ Jaipal Singh and others had announced the merger with the INC without consulting or asking for ratification of the General Body of the JHP. It also gives an indication of the kind of personalised politics that existed in the region.⁹⁴

Most tribal people and leaders were unhappy with the merger and the leaders who had agreed to it faced a lot of criticism. There were speculations that the INC had bribed Jaipal Singh and that for a place in the government ministry he had sold the cause of the Jharkhandis to the INC.⁹⁵ N. E. Horo, a senior and respected leader of the movement, had opposed the merger along with his supporters. The Christian tribal section also saw this merger as a threat to their influence and was therefore, not happy with it. The merger thus encouraged more factionalism than consensus.⁹⁶

A result of the merger was that the Jharkhandis got their first exposure to actual governmental office and day-to-day administration. Jaipal Singh was accommodated as a cabinet minister in the Bihar government⁹⁷ and all the other important leaders were appointed to various district and state level boards.

The Jharkhandi leaders, being in government, were also exposed to the logic of factional politics that operated in the INC. Along with this, factionalism within the Jharkhand movement threatened the movement itself to the point of disappearance in the following years. Far from promoting consensus, the merger encouraged further dissensions within the Jharkhandi groups as they tried to rally around the various chief ministerial candidates in the hope of political office. S. K. Bage emerged as an important tribal leader and challenged the leadership of Jaipal

⁹³ Most of the electorate of tribal Bihar did not know of this merger until the next elections in 1967. They came to vote for their preferred JHP only to discover that it had merged with the INC.

⁹⁴ Vidyarthi and Sahay, op. cit., pp. 99-100.

⁹⁵ *ibid.*, p. 100.

⁹⁶ Jha, *Political Elite in Bihar*, op. cit., pp. 110-1.

⁹⁷ Vidyarthi and Sahay, op. cit., p. 100.

Singh. Binodananda Jha, the erstwhile Chief Minister, was increasingly marginalised in the caste politics that ensued after the Kamraj Plan. He was forced to resign and being out of power it was no longer possible for his faction to keep the support of the faction led by Bage who defected to a more likely chief ministerial candidate, K. B. Sahay. He in turn was willing to oblige this section against Jaipal Singh. After K. B. Sahay was installed as the Chief Minister, the politics behind his election as the Chief Minister promoted further dissension in the Jharkhandi group within the INC. Sahay made Bage a minister against the express wishes of Jaipal Singh.⁹⁸ In reaction Jaipal Singh, at a press conference at Patna in 1964, declared that "none of the terms and conditions of Jharkhand-Congress merger agreed upon in June 1963 had been implemented by the Congress [Party] in Bihar though the Congress President and Chief Ministers of Bihar, West Bengal and Orissa were party to it".⁹⁹

On the eve the general elections of 1967, the popularity of both Jaipal Singh and Bage was at low ebb. The creation of Haryana and Punjab in 1966 but not Jharkhand alienated the people further. Furthermore, Jaipal Singh and S. K. Bage, despite being in the government, had not been able to deal with the problems of the tribal people effectively.

Jaipal Singh's image as a great leader was fading and he gradually became convinced that the powers that be would not yield control of the mineral rich area of Jharkhand. He thought that the time had come when "the days of begging are gone, we shall have to act in Birsa Munda fashion to get our legitimate demands. Tribals should raise their heads against wrongdoers and if necessary use bows and arrows".¹⁰⁰ There was also some talk of reviving the Adivasi Sabha but nothing concrete took place. Jaipal Singh is said to have told N. E. Horo shortly before his

⁹⁸ *ibid.*, p. 101.

⁹⁹ Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 71.

¹⁰⁰ Singh, *op. cit.*, p. 324.

death in 1970 that he felt cheated by Nehru who had not created a separate state of Jharkhand.¹⁰¹

This exercise to co-opt the JHP and the willingness of its leaders to join the INC had far reaching consequences for the movement. The JHP was seen as having sold out to the INC, a calamity from which the Jharkhand movement never fully recovered. During the 1996 field study, many respondents quoted the JHP-INC merger as an example of the leadership being open to temptations, particularly that of ministerial office. Jaipal Singh, despite being a revered legend, was never forgiven for agreeing to the merger and the resulting fragmentation of the movement.

The supporters of the INC-JHP merger also began to have doubts about its effectiveness and necessity and this gave an impetus to the future course of action for the Jharkhand movement. Fresh efforts were made to revive the Jharkhand Party and secure it the recognition of the government and the Election Commission.¹⁰²

The 1967 elections thus marked the end of an era in Jharkhandi politics. Since 1938, Jaipal Singh and the JHP had dominated the politics of the area and had fought for a separate province of Jharkhand. They did have substantial political legitimacy in the region but the movement was not organised enough in the rural area. It was not really a mass movement and hence the struggle for a separate state did not involve the masses in enough numbers.

The splintering within the Jharkhandi factions had begun with the merger of the JHP with the INC but after the 1967 elections it became overt. There emerged a number of 'groups' such as the 'Sahdeo Group', 'Paul Dayal Group', 'Lakra Group' and others. All such groups claimed to be continuing the JHP and some of them also approached the Election Commission, unsuccessfully, to allot them the

¹⁰¹ Rekhi, op. cit., p. 167.

¹⁰² Vidyarthi and Sahay, op. cit., pp. 101-2.

election symbol of the Cock. Since these groups were not parts or allies of any major political party, they were treated as independents in the general elections.¹⁰³

These groups also realised that as long as multiple groups claiming to be working for the cause of a separate state of Jharkhand existed, none of them would be able to secure the effective support of the Jharkhandi people. Consequently, there began an effort towards unity. A conference of all the groups took place in November 1968 at Hazaribagh where important Jharkhandi leaders such as David Munzmi, S. K. Bage, N. E. Horo and Simon Tigga were present. At this conference sharp differences and allegations were levelled against one another. Notwithstanding the differences and divisions, one unified party called the All India Jharkhand Party (AIJP) was launched with Bagun Sumbrai as its President and N. E. Horo as its Secretary. The 1963 merger of the JHP with the INC was declared invalid because the general body had not approved it.¹⁰⁴

However, the faction-based character of the Jharkhandi politics could not be undone and the new AIJP was soon divided into two internal factions under Horo and Sumbrai. After the 1969 split in the INC, the two factions supported different sections. The Horo led faction aligned itself with the new Congress (R) and the Sumbrai-led faction supported the old INC and Jan Sangh. This incompatibility amongst leaders of the AIJP continued till Horo resigned from it and revived the JHP which split again when the members belonging to the Santhal tribe, citing their grievance of under-representation despite being numerically larger than the Oraon tribe, split away from it to form the Hul¹⁰⁵ Jharkhand Party. Factionalism in the Jharkhandi politics reached a new peak when another party was formed to represent the interests of the Jharkhandis called the Bihar Prant Hul Jharkhand Party which soon split further into two factions in 1972 that called themselves the Progressive Hul Jharkhand Party (PHJP) and the Rajya Hul Jharkhand Party (RHJP). This

¹⁰³ *ibid.*, pp. 102-3.

¹⁰⁴ Rekhi, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

¹⁰⁵ This party called Hul Jharkhand Party was named after the Santhal insurrection of the 19th century. In the local parlance this insurrection was termed as 'Hul'.

division was again, due to the same factors which had caused the AIJP to split; namely, personality clash and political ambition amongst the leaders. The parties born out of the above splits and sub-splits had tribal particularism as their organising principle: AIJP was mainly supported by the Ho tribe with its headquarters at Chaibasa, the JHP was adhered to by the Munda tribe with Ranchi as their base, whereas the Hul Jharkhand parties were favoured by Santhal tribe centred in the Santhal Pargana.¹⁰⁶

There was a widespread use of cultural factors by the leaders of these splits. They invoked ascriptive factors such as denominational,¹⁰⁷ historical,¹⁰⁸ cultural,¹⁰⁹ lingual¹¹⁰ and other differences to emphasise the differences between the Jharkhandis and the rest of the Indian people. However, the leaders were not able to avoid the logical danger inherent in the use of such symbols; i.e., someone else might use the same symbolism in a more potent fashion to split their new party. This is exactly what had been happening in Jharkhandi politics.

The factionalism that had become the hallmark of Jharkhandi Politics after the JHP-INC merger was the single most important factor in the undermining of popular support for the Jharkhandi political parties and shifting of electoral support to INC, CPI and Hul Jharkhandi parties¹¹¹ (see chapter VI). This shift of popular support to the national parties also reflects a greater maturity of the electorate. The splintering of Jharkhandi parties also ensured that they lacked the organisational strength to expand their political base from over-dependence on urban mobilisation to rural areas. Consequently, urban politics came to play an important role in the Jharkhandi movement.

¹⁰⁶ Singh, *op. cit.*, pp. 324-26.

¹⁰⁷ Christian versus non-Christians; Santhals versus Hos versus Mundas versus Oraon and so on and so forth.

¹⁰⁸ Invoking the spirit of the Santhal rebellion by Jaipal Singh and later by the Hul Parties etc.

¹⁰⁹ Invoking of the tribal totems and symbols such as the cock, the bow & arrows, etc.

¹¹⁰ There are as many languages in the Jharkhand region as tribes, although they are still evolving into written form. This has led some people to comment that they are not languages but mere dialects.

4. The Rise of Urban and Industrial Factors in Jharkhandi Politics

After 1967, a new factor emerged on the political horizon of the Jharkhand region. This was the formation of what can be called urban pressure groups and industrial political bodies such as the Birsa Sewa Dal (BSD), Krantikari Morcha and Chota Nagpur Parishad. Amongst these, the BSD was the most important. It was formed under the tutelage of Jaipal Singh by a group of young men with the aim of acting as an independent tribal organisation working towards the unification and betterment of tribal society. It sought to secure better avenues for the tribal population in opportunities for employment, with the final goal being the creation of a socio-political consciousness amongst the tribal population. This section of the Jharkhand movement laid greater emphasis on social-reform and social service.¹¹²

The emerging divide between the Christian and non-Christian tribal population reached a new high when the non-Christian tribals demonstrated before the Study team of the Joint Committee of Parliament at Ranchi in 1968. The purpose of this demonstration was to ventilate their grievances in front of the Parliamentary Committee and seek exclusion of Christian tribals from the Scheduled category. It soon evolved into a memorandum war between the two groups. Against such a social background, there emerged two sections in the BSD, one that saw similarities with the viewpoints of the missionaries and the other that found greater concurrence with the arguments of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPM). This created a very unstable leadership in the BSD and it soon split into two sections.¹¹³

However, the two factions did manage to work together for some time. The BSD stood for the common problems faced by most tribal people and aimed at ameliorating their condition. It attempted to bring about a greater consciousness amongst the tribals and to reduce their sense of fear, inferiority and isolation and sought to develop a sense of belonging and pride for their tribal cultural heritage and

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¹¹¹ Vidyarthi and Sahay, op. cit., p. 104.

¹¹² Sachchidananda, op. cit., p. 176.

tradition. It also aimed at organising the tribal people and using their collective strength to secure greater enjoyment of fundamental and democratic rights. The workers and students were organised to act as the primary political outfits. BSD wanted to ensure that the tribal people were given priority in employment in the governmental and private sector and in admission to the educational institutions and sought the reduction in the drain of resources from the tribal belt and the restoration of the land rights of the tribals. In reality however, the activities of the BSD were limited to efforts aimed at ensuring that the tribals were given preference in jobs and admission to educational institutions. It also did some sloganeering for 'regionalisation of administration'.¹¹⁴

The activity of the BSD can be roughly divided into two phases: the first phase (1967-69) was a rather extremist period in which violent means were advocated to secure the rights and better life prospects for the tribal people. During this phase, large processions guarded by tribal youths with bows and arrows were taken out and the celebration of Birsa Day was held as methods of mobilising the tribal masses. Slogans such as "झारखण्ड हमारा है, झारखण्ड लड़ के लेगे, तीर के बल पर" [Jharkhand belongs to us and we will fight for it with arrows] were raised in the region. The political situation in the region became unstable and law and order worsened. Some sections of the BSD also supported a Naxalbari¹¹⁵ type movement launched by ultra-leftist parties in south Bihar in 1969.¹¹⁶

The second phase of BSD activities began in the early 1970s when its extremist stance failed to generate any substantial following in the rural areas of the

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¹¹³ Rekhi, op. cit., p. 174.

¹¹⁴ *ibid.*, pp. 174-5.

¹¹⁵ The Naxalbari movement was an ultra-left movement that held sway in most of the backward parts of eastern India in the late 1960s and 1970s. The subscribers to this movement and its philosophy were of the opinion that 'class enemies' (implied landed interests, money-lenders and entrepreneurs and government officials who seemed to be collaborating with these people) should be dealt summary justice in peoples' courts (which were often manned by the cadres of the movement). They emphasised the idea of *khatam* (finish/ end) implying that all such people must be killed instantly.

¹¹⁶ Sachchidananda, op. cit., p. 102.

region and the influence of the leftist parties waned. It therefore decided to restrict itself to more constitutional methods to pursue its demands. At this stage, a conflict ensued between the two factions of BSD whereby a split seemed to be unavoidable and one section aligned itself to the AIJP which was now operating from Jamshedpur.

This was a period when the BSD was the most important organisation in Jharkhandi politics but it was not actually a political organisation. It was more of a cultural organisation aimed at social reform but also had some political overtones. Effectively therefore there was almost no Jharkhandi political activity during this period.

5. Splintered Jharkhandi Politics and the National Political Agenda: 1969-80

During the period 1968-80, a number of Jharkhandi parties existed all of which claimed to be carrying on the true ideals of the Jharkhand movement. All of them commanded varying degrees of support in their respective regions of operation but none of them was strong enough to dominate the electoral agenda in the Jharkhand region as a whole. Consequently, these Jharkhandi political groups were collectively able to injure the prospects of the national and state level parties but were unable to offer a coherent alternative. This splintering resulted in extreme political instability in the Jharkhand region and Bihar. This phase also saw the increasing impact of national political events on the political dynamics of the Jharkhand region and the electoral performance of political parties was influenced more by events at the national level than regional issues.

A coalition government was formed in Bihar in 1969 in which the Jharkhandi splinter groups participated as a unified 'Jharkhand Legislative Party' to extract concessions in exchange of support to the coalition government. The Jharkhandi Parties had supported the government on the condition that a statutory board would be set up for Chota Nagpur and Santhal Pargana with complete powers to decide matters pertaining to the areas such as education, employment, welfare of people and development policies in the region. Their leader, N. E. Horo, briefly served as the Education Minister. However, no concrete policy emerged from this exercise because the government fell. In fact, the Jharkhandi groups were themselves

responsible for its collapse because the Hul Jharkhand parties and some other minor Jharkhandi political groups crossed the floor during voting on the Budget. Thereafter, a series of coalition governments followed, in which the Jharkhandi splinter groups participated to make them even more unstable. This trend continued till the next general election in 1972.¹¹⁷

The Jharkhandi splinter groups failed to extract any major concessions from these unstable governments despite the fact that the government depended on their support for survival. The prime reason for this was the lack of unity amongst the Jharkhandi splinter groups which is quite typical of Jharkhandi politics. Hence, the popularity and influence of the splinter groups of the JHP now carrying a plethora of names, each claiming to be different from the other, continued to decline. The confusion generated by the multiplicity of names and parties did not add to the prospects of a unified Jharkhand movement.

The electoral and popular support of the Jharkhandi splinter groups was further injured by the fact that just before the 1972 elections, the INC saw a surge in its popularity after the successful conduct of the 1971 war with Pakistan and the subsequent formation of Bangladesh under the INC government led by Mrs. Gandhi. This had also given rise to a widespread feeling of nationalism which translated into substantial electoral gains in the 1972 elections for the INC in the whole country and the Jharkhand region was no exception.¹¹⁸

The year 1972 can also be interpreted as a shift in the political dynamics of the Jharkhand region from regional politics to an all-India one. Some analysts have also seen this as the final proof of the Jharkhand region having been integrated into the larger political life of the country, with the implication that it repudiated the demand for the formation of a separate state of Jharkhand.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁷ Vidyarthi and Sahay, *op. cit.*, pp. 105-6.

¹¹⁸ This also supports the contention elsewhere in the thesis that 'sub-national' political identities that are equally strong, if not stronger, may not always be at cross-purposes with the Indian national identity.

¹¹⁹ Sachchidananda, *op. cit.*, pp. 180-3.

Nonetheless, it must be noted that the politics of the region have always been quite unpredictable and the influence of an external factor (the Indo-Pak war of 1971) may have yielded such a pattern only in the short term. The character of politics in a region cannot be altered by such short-term events. Moreover, to generate popular support, there was a heavy emphasis on region-specific factors (such as culture, tribal special needs and so on) by all political parties including the INC. Hence, the belief that the 1972 election had swept away all such particularistic factors was misplaced.

In the period of political turmoil that followed this election, the Jharkhandi groups/parties confined themselves to more passive forms of political activity. It was mainly due to the fact that the results of this election had made it more than evident that they did not enjoy the same political legitimacy and influence in the region as they used to. Their noteworthy efforts towards the goal of a separate state of Jharkhand at the national level were confined to the presentation of two memoranda to the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by N. E. Horo with little avail. At the regional level, the JHP continued its efforts to generate a political consensus towards a re-organisation of states by combining its efforts with those of the Maha Vidharba Samiti, and the Vishal Haryana Party. These three parties tried to organise a conference of all regional parties to draw up a plan for regional reorganisation based on an agenda of smaller states. According to these parties, larger states generated socio-economic imbalances and hence instability whereas smaller states were capable of achieving a balance in economic and political growth and ensured stability.¹²⁰

In the 1977 election held after the period of Emergency, the Jharkhandi groups again did not perform very well. N. E. Horo had supported the INC and was affected by the anti-INC sentiment and lost his own seat although he was able to get two other members of his party elected to the state legislature. On the other hand, the AIJP despite having supported the Janata Party also did not do well. Clearly, the

¹²⁰ Rekhi, op. cit., pp. 183-4.

politics of the Jharkhand region had slipped out of the control of the Jharkhandi groups.

However, the arguments about the death of regional politics in Jharkhand cannot be conclusive. Just as it cannot be deduced from the results of 1972 elections that national politics had come to stay in the Jharkhand region because external factors were at play, similarly not much can be deduced from the results of the 1977 elections. The operation of the Emergency from 1975-77 had alienated many people from the INC in the short-term.

By the time mid-term elections were held in 1980, all other Jharkhandi groups had disappeared over the past decade and only the AIJP led by Begun Sumbrai and the JHP led by Horo remained. However, both performed badly in the election. The JHP, even though it had contested the 1980 election, tried very little to organise and mobilise people in the region and had now restricted itself to memoranda and petitions. The INCI¹²¹ had rebounded as the leading and dominant party.

Other parties such as Janata Party (JP),¹²² CPI and BJS also picked up some of the lost influence of the JHP but none of them could gain the past pre-eminence enjoyed by the JHP. The JP was unable to cash in on its pro-poor image due to the factional politics that had plagued it. The INCI was the prime gainer in this state of affairs.

The issue of Jharkhandi identity and the creation of a separate state still enjoyed a considerable appeal with the masses but due to the multiplicity of parties, no single party had the political potential to exploit it and that included the JHP and AIJP. Failures to derive any substantial gains on this front had made the bonafides

¹²¹ Indian National Congress (Indira) (INCI) had emerged after splits in the original INC. However, in the electoral records, the acronym INCI has been used only in the 1980 elections. For all other elections INC has been used to refer to this party despite the fact that it retains the suffix 'Indira' because no other significant party of a similar name exists.

¹²² The national Janata Party, not the one that operated in Bihar in 1950s and the 1960s.

of its leaders suspect.¹²³ The electorate had lost their faith in the leaders and were unwilling to reinvest all their support in the Jharkhandi groups. By the early 1980s, the character of Jharkhand movement, as has been discussed below, was set to change yet again. Developmental problems that had become acute in the region sidelined the issue of autonomy.

6. Marxist, Radical and Leftist Components of Jharkhandi Politics

The Leftist industrial and urban pressure groups such as the BSD had already emerged in the late 1960s as a component of the larger Jharkhand movement. This increasingly Leftist orientation of the Jharkhand movement was helped by the weakening influence of the Jharkhandi parties in the region. In the early 1970s however, the independent Marxist and Leftist organisations that had not found much appeal with the masses until then, moved in to fill the political vacuum. Land related problems played a major role in helping Leftist inroads.¹²⁴ Related issues such as growing unemployment amongst the tribal youth due to continuing alienation of agricultural land and poor job prospects in the urban industrial complexes also played an important role. With the growth of industrial enterprise in the region, an unprecedented in-migration of non-tribal staff into the more specialised jobs in industries like Bokaro Steel Plant, HEC, Ranchi, Tata Steel Plant, etc. occurred. This made competition for jobs stiffer for the tribal and local population. Moreover, the speed of development activity in the tribal region was very slow compared with the aspirations of the younger generations of the tribal people. The combined effect of these factors increased the appeal of radical political positions.

The Naxalite movement and Leftist politics altered the character of Jharkhandi politics to a considerable degree. Leftist politics, which had originated in the industrial centres in the region gradually, began to influence the tribal politics as well. Consequently, the tribal organisations and other forums on the political

¹²³ Sachchidananda, op. cit., p. 176.

¹²⁴ As discussed earlier, the JHP had never succeeded in creating a stable political base for itself in the rural areas of the region. Therefore, it had played down the issue of land alienation and other land-related problems which was exploited by the emerging Leftist organisations.

landscape of the region began to be affected by more radical ideas. The result of this new trend was that there began to be greater stress on the political education of the political workers and the people at large about the Leftist analysis of land relations and other agrarian issues. This meant linking up local issues with all-India politics, violence and often militancy. Moreover, there began to be an emphasis on greater and better political organisation of the people of the region. Also important is the fact that the national Leftist parties saw the concept of tribal autonomy as different from that of a separate state.¹²⁵

With the greater emphasis on tribal land relations and the general exploitation of the tribes, the demand for a separate state was pushed into the background and the foreground came to be occupied by the demand to end all kinds of exploitation, industrial or agrarian. The political activity centred on securing more opportunities for the tribal population in terms of places in educational institutions and the industrial enterprises, as also restoration of alienated land. All these new ideas being introduced in the region had some attraction for the Jharkhandi population because they seemed closer to their everyday existence.

The new factor of Leftist politics entered on to the stage of Jharkhandi politics at the end of 1960s and in early 1970s through the unlikely avenue of the caste politics of Bihar. Binod Bihari Mahto had emerged as an important *kurmi* leader in Dhanbad and Hazaribagh (both districts had shown little support for Jharkhandi politics before this time).¹²⁶ He had established a social reform organisation to work amongst the *kurmis* called the Shivaji Samaj. It sought restoration of land to these communities which had been alienated during the process of industrialisation and highlighted the backwardness of the region. For this purpose, an alliance was forged with the Santhal population of the area that came to be known as the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM). There had been a rising influence of Left parties in neighbouring West Bengal and A. K. Roy and Immanuel Hai Khan

¹²⁵ Singh, op. cit., pp. 323-4.

¹²⁶ The Naxalite elements had been successful in forming joint fronts of *kurmis* (a caste group) and tribes to struggle against their common exploiters because the socio-economic conditions of both the *kurmis* and the tribal population were very similar.

wanted the communities of the Jharkhand region to join the struggle and fight for a separate Jharkhand. The Marxist Co-ordination Committee (MCC) headed by A. K. Roy also supported the JMM. Therefore, under the leadership of the JMM and the MCC, the Jharkhand movement was successful in drawing in the support of a sizeable section of tribal and non-tribal population. The major leaders of the JMM were Shibu Soren, B. B. Mahto and Sadananda Jha. Under their leadership, the JMM combined a mixture of radicalism, social reform and cultural revivalism in its activities.¹²⁷

On the socio-cultural front, the JMM organised a series of reform movements. It started a campaign to rid the region of the habit of liquor consumption since this habit was seen as the root cause of indebtedness and consequent alienation of land. It also repeatedly emphasised the tribal nature of the Jharkhandi politics and one of its most used slogan was '*kallali Toro, Jharkhand choro*' [break the bottles (of liquor), leave Jharkhand]. The first part of the slogan was aimed at the local population and the second part at the *diku* inhabitants of the area. This campaign forced the state government to declare prohibition in the district of Dhanbad in 1976, causing considerable loss of revenue to the state exchequer. Another aspect of socio-cultural activities was the frontal assault it led on illiteracy. It secured funds for this programme through donations collected from the masses and opened night schools. These night schools served the twin purpose of imparting knowledge about the 3Rs and facilitating political education.¹²⁸

The JMM realised that the government credit institutions were not sufficient and that there was a need for credit institutions in the villages. It therefore began to implement an indigenous scheme of establishing *golas* [banks] for grain in each village from which needy peasants could borrow at a nominal rate of interest. The JMM also experimented in areas like reducing extravagant weddings and promoting collective farming.¹²⁹ Another feature of the JMM's agenda was its efforts at the

¹²⁷ Singh, op. cit., p. 329.

¹²⁸ *ibid.*

¹²⁹ Rekhi, op. cit., pp. 193-4.

revival of old traditions. It revived tribal people's courts¹³⁰ where cases could be speedily tried and justice delivered. In these courts a number of local landlords were tried and punished.¹³¹

The JMM resorted to direct action and began a campaign to recover alienated land and organised a series of raids to forcibly harvest crops from the alienated fields all over the region, especially in the districts of Giridih, Dhanbad, and Hazaribagh. Consequently, there were large-scale clashes and disturbances during the harvests of 1974-75 and the movement spread to many areas of the region. This often led to situations in which the landlords retaliated with firearms and the peasants responded with tribal weapons. The landlords and moneylenders adopted the tactics of eliminating the leaders of the JMM and the MCC with the help of police and government officials. A. K. Roy and B. B. Mahto were arrested on pretexts and Sadananda Jha was killed by anti-social elements. These events sparked off the wrath of Jharkhandis and they fought pitched battles with the police parties and a number of people lost their lives. This period thus witnessed widespread violence and anarchy.¹³²

Efforts were also made towards political mobilisation on the basis of Leftist ideology. The JMM and the MCC established the 'Jharkhand Alliance' between the workers and peasants since, according to them, a 'Jharkhandi' was anyone who worked and a '*diku*' was any one who exploited. The effort was to unite all 'Jharkhandis' against all '*dikus*' to ensure the creation of a separate state of Jharkhand. The JMM led the alliance with the slogan "Jharkhand, *Lalkhand*" [Jharkhand is a red (implying Communist) area]. Processions and rallies organised under the joint leadership of the JMM and the MCC soon drew up to 50,000 people and the demand for a separate Jharkhand state again became stronger. These demonstrations were primarily aimed at bridging the differences between the

¹³⁰ This practise of peoples' courts was borrowed from the Naxalite practise and reflects the links which had developed between the Leftist parties and the Jharkhand movement.

¹³¹ Rekhi, op. cit., p. 194.

¹³² *ibid.*, p. 195.

workers and peasants so that a *Lalkhand* (communist area) could be established in a separate state of Jharkhand. February 4 every year came to be celebrated as Jharkhand Divas (Jharkhand Day) marked by large processions of armed peasants and workers. The mass following that the JMM had managed to generate led to its becoming more assertive.¹³³

The Railway strike of 1974 and the nationalisation of collieries further provided a distinct Leftist leaning to the Jharkhand movement. Under the authoritarian regime of Mrs Gandhi, a large number of workers tribal and non-tribal were dismissed from work for minor or construed misdemeanour. This encouraged their participation in trade union politics and in turn, led to further dismissals from work. The leaders of the movement took part in all the democratic programmes of Jai Prakash Narain under the banner of *Janvadi Sangram Samiti* (Committee for Democratic War) but retained their political identity in the form of *Jan Sangharsha Samiti* (Committee for People's Struggle). Faced with a challenge to the legitimacy of the regime, the Indian state came down heavily on the dissenters and Leftist politicians such as the Naxalites were suppressed. Coercion by para-military forces and the Bihar Military Police was widely used and the movement was crushed. Many of the Jharkhandi leaders like Shibu Soren and B. B. Mahto were arrested under provisions of preventive detention. Thus, this movement became a part of the larger movement that led to the proclamation of the Emergency in 1975. Like most non-INC political activity, the Jharkhand movement was undermined during the period of Emergency from 1975 to 1977.¹³⁴

In a way, the militancy that had become a hallmark of the Jharkhand movement in the 1970s was partly responsible for the collapse and temporary disappearance of the movement. Its extremism in this phase may have been successful in mobilising a large number of people in the short term but it also invited State repression. The Leftist points of view may argue in terms of an

¹³³ Devalle, op. cit., pp. 170-1.

¹³⁴ Arvind N. Das, 'Struggle of Workers and Peasants' in *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. X no. 9, 1 March 1975, p. 384.

imminent revolution but any movement that depends on mass following instead of a devoted cadre is not likely to succeed if it invites the full repressive force of the law enforcing machinery on itself. However, the contribution of this phase of the movement to the cause of a Jharkhandi identity was important because it was the first time that stress was laid on schooling and political education of the people at large as well as on explaining the oppressive land relations.

Simultaneously, the JMM supported the mainstream development programmes such as the 20-point Programme launched by the then Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, and was successful in securing the support of the Hul Jharkhand parties. Thus, the JMM also tried to incorporate some degree of broad-based politics in its activities.

In 1976-77, efforts were made to revive political activity in the Jharkhand region. In this phase, the surviving leaders of the Jharkhand movement formed a United Front which included the JHP, the MCC, the JMM, the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (CPI-ML), the Birsa Sewa Dal, the Jharkhand Muslim Morcha, the Hul Jharkhand Party and the Revolutionary Socialist Party. The united front drew upon the slogan of the national movement and proclaimed "Give me your blood and I will give you freedom".¹³⁵

The Jharkhand movement in this phase focused itself on the mobilisation of the population of the area, political efforts to pursue the goal of a separate Jharkhand state and efforts towards fighting the economic exploitation of the people of the area. The movement now aimed to secure urgent public policy measures to reduce the suffering of the masses pending the creation of a territorial state of Jharkhand. It tried to generate a mass movement based on processions, blockades, *gheraos*, public meetings, propaganda, sit-ins, and demonstrations.

These methods of mass mobilisation were used to reclaim land for cultivation by cutting forests, to oppose the new public sector enterprises being set up in the

¹³⁵ Rekhi, op. cit., p. 198.

region, to oppose the official forest produce purchase policy and to struggle for restoration of alienated land-rights to the tribal people. Under the leadership of the United Front, this phase of the movement was able to secure participation by a sizeable population. Once again, it faced severe repression by State agencies. At the same time, the State authorities tried to control the popular wrath with the help of public policy measures. They emphasised the need for integration of the tribal population and established autonomous development bodies for North Chota Nagpur, South Chota Nagpur and Santhal Pargana. Members of the Janata Party, which was in power at the state and national levels and not the local leaders, headed these bodies. Thus, a combination of integrationist and repressive measures was adopted to quell the tide of this phase of the Jharkhand movement.¹³⁶

At this juncture, support for the Jharkhand movement came from an unexpected quarter. On 21 March 1979, the tribal people living in North Bihar formed an organisation called Uttaranchal Bharatiya Samiti. Despite the fact that the area of their residence did not fall within the territorial scope of the demand for a separate state of Jharkhand, this organisation opposed the exploitation of the tribal population by landlords and the police atrocities. They put forward a charter of 30 demands at a rally and one of these demands was the creation of a separate state of Jharkhand. Another unexpected quarter from which the Jharkhandis found support was that of landlords when some of them, despite belonging to the class which had tried its best to fight the movement during the last few years, renewed their support for the JMM.¹³⁷ The support of these groups added legitimacy to the movement. The Jharkhand movement had also started finding support not only in the areas outside the territorial boundaries of the proposed state but also in the quarters that had been

¹³⁶ *ibid.*, p. 199.

¹³⁷ For instance, Basant Narain Singh, a landlord of Ramgarh joined the movement in 1979. The landed interests had supported the JHP at its inception and their financial contributions were vital to its activities. The radicalism of the JMM and its allies in the 1970s had alienated the landed interests but in the late 1970s, the landlords reaffirmed their support for the Jharkhand movement. The reasons behind their renewal of support in the late 1970s were much the same as in the early 1950s.

sceptical. It gave the movement a slightly larger base and a considerable degree of social and political legitimacy.¹³⁸

While the movement was gaining strength from the increasing support base, other factors at work were to weaken it. The beginning of the 1980s saw the emergence of cracks in the Jharkhand Alliance that had earlier put forward ambitious programmes for forging unity between the peasant and workers to widen the social base of the movement. The rift began with a personality clash between leaders like Shibu Soren, B. B. Mahto and A. K. Roy. The Marxist leaders like Roy thought that the workers in the industrial towns like Jamshedpur, Dhanbad, Bokaro and others should take up the leadership of the movement, while the Jharkhandi leaders like Soren saw the workers as becoming increasingly middle-class and therefore the peasantry was the class which had to bear the mantle of liberating Jharkhand from the clutches of the landlords and the *dikus*.¹³⁹

Soon, this rift took the form of suspicions in the minds of the rural population about the workers. There began re-emergence of slogans calling for driving out all *dikus* including the workers. It acquired an ideological undertone of Marxists versus the rest.

Faced with widening differences with its Leftist allies, the JMM entered into an electoral alliance with the INCI for the 1980 mid-term polls. It served the interests of the INCI to forge an electoral alliance with a party that had a regional presence and at the same time bolstered its image as a pro-tribal party. It also helped the INCI in neutralising the influence of Leftist Parties led by leaders like A. K. Roy. This new alliance with the INCI encouraged Soren to withdraw the more militant movement in the region. The violent activities of the JMM over the past few years had led to a massacre of people in many villages by the law-enforcing agencies. This also influenced Soren's decision to reduce the extremism of the

¹³⁸ AS, 'Containing the Jharkhand Movement' in *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. XIV no. 14, 7 April 1979, p. 650.

¹³⁹ Hiranmay Dhar, 'Split in Jharkhand Movement' in *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. XIX no. 29, 21 July 1984, p. 1139.

movement and he became almost Gandhian in his approach. The movement became quite low-key and fell into disarray due to another external factor. Huge amounts of development funds started to flow into the region under the Tribal Sub-Plan (TSP) in the form of developmental grants, foreign project assistance and relief operations.

The overtly Marxist phase of the movement thus practically ended with the electoral alliance between the JMM and the INCI in the 1980 elections. A formal split between the Leftist and Jharkhandi political groups was to follow soon.

7. The Jharkhand Movement: Recent Patterns

The cracks that developed in the Jharkhandi movement by the early 1980s were to lead to further splits in the movement in the years that followed. The split in the Jharkhand Alliance came into the open during the First Central Conference at Saraidhela in January 1983 presided over by Binod Bihari Mahto and inaugurated by its Secretary, Shibu Soren. There emerged a competition within the Jharkhandi political groups over the sharing and control of symbolic resources. The differences between the two factions were on the issues of the JMM's relations with the MCC, the use of the Red Flag and about the Bihar Colliery Kamgar Union (BCKU). Soren emphasised the necessity of maintaining the separate political identity of the JMM whereas the Leftist factions argued that the JMM had become a handmaid of the INCI. The Leftists therefore, wanted to maintain and strengthen the Jharkhand Alliance between the JMM and the MCC.¹⁴⁰

The two groups also differed over the dual membership of the BCKU and the Jharkhand Mazdoor Sangh. Soren and his groups were accused of supporting the exploiters' party, i.e., the INCI, with the help of the BCKU. They were also accused of corruption. The Leftists also argued that due to the close relationship between the JMM and the INCI, the exploiters were almost glorified and that therefore the workers and not the peasants should lead a joint Jharkhand movement with guidance from Roy. Soren on the other hand, emphasised the final goal of a

¹⁴⁰ *ibid.*

separate Jharkhand state and not the principle of whether the movement should be led by one section or the other. Soren thus, accepted the alliance with the INCI as a useful short-term strategy.

Soren saw this conference as the perfect opportunity for launching the JMM as a new political party and did not see it as a breach of the political alliance with the MCC. It was also felt that there was a need to clarify the separate identity of the JMM and therefore, a new constitution was adopted on 6 April 1984.¹⁴¹ This constitution envisaged the role of the JMM as the leader in the all-round fight to drive out the *dikus*.¹⁴² The conceptual relationships in Jharkhand were again redefined which was essential if the JMM was to participate in electoral politics. The changes in the demographic profile of the region had made the tribals a numerical minority. Consequently, electoral support of only the tribal population (even if seen as a monolithic political group, which they are not) was not sufficient to secure enough votes.

With the participation of the JMM in electoral politics and the effort of some of its MLAs to become ministers, all scope for political co-operation with the MCC ended because Roy and his supporters considered this unacceptable. The movement again became confused and divided. Jharkhand Alliance split into the pro-right JMM led by Shibu Soren, Suraj Mandal and Hakim Prasad and the pro-Communist MCC led by B. B. Mahto, A. K. Roy. Later, the JMM also split into two factions, each led by Soren and Marandi, respectively. The JHP had almost disappeared and N. E. Horo was the only candidate to contest and win the election in 1984. However, Soren emerged as the undisputed mass leader in the region with all others coming after him. The JMM maintained close alliance with the INCI and Soren probably, remains the symbol of the articulation of the aspirations of the masses.

During the mid-1980s once again, the Jharkhandi leaders realised the necessity of joint action if meaningful political presence was to be maintained.

¹⁴¹ *ibid.*

¹⁴² *Dikus* were now being defined as all exploiters including the tribal ones.

Consequently in 1987, 62 cultural and political organisations such as the JMM (Soren), the JMM (Marandi), and a host of smaller organisations forged the Jharkhand Co-ordination Committee (JCC) to guide a unified agitation to realise the dream of a separate province of Jharkhand. The JCC was soon faced with threat to its survival from a students' body formed in 1988 called All Jharkhand Students Union (AJSU). The AJSU since its inception, has been the most vocal constituent of the JCC. It has been giving out calls for blockading of all mineral mining and transportation in the Jharkhand region¹⁴³ to force the union government to agree to the formation of the state of Jharkhand as well as to secure a better policy response to the development problems of the region. However, the response from other constituents of the JCC has been very varied.

The JMM continues to exist divided into two groups the Marandi and Soren groups. They exercise marginal roles in the Parliament and the state legislature along with some other even smaller Jharkhandi parties. The latest instance of such a role is their present support to the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) government in Bihar. In exchange for their support, Bihar Vidhan Sabha led by the RJD adopted a resolution recommending to the central government that a separate state of Jharkhand must be created.¹⁴⁴ Since it is the prerogative of the central government to create new states, the resolution serves only political and symbolic functions. The Bihar government can now point to the central government as the culprit delaying the creation of a state of Jharkhand. The Jharkhandi groups once again, failed to capitalise on one of the rare instances when they actually had a position of influence. Instead of pressurising the Bihar government to transfer actual powers¹⁴⁵ to the Jharkhand Area Autonomous Council (JAAC) created about two years ago, the Jharkhandi leaders sought to play to the gallery with political and symbolic

¹⁴³ There have been many economic blockades in the region organised by the AJSU and other constituents of JCC since late 1980s. The blockade in September 1992 is one such example, *Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, 2 September 1992.

¹⁴⁴ *Times of India*, Internet edition at <http://www.timesofindia.com>, 23 July 1997.

¹⁴⁵ During the field-study interviews, Shailendra Bhattacharya, member of the Central Committee and Executive Committee of JMM complained that the purpose behind the creation of JAAC is not being fulfilled since Bihar government has not transferred powers to JAAC.

gestures. Thus, the history of the Jharkhand movement is a chequered one. Like all movements seeking political recognition, it has had its peaks and troughs. Perhaps, it might have attained greater success if it had not been plagued by divisiveness, lost opportunities, ideological fluidity and inept leadership.

Chapter III

Tribal Areas of Bihar in Independent India

A Legacy of Colonial Discourse?

During British rule, the tribal population of India was by and large, concentrated in four major areas - North-eastern parts of the country (erstwhile province of Assam), the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), the Western Tribal region (in the Bombay Presidency i.e., south Gujarat and western Madhya Pradesh) and the Eastern Tribal Belt (in the province of Bengal and later that of Bihar and Orissa). The British rule in India could not ignore the tribal areas in India due to their strategic and economic importance. The tribal population in NWFP and Assam gained some attention from the colonial administrators owing to their frontier location. Control over these areas was essential for effective strategic defence of the Indian Empire. The Eastern Tribal Belt was also important to the colonial state due to its mineral wealth. The requirements of raw materials for emerging industries ensured that this region occupied an important place in the British colonial project.

The necessity of maintaining peace and order in the frontier provinces prompted the British administrators to develop a system of exclusion that to some extent incorporated the traditional tribal elite. The inaccessibility of these frontier regions combined with the relatively low levels of economic returns from them precluded the necessity of active direct rule. As long as the frontiers of British India could be effectively defended, the colonial state was willing to allow a degree of autonomy to the tribes in these regions.

Contrary to the case of NWFP, the Eastern Tribal Belt did not have the same strategic importance but its long-established mineral wealth made the region significant to the colonial state. Effective utilisation of the economic resources in this region required a far greater degree of direct rule. Consequently, in these regions a system of exclusion developed which did not allow for any significant role of the tribal elite. The system of exclusion in this region was premised on direct paternalistic rule by the Governor of the province through the district officers.

The colonial policy of exclusion of the tribal areas operated within the larger colonial discourse. This policy carried within itself the twin ideas of protection and the 'civilising effects' of British rule. It was this model of exclusion that went on to significantly influence the tribal policy of later years as well that of the independent Indian state. This chapter seeks to analyse the colonial discourse and locate the policy of exclusion within it with the aim of unravelling the continuities and discontinuities of this policy in independent India.

The argument in this chapter is that the rationalist-integrationist paradigm of the dominant colonial discourse was carried into the administrative arrangements of post-colonial India. The colonial discourse was rationalist in the sense that it drew upon the theories of the Enlightenment to generate legitimacy for the colonial state and sought to organise administrative structures according to a Weberian model of bureaucracy. The post-colonial Indian state is a rationalist state in the sense that it continued the colonial state's emphasis on a rationally organised Weberian bureaucracy. Moreover, it seeks to further its twin goals of development and integration with the help of a bureaucratic planning and delivery mechanism. The centralised development planning presupposes that a certain policy must 'rationally' work in all contexts and ignores the political and cultural factors.

I

The Idea of Discourse and Hegemony

The view that a body of ideas generates and sustains the power and legitimacy of State structures has been seen to have its intellectual roots in the writings of Antonio Gramsci¹ and in his concept of the hegemonic power of an ideology. Gramsci's conception of the State as "coercion plus hegemony" led to a well-established intellectual tradition that explores the relationship between ideological structures and power. "Ideology operates as discourse, addressing or, as

¹ Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, tr. Q. Hoare and G. Nowell Smith, London, 1971, pp. 44-120.

Althusser puts it, interpreting human beings as subjects”.² There are many strands to this area of enquiry. In the “Althusserian tradition, emphasis was laid, first on the science/ ideology demarcation, then on ideology ‘in general’ and the operation of ‘ideological state apparatuses’”.³ The creation and organisation of ideological hegemony was examined by neo-Gramscian scholars while the Weberian strand of thought dwelt on the ‘crisis of legitimation’ in the social order. Marxist scholars studied the operation of political discourses in terms of the contradiction between material base and ideological superstructure.⁴

The study of hegemonic power of an ideology in colonial and post-colonial cases showed that the colonial states had been successful in exercising hegemony over the population of the colonising country as well as the colonised people.⁵ This stream of enquiry into the relationship between ideas and State power in colonial states has been called ‘colonial discourse analysis’ or ‘colonial discourse theory’. It is this strand of the study of hegemony which is relevant to this study. It can be seen to originate in Edward Said’s powerful writings. “It is perhaps no exaggeration to say that Edward Said’s *Orientalism*,⁶ . . . single-handedly inaugurates a new area of enquiry”⁷ – that of colonial discourse. Said’s later book⁸ also expanded the boundaries of colonial discourse theory to the analysis of the linkages between culture and imperialism.⁹

² Goran Therborn, *The Ideology of Power and Power of Ideology*, London, 1980, p. 15.

³ *ibid.*, p. 31.

⁴ *ibid.*, pp. 31-2.

⁵ For instance, Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse*, London, 1986.

⁶ Edward Said, *Orientalism*, London, 1978.

⁷ Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman, ‘Colonial Discourse and Post-colonial Theory: An Introduction’ in Williams, Patrick and Chrisman, Laura, *Colonial and Post-colonial Theory*, Cambridge, 1993, p. 5.

⁸ Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, London, 1993.

⁹ The close relationship between colonialism and imperialism (also politics and economics) was enunciated by Lenin in his celebrated pamphlet on imperialism and highlighted by Marxist writings such as Eric Hobsbawm, *Age of Imperialism*, London, 1987.

Said's work focused mainly on the variety of textual forms in which the West produced and codified knowledge about non-metropolitan areas and cultures, especially those under colonial control. Recent works in colonial discourse theory however, have tended to use a local rather than a global focus, as well as drawing from a wide variety of intellectual traditions. For instance, "psychoanalysis (Homi Bhabha) . . . deconstruction (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak), feminism (Chandra Mohanty), other forms of Marxism (Aijaz Ahmad)"¹⁰ and political psychology (Ashis Nandy).

Edward Said's *Imperialism* was an important landmark in the acceptance of this area of enquiry as a formally recognised area of study but was "preceded by a German intellectual tradition which shared Said's concerns with the historical and theoretical relations between the Western economic/ political global domination and Western intellectual production". For instance, Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer of the Frankfurt School, Walter Benjamin and Hannah Arendt¹¹. Subsequently, Frenchman Michel Foucault's work¹² on the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries examined the construction of "man and his others" as objects of knowledge within this overall period with the implication that an ideological continuity exists into the twentieth century.

Arendt combined political, cultural and sociological theory with empirical investigation and offered what can be termed as "an eclectic and singularly Heideggerian-informed left-leaning cultural materialism" and in her analysis "aesthetic culture and philosophical idealism emerge as crucial components of imperialism's political self-legitimation".¹³

This intellectual heritage has led to a number of avenues of enquiry. The dynamics of 'hegemonic consensus' that emerged in India in the nineteenth century

¹⁰ Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman, op. cit., p. 5.

¹¹ Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, New York, 1986.

¹² Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of Human Sciences*, London, 1970.

¹³ Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman, op. cit., p. 7.

is the strand that is crucial to this study. The debate about the relationship between ideology and power in the Indian context was conducted within the “ambit of Marxist theory, but more specifically within the relations between culture and politics suggested in the writings of Antonio Gramsci”. It has linked up with the Marxist approach to the ‘national and colonial question’ and “recent European discussions on Gramsci have highlighted the importance of his ideas not merely in the context of revolutionary politics of Europe, but for post-colonial state in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America”.¹⁴

Gramsci’s idea of the State as ‘coercion plus hegemony’ and of struggle for power as domination plus intellectual-moral leadership has enabled

Indian critics to examine afresh the so-called ‘renaissance’ in 19th century India in terms of the aspiration of a new class to assert its intellectual-moral leadership over a modernising Indian nation and to stake its claim to power in opposition to its colonial masters. But the examination also demonstrated how, under the specific conditions of the economy and polity of a colonial country, this domination necessarily rests on extremely fragile foundations and the intellectual-moral leadership of the dominant classes over the new nation remains fragmented.¹⁵

This study makes use of this stream of colonial discourse theory to examine the operation of the dominant strand of colonial discourse in India and the emergence of a nationalist and later a sub-national discourse.

II

Colonial Discourse and the Nationalists

In order to understand the continuities between the tribal policy of the colonial state and that of the independent Indian state it is important to understand

¹⁴ Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse*, London, 1986, p. 29.

¹⁵ *ibid.*

how the nationalist discourse borrowed significant elements of the colonial discourse. Nationalist discourse in India emerged first as a reaction and later as an alternative to the colonial discourse.

The British colonial state in India was not only a set of institutions and structures but also a set of discourses. The success of these discourses was essential for the legitimisation of the colonial rule in the socio-political context so as to generate political stability. The colonial state was inextricably dependent on a set of discursive structures premised on the discourse of Enlightenment. Both, the functionaries as well as the critics of the colonial state believed that it drew its power from the "grand theories of European rationalism - its theories, self-definitions, narratives, delusions and strategies . . . [which it used] to define and describe itself, to negotiate and bring under control the alien social world"¹⁶ it had entered. Those who had to deal with this colonial state, whether in a collaborative or contesting manner, recognised and respected the indivisibility and importance of the myth of invincibility of western rationality which was fundamental to understanding its institutions and logic of functioning. Therefore, while some tried to acquire western education in order to master the occult powers of invincible western rationality, others tried to adopt and adapt the ideals of English Utilitarianism into the figures of traditional Indian mythology. Yet others tried to avoid it completely by turning towards the traditional discourse.

In general however, the reaction against colonial discourse was muted because the colonial state adopted multiple levels of dialogue. It had to address three kinds of audience – British public opinion, Indian western-educated intelligentsia and middle-class and the masses of India. With each of these, it adopted a different kind of language while always employing the concepts of the rationalist discourse. When addressing British public opinion it used the tone of reasonableness; that of education and legislation in its dealings with the Indian intelligentsia and the

¹⁶ Sudipta Kaviraj, 'On the Construction of Colonial Power: Structure, Discourse, Hegemony' in Engels, Dagmar and Marks, Shula, eds., *Contesting Colonial Hegemony: State and Society in Africa and India*, London, 1994, p. 21.

indigenous middle-class; and that of force and power with respect to the large and distant masses of India. The language of discourse which the colonial state employed with the middle-class and Indian intelligentsia was most significant in generating and maintaining political hegemony in India. It generated a new kind of discourse which at once, consolidated the power of the colonial state's power as well as undermined it in the years to come.¹⁷

The colonial discourse was a rationalist discourse in the sense that it drew upon the theories of the Enlightenment to generate legitimacy for the colonial state and sought to organise administrative structures according to a Weberian model of bureaucracy.

The colonial state's projects of legislation and education led the Indian intelligentsia to view the colonial state in contrast to the pre-colonial state, as one that defended the rule of law, gave security to life and property and provided an opportunity to acquire knowledge of European arts and sciences. Furthermore, the vision of political future as projected by the colonial state was even more attractive to these intellectuals. The colonial state promised to fulfil their cherished ideals of democratic and constitutional governance accompanied with modern industrial development. Minor concessions in the form of a series of Council of India Acts encouraged them to believe in the colonial state. "In their conception, England which held out the ideals of parliamentary democracy, civil liberties and modern economic development, would act as the instruments for their dispensation to other countries of the world. England was a 'mirror of their own future' . . . British rule was, therefore, 'welcomed as the chosen instrument'"¹⁸ to change the despotic

¹⁷ For a full discussion of the processes by which the nationalist discourse emerged, see Panikkar, K. N., *Culture, Ideology, Hegemony: Intellectual and Social Consciousness in Colonial India*, New Delhi, 1995; Kaviraj, Sudipta, 'On the Construction of Colonial Power: Structure, Discourse, Hegemony' in Engels, Dagmar and Marks, Shula, eds., *Contesting Colonial Hegemony: State and Society in Africa and India*, London, 1994, pp. 19-54; Kaviraj, Sudipta, 'The Imaginary Institution of India' in Chatterjee, Partha and Pandey, Gyanendra, eds., *Subaltern Studies: Writings on South Asian History and Society*, vol. VII, Delhi, 1992, pp. 1-39 and Chatterjee, Partha, *Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Post-colonial Histories*, New Delhi, 1995.

¹⁸ K. N., Panikkar, *Culture, Ideology, Hegemony Intellectual and Social Consciousness in Colonial India*, New Delhi, 1995, p. 22.

conditions of pre-colonial India into a bourgeois-democratic system. Notwithstanding the sharp criticisms of the colonial rule which were put forward by the intellectuals of the time, the belief that the transformation of India would occur within the colonial framework was clear. This belief had its roots in the false consciousness created by the ideologies disseminated by the colonial rulers and adopted by the intellectuals of the time.

Some intellectuals accepted a version of essentialism. A collaborative relationship developed amongst the colonial rulers and the colonised people in which the latter accepted the world view, apparatus of knowledge, criteria of judgement and ideology of the former. One strand of this discourse was particularly important in reinforcing this relationship as it suited the hegemonic consensus. This view accepted the separateness of Indian history in spiritual/ cultural matters but sought to retain British control over economic and political questions since in the latter the superiority of the British rationality was evident.

Apart from generating legitimacy for the colonial state, this project also went on to produce unintended and opposite results in the longer run. "By integrating society, introducing symmetric trends of social hierarchy, enumerating society, familiarising Indians with the theory of public power and democracy, placing before them the universality of reason and the great narratives of European nation-formation and introducing the skills of forming associations, this imperial discourse had also taught the Indians how rationalism could be turned against colonisers themselves".¹⁹

Some western educated intellectuals, while employing the rationalist tools which they had learnt from western education, began to put forward an alternative historical narration that contested universalist imperial history. Thus, the nationalist view of history began by creating a dichotomy between the material and the spiritual domains as opposed to the dichotomy of public and private spheres offered by the colonial state. "Anti-colonial nationalism creates its own domain of sovereignty

¹⁹ Kaviraj, op. cit., p. 44.

within colonial society well before it begins its battle with the imperial power. It does this by dividing the world of social institutions and practises into two domains — the material and the spiritual”.²⁰ In the opinion of the nationalists, in the material domain of economy, state craft, technology and science, the West had proven its superiority and this superiority had to be acknowledged, studied and replicated.²¹ However, the greater the success in adopting and imitating the material imperialist domain, the greater was the need to preserve the distinctness of the cultural domain as the essentials of the identity existed there.

This is perhaps fundamental to the trajectory of nationalism in India. It is reflected in the social reform efforts of the 20th century when the necessity of change in the social and cultural domain was acknowledged but intervention by the colonial state in the guise of legislation was sought to be excluded.²² It was within this domain that nationalists contested the imperialist history of India with a history of their own which although used the universality of rationality as a tool, endeavoured to construct a modern national culture that was not western. The ‘imagined community’ of the nation came into being in this domain where it was already sovereign. The major areas where this transformation of a colonised culture into a nationalist culture took place were those of language, literature, mass media such as drama, art, nationalist educational institutions, family and religion. Indian nationalism started by asserting its autonomy and sovereignty in these areas and constructing the ‘Indian’ identity with its historical, cultural and symbolic appendages.

In the domain of the material, nationalism was unable to emphasise the difference, as it was able to in the spiritual and cultural domain.²³ Therefore, it

²⁰ Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Post-colonial Histories*, New Delhi, 1995, p. 6.

²¹ Although, some stands of nationalist discourse such as the Arya Samaj believed that classical Indian thought and practises was superior in the material realm too.

²² Unlike the earlier period when social legislation was desired by most reformers.

²³ Chatterjee, *The Nation and its Fragments*, op. cit. discusses why the cultural domain was more amenable to the creation of the community than the material domain.

began to assert itself in the public domain constituted by the modern/ colonial state. Its main task was to challenge colonial hegemony over the middle class, i. e. to contest the 'rule of difference'. The growth of institutions in the country required that the 'rule of difference' be also institutionalised.²⁴ Nationalism, utilising the rationalist thought and humanism that it had learnt from the colonists, contested this difference between the rulers and the ruled with the result that it became a force in the public domain as well. The public area occupied by nationalism expanded as nationalist politics grew stronger.

The nationalists thus created a dichotomy between the material and the spiritual/ cultural (nationalism having declared sovereignty in the latter realm). The rationalist colonial state on the other hand, operated within the distinction of public and private domains whereby it sought to ensure equality of all private domains (in terms of religion, caste etc.). The nationalist discourse operated in a set of contradictory domains. On the one hand, in the cultural domain it was able to construct a new discourse that was premised on the difference from the colonial discourse and on the other hand, it accepted and revered the colonial model in the realm of the material.

Therefore to some extent, parts of the public domain of the colonial state and the material domain of nationalism overlapped. Nationalist thought was not successful in constructing an alternate discourse in the material domain (partly because the nationalist leaders were convinced of the superiority of the western rationalist discourse within the material domain). Consequently, it also accepted the colonial model of economic and political development consisting of politico-economic and social integration and industrialisation.

²⁴ The colonial discourse embodied the concept that there was an essential difference between the British rulers and the Indian subjects. This led to a 'rule of difference' that dwelt on the superiority of the Europeans race and their cultural practises over the Indian population and their practises. Examples of this include barring of all Indians from certain areas of Indian cities and the outcry from the European population living in India over the Ilbert Bill whereby an Indian judge could try European offenders.

The acceptance of the essentials of the material domain of the colonial discourse by the nationalists had an important impact on the administrative and discursive structures of the postcolonial state in India. It will emerge in the subsequent discussion that there is a strong continuity of colonial discourse in the Constituent Assembly and hence, the Constitution.

III

Colonial Policy and the Tribal Areas of Bihar

British colonial discourse, since the earliest Orientalist versus Anglicist debates, had two distinct strands. Both viewed European cultural practices as superior to Indian and gave primacy to British power but differed over the future of Indian society. One strand, which was to become the dominant model, viewed the future in a Macaulayan trajectory in which European theory and practice was to lead the way towards an integrated and centralised Indian polity which would promote free trade within a global market. The other strand of British discourse saw the future of India as retaining its differences under a benevolent British suzerainty in alliance with the 'natural' leaders of the country (the native Princes and Rulers or the dominant caste/ tribal groups). In the context of the tribal regions, the two strands of colonial discourse was played out between the missionaries in which some (such as the Evangelicals) viewed all Indian practises as 'corrupt and backward' and sought its replacement by the 'superior' European practices. The other strand wished to work with what they saw as the 'grains' of Indian society such as the caste structure. Nonetheless, both the points of view concurred on the history of tribal society and viewed it as victim of the Hindu caste system (such as exploitation by the moneylenders) and assigned a pivotal role to the British rule. Under British rule, the future of tribal society was seen as either completing their transition to a market economy or enjoying an ahistoric future of rustic happiness.²⁵

²⁵ I am grateful to Dr. David Taylor for his comments and suggestions on this formulation.

Within the broad framework of colonial discourse, ethnographers, anthropologists, sociologists, historians, administrators and Christian missionaries had actively investigated the tribal cultures of India from which emerged two broad approaches towards the tribal areas. The first conceptual framework which became the dominant model, was developed by the British administrator-ethnographer-anthropologists. This model treated the tribal communities as "isolates, tribals as Noble Savages, and the primitive condition was described as a state of Arcadian simplicity . . . These scholars overlooked the operation of the historical processes that led to the formation of the state, the emergence of a complex regional system in the wake of the migration of non-tribal communities and functional castes and the penetration of cultural influences . . . This led to the build-up of a myth that has bedevilled all historical writings on Chotanagpur and inspired all tribal movements".²⁶ Thus, a tribal was constructed as a person who was innocent of the operation of the socio-historical processes and therefore open to being duped by the non-tribals and moneylenders. This perspective served the purpose of justifying the continued presence of not only the colonial Raj but also that of missionaries.

The second point of view construed the tribes as members of a sub-system of Hinduism in the process of being absorbed into the Hindu Society.²⁷ Both these points of view, despite their obvious difference in approach, viewed the tribal communities as waiting to be absorbed into the mainstream political and economic system – either the market economy or the Hindu caste-system.

The central premise of the dominant strand of colonial discourse was that until the time when the tribal communities were integrated into the dominant politico-social systems, they required a great degree of protection. This formed the basis of the broad colonial policy towards the tribal areas. Once the structures of the colonial state were in place, it had the ability to choose between direct intervention

²⁶ K. S. Singh, *Tribal Society in India: An Anthro-historical Perspective*, New Delhi, 1985, p. 1.

²⁷ With some modifications, this point of view is the foundation behind the BJP's concept of *Vanvasis*.

and a judicious veto. This capacity to exercise a veto was also central to the tribal policy of the colonial discourse.

The colonial state realised its inability to intervene in the spiritual/cultural domain of the tribals, as this area did not allow for rationalist reduction. The colonial state was content to control the economic life of the region by emphasising what was now broadly accepted by the intelligentsia of India: the rationalist discourse was superior in the material domain and therefore was worthy of emulation. The tribal regions were portrayed as primitive and backward and to bring them into the mainstream of material rationalist discourse was seen as desirable. The colonial state therefore, gradually adopted a policy of exclusion whereby the rationalist discourse would be furthered in the material domain by maintaining control with the help of a 'judicious veto'. The rationalist dichotomy of public/private domains was invoked to guarantee the inviolability of the spiritual domain in the form of laws that guaranteed tribes the right to practise their customs and traditions.

The concept of *protecting* the tribal communities from the ill effects of too rapid an integration into the economy and polity was born out of the nature of British rule in India. Unlike elsewhere in the world where the traditional leaders played an important role as an intermediary between the colonial administration and the tribal communities, a system of direct rule (with varying degrees of active direct rule) evolved in India. This direct rule was integrationist in character whereby some of the tribal areas were incorporated into the general administration of the British provinces or the Indian Princely states. At the same time, in other areas of tribal concentration, a system of exclusion was developed where the concept of protection of the tribal population gradually developed. The main features of this system of exclusion were:

- (a) paternalistic rule by district officers;
- (b) exclusion of tribal areas from the operation of ordinary laws to preserve their ethos, laws, etc. with its logical corollary of limitation of the jurisdiction of ordinary courts and simple procedures to settle disputes;

- (c) restricted entry of non-tribals into tribal areas; and,
- (d) strengthening of tribal leadership.

The tribal revolts and rebellions that occurred as a result of the gradual implementation of direct rule over the 19th century in turn, further reinforced the policy of direct rule. The necessity of establishing convenient lines of communication to facilitate administration and rapid deployment of the army in cases of rebellion was soon followed by cantonments, traders and a faster pace of urbanisation. Moreover, the operation of this policy of direct rule led to higher rates of in-migration of non-tribals into the region. Consequently, the tribal areas were integrated into the new economic and administrative set-up which ended the relative isolation of the tribes and their political dominance in the region.

In the tribal regions of Bihar (as in many other parts of the country), the use of military force formed the basis of early colonial policy. It was followed by legislation incorporating the fundamentals of the colonial discourse as an avenue to legitimise its power in the region. In the tribal areas which came to be called the Excluded Areas under the British rule, colonial intervention began by the organisation of structures aimed at maximisation of rent. It confined itself to the material domain. The colonial state utilised the military force it had at its disposal to create material structures aimed at a greater intervention in the economic life of the region.

In this initial phase, the colonial state was still expanding and efforts at legitimisation of the regime were not of primary importance. The earliest available instance of significant British activity in south Bihar was a militia force under Captain Camac in 1769 sent to subjugate the local chiefs and landlords. This step was taken to ensure regular payments of revenue by local tribal chiefs. Since then almost till the middle of the next century, the British activity in this area was limited to occasional military operations aimed at subjugating recalcitrant local chiefs, tribal heads, landlords and revenue intermediaries, and the collection of overdue revenue and war booty. This policy was geared towards maximisation of revenue without incurring the cost of a local administration. The introduction of contract rent

collection by local chiefs, *thikedars*, *ilakdars* and landlords on behalf of the British brought about a fundamental change in the agrarian relations of tribal south Bihar.

It was only after the Kol Insurrection of 1831-32 and the Santhal Rebellion of 1855 that the contradictions in such a policy of maximisation of rent from the land through the intermediaries were noticed. Although the erstwhile officers²⁸ would like us to believe that the local rent-collectors were responsible for the numerous tribal revolts and insurrections in the late eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth centuries, the British administration cannot escape responsibility since it was their efforts at maximisation of revenue that passed down the line until it became unbearable for the tribal peasant of south Bihar.

The tribal revolts of the mid-19th century signified that the policy of minimum administration with maximum rent collection had outlived its utility. If British rule was to benefit from this mineral-rich region, the colonial discourse had to move on to the level of legitimisation from the level of the use of force. The hegemonic discourse of British rule was already emerging in the rest of India in the shape of projects of legislation and education. The tribal areas were to become a part of the larger colonial discourse after the rebellion by the tribes had been crushed by sheer military superiority. It is at this point of time that the colonial discourse on the tribal areas was articulated in a nascent form.

Gradually, a regular administration and police force were established in the area. A number of laws were enacted such as the Wilkinson Rules, Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act and others, incorporating the fundamentals of the colonial discourse. As already pointed out, the colonial discourse carried within it the concept of protection that was now implemented vis-à-vis the tribal population. Hence, the colonial intervention in the region was justified by the colonial discourse on the benefits that it offered to the local population in terms of protecting them from two

²⁸ For instance, the Report of Joint Commissioners Dent and Captain Wilkinson dated 4 September 1833 regarding the disturbances in Barabhum and neighbouring Parganas during the Kol Rebellion blamed the local *ilakdars*, *zamindars*, and *thikedars* for increasing the rent by 35% over a few years as the primary cause of the disturbances, *Bihar District Gazetteers: Ranchi*, Patna, 1970, pp. 52-3.

dangers; namely, the loss of agricultural land owned by the tribal people to 'more civilised sections of the population' and the 'wiles of the moneylender'. Consequently, a policy of protection and exclusion was adopted towards these areas since colonial discourse portrayed the tribal people as 'primitive people, who were simple, unsophisticated and frequently improvident'.

For this purpose, initially, a number of individual laws were enacted and enforced in various parts of British India, including tribal Bihar. The Scheduled Districts Act 1874 was the first enactment to treat the tribal areas as a separate category. This enactment empowered the executive branch of the government to extend any enactment in force in any part of British India to a 'Scheduled District' with such modifications as might be considered necessary and by implication, excluded the scheduled areas from the operation of any ordinary law of British India. This concept of protecting the tribes by excluding them from the operation of ordinary laws was an integral part of the colonial discourse and continued in the Montagu-Chelmsford Report and the subsequent Government of India Act, 1919.

The Montagu-Chelmsford Report contained a brief reference to such areas and suggested that the political reforms being contemplated for the rest of British territories in India could not be applied to the scheduled areas because "there was no political material on which to found political institutions".²⁹ Hence, the typically backward tracts were excluded from the scope of reformed legislatures in the provinces of British India.

The Government of India Act, 1919 introduced a new element in the administration of these areas. It divided the 'Backward Tracts' into two types: the first included those areas that were considered so backward that they were completely excluded from the scope of the reformed legislatures and the constitutional reforms.³⁰ With respect to these areas, neither the central nor the

²⁹ *Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms 1918*, para 199.

³⁰ This arrangement of exclusion applied to tribal areas in the backward regions: Amindivi and Laccadive Islands and Minicoy Islands in the erstwhile province of Madras (now the Union Territories of Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Lakshwadeep Islands), the Chittagong Hill Tracts

Contd.

provincial legislatures were given any powers. The Governor-General-in-Council was the sole legislator for such areas and the elected ministers had no responsibility for them. The proposals for expenditures in these areas were not subject to voting approval of the Legislatures and no questions could be asked or discussions entered into about such areas. The second type of Backward Areas were those in which the reserved half of the diarchical government exercised the powers of extending or restraining any provincial law or enactment. Such areas were represented in the legislatures but the representation was neither adequate nor effective.³¹ The protectionist strand of the colonial discourse had evolved to ensure that Governor operating through the district administration was the sole arbitrator in the tribal regions. The use of education to ensure a wider social base for the colonial discourse (and to generate sympathetic support for it in the minds of emerging middle-class Indian intelligentsia) generated legitimacy for this system of exclusion.

After independence, the Constituent Assembly adopted not only the basic structure of governance but also some fundamentals of the colonial discourse. Owing to the nationalist belief in the desirability of western rationality in the realm of the material, the Constituent Assembly tried to implement an integrationist policy with a development model premised on industrialisation and a rationally organised bureaucracy as the delivery mechanism for public policy. In some ways, the protectionist strand of the colonial discourse also survived in post-independence India. No doubt, significant new ground was broken when the Constituent Assembly sought to remove the 'rule of difference' and granted full political status to the tribal population. However, with regards to other matters, the paternalistic and integrationist discourse vis-à-vis the tribal population continued.

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in Bengal (now in Bangladesh), the area of Spiti and Lahaul in the Kangra district of the province of Punjab (now in Himachal Pradesh) and Angul in the province of Bihar and Orissa (now in Orissa).

³¹ The Statutory commission reported in 1930 that the whole of the Assam backward tracts (an area of approximately 50,000 square miles) was represented by one nominated member in the Provincial Legislature, who for a considerable length of time was a Welsh Missionary.

IV

Creation of Autonomous 'Sub-national' Community and Colonial Tribal Policy

The nationalist project had begun with an autonomous form of imagination of the community in the spiritual/cultural domain, which was not amenable to rationalist reductions. The nation was first imagined in this domain and declared sovereign. "The result is that autonomous forms of imagination of the community were, and continue to be, overwhelmed and swamped by the history of the postcolonial state. Here lies the root of our postcolonial misery: not in our inability to think out new forms of the modern community but in our surrender to the old forms of the modern state. If the nation is an imagined community and if nations must also take the form of states, then our theoretical language must allow us to talk about community and the state at the same time . . ." ³² The Jharkhandi community like numerous other communities premised on various cultural lines (for instance, the Oriya identity premised on a distinctive language) employed the autonomous method of imagination of community that the nationalists had used vis-à-vis the colonial state. The leaders in the tribal areas of Bihar, who were also western-educated, were quick to learn from the nationalist leaders. They employed a version of local history, glorified the tribal revolts and utilised the uniqueness of the tribal heritage to engender a process of such autonomous forms of imagination of the community that soon started to desire political recognition. Proto-Jharkhandi identity was articulated in the early 1930s in a Memorandum to the Simon Commission. Consequently by 1947 the tribal regions, supported by the protection of their cultural life under the system of exclusion, had acquired an 'imagined community' premised on tribal uniqueness and culture. It was helped by the fact that the Jharkhand region was on the fringes of both British colonial administration (in terms of it being an Excluded Area) as well as the nationalist discourse.

³² Chatterjee, *The Nation and its Fragments*, op. cit., p. 11.

The 'sub-national' communities employed the same avenues which the nationalists had employed vis-à-vis British colonial rule to invent and declare their political identity in the spiritual/cultural realm. Once such a community was created, it began to seek political recognition from first the colonial state and then the post-colonial Indian state.³³ These 'sub-national' or 'regional' identities also shared with the nationalists a belief in rapid rationalist development. Consequently, the community thus created employed the poor performance of the development policy of the Indian state as an additional reason to demand political autonomy.

During the colonial period, the colonial discourse of paternalism, protectionism and integration in the tribal regions of India, especially in Bihar, was able to secure almost a consensus on the tribal policy as evident in the lack of dissent in the reports and debates of the period (elements of this also continued into the post-colonial period). The colonial project of legitimisation under the project of legislation continued with the appointment of the Indian Statutory Commission (The Simon Commission) in 1928. The Commission which considered wide-ranging constitutional powers for the provinces, chose not to include the tribal areas in the new arrangements. Perhaps, the relatively poor growth of education in the region and the large-scale presence of missionaries had some bearing on this decision. Unlike the rest of India, the colonial state was not able to generate the same degree of legitimacy in the region since the educated middle class was still very small in number. The superiority of the colonial rationalist discourse, at least in the material domain therefore, could not be stressed upon. As will emerge in the following discussion, the missionaries as well as some proportion of the local populace portrayed the tribal regions as 'requiring civilising influence'.

To add to the persistence of the hegemony of the colonial discourse with respect to the region, the relatively low place of the tribal question on the nationalist

³³ In the colonial state, the demand for greater political recognition (as will be seen later in this chapter) took the form of a demand before the Simon Commission for greater democratic administration (including the demand for the Chota Nagpur region to be converted into a Chief Commissioner's or a Governor's province) in the Excluded Areas. In the post-colonial state this demand crystallised into a demand for an autonomous state.

agenda did not help matters. Although individual leaders such as Gandhi and Thakkar Bapa were alive to the tribal population and their problems, Indian National Congress as an organisation was surprisingly unconcerned.³⁴ Moreover, the broad acceptance of the colonial discourse with respect to the material domain by the nationalist leadership also implied the acceptance of desirability of greater social and economic integration of the tribal population.

In its report, the Simon commission took notice of the 'Backward Tribes' and commented that if Burma was excluded, "they are to be found in five of the eight provinces, and the total extent of the backward tracts in these five provinces is no less than 120,000 square miles, containing a population of 11¹/₄ millions".³⁵ It further on pointed out that "the province of Bihar and Orissa, . . . is the *most artificial unit* of all the Indian provinces. It was formed by bringing under a single administration three areas which differ markedly, not only in physical features, but in many racial, linguistic, and cultural characteristics"³⁶ (emphasis added). Notwithstanding these observations, the report of the Simon Commission did not lead to any significant change in the policy orientation towards the tribal areas.

When the Report of this Commission was being discussed in the House of Commons, the Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas (as the 'Backward Areas' came to be called in the Simon Commission Report) were conspicuous by the brevity of reference to them. While introducing the Bill, the then Secretary of State for India, Sir Samuel Hoare, in dealing with the subject of special responsibilities, made a brief reference to these areas: "Again, with the backward districts and aboriginal tribes, . . . every hon. member will agree that we must keep in reserve powers to prevent these tribes and these remote districts from being exploited".³⁷

³⁴ "The tomes of the Congress resolutions did not contain a word about the tribal issue; probably there was no attempt to identify the issues in the times of the all-consuming struggle for independence, when the tribal issue was considered a minor part of the wider social and economic challenge", Singh, op. cit., p. 177.

³⁵ *Report of the Indian Statutory Commission*, vol. II, London, 1930, para. 127.

³⁶ *ibid.*, vol. I, para 87.

³⁷ *Parliamentary Debates*, Official Report, Fifth Series, vol. 296, House of Commons, 10 December 1934, col. 53.

The colonial discourse is quite clear in this excerpt with the language of reasonableness in use. In line with the strength of the colonial discourse, there was no dissent. The hon. members agreed with his point of view. There was no further debate or discussion on the issue except for a brief reference by Wing-Commander James who while referring to the Backward Tracts and Excluded Areas observed: "I welcome the proposals . . . [which] appear to be a great improvement . . ." over the existing provisions. He wanted the Government to clearly demarcate the Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas. Referring to such areas, he observed that "more than mere powers kept in reserve are required . . . The trouble is that they [reform and demarcation of the Excluded Areas] have always been left for further consideration . . . What I should like to hear from Secretary of State, if possible, is how and when he proposes that the survey, . . . be carried out because I hope the inquiry is going to be independent, unfettered . . ." ³⁸ The protectionist element of the colonial discourse that the nationalist leadership also agreed with by default (since they did not have opinions that opposed it) was mirrored in the House of Commons. The House of Commons, in accordance with the accepted rationalist colonial discourse and its corollary of protectionist administration in the tribal areas, whole-heartedly supported the continuance of the system of exclusion.

The underlying discourse in which the Simon Commission functioned is evident when it quoted from the Memorandum on Backward Tracts prepared by the Bihar and Orissa Government ³⁹ in order to emphasise the need for special provisions and special protection for the aboriginal population:

They cannot compete against the subtler minds of the Aryan races that have in the past two or three centuries penetrated slowly into the country; their improvidence lays them open to the wiles of the moneylender; their lack of education and their distinctive languages place them at a great disadvantage in the Courts. When roused to

³⁸ *Parliamentary Debates*, Official Report, Fifth Series, vol. 296, House of Commons, 11 December 1934, col. 307-11.

³⁹ 'Memorandum on Backward Tracts presented by the Bihar and Orissa Government', *Report of the Indian Statutory Commission*, vol. XII: *Selections from the Memoranda and Oral Evidence by Officials*, London, 1930, pp. 332.

action by real or fancied grievances their tribal organisation, where it survives, and elsewhere the solidarity of kinship make for a rapid spread of disaffection, while their childlike outlook makes the duty of restoring order a peculiarly distasteful one.⁴⁰

Evidently, the colonial officials saw ample justification for the continuance of the protectionist policy in the tribal region. Furthermore, the official view of a tribal hardly seemed to have evolved since the late 19th century. The tribals were still viewed as a race inferior to the 'relatively more civilised Aryan races' without a sense of history or understanding of the results of their actions and were prone to revolts on imagined grounds. The Commission took note of the 1855 Santhal rebellion and observed that it was marked by "looting and violence" and "a large punitive force was required to restore order. After the rebellion, the district was excluded from the operation of the general regulations . . ."⁴¹ Their distinctive cultural features such as language and social organisation were portrayed as in need of civilising influence of the rationalist paternalistic administration.

The Simon Commission in its report, referring to the tribal population, observed that

these backward races are commonly supposed to be *remnants* of pre-Aryan autochthonous people into whose strongholds in the hills and forests the invader found it difficult and unprofitable to penetrate. Some of them live by hunting, and by a type of shifting cultivation . . . In the valley, the tribes have with great labour terraced isolated fields, producing abundant crops, but at no time before the establishment of British rule were these plots coveted by the plainsman, *for he could not have collected rent from the occupiers.* But the moneylender and the trader took advantage *of the new reign of law to reduce the aboriginal owners to practical serfdom*⁴² (emphasis added).

This statement demonstrates the entrenched and dominant colonial discourse in the approach of the Commission towards the tribal population. It considered the

⁴⁰ *Report of the Indian Statutory Commission*, vol. I, op. cit., para 88.

⁴¹ *ibid.*

⁴² *ibid.*

tribal population to be 'remnants' of some pre-historic people with the undertone being that these remnants should have 'Aryanised' by now but somehow historically it did not work out that way. Therefore, unless they were 'civilised' under the paternal British rule, would be perceptually in need of protection. The Commission saw the tribal population as wild people who spent their time hunting and copying 'more civilised' people in trying out some agriculture in terraced fields. The 'civilised Aryans' had no great use of such people. It was only after some agriculture developed ('civilising effect') under the British rule that these areas became attractive to the outsiders ('more civilised people'). The Commission had implicit belief in the goodness of the colonial administration and saw no difficulty with the facts that money-economy came into that area with British rule and that the same money-economy was making the tribal population dependent on the moneylenders. However, the dominant colonial discourse was performing its function of allowing awkward realities to be subsumed as exceptions or anomalies and this was not seen as incongruous.

The colonial discourse continued when the Commission observed that

. . . the Chota Nagpur plateau, which formed part of the inaccessible forest tract which the Aryan invaders called 'Jarkhand' . . . These *primitive tribes* amount to 58 per cent. of the population, and they nurse a resentment against the Hindu immigrants who, as they consider, have robbed them of their ancestral lands. Unrest, usually arising from agrarian causes often assuming a religious complexion, *is still endemic* . . . [the tribal] *remains credulous and excitable and almost as much as ever in need of special protection* . . . ⁴³ (emphasis added).

In this quotation, the Commission not only carried forth the colonial discourse but also reflected an inadequate understanding of the area. Unrest in South Bihar has always been agrarian, arising out of the new revenue system imposed between 1769 and 1855. Furthermore, in saying that the unrest is "still endemic", the undertone of the Commission is, again, patronising. It implies that civilised

⁴³ *ibid.*

people do not have such unrest and only the "under-civilised" societies were prone to such problems.

In volume II of the Report (Recommendations), the Commission suggested that

they should be known in future not as 'Backward Tracts' but as 'Excluded Areas'. The state of development reached by inhabitants of these areas prevents the possibility of applying to them methods of representation adopted elsewhere. *They do not ask for self-determination, but for security of land-tenure, freedom in pursuit of their traditional methods of livelihood, and the reasonable exercise of their traditional customs. Their contentment does not depend so much on rapid political advance as on experienced and sympathetic handling, and on protection from economic subjugation by the neighbours*⁴⁴ (emphasis added).

In this statement, the Commission completely divorced economic development and social well being from political advancement and emphasised the desirability of British rule. It continued the protectionist approach as a means of justifying the colonial rule when it observed that

. . . the principal duty of the administration is to educate these people to stand on their own feet, . . . It is too large a task to be left to the single-handed efforts of missionary societies or individual officials. Co-ordination of activities and adequate funds are principally required. The typical backward tract is a deficit area, and no provincial legislature is likely to possess either the will or the means to devote special attention to its particular requirements . . . Only if responsibility for the backward tracts is entrusted to the Centre, does it appear likely that it will be adequately discharged.⁴⁵

The integrationist approach of the Commission was also clear when it observed that " . . . the bulk of the inhabitants of a backward tract are so little advanced that representative institutions cannot be provided" and hence should be treated as excluded but " . . . where backward tracts are more developed, though

⁴⁴ *Report of the Indian Statutory Commission*, vol. II, op. cit., para 128.

⁴⁵ *ibid.*, para 129.

still unfitted to take their full share in the normal constitutional advance, different arrangements may have to be made . . .”⁴⁶ The Commission seemed to be of the view that once a certain proportion of the population of an excluded area had acquired a level of western education and industrial development there would be greater legitimacy for the colonial regime and consequently, “political material” for the creation of self-governing political institutions.

The relative inability of the colonial discourse to legitimise the colonial rule in the tribal areas owing to poor progress of western education in the region ensured that the threat of another tribal revolt loomed large. The superiority of the colonial discourse in the material domain, which had been accepted by the Indian intellectuals, had also not progressed in the region. The operation of the concept of protection had further reduced the scope of this kind of intervention. Since the legitimisation of the British rule in the tribal areas was still evolving at this stage, one of the reasons for the exclusion of these districts from the operation of the ordinary laws and enactment may have been fear of another difficult to control tribal uprising. The erstwhile Governments of India and Bihar & Orissa could not risk such an action on the part of the tribal population in the mineral rich belt. Moreover, another uprising would have required the deployment of a large punitive force. Such a scenario would have meant that efforts at legitimisation of the regime by the use of legislation and western education would have to start from scratch again, not to mention the disruption caused to the mining of minerals.

Hence, it may not have been seen as desirable to interfere in the delicate balance that existed in the tribal areas under the system of exclusion. This conclusion is also borne out by the fact that even after the Government of India Act 1935, the functions of the government in this area remained what can be termed as the negative functions of the State. The missionaries and other social service organisations did whatever little development work (both economic and social) was undertaken.

⁴⁶ *ibid.*, para 132.

The Statutory Commission also drew upon inputs from the non-officials. These non-official viewpoints are also important since they not only exercised some influence in shaping the perception of the Simon Commission but also enable us to understand the prevailing elements of the colonial discourse vis-à-vis the Excluded Areas and the challenges that it faced. Amongst the documents presented before the Indian Statutory Commission at Patna, the memorandum submitted by the Catholic Bishop of Ranchi⁴⁷ is noteworthy. It emphasised that the "land laws and customs should remain untouched what ever the measure of self government granted to other parts of India" and that "adequate safe guards should be provided". Further, this Memorial observed that self-government "would be a distinct disadvantage to the aboriginal races" because the "degree of civilisation attained by the aboriginals of Chota Nagpur is still so far below the degree attained by other races of Bihar and Orissa, that the aboriginals are unable to meet these other races on an equal footing . . . As the matters stand now, an illiterate Bengali is more aware, more wide awake, more civilised than an aboriginal who has completed the primary course of schooling - or even the secondary course. The illiterate Bengali indeed obtains all the advantages arising out of his civilised surroundings; the educated aboriginal loses much of the fruits of education on account of the backward society in which he lives. The aboriginal society is still in the primitive stage . . ."

The memorial went on to argue that the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act which admitted tribal law as Laws would be ignored or bypassed if self-government was granted to the tribal areas because ". . . these privileges would be inevitably considered as a mere obstacle by the *more clever races* who desire to obtain a footing in their ancestral land . . . Their simplicity leaves them open to the wiles of other races . . ."⁴⁸ (emphasis added). Further, it quoted instances like the tribal peasants mortgaging crops of numerous years to pay off a minuscule debt to highlight their plight and need for special treatment without recognising that similar

⁴⁷ 'Memorial by the Catholic Bishop Representing the Aborigines of Chota Nagpur', *Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, vol. XVI: Selections from the Memoranda and Oral Evidence by Non-Officials*, Part 1, London, 1930, p. 432.

⁴⁸ *ibid.*, p. 433.

conditions existed all over rural India and were not peculiar to tribal South Bihar. Similarly, other arguments in support of the claim for special administration in tribal south Bihar such as inadequate knowledge of technicalities of courts and poor literacy levels were all identical to the rest of rural India. Hence, either the whole of rural India required special administration or there was no need to exclude the tribal areas from general administration. Arguments on similar lines were put forward in Memoranda submitted by Rev Kenneth Kennedy, the Bishop of Chota Nagpur⁴⁹ and the Bishop of Calcutta and Metropolitan of India, Burma and Ceylon.⁵⁰

These documents clearly underlined the operation of the colonial discourse vis-à-vis the tribal population. They carried the presumption that the concepts of a tribal society (such as communal property) were in need of 'civilising influence' of western rationality.

The autonomous form of community formation that was seen at the national level was replicated at the level of the Jharkhandi community and it threw up an alternative discourse to contest the dominant colonial discourse. This is reflected in the Memorandum⁵¹ submitted by the Chota Nagpur Improvement Society.⁵² This document not only tried to break away from the colonial typecasts but also suggested an alternative framework for looking at the problems of tribal Bihar.

It began by portraying the standard bleak picture of the tribal people, their ignorance and their exploitation by outsiders but went on to propose an entirely different set of remedies. The Memorandum argued for abolition of the prevailing system of laws of tenancy as according to it, under the existing conditions "... to all intents and purposes, the aboriginal people are serfs and village organisation is 'feudalistic'. The Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act has only confirmed these unjust

⁴⁹ *ibid.*, p. 434.

⁵⁰ *ibid.*

⁵¹ 'Memorandum submitted by the Chota Nagpur Improvement Society', *Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, vol. XVI: Selections from the Memoranda and Oral Evidence by Non-Officials*, Part 1, op. cit., p. 435.

⁵² See chapter II for the importance of the Chotanagpur Improvement Society.

divisions of lands and aggravated the lifelong grievances of the aboriginals”.⁵³ The Chota Nagpur Improvement Society broke new grounds when it demanded that “. . . each village should have its own Corporation for self-government in civil matters and judicial panchayat in certain matters and executive body in dealing with village lands.”⁵⁴ It also dealt in detail with the basis of franchise, divisions of existing provinces, and law and judiciary. Further on, with regard to education, the Chota Nagpur Improvement Society demanded that “. . . compulsory primary education be introduced . . . the education at primary stage be imparted through the medium of languages spoken in the area”, a local board of education and recurring grants.

This Memorandum demonstrated a dual approach to the tribal areas of south Bihar. In accordance with the established colonial discourse, it sought the implementation of policies that would further the ‘desirable’ aspects of western rationality. In seeking education and self-governance, it was echoing similar demands elsewhere. However, it also sought allowances to be made to the cultural distinctiveness of the region in terms of promotion of local languages, preservation of local laws and customs. In sum, the deputation wanted a system of government that recognised the tribal identity (and did not exclude them from the operation of ordinary laws) with variations to suit local needs. They observed that “our judicial system should be quite different, our educational system should be different. The Government must concentrate its attention on the development of our people . . .”⁵⁵

A deputation of this Society also called on the Simon Commission on 17 December 1928 at Patna in which one of the members, Mgr. Van Hoeck, stated that the question was “whether we would insist on more safeguards or whether we should like the area put under a separate administration, under a Chief Commissioner or a Governor as head of Province, I would prefer the latter”. He also observed that “I believe that really no insistence is sought to be placed on going back to old customs . . .”

⁵³ ‘Memorandum submitted by the Chota Nagpur Improvement Society’, op .cit., p. 436.

⁵⁴ *ibid.*

To a question by the Commission whether the deputation favoured a paternal or a popular government, the deputation spokesman responded that they were in favour of a popular government in the sense that it must be a "representative government, by an elective method, and a paternal one in the sense that the Governor and other officials of the Government should be in more direct and sympathetic touch with the people".⁵⁶ He added that "we want not only protection of our lands but we want to be treated as quite a separate people by ourselves". This is perhaps, the oldest articulation of a tribal identity in the Jharkhand region.

Thus, in the plethora of statements and Memoranda depicting the helplessness of the tribal peoples in a way that portrays them as entities without any intelligence or will, the Memorandum by the Chota Nagpur Improvement Society, comes as a breath of fresh air. While others tried to entrench a paternalistic administration, this Memorandum demanded self-governance and greater effort at education. It also emphasised although implicitly, that the tribal people were competent enough not to need the 'civilising influences of a paternalistic government' but what was essentially required was a concerted effort at providing them with avenues to learn and improve their life-prospects. This is perhaps, the only document to question the system of special administration and to suggest a new approach to the tribal areas. Although this document did not completely discard the colonial discourse, it does go on to articulate a 'proto-Jharkhandi' identity in whatever imperfect way it deemed fit. Despite the fact that this point of view did not find much favour with the Simon Commission, it marked the beginning of a 'sub-national discourse' for political recognition of an identity that was premised on cultural attributes, not unlike the nationalist leaders at the national level.

In its report, the Indian Statutory Commission did not refer to the rather progressive recommendations made by the Chota Nagpur Improvement Society.

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⁵⁵ *ibid.*, p. 455.

⁵⁶ *ibid.*, p. 454.

This by default means that the Commission was in agreement with the views of the majority that tribal people were primitive and backward and required 'protection'.

Although a proportion of the Indian intelligentsia had helped the Commission in its investigation, they had accepted the broad premises of the colonial discourse, especially in the material domain. Therefore, there was little disagreement with respect to the continuance of excluding certain areas from ordinary administration. Moreover, the intellectuals and nationalists were vigorously engaged in the creation of an alternative discourse in India. The tribal issue was considered a part of the larger question of socio-economic change. Further, it may be assumed that even if the tribal issue was given substantial political space, it is unlikely that the nationalists, given their integrationist leanings would have been happy to consider an autonomous administrative system for the tribals.

V

Colonial Discourse and 'Sub-national' Discourse in the Constituent Assembly

Before discussing the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly, some space must be devoted to the tribal question during the transfer of power. Owing to the absence of any major intellectual exercise about the tribal issue in the INC and other nationalist forums, the transfer of power papers had no major reference to the tribal issue. Sir Olaf Caroe, ICS, Secretary in The External Affairs Department, Government of India, pointed out in 1947 that "Hitherto there had been an almost absence of recognition of the important place the tribes . . . generally must take in the India of the future".⁵⁷ Although he had made this observation with reference to the NWFP tribes, it reflects the general situation of the tribal issue.

There were deliberations about the tribes in the NWFP and Assam but the general theme of the discussions and debates was focused on those aspects of the

⁵⁷ 'Minutes of First Day of First Governors' Conference', 15 April 1947, L/PO/6/123:ff 372-4.381-92, reproduced in Mansergh, Nicholas, ed., *Constitutional Relations Between Britain and India: The Transfer of Power 1942-47*, vol. X, London, 1981, p. 252.

tribal areas which affected the transfer of power and the partition. Furthermore, most references to the tribal question were overshadowed by the communal question that was exercising the government of the time. During its last few years, the colonial government was more concerned with containing the communal riots, arson and looting rather than dwelling upon the future administration of the tribal areas. That was to be the task of the Constituent Assembly.

The intellectual baggage that was carried into the Constituent Assembly drew heavily on the colonial rationalist-integrationist model. The post-colonial Indian state is a rationalist state in the sense that it continues the colonial state's emphasis on a rationally organised Weberian bureaucracy. It seeks to further its twin goals of development and integration with the help of a bureaucratic planning and delivery mechanism. The centralised development planning presupposes that a certain policy must 'rationally' work in all contexts and ignores the political and cultural factors. The Constituent Assembly adopted more of a melting-pot model and not a 'salad-bowl' approach in which all the different communities would retain their identity and still be a part of the national community. One may venture the opinion that such an approach was a direct result of the adoption of the colonial integrationist approach. The experience of partition seemed to vindicate the nationalists' integrationist approach. One is not quite sure if the trend of integration of peoples different from the mainstream communities and political groups is desirable, or even safe, in a democratic system of governance. Here again, the dilemma of the political system to choose between the integrationist and salad-bowl approach towards such socio-political groups is evident

Owing to the acceptance of the material domain of the colonial discourse, the Constituent Assembly employed a number of colonial concepts and presumptions. The integrationist approach of the colonial discourse was reinforced in the minds of the nationalist leaders by the experience of partition and formed the basis of the political reorganisation of India. Moreover, politics and economics were two areas where the nationalists had accepted the desirability of the colonial rationalist discourse. Therefore, the Constituent Assembly sought to implement the ideals that the nationalist leaders had learnt to cherish such as industry-led development and political democracy and a complete break from the colonial approach could not be

expected. Further, the integrationist approach of the Constituent Assembly was perhaps, reinforced by its desire to remove the 'rule of difference' which the nationalists had contested during the freedom movement. Consequently, while a number of colonial concepts prevailed, some new ground was broken.

The Government of India Act 1935 provided a model for the new Constitution of independent India. Inputs into the constitution making process such as the Cabinet Mission statement of 16th May 1946, which mentioned the Excluded Areas and Partially Excluded Areas as being of particular importance for the Constituent Assembly,⁵⁸ added to the already accepted integrationist model.

The Cabinet Mission statement directed that the Advisory Committee on Fundamental Rights and Minorities should be established at the preliminary session of the Constituent Assembly with representation of all the interests affected (including all religious minorities and Excluded Areas). One of its functions was to report to the Constituent Assembly on a scheme for the administration of the tribal and the Excluded Areas.⁵⁹ Consequently, the Advisory Committee in its meeting on 27 February 1947 set up three Sub-committees.⁶⁰ One was to report on the future administration of the Excluded Areas in Assam while another was to consider the future administrative arrangements in the Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas (other than Assam). The latter thus, considered the tribal areas of Bihar. The Chairperson of the Advisory Committee on Fundamental Rights, Minorities and Tribal and Excluded Areas suggested that a joint meeting of the two Sub-Committees should be held in August 1949. The Report of the Joint Subcommittee exercised a profound influence in shaping the approach of the framers of the Constitution of India towards the tribal population or 'problem' which noted that

⁵⁸ *Statement of the Cabinet Mission* 16 May 1946, para 19 (iv), reproduced in B. Shiva Rao, *The Framing of India's Constitution*, vol. I, New Delhi, 1966, pp. 209-18.

⁵⁹ *ibid.*, para 20.

⁶⁰ One of the three Sub-Committees was entrusted with the task of considering the tribal areas in the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan. After partition therefore, only two Sub-Committees functioned chaired by A. V. Thakkar and G. N. Bardoloi.

the areas inhabited by the tribes, . . . are difficult to access, highly malarial and infested also in some cases by other diseases like yaws and venereal disease and *lacking in such civilizing facilities as roads, schools, dispensaries and water supply*. The tribes themselves are for the most part *extremely simple people who can be and are exploited with ease by plainsfolk* resulting in the passage of land formerly cultivated by them to moneylenders and other erstwhile non-agriculturists. *While a good number of superstitions and even harmful practices are prevalent among them the tribes have their own customs and way of life* with institutions like tribal and village panchayats or councils which are very effective in smoothing village administration. *The sudden disruption of the tribal customs and ways by exposure to the impact of a more complicated and sophisticated manner of life is capable of doing great harm*. Considering past experience and strong temptation to take advantage of the tribals' simplicity and weaknesses it is essential to provide statutory safeguards for the protection of the land which is the mainstay of the aboriginal's economic life and for his customs and institutions which, apart from being his own, contain element of value⁶¹ (emphasis added).

This statement by the Sub-Committee at the helm of affairs vis-à-vis the tribal population is quite important in deciphering the then prevailing discourse with regard to the tribals. In a number of ways, this approach is direct continuation of the colonial discourse. The statement continues the colonial stereotype of the tribal people as savage and intellectually weak who have no understanding or capabilities to protect themselves from being exploited. References to superstitions and harmful practices also reflect a similar point of view. This creation of a 'them' versus 'we' dichotomy resulted in a paternalistic, almost patronising attitude in the mind of the Constituent Assembly which reflected a heavy dependence on the colonial discourse.

The above approach also meant that the concept of protection as witnessed in the colonial period was carried on in the postcolonial period, albeit in a somewhat different form. In its Interim Report, the Sub-Committee on Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas (other than Assam) was also of the view that the people of the

⁶¹ Enclosure in *Joint Report of the Excluded and the Partially Excluded Areas (other than Assam) and the Northeast Frontier (Assam) Tribal and Excluded Areas Sub-Committees*, 25 August 1947, New Delhi, 1947, para 2, reproduced in B. Shiva Rao, *The Framing of India's Constitution*, vol. III, New Delhi, 1967, pp. 770- 779.

Excluded Areas have no experience in local self-government institutions of the modern or statutory type and are of course not represented in the legislature. The management of a local board is perhaps likely to be a much bigger undertaking for the people of these areas than the mere election of a representative to the Legislature and the establishment of such bodies needs perhaps a period of official guidance and control . . .⁶²

This Sub-Committee thus emphasised that it was not prudent to leave the solution of the tribal problem to the provincial governments with limited financial resources and competing claims. The protectionist element of the colonial discourse continued without any major modification.

In its sincerity to explore alternative administrative arrangements for the tribal population, the Sub-Committee questioned the desirability of continuing the policy of exclusion of the tribal areas. It pointed out that the system of exclusion despite being in force for a number of years, had not yielded many benefits. It laid the blame for this at the doors of erstwhile Governors since such areas were outside the realms of legislative voting. It pointed out that “no definite programme for the development of the Excluded Areas with the view to removing the disability of exclusion has been followed”.⁶³ It blamed the system of shared responsibility for the ills in the administration of tribal areas. It stressed the point that

the representatives of the partially Excluded Areas have not been capable of bringing sufficient pressure and influence to bear on the Ministry. Further, some of the Partially Excluded Areas which constitute small pockets in large districts and constituencies could apparently be lost sight of and their interests subordinated to those of larger areas in which they were contained.⁶⁴

It summed up the operation of the Excluded/ Partially Excluded Areas in the following words: the “partial exclusion or exclusion has been of very little practical

⁶² *Interim Report of the Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas (other than Assam) Sub-Committee*, August and September 1947, New Delhi, 1947, para 4, reproduced in Shiva Rao, vol. III, op. cit., pp. 733-763.

⁶³ *ibid.*, para 5.

⁶⁴ *ibid.*

value. There has been neither educational nor economic development on any appreciable scale. The object of special administration has thus not been achieved, and it is clear that if the hill tribes are to be *brought up to the level of the rest of the population* the strongest measures are now necessary”⁶⁵ (emphasis added). The Sub-Committee saw the final solution to the problems of backward areas in development as defined by the mainstream and consequent assimilation. The rationalist model of development therefore, remained the central plank of the Sub-Committee’s recommendations.

There appears to be a degree of contradiction in the point of view of the Sub-Committee. On one hand, the Sub-Committee expressed its doubts on the necessity of having a system of special administration whereas on the other hand, it recommended a special administration to ‘bring’ the tribal people up to the level of the rest of the population.⁶⁶ This inconsistency is perhaps, due to the centripetal pull to unify all the peoples of India under one administration in which there is no exception of any kind (integrationist approach), the desire to end the ‘rule of difference’ and also the underlying belief in the protection of ‘lesser developed communities’. The Sub-Committee did not find it desirable for the administrative arrangements to reflect cultural identities and emphasised the necessity of a fast-track rationalist development and industrialisation in the future administrative arrangement for the tribal areas.

On the question of representation in the legislatures also, the Sub-Committee favoured reserved seats in a joint electorate. By advocating a joint electorate with reservation of seats for the scheduled tribes, the Sub-Committee tried to politically unify all the communities with adequate safeguards for the more backward sections. Here, the unifying and integrationist approach of the Sub-Committee is evident.

⁶⁵ *ibid.*

⁶⁶ *ibid.*

Interestingly, despite earlier references by the Sub-Committee to the unique cultural characteristics of the tribes, their case was identified with that of Scheduled Castes. It pointed out that the tribal population was

in fact more backward in education and in their economic condition than the Scheduled Castes. Representation in proportion to their numbers in the Legislatures, even if some of them are not vocal or able to argue their case will emphasise the importance and urgency of their problems. And it is to the interest of the country to see that these original inhabitants of the Indian soil are *brought up to the level of the rest so that they can contribute in due measure to the progress of the country rather than be a drag on the rest* . . . The aboriginals have to take part in direct elections sometime and the sooner their training for this starts the better ⁶⁷ (emphasis added).

In comparing the cases of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, no reference is made to the specific tribal culture and way of life (although this is acknowledged elsewhere in the report). There was also an underlying element of integrationist and unifying approach - all communities have to become one and contribute to national progress. It carried a dangerous thread of uniformity and assimilation. Besides, the tribal people in their present state were considered a drag on the national life and their contribution as labourers in mines, tea gardens and elsewhere was not taken into account.

In the years immediately after independence, nationalist euphoria and the trauma of partition emphasised the need for a manifestly integrationist approach. The national community was perceived to subsume all other identities. We now have the benefit of hindsight to point out that this was only a fond hope. Perhaps, the nationalist leaders who formed the Sub-Committee believed that by vigorously promoting an 'Indian' identity supported by a uniform economic and administrative system, local identities would be subsumed into the national identity. The desirability of a unifying and uniform model of development as defined by the majority community thus permeated the report.

⁶⁷ *ibid.*, para 9.

The recommendation to de-Schedule the districts of Manbhum, Hazaribagh and Palamau derived from this belief. According to the Sub-Committee, these districts had attained a level of development that did not require special treatment. It may be pointed out that these districts were more urbanised due to mining and other industrial activities. In these districts the tribals were working in industrial enterprises where conditions of exploitation were similar to the ones in the agricultural sector. It implies that the Sub-Committee did not consider there to be a scope of exploitation in industrial occupations. The undertone of the Sub-Committee was that the 'civilising' affects of industry were a remedy to all problems associated with the tribal regions. The colonial rationalist model with its dependence on industrialisation can be seen clearly. Moreover, the colonial approach of ending of exclusion in areas where industry and education had progressed to a certain level was continued.

Although the Report of the Sub-Committee did not generate much debate, Jaipal Singh, the tribal leader from the Jharkhand region, put forward a Minute of Dissent in the Report in which he argued against the de-Scheduling of the districts of Manbhum, Hazaribagh and Palamau. He pointed out that according to 1941 Census this area was inhabited by 1,479,485 *adibasis* (tribal population). He held that "I cannot see how I can agree to the demolition of the economic, geographical and ethnic unity and entity of the Chota Nagpur Division. It is not right that we should give an *ex parte* verdict and change the *status quo* of these three districts".⁶⁸

He was in effect, raising the question of tribal identity. His statement also implied the importance of considering the needs, opinions and aspirations of the tribal people. He emphasised the need to collect the views of the tribal population on this new arrangement. In some ways, Jaipal Singh was utilising the same arguments which the nationalists had advanced to the British administration. He was emphasising the same rationalist arguments for the recognition of the tribal community as the campaigners for popular government had done vis-à-vis British rule in the 19th and 20th centuries.

Such autonomous form of creation of political identities by the 'sub-national' community in the Jharkhand region was already emerging during the last decade of British rule in India. By 1948-49, the sub-national community thus formed was beginning to demand political recognition by the Indian state. The Final Report of the Sub-Committee took note of discontent in the Chota Nagpur region and said:

*the feeling [is] common among educated tribals and shared by non-tribals in considerable measure that Chota Nagpur has little share in the administration commensurate with its area, population and industrial importance and is being neglected by the Government which is made up of elements interested mostly in the rest of Bihar. Certain aboriginal witnesses have expressed their views about the neglect of Chota Nagpur in no uncertain terms and suggested that the ameliorative measures claimed by the Government are purely defensive action prompted by the separation movement . . . The extreme expression of the discontent prevalent in Chota Nagpur is the separatist movement which demands the formation of a new province of Jharkhand out of the partially excluded area*⁶⁹ (emphasis added).

This section of the final report negates the observations made in the interim report that the Adivasis were not politically conscious and were incapable of expressing, protecting and promoting their interest. A politically passive community cannot be conceived to demand a better share in the products of economic activities of the area, a better administration and general well-being or upliftment. The common people of the area might not have been as vocal as their educated tribal brethren but the fact that some kind of separatist movement was observed by the Sub-Committee implies that the tribal people were not so passive as the Sub Committee had presumed. This again brings out its paternalistic bias. It was also forced to admit that "the problem of administration in this tract must be dealt with not only by economic and educational improvements but also by remedies which

Contd.

⁶⁸ *ibid.*, Appendix D, *Minute of Dissent by Jaipal Singh*, 19 August 1947.

⁶⁹ *Final Report of the Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas (Other than Assam) Sub-Committee*, September 1947, New Delhi, 1947, para 2, reproduced in Shiva Rao, vol. III, *op. cit.*, pp. 763-770.

recognised its political and psychological aspects; and we would lay the maximum emphasis on the urgency of action in both these directions".⁷⁰

Jaipal Singh again recorded a minute of dissent in the final report on the lines of the one in the interim report arguing against the de-scheduling of certain areas in south Bihar. However, what is pertinent here is the fact that the Chairperson of the Sub-Committee, A. V. Thakkar, decided to record a Note of Comment on this Minute of Dissent. This expressed the view that "'Scheduling' has a certain special meaning which was not explained to nor known by the witnesses at all, not even to Dr. Sachchidananda Sinha. Therefore they could not distinguish between Scheduled and non-Scheduled areas in which tribes reside . . ." ⁷¹ This again reflected a strangely deep-rooted belief about the lack of understanding amongst the tribals, despite evidence to the contrary. The above discussion highlights that the Sub-Committee drew heavily on the practices and typology of the preceding colonial government.⁷²

Despite its heavy dependence on the colonial discourse, the Sub-Committee broke new ground when it recommended the creation of Tribes Advisory Councils. It observed that

Taking into account the past history of these tracts, the needs and susceptibilities of the people . . . it appears desirable . . . that Provincial Governments should be advised to take such actions as the establishment of District Councils and Tribes Advisory Councils as may be possible immediately to give effect to the policy

⁷⁰ *ibid.*

⁷¹ *Note by the Chairman on the Minutes of Dissent by Shri Jaipal Singh, 25 September, 1947 in ibid.*

⁷² The Sub-Committee on the Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas (other than Assam) made some further observations which show that it was not only heavily dependent on the colonial discourse but also had an inadequate understanding of the actual needs of the areas concerned. It recommended that shifting cultivation "should be eliminated as soon as possible" (*Interim Report*, op. cit., para 23) without taking into account whether an alternate strategy was valid for such areas. It seems that the members found it difficult to create new frames of reference for the tribal population. The only new additions were the emphases on the unity of India, democratisation and universal franchise. The emphasis on these areas owes its origin to the material realm of the colonial discourse that the nationalists had enthusiastically adopted.

recommended by us and to make such statutory regulations for this purpose as may be necessary.⁷³

The Sub-Committee's recommendation that vacant land in tribal areas should be allotted for cultivation after consulting the Tribes Advisory Councils to be set up in all states having tribal population was another step that sought greater democratisation of government decisions. Here the Joint Sub-Committee expressed an eagerness to implement democratic institutions of some kind and was not ready to wait till the time the new Constitution came into force. This proves that the Sub-Committee found indications of the tribals being able to handle democratic institutions although they had not been much exposed to the modern ones.

The recommendation of the Sub-Committee on land alienation also marks a break with the past. The Sub-Committee observed that "Alienation of any kind, even to other tribals, may have to be prohibited or severely restricted . . ."⁷⁴ This observation reflects the fact that the Sub-Committee addressed the need to treat the tribal agriculturists as akin to poor peasants elsewhere and acknowledged the possibility of some tribals becoming exploiters (despite their tribal origins) of other tribal people.

The Report of the two Sub-Committees did not generate much debate in the Constituent Assembly. Curiously, several references were made to clause 20 of the Cabinet Mission statement dated 16 May 1946 under which Advisory Committees on Excluded and partially Excluded Areas were set up. One gets the impression that had the Cabinet Mission not made such reference, the Constituent Assembly would have perhaps ignored the issue of the tribal population altogether. In its zeal to unify India under one kind of administration and to bring about effective integration of all areas and people, the Constituent Assembly might have not devoted any time and attention to this question.

⁷³ *Joint Report*, op. cit., para 1.

⁷⁴ *Interim Report*, op. cit., para 25.

The members of the Constituent Assembly by and large shared the attitude of the Sub-Committee. Yudhisthir Mishra (Orissa General) opined: "I cannot but strongly press for the *protection* of these tribal people . . . by bringing these tribal areas under the scope of the Fifth Schedule"⁷⁵ (emphasis added). Further, he was of the opinion that the "tribal areas according to the proposed Constitution will no longer be treated like the excluded or partially excluded Areas in the present Constitution . . . The scheduled areas specified in the Fifth Schedule will not be excluded from the jurisdiction of the Legislature or executive" and that "the Tribal Advisory Committee, . . . will only work as a sort of check on the executive power of the provinces as far as tribal matters are concerned."⁷⁶ This statement reflects the presumption that once the tribal areas were brought under general administration albeit with checks, the problems of all such areas would be solved.

The Constituent Assembly's approach on this issue also reflects a belief in the mainstream industry-led model of development as a panacea for all ills in the tribal areas. The framers of the Indian Constitution believed that the problems and discontentment in the tribal areas existed due to their exclusion from the mainstream development patterns. By implication it was perhaps felt that no need existed for special administration or development programmes in the tribal areas. This attitude is summarised in H. V. Kamath's statement:

It will be agreed . . . [by all] that we do not contemplate the continuance of these various tribal scheduled areas in the same condition as they are today. I am sure that all of us visualise the day when *they will be brought up to the level of the adjoining neighbouring provinces and will be integrated with the Provinces and States that lie contiguous to them*. We do not contemplate a permanently differently type of administration for them from what is obtaining or might obtain or will obtain in the rest of India . . .⁷⁷ (emphasis added).

⁷⁵ *Constituent Assembly Debates*, vol. IX no. 1, 19 August 1949, New Delhi, 1949, p. 494.

⁷⁶ *ibid.*

⁷⁷ *ibid.*

The use of the terms like 'brought up' and not alternatives such as 'come up' for the tribal population certainly reflects a patronising attitude. The underlying idea was that the tribal people were somehow, incapable of looking after themselves and if the goal of assimilation of the tribal population into the national mainstream was to be achieved, the 'superior civilised people' – that is the non-tribals – would have to make deliberate efforts to 'civilise them'. It seems to be an indigenous corollary of the 'white man's burden' and elements of the colonial discourse are quite evident.

This perception although shared by the majority, did not signify an absolute consensus on the issue. Jaipal Singh differed on a number of issues. In the debates on the Draft Constitution on 24 August 1949, Jaipal Singh delivered a lengthy political speech. His remarks are relevant and useful for this study since this is one of the few places in the Constituent Assembly debates where an effort was made to divorce the case of Scheduled Tribes from that of the Scheduled Castes. Jaipal Singh also raised the issue of the existence of a tribal community in Jharkhand. He pointed out that the Constituent Assembly had not had the opportunity to discuss the recommendations made by the two Tribal Areas Sub-Committees and wanted more time to be devoted to the issue. He emphasised that the tribal people were the true and original inhabitants of India and as such had a claim to the whole of India and yet emphasised that the reservation of seats for the tribal people in the legislatures was necessary. Referring to the fact that the Muslims and Christians had given up their claim for such reservation, Jaipal Singh observed that

Adivasis are not giving up anything because they never had anything. It seems very surprising that people talk of democracy when their whole conduct has been undemocratic in the past. [he implies the past centuries] . . . It is essential that these people be compelled to come out of their jungle-fastness. It is for that reason reservation is very necessary. If you want unity in this country, we must all get together.⁷⁸

He did not find a contradiction in 'all the people getting together' and reservation of seats for the tribals. On the one hand he emphasised the unity of India

⁷⁸ *Constituent Assembly Debates*, vol. IX no. 17, 24 August 1949, New Delhi, 1949, p. 651.

and at the same time demanded reservation of seats for the tribal people. He thus implied that the tribal identity was a part of the Indian identity and yet separate from it. The claim of a Jharkhandi 'sub-national' identity for political recognition was thus underway.

Further on, Jaipal Singh emphasised that the tribal people no longer lived in jungles and interaction between the tribal population and the rest of the people was common place. He thus underlined the capability of the tribal people to cope successfully with the different conditions of the rest of the world. Contradicting himself in the very next statement he went on to state that the tribals had always been exploited by the *dikus* (outsiders) which the "Adivasi rightly resents."

A noticeable feature of this speech is that he underlined the capabilities of the tribal people to take on the world but at the same time asked for concessions for them based on their economic and political isolation and consequent backwardness. He was almost prophetic when he said that "I am not at all optimistic that in the short space of ten years, which means two general elections, Adivasis will have come to the level of rest of India . . ."⁷⁹ Simultaneously however, he supported joint electorates:

I welcome the fact that the Adivasis will be elected from the joint general electorates . . . I also welcome the fact that the House, as a whole, is unanimous that Adivasis must be compelled to come into the Government of the provinces as well as at the Centre . . . There must be 51 [MLAs] because there will be 51 seats reserved for them .

. . .⁸⁰

His support for joint electorates was probably due to unitary influences so common in those days as well as the integrationist colonial discourse that still held its sway. However, he was quick to point out that the tribals, being one of the most backward sections of the society, required special treatment. He was of the opinion " . . . that any section of our society that is economically and politically backward

⁷⁹ *ibid.*

⁸⁰ *ibid.*, p. 652.

must have safeguards and provisions that will enable it to come up to the general level".⁸¹

On similar lines, Yudhisthir Mishra pointed out that the ten-year restriction to the reservation for Scheduled Castes and Tribes would not be enough to serve the interests of Scheduled Tribes. He was of the opinion that Scheduled Tribes were far more backward compared to the Scheduled Castes. He declared that:

I hold that the standard of education and material well-being of the Scheduled tribes are lower in most cases than even those of the Scheduled Castes. This is clear from the representation of the scheduled tribes in this House in comparison with the representation that the Scheduled Castes have been able to secure. Even the representative character of this House has been challenged by some people . . .⁸²

He used these words to emphasise the need for reservation for Scheduled Tribes but also, in a way not quite like Jaipal Singh, differentiated between the needs of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. His ground for such a distinction was that the tribal people would require a greater amount of time to be able to play on a level field with other communities. Nonetheless, he was aware of the need for difference of treatment for the tribal population. Although his was a minority opinion in the Constituent Assembly, it certainly was a departure from the dominant discourse.

Speaking on the occasion, Brajeshwar Prasad opposed the extension of representation to the tribal areas and pointed out that "by giving them a few seats here and there, their economic condition and their educational level will in no way be improved".⁸³ He was one of the few members of the Constituent Assembly who dwelt on the need for direct support to the Scheduled Castes and Tribes in terms of their actual needs. However, he was opposed to tribal representation in the

⁸¹ *ibid.*, p. 653.

⁸² *ibid.*, p. 675.

⁸³ *ibid.*, p. 664.

legislatures, as he was unsure if "representation in legislatures will in anyway alter the material and moral levels of these people".⁸⁴ The continuation of the colonial discourse of 'sympathetic and experienced handling' and not self-determination of the tribal population is quite clear.

Jaipal Singh outlined though not in detail, the existence of an identity amongst the tribal peoples as different from the non-tribal population. He pointed out that it does not befit the rest of India to tell the tribals what was democracy because

Adibasi society is the most democratic element in this country. Can the rest of India say the same thing? . . . In Adibasi society all are equal, rich or poor. Everyone has equal opportunity and I do not wish that people should get away with the idea that by writing this Constitution and operating it we are trying to put a new idea into the Adibasi society. What we are actually doing is you are learning and taking something . . . Non-Adibasi society has learnt much and has still to learn a good deal. Adibasis are the most democratic people and they will not let India get smaller or weaker . . . I would like the members . . . [to] not be so condescending.⁸⁵

During the debates, Jaipal Singh underlined the lingual aspect of tribal identity. He pointed out that the outsiders were treated suspiciously because of their ignorance of the tribal languages and proclaimed that they would be "treated with less of suspicion than they are now"⁸⁶ if they knew some of the tribal languages.

Also pertinent is the fact that this kind of articulation of tribal identity was not seen as clashing with the Indian identity in any way. According to him, the dominant viewpoint of working towards a pan-national identity which would subsume all sub-identities, might not be a desirable option but pointed out that these identities are not necessarily at cross-purposes with the national identity. (this position survives till today). Jaipal Singh stated that

⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 663.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 653-54.

⁸⁶ Ibid., pp. 990-1.

What is necessary is that the backward groups in our country should be enabled to stand on their own legs so that they can assert themselves. It is not the intention of this Constitution, nor do I desire it, that the advanced community should be carrying my people in their arms for the rest of eternity. All that we plead is that the wherewithal should be provided . . . so that we will be able to stand on our own legs and regain the lost nerves and be useful citizens of India . . . I may assure non-Adibasis that Adibasis will play a much bigger part than you imagine, if only you will be honest about your intentions and let them play a part they have a right to play.⁸⁷

The above quoted speech carries a claim of the adivasis for better treatment as well as an articulation of an autonomous community. It is not yet a clear demand for recognition as a separate identity, but is definitely an underlining of such an identity. Another stark point is the fact that this is the only place where there is no undertone of pity for the poor state of the tribal people but a demand from the rest of India to give the tribals their due. It was a nascent expression of tribal identity in terms of their difference from the rest of India. The point that is important here is that they were not in any way – politically, culturally or socially – inferior from the mainstream but only different. This strain of tribal identity survives till date, as was revealed in the field trip.

In the debates on 5 September 1949, Jaipal Singh insisted that there should be a provision obliging the Governors of the states having Scheduled Tribes population to report on the state of their development every year and not at the discretion of the President as envisaged. According to him, the motive behind such an amendment was that without such a provision the Government of India would not be aware of the state of affairs in the tribal areas. Further, he was critical that a merely advisory status was envisaged for the Tribes Advisory Councils and not an actively political one (as had been recommended by the Joint Sub-Committee on Tribal areas). He asserted that “Tribes Advisory Council should be effective and

⁸⁷ *ibid.*, p. 654.

have a real say in what is being done . . .”⁸⁸ and not mere advisory powers subject to the pleasure of the Governors or Rulers of a province or state.

This speech generated only a lukewarm response from other members of the Constituent Assembly. The debate on this issue continued on the lines of the dominant discourse. Shibban Lal Saksena, speaking on the same day, probably summed up the majority view of the Constituent Assembly, which drew upon the colonial discourse:

The existence of the Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled areas are a stigma on our nation just as the existence of untouchability is a stigma on the Hindu religion. That these brethren of ours are still in such a sub-human state of existence is something for which we should be ashamed. Of course, all these years this country was a slave of the British, but we cannot be free from blame. . . . these scheduled tribes and areas must as soon as possible become a thing of the past . . . I only want that these scheduled tribes and scheduled areas should be developed so quickly that they may become indistinguishable from the rest of the Indian population and that this responsibility should be thrown on the Union Government and on the Parliament.⁸⁹

This statement reflects the continuation of the approach developed by the colonial official-scholars that the tribal community was waiting to be absorbed and integrated into either the Hindu community or the mainstream communities. Until such time, there is a necessity to protect the tribes and make efforts to facilitate their speedy integration.

The dominant nationalist discourse in the Constituent Assembly also undermined any suggestion of a separate tribal identity. Reacting to the possibility of the existence of a ‘sub-national’ tribal identity that does not clash with the national identity as raised by Jaipal Singh, K. M. Munshi pointed out:

. . . which he called Adibasis collectively form part of a single community . . . is . . . an entirely incorrect statement of facts. Each province has many scheduled tribes of its own. Each of these tribes is different from the other ethnically as well as (sic) from the

⁸⁸ *Constituent Assembly Debates*, vol. IX no. 26, 5 September 1949, New Delhi, 1949, p. 976.

⁸⁹ *ibid.*, p. 979.

point of view of language, . . . [and] social and religious customs. There is nothing common between one tribe and another . . . To call them Adibasis and group them together as one community will not only be an untruth in itself but would be absolutely ruinous for the tribes themselves. Therefore it is necessary that in order to give them a proper place in the society, different sets of activities would have to be adopted. This is the cardinal difference between the attitude of my friend, Mr. Jaipal Singh, and the rest of us. The Adibasis are not one conscious, corporate, collective whole in this country, that somebody can speak in its name or can lead a movement combining them into a single unit . . . We want that the Scheduled Tribes in the whole country should be *protected from the destructive impact of races possessing a higher and more aggressive culture and should be encouraged to develop their own autonomous life*; at the same time we want them to take a larger part of the *country adopted*. They should not be isolated communities or little republics to be perpetuated for ever⁹⁰ (emphasis added).

Continuing the dominant integrationist nationalist discourse, Munshi saw no merit in Jaipal Singh's and Yudhisthir Mishra's efforts at seeking greater powers and role of the Tribes Advisory councils. He opined that ". . . Tribes Advisory Council should . . . aid and advise the Governor in all matters" regarding the administration of scheduled areas and found it "an utter absurdity" that the Governor be obliged to act on such advice. Munshi also observed that ". . . I am sure they [tribals] would say that they do not understand a word of it [Moneylenders Act]. The word 'consulted' therefore has been put in the place of 'advice' purposely". He saw it as impossible that the Tribes Advisory Council of a small tribe would come to a conclusion with regard to an elaborate Act of Parliament "as to what provisions of it should or should not apply." Hence, it has been provided that ". . . with regard to the regulations of transfer of land and other things relating to the welfare of the tribes, the tribal assembly will have to be consulted. Naturally their interests will be placed before the government in the course of consultations. But to make decision depend upon the advice of this assembly, would in the end lead to disaster to the tribes themselves".⁹¹

⁹⁰ *ibid.*, pp. 997-8.

⁹¹ *ibid.*, pp. 998-9.

Other members shared this paternalism, integrationist thrust and reluctance to delegate powers to local bodies. Kuladhar Chaliha (Assam General) was of the opinion that if tribes are allowed to run administration then it will be a negation of justice or administration due to the practice of summary justice for a grievance prevalent amongst some tribes. He apprehended separatist tendencies at work if delegation of powers was resorted to and feared that 'tribalistan' would be created just as "you have created Pakistan." Therefore, he was in favour of central and provincial governments keeping ample reserve powers.⁹²

To summarise, the main current of the debates in the Constituent Assembly was assimilation of the different sections of a very varied tribal population, as was the case with other minorities. The members of the Constituent Assembly seemed to be of the opinion that all identities should merge into the Indian identity as soon as possible. They did not conceive of a multi identity, multi-faceted India in which all the sub-identities combine together to form a larger Indian identity. The salad bowl approach was clearly absent in the Constituent Assembly debates.

Another notable point in the debates was that people from across the political spectrum spoke on the question of reservation of seats for the Scheduled Castes and Tribes. Their main line in supporting this issue was the exploited past of the tribes and the members who argued against it dwelt by and large, on the fissiparous tendencies which they saw built into the logic of granting reservation of seats.

It is also interesting to note that despite an attempt on the part of Jharkhandi leaders to create an autonomous community premised on tribal cultural uniqueness, the issue of speedy development of the tribal population was repeatedly emphasised. The integrationist view could not conceive of any challenge to the national community from any lesser community and development was seen as the remedy to whatever dissatisfaction that existed in the region. In the years to come, the identity aspects of the Jharkhand movement came to be increasingly dominated by the developmental aspects.

⁹² *Constituent Assembly Debates*, vol. IX no. 27, 6 September 1949, New Delhi, 1949, pp. 1007-8.

Hence, although the Constituent Assembly continued a number of elements of the colonial discourse into the Constitution, it also broke new ground with its emphasis on universal adult franchise for the tribal population and welfare policies for a speedy development in the region. It must be pointed out that the material domain of the colonial discourse had been at the root of a number of such issues. Once the nationalist government had taken office, it sought to implement all the elements of colonial discourse that the nationalists saw as desirable. The creation of the nationalist state was seen as the fulfilment of the national community and the Indian state was not left with much intellectual use for the autonomous community that had been imagined by the nationalists. The independent Indian state left this aspect of the nationalist thought to the regional communities to experiment with and in some cases, achieve political recognition from the Indian state. For instance, the lingual reorganisation of Indian states in 1956 was an acceptance by the State that some degree of political recognition to 'sub-national' communities was required.

VI

Tribal Policy in Independent India

After the new Constitution came into force in 1950, under Article 339,⁹³ The Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes Commission was appointed in 1959⁹⁴ under the Chairmanship of U. N. Dhebar. In defining the problem before it, the Commission observed that "the term 'tribe' is nowhere defined in the Constitution . . ."⁹⁵ which merely states "that the Scheduled Tribes are 'the tribes or the tribal communities or parts of or groups within tribes or tribal communities'"⁹⁶ which the

⁹³ Article 339 stipulates that: "The President may at anytime and shall at the expiration of ten years from the commencement of this Constitution by order appoint a Commission to report on the administration of the Scheduled Areas and the welfare of the Scheduled Tribes in the States . . .", *Constitution of India*, 1950.

⁹⁴ Vide Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs notification no. 11/6/59-SCT.IV DT.

⁹⁵ *Report of the Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes Commission*, vol. I 1960-61, para 1.1.

⁹⁶ *Constitution of India*, op. cit., Article 342.

President may specify by public notification”.⁹⁷ It has a different meaning for different people in different contexts. This state of affairs as far as the definition of tribes is concerned continues till date.

The Commission drew upon the majority points of view of the Constituent Assembly and held that “everyone who has had something to do with the *tribal problem* can bear witness to the burning desire of these unspoilt children of Mother India *for advance and progress consistent with their notion of culture and civilized existence*”⁹⁸ (emphasis added).

Thus, ten years after the new Constitution came into force, when referring to the tribal people, the colonial discourse survived in some form. Moreover, the Indian state seemed to have become totally engrossed with the issue of speedy implementation of developmental policies. As far as the Indian state was concerned, the question of the nature of the administrative arrangements for the tribal areas had been addressed and resolved by the Constituent Assembly. Consequently, the subsequent SC/ST Commissions did not question the suitability of the industry-led model of development and instead devoted their attention to the factors that hinder the implementation of the industrialisation-integration model of development.

Hence, the Dhebar Commission observed that “there is the problem that the tribals belong to varying and widely different stage of development . . .”⁹⁹ and in that context highlighted “the problem of integration and development”.¹⁰⁰ It went on to declare that “our objective is advancement and integration of tribals [;] . . . our aim has been . . . to secure to the tribal people, along with all other people of India, a social order based upon equality of status and opportunity and a fraternity . . . ” Thus, it carried on with the integrationist point of view which was the mainstream view at that time and harped upon the “great awakening” of the tribal people by

⁹⁷ *ibid.*, para 1.2.

⁹⁸ *ibid.*, para 1.20.

⁹⁹ *ibid.*, para. 1.20.

¹⁰⁰ *ibid.*, para. 1.23.

means of massive developmental activities carried out by the State machinery. This perception neither questioned the logic of integrating the diverse identities into one nor challenged the soundness of implementing development programmes that have little relevance to the poor people and their lives, leave alone tribals.

In light of the above, it is no surprise that the subsequent reports of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Commission have become more or less statistical diaries concerned mainly with the performance of the public policy machinery. They do not analyse the rationale behind a certain government policy. For instance, The Report of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Commission 1966-67, Report of the Study Team on Tribal Development Programmes 1969 and The Report of the Advisory Committee on the Revision of the List of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes 1965, all treated the tribal issues as aspects of the larger problems of efficient implementation of development policies. The Report on the Development of Tribal Areas by National Committee on the Development of Backward Areas, 1981 continued with the same approach.

Over the years there is thus no noticeable difference in the approach of the Indian state from that of the Constituent Assembly; i. e. (a) the tribal people need to be 'civilised', (b) the development as defined by the mainstream is extremely desirable, (c) the tribal groups need to be integrated and assimilated into the mainstream, and (d) the tribal customs need 'protection' of the majority community. The thread of emphasis on the efficient implementation of the development model to resolve all socio-economic and political conflict continues unbroken. In that sense the colonial discourse continues in contemporary India as well.

Here it may be observed that various tribal communities did not see the issue from the point of view of the Indian state. The autonomous forms of creation of a community continued in post-independent India. The lessons that the nationalists had learnt from the colonial discourse were also internalised by the smaller communities. These communities started using the same tools which the nationalists had used and began demanding greater political autonomy. The State, premised on the rationalist assumptions, could do little to contain such mobilisations. Consequently, the various sections of the population, especially the non-mainstream

ones like the tribes, started demanding political recognition and a share in the largesse of State's development funds. Although one cannot find a document that redefines the policy towards such sections in terms of accommodation of the demands of various identities, in practice there has been such a trend, although within the bounds of the Constitution. The marginalised identities have benefited from greater availability of educational and economic avenues and there has emerged an idea which is quite unique and new in India in particular and the world at large. The newly articulated identities now lay a claim to better economic prospects and demand State's response. These groups are no longer content to gratefully accept whatever the State machinery is able to deliver. They demand that the State machinery should perform well or else concede administrative powers to local arrangements.¹⁰¹ Since these groups are unable to influence the central policy agenda making, they resort to a typical Indian avenue: 'agitate first, demand later'.

The Indian state when pressed hard by these highly mobilised and articulated groups, has been making important administrative concessions in the form of delegated and de-centralised administration. This aspect of the Jharkhandi case shall be discussed at length in chapter VII.

¹⁰¹ I am grateful to Dr. Sudipta Kaviraj for his valuable comments on this line of argument.

Chapter IV

Changing Patterns in the Development

Profile of the Jharkhand Region – I

The post-colonial Indian state, as discussed in chapter III, depended heavily on a rationalist-integrationist and bureaucratic model of administration due to the nationalist discourse's dependence on the essentials of the colonial discourse. As a result of this rationalist model of administration, the primary concerns of the State have been integration and development with the development programmes intended "not only to achieve certain tangible economic ends . . . [but also to be] a step towards the goal of integration".¹ The State's emphasis on development was also appropriated by the 'sub-national' identities to pursue and legitimise their claims and this emphasis on development has affected the character of articulation of 'sub-national' or ethnic identities as well as the State in a profound way. The State was unable to respond to the challenges from the ethnic identities with adequate political measures owing to its dependence on the integrationist-rationalist paradigm. It continued to emphasise the need for a faster pace of development as a means to remove all allegiance to any other political identity, save the nationalist Indian identity. It appears that, as far as the State is concerned, better administration of development programmes is the only possible reason to re-orient the administrative boundaries now. Consequently, the ethnic identities have also taken on board this factor (in addition to whatever factors that they invoke to mobilise the people into a politically significant identity) to demand political recognition. Development and identity have thus become inextricably linked, as evident in the following:

किसी भी क्षेत्र का विकास कौन कर सकता है ? हमारा विचार है
कि किसी भी क्षेत्र का विकास उस क्षेत्र की जनता ही कर सकती

¹ Kanchan Mukhopadhyay, 'The Tribal Policy of Jawaharlal Nehru' in Singh, K. S., ed., *Jawaharlal Nehru, Tribes and Tribal Policy*, Calcutta, 1989, p. 21.

है। किसी भी क्षेत्र की क्या-क्या समस्याएँ हैं उनका कैसा हल होना चाहिए – इसे उस क्षेत्र की जनता से अधिक कोई समझ नहीं सकता। जनता अपना विकास खुद करे, अपनी विकास की समस्याओं में दिलचस्पी ले, अपने विकास के लिये पहल करे, विकास के कार्यक्रम बने और विकास के लिये सामूहिक प्रयत्न करे, यही एक मात्र रास्ता है। . . . लेकिन जनता को अपना विकास करने के लिए जरूरी है कि कुछ अधिकार हों। ये अधिकार स्वायत्ता के अधिकार हैं। हम इस अधिकार की मांग सिर्फ प्रस्तावित झारखण्ड प्रान्त के लिये नहीं बल्कि पूरे देश के सभी राज्यों एवं क्षेत्रों के लिये करते हैं। . . . स्वायत्ता की मांग सिर्फ जनता के आर्थिक विकास के लिये नहीं बल्कि इसका उद्देश्य एक जाति को दूसरी जाति के शोषण से बचाना भी है।²

[Who can bring about development in an area? In our opinion, only the public of that region can develop an area. What are the problems of a region, how should they be solved – no one can understand this better than the people of that area. The only avenue is that the people must develop themselves, take interest in the problems of development of their area, take initiatives for their development, chalk out developmental programmes and make efforts for their collective development . . . but for the people to develop themselves, it is essential that they have some rights. This right is the right to autonomy. We do not demand this right only for the proposed Jharkhand state but for the whole country . . . The reason for demanding autonomy is not only for economic development but the aim for this demand is to save one *jati* [here the term *jati* has been used to mean community and very loosely, tribes] from exploitation by another *jati*.]

This extract from one of the writings of Sibn Soren³ clarifies the Jharkhandi leadership's views about the inter-linkages between poor development profile of the region and their demand for autonomy. Soren appears to stress the drawback of weak local development institutions and poor linkages between communities and the larger policy mechanism as an important factor in the poor performance of development policy in the region. Additionally, the quote also raises a number of

² Sibn Soren, "झारखण्ड राज्य का सवाल" [The Question of Jharkhand State], in Narayan, S., ed., *Jharkhand Movement: Origin and Evolution*, New Delhi, 1992, p.19.

³ President of Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (Soren).

other issues that link up with the issues of alternative delivery mechanisms for development policy. However, the Jharkhandi leadership does not clarify what it means by 'development'.

It is an elusive task to define development. The meaning of development is highly context-specific and changes according to the point of view and ideological orientation of the person concerned. Some people may define development as change but it can be argued that not all change constitutes development. One point of view may regard development as the removal of poverty while another may go on to define development as an increase in the societal groups' capacity to organise and utilise their resources and implement their agenda. Still others may define development in social, political, economic and/ or cultural terms.

Apart from the difficulty of defining 'development', the understanding of what it means can differ between the State and the beneficiary population. Presently, irrespective of their points of view, development for both the State and the population of the Jharkhand region, means similar things such as greater avenues for employment and education, improved health facilities, etc. However, if there is any substantial degree of decentralisation of power under the JAAC or any other such body, the meaning of development for the Jharkhandi population may change.

For the purpose of this analysis, development may be defined as improvements in the living standard of the population. It involves better availability of health and educational facilities as well as improvement in the availability of the opportunities of gainful employment. It also consists of improvement in the economic conditions of the population. Consequently, this analysis will utilise available data to evaluate the development profile of the Jharkhand region and Bihar as a whole in terms of improvements in health, education and employment opportunities. Some supplementary data such as agricultural output of the region and irrigated area will also be utilised (wherever available) to chart out the changes in the potential for economic improvement.

During the field-study, respondents were eager to point out that the Bihar government in Patna was not concerned about the development profile of the Jharkhand region. They alleged that there exists a north versus south Bihar divide as

far as developmental activities are concerned and that the persons from north Bihar dominate the government. For instance, a Panchayat head in Sonahatu block of Ranchi district alleged that “झारखण्ड के खिलाफ षड्यन्त्र है, यहाँ का पैसा बाहर जाता है और उससे वहाँ का [बिहार का] विकास होता है, . . .” [There is a conspiracy against the Jharkhand region, the wealth from here goes out and it is used for the development activities there (in the rest of Bihar)].⁴ Consequently, the resources from south Bihar (the Jharkhand region) were utilised for developmental activities elsewhere and inadequate attention was given to the region. Therefore, the analysis that follows also compares the development profiles of the Jharkhand region with that of Bihar as a whole.

An effort to define the term ‘development profile’ is not unproblematic as it is directly related to the definition of development. Since this study defines development as an improvement in the living standards of the population, the term ‘development profile’ has been used to refer to the patterns emerging from an analysis of all the indicators of development for a region at any given point of time. For instance, the development profile of Jharkhand in 1951 refers to the broad patterns of development which emerge from an analysis of all the development indicators available for that year such as the figures for infant mortality, public health, employment levels, educational levels and so on. Besides, the analysis also takes account of the potential of economic growth reflected in indicators such as changes in irrigation potential and land under major crops (whenever available) and the changes in the pattern since the last available comparable data.

The changing development profile of Bihar as a whole and the Jharkhand region have been analysed in this chapter and chapter V to find out whether there has been any change in the developmental profile of the Jharkhand region. A comparison with the development profile of Bihar as a whole will indicate if the gap between the two (if any) is real or imagined which will clarify whether the

⁴ Interview with a panchayat head in the Sonahatu development block in Ranchi in May 1996.

developmental issues in the articulation of the Jharkhandi identity are real or perceived.⁵

I

As far as the development profile of Jharkhand in 1951 was concerned, the state of the population was poor, but slightly better than that of Bihar as a whole. In 1951, the area now known as the Jharkhand region in Bihar accounted for 42.4 per cent of the total land area of Bihar and had a population of more than 9 million.

Table 1: Population in Jharkhand 1951

	Area (Sq. Miles)	Total Population	Males	Females
Jharkhand Total	29,821	9,318,792	4,753,241	4,565,551
Bihar Total	70,330	40,225,947	20,223,675	20,002,272
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	42.40	23.16	23.50	22.82

Source: *Census of India 1951*, vol. V, Bihar Part II-A (Tables A, C, D & E series) – General Population Tables, Patna: Government Printing Press, n. d.

Table 2: Scheduled Tribes Population in Jharkhand 1951

	Total Population	Males	Females
Jharkhand Total	3,430,599	1,707,521	1,723,051
Bihar Total	4,049,183	2,017,414	2,031,769
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	84.72	84.63	84.80
Jharkhand Percentage	36.81	35.92	37.74

Source: *Census of India 1951*, vol. V, Bihar Part II-A (Tables A, C, D & E series) – General Population Tables, Patna: Government Printing Press, n. d.

Approximately 23.16 per cent of the total population of Bihar lived there (Table 1).⁶ Within the Jharkhand region, the Scheduled Tribes accounted for 36.81 per cent of the total population of the region (Table 2).

⁵ Real developmental problems also need to be perceived by the population and articulated into political demand making. However, here attention is being drawn to the fact that a situation can exist where the population or an ethnic identity perceives that there is deterioration in the development profile of the region (or feels discriminated against) without there actually being such a deterioration (or discrimination).

⁶ In the interests of the continuity of the text, only short abstracts of the tables have been included in the text. The relevant district-wise detailed tables have been included as Statistical Annex to the thesis.

Clearly, the tribal people were a numerical minority but still constituted one of the most cohesive social groups in the region. Consequently, both the tribal people as well as the non-tribal people were significant in the electoral politics of the Jharkhand region in independent India.

The development indicators of the area at that time offer us a mixed picture. In 1950, the condition of the Jharkhand region was better than the average for Bihar as a whole as far as infant mortality, birth and death rates are concerned. Infant

Table 3: Infant Mortality and Birth & Death Rates in Jharkhand 1950

	Total number of Live Births¹	Total number of Deaths¹	Infant Mortality²	Infant Mortality Rate² (per 1000 live Birth)	Birth Rate³ (per 1000 of Population)	Death Rate³ (per 1000 of Population)
Jharkhand Total/ Average	158,257	109,280	9,691	62.77	17.08	11.54
Bihar Total/ Average	714,376	461,335	57,945	81.11	19.01	12.36

¹ Registered.

² Provisional Figures.

³ Based on 1941 calculations.

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1951*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1953, p. 46.

mortality was significantly lower (62.77 per 1,000 live births) in the Jharkhand region compared with that of the Bihar average (81.11 per 1,000 live births) (Table3). Even after making allowances for the poor recording of deaths of infants in a not too-conducive terrain (compared to the plains of north Bihar) such as the Jharkhand region, the difference in the figures indicates a better health profile in the Jharkhand region. In the case of birth and death rates, the difference between the rates of the Jharkhand region and Bihar as a whole is not significant. The Jharkhand region still had a better health scenario than Bihar as a whole.

However, the same proportional share of the Jharkhand region does not continue in other development indicators. As Table 4 points out, as far as agricultural production is concerned, the Jharkhand region contributed a significant share to the output of all the major crops in the whole of Bihar. It produced as much as 42.28 per cent of the total paddy, 25 per cent of the maize and 20 per cent of *arhar* (a variety of lentils) produced in the whole of Bihar.

Table 4: Output of Principal Crops in Jharkhand (in thousands of tons) 1949-50

	Paddy	Wheat	Gram	Barley	Maize	Masoor	Arhar	Khesri	Peas	Sugar cane	Potato	Tobacco	Jute	Chilli
Jharkhand Total	1583	10	29	19	105	1	27	27	4	7	20	0	1	0
Bihar	3744	357	296	213	412	87	129	468	71	265	219	12	76	15
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	42.28	2.80	9.79	8.92	25.48	1.14	20.93	5.76	5.63	2.64	9.13	0	1.31	0

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1951*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1953, p. 22.

Table 5: Land Improvement Loans Advanced to Agriculturists in Jharkhand 1950-51[#]

	Loans Advanced (Rupees)
Jharkhand Total	2,268,922
Bihar Total	13,826,343
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	16.41

[#] Under the Land Improvement Loans Act, 1883, Agriculturists' Loans Act, 1884, Natural Calamities Loans Act and Gratuitous Relief. Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1951*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1953, p. 116.

Nevertheless, as far as the availability of agricultural finance is concerned, the share of the Jharkhand region was not high (Table 5). The area of Jharkhand comprised approximately 42 per cent of the total land area of Bihar with about 23 per cent of the total population. Moreover, the landscape of the Jharkhand region is hilly and most agriculture was rain-dependent. In such a scenario, it was unsatisfactory that only 16.41 per cent of the total money advanced to agriculturists in Bihar as a whole was spent in the Jharkhand region in 1950-51 (Table 5). However, this did not reflect any systematic neglect of the region as development planning was still emerging in India.

Another related point that would have a bearing on the region's developmental profile is that of wasteland development because the Jharkhand region is composed of a rather hilly terrain and wasteland development is of far-

Table 6: Loans Disbursed for Reclamation of Wasteland and Area of Wasteland Reclaimed in Jharkhand 1951-52

	Land Improvement Loans Disbursed (Rupees)	Area of Waste Land Reclaimed (Acres)	
		By Manual Labour	By State Tractors
Jharkhand Total	1,361,488	7,976	-
Bihar	2,804,286	37,208	3,602
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	48.55	21.43	-

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1951*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1953, p. 27.

reaching consequence to the region. In this area, one can notice that a fair share was being spent in the Jharkhand region. In the year 1951-52, 48.55 per cent (Table 6) of the total amount spent on wasteland development in the whole of Bihar was spent in the Jharkhand region. However, more than 48 per cent of funds yielded only about 21 per cent of the total area reclaimed by manual labour. State tractors were not employed in the Jharkhand region. This is indicative of a trend in the Jharkhand region where a large amount of investment leads only to a modest improvement in the development profile.

The figures available for public medical institutions (Table 7) also express

Table 7: In-door and Out-door Patients Treated in Public Medical Institutions Owned, Subsidised or Aided by Public Authorities in Jharkhand 1947

	Number Indoor Patients Treated	Number Outdoor Patients Treated
Jharkhand Total	27,768	1,191,301
Bihar Total	127,844	5,620,869
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	21.72	21.19

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1951*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1953, p. 70.

Table 8: Expenses of Public Medical Institutions Owned, Subsidised or Aided by Public Authorities in Jharkhand 1947

	Income (Rupees)	Expenditure (Rupees)
Jharkhand Total	1,033,483	958,998
Bihar Total*	10,797,502	4,712,237
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	9.57	20.35

* Figures for Saharsa are not available.

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1951*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1953, p. 70.

the same scenario. In 1947, approximately 21.72 per cent of the total indoor and 21.19 per cent of the total outdoor patients treated in Bihar as a whole in all medical institutions owned, subsidised or aided by public authorities were in the Jharkhand region. These figures are proportionate to the percentage of total population of Bihar living in the Jharkhand region. Therefore, the health system in the Jharkhand region was not drastically inferior to that of Bihar as a whole.

However, health facilities in the Jharkhand region depended more heavily on governmental aid than in Bihar as a whole. The figures for income and expenditure incurred by the medical institutions publicly owned, aided or subsidised indicate that there was a larger expenditure in the Jharkhand region (Table 8). The income of such institutions in the Jharkhand region accounted for a mere 9.5 per cent of the total income whereas the expenditure accounted for more than 20 per cent of the total spent on such institutions in Bihar as a whole which was lower than the proportion of population living in the Jharkhand region.

Table 9 shows that the Jharkhand region was fairly urban since 29.48 per cent of the total population living within municipal limits in Bihar as a whole

Table 9: Municipal Councils' Income and their Expenditure on Primary Education in Jharkhand 1949-50

	Number of Municipalities	Population within Municipal Limits	Total Income (excluding opening balance) (Rupees)	Total Expenditure (Rupees)	Percentage of Expenditure on Primary Schools to Total Income
Jharkhand Total/ Average	19	487,408	2,920,680	2,690,107	35.92
Bihar Total*	58	1,653,346 *	12,399,875	10,284,678	24.97
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	32.7	29.48	23.55	26.15	-

* Excludes Dehri Notified Area Committee.

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1951*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1953, p. 75.

resided in the Jharkhand region. The same table also indicates a rather equitable expenditure on primary education in the Jharkhand region. It is noteworthy that 35.9 per cent of the income of municipal councils in the Jharkhand region was spent on primary education whereas the corresponding figure for the whole of Bihar was 24.9 per cent. This indicates the importance attached to primary education in the Jharkhand region by the policy machinery in 1951. The percentage of total

municipal expenditure on primary schools in the Jharkhand region as percentage of total such expenditure in Bihar as a whole is 26.15 per cent whereas the corresponding percentage of income is 23.55 per cent. Clearly, there is more expenditure than income from primary schools in the Jharkhand region.

Moving on to overall revenue generation, agricultural income tax collection from the Jharkhand region contributed only 7.14 per cent to the total agricultural tax

Table 10 Collection of Agricultural Income Tax in Jharkhand 1950-51

	Tax Collected (Rupees)[#]
Jharkhand Total	498,978
Bihar Total	6, 986,079
Jharkhand as a Percentage of Bihar	7.14

[#] Provisional figures.

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1951*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1953, p. 101.

collected in Bihar as a whole in 1950-51 (Table 10). This is despite a high proportion of agricultural produce in the region at that time (Table 4).

On the other hand, taxes collected on electricity consumption show a high figure. This indicates the large-scale industrial installation in the region due to the vast mineral deposits. The Jharkhand region contributed 53.41 per cent to the total

Table 11: Collection of Revenues under Electricity Act 1948 in Jharkhand 1950-51

	Tax Collected (Rupees)[#]
Jharkhand Total	579,808
Bihar Total	1,085,565
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	53.41

[#] Provisional figures

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1951*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1953, p. 109.

Table 12: Collection of Sales Tax in Jharkhand 1950-51

	Tax Collected (Rupees)[#]
Jharkhand Total	15,026,418
Bihar Total	40,814,811
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	36.81

[#] Provisional figures

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1951*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1953, p. 103.

revenues collected in Bihar as a whole from taxes on electricity (Table 11). This translated into a higher percentage of non-agricultural employment (discussed in the subsequent pages). Sales tax collection also indicates a similar high figure as higher industrial employment indicates higher consumption rates which in turn, leads to higher sales tax collection (Table 12).

An important issue in the politico-economic dynamics of the Jharkhand region has been that of land alienation (see chapter II). The high and unreasonable rates of interests charged by the moneylenders were one of the reasons for the numerous tribal revolts during the British period. The Jharkhandi leaders have asserted that there is a high rate of money-lending business in the Jharkhand region and consequently more and more land was being alienated from the tribal cultivators.

Table 13: Number of Moneylenders' Licenses Issued and Moneys Advanced in Jharkhand 1950-51

	Number of Licenses Issued	Amount of Loan Advanced (Rupees)		
		With Security	Without Security	Total
Jharkhand Total	1128	8,215,177	1,532,486	9,747,663
Bihar Total*	4,996	153,090,492*	5,792,081	158,882,573
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	22.57	5.36	26.45	6.13

* Figures from Muzzafarpur and Darbangha include the figures for loans advanced without security as well.

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1951*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1953, p. 130.

However, the figures for the year 1950-51 do not show a drastically high number of money-lending licences in the Jharkhand region (Table 13). Only 22.57 per cent of the total number of licenses issued in Bihar as a whole were for the Jharkhand region. The same table also indicates that only 5.36 per cent of secured loans and 26.45 per cent of the unsecured loans were disbursed by moneylenders in Bihar as a whole were in the Jharkhand region. Clearly, more unsecured loans were disbursed in the Jharkhand region than secured ones. Frequently, land is the item offered as security in rural India. The significantly lower amount of secured loans advanced in the Jharkhand region seem to reflect some degree of effectiveness of the legal provisions which forbid such transfers of land from tribal to non-tribal persons. Nevertheless, one cannot rule out danger of moneylenders becoming *de facto* (as opposed to *de jure*) owners of land on which interest payment had defaulted.

Other indicators for the region's level of advancement reinforce the above picture. The region of Jharkhand had better conditions than the average for Bihar as a whole. In a way, it seems natural that an area that has greater non-agricultural

activities should yield better results as far the indicators of socio-economic well being are concerned.

The indicators that will now be discussed; namely, the livelihood classes and educational patterns cross-tabulated with livelihood classes merely confirm this deduction for 1951. The category of 'Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar' in Table 14 shows that the proportion of population that depended on non-agricultural occupations and resided in the Jharkhand region was higher than the percentage of

Table 14: Livelihood Classes in Jharkhand 1951

	Agricultural and Related Activities			Non- Agricultural Activities		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	22.55	22.68	22.42	26.91	28.11	25.50
Jharkhand Percentage	83.78	82.04	85.58	16.21	17.95	14.41
Bihar Percentage	86.04	84.99	87.10	13.95	15.00	12.89

* The 1951 Census differed from the earlier ones because "the 1941 table gave distribution of population of each district by the main communities, this table gives distribution of population of each district according to . . . livelihood classes. . .", *Census of India 1951*, vol. I - India, Patna, n. d., p.333. It classified the population according to Self-supporting, Non-earning Dependent and Earning Dependent in Agricultural and Non-agricultural sectors. This figure is for the total population and not workers only as in later years. Source: *Census of India 1951*, vol. V, Bihar Part II-B Tables - Economic Tables, Patna, Government Printing Press, 1953.

people who lived in the region. Approximately 22.5 per cent of the total number of people who depended on agricultural activities in the whole of Bihar resided in the Jharkhand region whereas the same figures for those in non-agricultural occupations was slightly higher at almost 27 per cent. Clearly, a greater proportion of the industrial workforce of Bihar lived in the Jharkhand region which indicates a greater level of industrial activity in the Jharkhand region. The same conclusions can be reached by looking at the proportion of population dependent on the two kinds of occupation. In the Jharkhand region, 83 out of every 100 persons depended on agricultural activities whereas in whole of Bihar the same figure was 86 out of every 100.

The patterns that emerge from the analysis of livelihood classes in 1951 are reinforced by those emerging from an analysis of the occupational patterns.⁷ The category of 'Jharkhand as percentage of Bihar' in Table 14A shows that 24.82 per

Table 14A: Occupational Patterns in Jharkhand 1951*

	Agricultural and Related Activities			Non- Agricultural Activities		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
Jharkhand as a Percentage of Bihar	24.82	23.54	27.69	31.67	32.10	30.09
Jharkhand Percentage	33.17	42.62	23.33	6.43	10.04	2.67
Bihar Percentage	30.95	42.55	19.22	4.70	7.35	2.02

*The 1951 Census differed from the earlier ones because "the 1941 table gave distribution of population of each district by the main communities, this table gives distribution of population of each district according to . . . livelihood classes. . .", *Census of India 1951*, vol. I - India, Patna, n. d., p.333. It classified the population according to Self-supporting, Non-earning Dependent and Earning Dependent in Agricultural and Non-agricultural sectors. This figure is for the total population and not workers only as in later years. Therefore, these figures have been arrived at by subtracting Non-earning Dependents from the figures for the categories of Agricultural and Non-agricultural classes. This is the closest figure that can be calculated for the category of workers in the two sectors in the year 1951.

Source: *Census of India 1951*, vol. V, Bihar Part II-B Tables - Economic Tables, Patna: Government Printing Press, 1953.

cent of those in agricultural and related activities in the whole of Bihar lived in the Jharkhand region. This is not substantially different from the proportion of population that lived in the Jharkhand region. The same figures for the non-agricultural activities were 31.67 per cent, which was significantly higher. The Jharkhand region had a predominant place in the industrial activities of Bihar.⁸

Within the Jharkhand region, 33.17 per cent of the population worked in agricultural activities compared with only 6.43 per cent in non-agricultural activities. It adds up to about 40 per cent of the population being gainfully

⁷ The 1951 Census differed from the earlier ones because "the 1941 table gave distribution of population of each district by the main communities, this table gives distribution of population of each district according to . . . livelihood classes . . .", *Census of India 1951*, vol. I - India, Patna, n. d., p. 333. The 1951 Census classified the population according to Self-supporting, Non-earning Dependent and Earning Dependent in Agricultural and Non-agricultural sectors. Therefore, the figures for Livelihood Classes are classification of the entire population and not workers, as in the later years. The figures for workers for this year (Table 14A) have been arrived at by subtracting the Non-earning Dependents from the figures for the categories of Agricultural and Non-agricultural Livelihood Classes. These are the closest figures that can be calculated for the category of workers in the two sectors for 1951.

⁸ These figures also indicate a higher work-force participation rate in the Jharkhand region and therefore, a better employment scenario.

employed. For Bihar as whole, the same figure adds up to roughly 35 per cent. Evidently, there were greater employment opportunities in the Jharkhand region than Bihar as a whole in both the sectors. As would be expected in the mineral-rich Jharkhand region, non-agricultural employment was higher than Bihar as a whole. However, in itself, the Jharkhand region was no island of industrial activity within Bihar. Within the region, employment levels still showed a heavy dependence on the agricultural activities.

As far as the advancement in the educational levels amongst livelihood classes is concerned, an examination of Table 15 indicates that there existed a mixed picture. As a percentage of Bihar, the Jharkhand region seems to have been a repository of literate personnel who depended on the non-agricultural sector for their livelihood. More than 54 per cent of the total literate persons in the non-agricultural livelihood class resided in the Jharkhand region. In Bihar as a whole, merely, 20.18 per cent of the non-agricultural population was literate while the corresponding figures for the Jharkhand region was 40.57 per cent. This stark difference in the figures when read with the pattern emerging from other development indicators indicates that most probably, it was the skilled workforce, often from other regions of India that had inflated the numbers of literate people in the Jharkhand region. It is therefore, unwise to attach much significance to these figures.

In the agricultural livelihood classes, the average literacy in the Jharkhand region was 6.90 per cent compared with 8.82 per cent in Bihar as a whole. The figure of female literacy in the agricultural classes in both Bihar as a whole and the Jharkhand region was only about 2 per cent. Male literacy in the same category was also significantly lower in the Jharkhand region than average for Bihar as a whole. Thus, overall, the state of literacy in the Jharkhand region left much to be desired. While literacy rates amongst the non-agricultural population in the Jharkhand region were substantially better than the average for the whole of Bihar, amongst the majority of the agricultural workers, they were worse. However, as is evident from Table 15, a discussion of the various educational levels attained by persons in the two livelihood classes is of extremely limited value. The proportion of educated population is too small to be of consequence.

The general development indicators in the region at the time of the first general elections do not seem to be very poor vis-à-vis Bihar as a whole. Unlike what the Jharkhandi leaders projected at that time, there is no indication of an extremely poor development profile in the Jharkhand region relative to Bihar as a

Table 15: Livelihood Classes by Educational Standards in Jharkhand 1951⁸

Educational Standards	Agriculture-Related Activities			Non- Agricultural Activities		
	Person	Male	Female	Persons	Male	Female
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar						
Literate	17.64	16.89	22.92	54.11	62.13	29.27
Middle School	19.09	16.80	36.86	23.03	22.64	24.93
Matriculate	17.27	16.29	29.52	36.82	36.59	38.70
Intermediate	12.32	11.59	22.58	23.27	22.80	26.94
Graduate and Others #	10.00	10.20	7.36	21.66	21.11	27.32
Jharkhand Percentage						
Literate	6.90	11.56	2.24	40.57	62.39	12.29
Middle School	0.64	1.01	0.28	3.13	4.54	1.31
Matriculate	0.12	0.21	0.03	2.30	3.60	0.61
Intermediate	0.01	0.02	0.004	0.40	0.62	0.12
Graduate and Others #	0.03	0.06	0.003	0.71	1.13	0.18
Bihar Percentage						
Literate	8.82	15.53	2.19	20.18	28.23	10.71
Middle School	0.76	1.36	0.17	3.66	5.64	1.34
Matriculate	0.15	0.29	0.02	1.68	2.76	0.40
Intermediate	0.03	0.05	0.003	0.46	0.76	0.11
Graduate and Others #	0.07	0.14	0.01	0.89	1.50	0.17

⁸The 1951 Census differed from the earlier ones because "the 1941 table gave distribution of population of each district by the main communities, this table gives distribution of population of each district according to . . . livelihood classes. . .", *Census of India 1951*, vol. I, India, Patna, n. d., p.333. It classified the population according to Self-supporting, Non-earning Dependent and Earning Dependent in Agricultural and Non-agricultural sectors. This figure is for the total population and not workers only as in later years. This Table has therefore, used the Tables on Livelihood Classes 1951 to calculate the proportion of population in various educational categories amongst the Agricultural and Non-agricultural Livelihood Classes. Therefore the cross-tabulation for Educational Levels is available only for the entire population and not the working population, as in later Censuses.

Includes Graduate, Postgraduate, Teaching, Engineering, Commerce, Agriculture, Veterinary, Legal, Medical and other qualifications.

Totals for the Jharkhand region have been arrived at by adding the relevant categories for each district of the region.

Source: *Census of India 1951*, vol. V, Bihar Part II-A Tables (A, C, D, & E series), Patna: Government Printing Press, n. d.

whole. An equitable and proportional share of resources was allocated to the region. Nonetheless, the fact that different socio-economic and geographical conditions in the Jharkhand region required a different and more intensive approach was not acknowledged. However, this could hardly be expected in a province of a newly de-colonised India. The pattern which emerges from the above analysis also underlines the fact that only a very small proportion of persons had benefited by the expansion of industrialisation in the region. On a comparative level thus, Bihar as a whole and the Jharkhand region offered a similar development profile.

Against the backdrop of such developmental profile, the first general election was conducted in 1952. In chapter II, it was noticed that by this time the Jharkhand movement had acquired mass appeal and Jaipal Singh and his Jharkhand Party were highlighting the question of an autonomous territory for the Jharkhandis. The 1952 elections were dominated by the issue of Jharkhandi identity and the demand for the creation of an autonomous state in Jharkhand based on the tribal identity. Owing to the fact that the development profile of the Jharkhand region was marginally better than that of the whole of Bihar, the developmental issues were not considered politically significant - a situation that was set to change in the years to come.

II

Before the Census of 1961 was conducted, certain developments on the national political stage exercised a profound impact on the scope and planning of development in the Jharkhand region. The States' Reorganisation Commission (SRC) had reported on the principles of reorganisation and the government had implemented most of its recommendations. Consequently, a number of new states had been created and the boundaries of other had been considerably altered.

This had some effects on the Jharkhand regions as well. The hope of Jaipal Singh and other Jharkhandi leaders of being able to contribute directly to the development activities in the region were belied. The SRC had not recommended the creation of the state of Jharkhand. This injured the legitimacy of the Jharkhand Party and led to a gradual decline in its popular support (see chapter II).

Efforts to involve local level initiative and participation in development activities were started on 2 October 1952 in Bihar with the formation of four Community Development Areas and one Community Development Block under the Community Development Movement (CDM). Over the next Five-Year Plan, the

entire state was divided into 591 Community Development Blocks.⁹ There were very few instances of the CDM being able to effectively implement the development agenda of the government. This marked a watershed in the development planning in India. Due to the lack of success of the CDM, beginning in the mid-1950s, there was an increasing dependence on government line agencies to implement development programmes. This heavily bureaucratic model of development turned out to be inefficient and incompetent and failed to accelerate the pace of development in the Jharkhand region and elsewhere.

By 1961, two Five-Year Plans had already been implemented and the third plan was underway. However, as far as the Jharkhand region was concerned, the achievements of a decade of centralised planning and bureaucratic implementation had been quite modest.

Reorientation in the administrative layout between 1951 and 1961¹⁰ had affected the Jharkhand region. The immediate result was that it emerged as an even

Table 16: Population in Jharkhand 1961

	Area (Sq. Miles)	Total Population	Males	Females
Jharkhand Total	30,763	11,606,489	5,921,901	5,684,588
Bihar Total	67,196	46,455,610	23,301,449	23,154,161
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	45.78	24.98	25.41	24.55

Source: *Census of India 1961*, Paper I of 1962 - Bihar, Patna: Government Printing Press, n. d.

Table 17: Scheduled Tribes Population in Jharkhand 1961

	Total Population	Males	Females
Jharkhand Total	3,938,065	1,953,019	1,985,046
Bihar Total	4,204,770	2,087,994	2,116,776
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	93.65	93.53	93.77
Jharkhand Percentage	33.92	32.97	34.91

Source: *Census of India 1961*, Paper I of 1962 - Bihar, Patna: Government Printing Press, n. d.

⁹ This approach to development administration by making a block as the smallest unit for implementation of development policy formed the basis for the Tribal Development Blocks under the Tribal Sub-Plan (TSP) from the Fifth Five-Year Plan onwards.

¹⁰ This administrative reorientation was the result of the implementation of the SRC's recommendations as well as the internal reorganisation of the districts of Bihar.

larger percentage of the total land area of Bihar. It now comprised of 45.78 per cent of the total land area of Bihar. Accordingly, there was also a slight increase in the percentage of population within the Jharkhand region, which now accounted for 24.98 per cent of the total population of Bihar (Table 16).

Another significant factor in the development planning and political texture of the region was the diminishing percentage of the tribal population in the area. From 36.81 per cent in 1951, the ST component of the population of the Jharkhand region diminished to only 33.92 per cent. Although 93.65 per cent of the total Scheduled Tribes (ST) population of Bihar resided in the Jharkhand region in 1961 (up from 84.72 per cent in 1951), their relative percentage in the total population of the Jharkhand region declined (Table 17).

As far as the development profile of the region was concerned, an improvement can be noticed in the period 1951-61. This improvement is at a rate

Table 18: Infant Mortality and Birth & Death Rates in Jharkhand 1961

	Total number of Live Births	Total number of Deaths	Infant Mortality	Infant Mortality Rate (per 1000 live Birth)	Birth Rate (per 1000 of Population)*	Death Rate (per 1000 of Population)*
Jharkhand Total/ Average	117,387	54,036	7,157	58.95	10.61	4.83
Bihar Total/ Average	458,442	229,442	39,891	87.01	9.86	4.94
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar/ Average	25.60	23.55	17.94	-	-	-

*Mid-year population.

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1961*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 96.

that is better than Bihar as a whole. In 1961, the infant mortality rate in the Jharkhand region fell to 58.95 per 1000 live births from 62.77 in 1950, whereas the average for the whole of Bihar increased from 81.11 in 1950 to 87.01 in 1961 (Table 18). This probably indicates a better availability of primary health facilities in the Jharkhand region than in Bihar as a whole. By 1961, the death rate in Bihar as a whole had fallen to 4.94 whereas in the Jharkhand region it had fallen further to 4.83. Birth rate also fell in both Bihar as a whole and the Jharkhand region. The family planning campaign of the government seemed to be showing results, and

indicates a gradual improvement in basic health facilities during the operation of the first two Five-Year Plans in the region.

However, it seems that the improvement in the availability of health facilities had not progressed beyond the basic and primary health care. Table 19 indicates that there was a need for improvements in the health facilities in the Jharkhand region as well as in Bihar as a whole. Admittedly, the overall death rate had fallen considerably by 1961-62. However, the causes of death indicate that there was scope to limit it further by improving the available health facilities. With the exception of cholera, the share of the Jharkhand region in all the causes of death in Bihar as a whole is significant (Table 19).

Considering the fact that in 1961, the Jharkhand region accounted for only about 25 per cent of the population of Bihar, its share in the number of deaths in all

Table 19: Causes of Death in Jharkhand 1961-62

	Cholera	Small Pox	Plague	Fever	Dysentery & Diarrhoea	Respiratory	Injury	All other Causes	Total
Jharkhand Total / Average	610	278	40	37,886	1,889	1,623	1062	12,612	49,648
Bihar Total	8,883	786	78	158,155	5,101	5,189	3,246	48,004	229,442
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	6.86	35.36	51.28	23.95	37.03	31.27	32.71	23.34	23.55
Jharkhand Percentage	1.12	0.51	0.07	70.11	3.49	3.00	1.96	23.40	-
Bihar Percentage	3.87	0.34	0.03	68.93	2.22	2.26	1.41	20.92	-

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1961*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 97.

the categories is disproportionate. The Jharkhand region accounted for 37.03 per cent of deaths due to dysentery and diarrhoea which indicates that more than primary health centres was required. Public health services such as ensuring safe drinking water and sanitation appear to be in a poorer state in the Jharkhand region vis-à-vis Bihar as a whole.

However, in Bihar as a whole as well as in the Jharkhand region, the single largest killer was unspecified fever causing 68.93 per cent and 70.11 per cent of deaths, respectively. None of the other causes of death form a significant percentage

in the total number of deaths in 1961-62. Therefore, as far as health facilities were concerned, the decade of 1951-61 saw some improvements in both the Jharkhand region as well as in Bihar as a whole but a lot of improvement was still required.

Another good indicator of the developmental profile of a region is achievements or failures of the government delivery mechanism in improving the level of education/ literacy. The available data for 1951 and 1961 are constructed quite differently and hence meaningful comparisons cannot be made.

However, Table 20 lists the number of children at school in 1961-62. It shows that 25.40 per cent of the total number of children at school in Bihar as a

Table 20: Number of Children at School in Jharkhand 1961-62

	Total	Males	Females
Jharkhand Total	1,055,126	817,711	237,315
Bihar Total	4,152,641	3,324,292	828,349
Rest of Bihar	3,097,515	2,506,581	591,034
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	25.40	24.59	28.64

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1961*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 118.

whole were in the Jharkhand region with a slight skew in favour of female students, which is quite rare in Indian conditions. The figure for children at school is roughly the same as the percentage of population in the Jharkhand region. Hence, all we can deduce from this data is that there is no imbalance in the allocation of resources to the Jharkhand region.

A more detailed educational profile cross-tabulated with the occupational pattern is provided in Table 21. This shows that in 1961, 20.75 per cent of the literate persons employed in agricultural activities and 33.84 per cent of those in non-agricultural activities in Bihar as a whole were in the Jharkhand region. The same figures in 1951 were 17.64 per cent and 54.11 per cent. However, this comparison is not entirely reliable because the data available for 1951 cross-tabulated livelihood classes with educational standards whereas the 1961 figures lists

occupational patterns cross-tabulated with educational standards.¹¹ Therefore, the changes in the educational profile of workers are misleading and meaningful comparisons with the 1951 figures cannot be arrived at. The 1961 educational profile has therefore, been analysed independently.

In 1961, the proportion of literate agricultural workers in the Jharkhand region is substantially lower than the proportion of the population that resided in the

Table 21: Occupational Patterns by Educational Standards in Jharkhand 1961

Educational Standards	Agriculture-Related Activities ³			Non- Agricultural Activities ⁴		
	Person	Male	Female	Person	Male	Female
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar						
Illiterate	32.75	26.33	41.42	31.52	33.02	28.42
Literate¹	20.75	20.12	39.70	33.84	34.53	14.48
Middle School²	24.33	22.94	75.90	37.19	37.50	29.32
Matriculate and Above	10.76	10.62	40.89	37.11	36.88	47.48
Jharkhand Percentage						
Illiterate	88.17	78.66	98.39	63.30	55.37	95.22
Literate¹	9.41	17.04	1.21	23.44	28.66	1.74
Middle School²	2.28	4.04	0.38	8.29	9.98	1.25
Matriculate and above	0.14	0.28	0.005	7.85	9.46	1.13
Bihar Percentage						
Illiterate	82.75	73.99	98.51	63.91	55.45	93.16
Literate¹	13.94	20.98	1.26	22.04	27.45	3.34
Middle School²	2.88	4.36	0.21	7.09	8.80	1.18
Matriculate and above	0.42	0.66	0.005	6.73	8.49	0.66

¹ Without Educational Level.

² Primary or Junior Basic.

³ Includes Cultivators and Agricultural Labourers.

⁴ Includes those in Mining, Quarrying, Livestock, Forestry, Fishing, Hunting & Plantations, Orchards and Allied activities; Household Industry; Manufacturing other than Household Industry; Construction; Trade and Commerce; Transport, Storage and Communication; and Other services.

Source: *Census of India 1961*, vol. IV, Bihar Part II-B (i) - General Economic Tables (Tables B-I to B-IV & B-VII), Patna: Government Printing Press, n. d.

region. On the other hand, the share of literate population in the non-agricultural category is skewed in favour of the Jharkhand region. The percentage of illiterate workers who lived in the Jharkhand region was also substantial with more than 30

¹¹ The concept of 'Work' was introduced in the 1961 Census in accordance with the recommendations of International Labour Organisation. This Census enumerated regular workers as well as seasonal worker. A regular worker was a person who was employed in his/her main activity for "any of the fifteen days preceding the day" of enumeration. A seasonal worker was enumerated as employed if he had more than one hour of work for the "greater part of the working season", *Census of India 1951*, vol. I, India, Patna, n. d., p. 333.

per cent of such workers in both the sectors of the economy living in the region. Furthermore, 88.17 per cent of the agricultural workers and 63.30 per cent of the non-agricultural workers in the Jharkhand region were illiterate.

The literacy percentage amongst workers in the Jharkhand region was marginally better in the non-agricultural sector compared with Bihar as a whole and was worse in the agricultural sector. Female literacy levels were poor in both the regions, with non-agricultural literate women in the whole of Bihar being almost double than women in any other category in the two regions (although the absolute numbers are still quite small) (Table 21).

Despite the large-scale illiteracy amongst workers in 1961, there seems to have been some progress in the attainment of middle-level education in the Jharkhand region. Percentage of workers employed in non-agricultural occupations and educated till middle school was 8.29 per cent. However, the percentage of similarly educated persons in agricultural occupations was still quite low at 2.28 per cent. The progress of further education was still quite poor with only 0.14 per cent of the agricultural workers in the Jharkhand region educated beyond matriculate level. This figure was better amongst the non-agricultural workers at 7.85 per cent. Non-agricultural women also demonstrate a better proportion of education at matriculate level and above. Overall, the population in non-agricultural activities was better educated than the agricultural workforce in the region. This indicates that more and more educated persons preferred to go into non-agricultural occupations.¹² On the whole, the performance of the education policy did not show many signs of success in the Jharkhand region. It is true that the Jharkhand region is not in a very poor state compared with the average for Bihar as a whole and that some

¹² Although it is common for matriculates in most countries to seek non-agricultural employment, the situation in Jharkhand attains salience because these matriculates frequently do not find any non-agricultural work. Nonetheless, they are reluctant to take up agricultural employment as it is seen below the dignity of a matriculate to work on the land. There is almost an absence of public policy effort to provide incentives for educated persons to work in agricultural activities. This middle-level education combined with prejudice against agricultural activities has thus made a large section of the youth 'non-workers', adding to rising unemployment.

improvements can be noticed in the region. The overall pattern of education in the region however, does not point to successful policy implementation.

Similarly, the occupational pattern of the region indicates some progress (Table 22). The Jharkhand region seems to be offering more employment opportunities than Bihar as a whole. 30.74 per cent of the agricultural workforce and 31.82 per cent of the non-agricultural workforce in the whole of Bihar resided in the Jharkhand region in 1961. Significantly, 41.47 per cent of women employed in agricultural activities in the whole of Bihar lived in the Jharkhand region. This indicates that more women worked in the Jharkhand region than Bihar as a whole as well as a higher work participation rate in the former.

The figures in Table 22 also point to a better occupational scenario in the

Table 22: Occupational Patterns in Jharkhand 1961

	Agricultural and Related Activities ¹			Non- Agricultural Activities ²		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	30.74	24.77	41.47	31.82	33.07	27.81
Jharkhand Percentage	39.14	39.74	38.74	12.21	19.29	4.88
Bihar Percentage	31.81	40.77	22.80	9.58	14.82	4.31

¹ Includes Cultivators and Agricultural Labourers

² Includes those in Mining, Quarrying, Livestock, Forestry, Fishing, Hunting & Plantations, Orchards and Allied activities; Household Industry; Manufacturing other than Household Industry; Construction; Trade and Commerce; Transport, Storage and Communication; and Other services.

Source: *Census of India 1961*, vol. IV, Bihar Part II-B (i) - General Economic Tables (Tables B-I to B-IV & B-VII), Patna: Government Printing Press, n. d.

Jharkhand region, particularly in the non-agricultural sector. Whereas only 31.81 per cent of the total population was employed in agricultural activities in the whole of Bihar, the same percentage for the Jharkhand region went up to 39.14 per cent. The difference in employment opportunities between Bihar as a whole and the Jharkhand region is further evident in the figures for non-agricultural activities. In Bihar as a whole, only 9.58 per cent of the population were employed in non-agricultural activities, while in the Jharkhand region, 12.21 per cent of population worked in such occupations. In sum, almost 52 per cent of the population were gainfully employed in the Jharkhand region whereas only about 41 per cent of population in Bihar as a whole were so employed. Also noteworthy is the fact that more women were gainfully employed in the Jharkhand region. About 44 per cent

of the women in the Jharkhand region had employment whereas in the whole of Bihar the same percentage was almost half at about 27 per cent. However, one must not ignore the fact that men found more occupational opportunities in non-agricultural activities than women, who were still largely concentrated in agricultural employment.

Other indicators of development again yield a mixed pattern. Since most of the population was still engaged in agricultural occupations, the output of principal crops in the region is significant to this analysis. As Table 23 tells us, the Jharkhand

Table 23: Output of Principal Crops in Jharkhand (in thousands of tons) 1961-62

	Paddy	Wheat	Gram	Barley	Maize	Masoor	Arhar	Khesri	Peas	Sugar cane	Potatoes	Tobacco	Jute *	Chilli
Jharkhand Total	1,708	17	34	21	121	2	17	25	3	257	26	*	7	*
Bihar	4,335	513	296	253	826	75	89	521	54	6,229	219	13	1,264	14
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	39.40	3.31	11.48	8.30	14.64	2.66	19.10	4.79	5.55	4.12	11.87	0	0.5	0

* In thousands of bales of 400 pounds each.

* Less than 1,000 tons.

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1961*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 49.

region continued its large contribution in the total output of paddy of Bihar. However, the share of the Jharkhand region in the total agricultural produce of Bihar went down. In 1949-50, the region contributed more than 42 per cent to the total paddy/rice production of Bihar but by 1961-62 the same fell to 39.4 per cent despite a 591 thousand tons increase in the total production of paddy in Bihar as a whole. The share of the region in maize production in Bihar as a whole decreased significantly from 25.48 per cent in 1949-50 to 14.64 per cent in 1961-62. Although there was a doubling in the total output of maize in Bihar as a whole, the growth rate of the Jharkhand region was slower than Bihar as a whole.

There was a marginal increase in the share of the Jharkhand region in the total wheat produced in the whole of Bihar. From 2.80 per cent of the total wheat production in Bihar as a whole in 1949-50, the Jharkhand region now produced 3.31 per cent. However, the actual increase (from 10 thousand tons to 17 thousand tons) was quite small when compared with the growth in the total wheat output in Bihar as a whole (from 357 to 513). Sugarcane production in the Jharkhand region grew from 7 thousand tons in 1949-50 to 257 tons in 1961-62 (a 35 times hike) compared

with a 23 times rise in the sugarcane output in Bihar as a whole. Despite being a substantial improvement in the output of this cash crop in the Jharkhand region, the absolute figure is not significantly large enough compared with the output of sugarcane in Bihar as a whole and accounted for only about 4 per cent of the total sugarcane output in Bihar as a whole. Such marginal improvements in the production of other crops can also be noticed, the prime examples being gram, barley, *masoor*, (a variety of lentils) and potatoes. Some increase in the production of jute can also be noticed which rose from 1,000 bales in 1949-50 to 7,000 bales in 1961-62. Overall, there was a modest growth in the agricultural output of the Jharkhand region but it was outstripped by the overall growth of agricultural output in the whole of Bihar.

Closely related to agricultural output is the question of availability of agricultural finance. Tables 24 and 25 show the amount of money advanced to agriculturists for the development of agriculture and reclamation of wasteland in order to further the agricultural production of the region. As Table 24 shows, of the total money advanced to agriculturists in Bihar as a whole, only 4.26 per cent was

Table 24: Land Improvement Loans Advanced to Agriculturists in Jharkhand 1959-60[#]

	Loans Advanced (Rupees)
Jharkhand Total	1,392,843
Bihar Total	32,663,478
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	4.26

[#] Distributed under Land Improvement Loan Act 1883, and Agriculturists' Loans Act, 1884.

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1961*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 267.

spent in the Jharkhand region in 1959-60. This figure had fallen drastically from the 1950-51 level of 16.41 per cent. A comparison of Tables 5 and 24 shows that the total money advanced to agriculturists in the Jharkhand region in 1959-60 had fallen not only in terms of the percentage of the money spent in Bihar as a whole but also in actual terms. In 1950-51, Rupees 2,268,922 were spent in the Jharkhand region whereas by 1959-60, the figure had fallen to Rupees 1,392,843. Moreover, this decline occurred when the total money spent in Bihar as whole for this purpose had more than doubled. It increased from Rupees 13,826,343 in 1950-51 to 32,663,478 in 1959-60. Clearly, there was much less investment in agriculture in the Jharkhand region during this decade which was reflected in the poor rate of growth of agricultural production in the region.

Poor availability of agricultural finance in the Jharkhand region is also shown in Table 25. The total money spent on wasteland recovery loans in the Jharkhand region in 1959-60 was only 36.25 per cent of the total amount spent in

Table 25: Loans Disbursed for Reclamation of Wasteland and Areas of Wasteland Reclaimed in Jharkhand 1959-60

	Land Improvement Loans Disbursed (Rupees)	Area of Waste Land Reclaimed (Acres)	
		By Manual Labour *	By State Tractors/ Private Enterprise/ Other Means
Jharkhand Total	132,909	1392.12	510.59
Bihar	366,597	7,638.70	510.59
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	36.25	18.22	100

* With assistance of Land Improvement Loans.

Totals may not tally due to rounding off of figures to the nearest thousands in the source.

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1961*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 55.

the whole of Bihar. The same figure in 1951-52 was 48.55 per cent (Table 6). The money spent on wastelands in the Jharkhand region had thus declined in real as well as proportional terms.

Consequently, wasteland recovery in the Jharkhand region also suffered. The total area of wastelands recovered by manual labour in 1959-60 (Table 25) is only one-sixth of the total wasteland recovered in 1951-52. The decline in the area of wasteland recovered is such that the total wasteland recovered in Bihar as a whole in 1959-60 was only slightly higher than the total wasteland recovery in the Jharkhand region only in 1951-52. Furthermore, wasteland recovered by manual labour in the Jharkhand region was only 18.22 per cent¹³ of the total so recovered in Bihar as a whole. The redeeming feature is that while there was no help from governmental tractors in wasteland recovery in the Jharkhand region in 1951-52, in 1959-60 all the land recovered by these agencies lay in the region (Table 25).

Keeping in mind the hilly terrain of the Jharkhand region, wasteland cannot always be easily recovered. In such circumstances, a steady if not increasing

¹³ The plateau geography of the Jharkhand region requires greater efforts at wasteland development rather than a proportional effort. While the rest of Bihar is largely plains and have been under the plough for centuries, the terrain of Jharkhand is hilly and overgrown and there is plenty of scope for agricultural extension.

financial allocation in wasteland recovery can be expected and not a declining allocation, as is the case. The same applies to irrigation potential. There is a limit for extension of irrigated area in the region but there has been an overall decline in the total irrigated area in the Jharkhand region. This indicates a poor developmental effort by the governmental machinery.

The irrigation potential of the region is quite poor. A mere 11.87 per cent of the total irrigated area in Bihar as a whole was in the Jharkhand region (Table 26). Also noticeable is the fact that more than 43.15 per cent of this meagre area is irrigated from 'other sources'. Since all the major sources of irrigation are listed separately, this heading in effect means that such areas are irrigated by seasonal rainfall.¹⁴ The second largest source of irrigation is tanks (39.12 per cent). During the field trip it was noticed that these tanks are seasonal tanks replenished by rainwater.

The third largest source of irrigation, wells (12.10 per cent), also depend on rainfall and their water levels fall during the years with poor rainfall making irrigation from them difficult. Interestingly, the dependence on rainfall for irrigation

Table 26: Area Irrigated from Different Sources in Jharkhand (in Hectares) 1961-62

	Government Canals	Private Canals	Tanks	Wells	Other Sources	Total Area Irrigated
Jharkhand Total	10,926.75	2,023.47	90,246.87	27,923.91	99,554.84	230,675.87
Bihar Total	528,531.02	32,375.56	223,391.36	236,993.16	831,647.20	1,942,938.30
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	2.06	6.25	40.39	8.53	11.97	11.87
Jharkhand Percentage	4.73	0.87	39.12	12.10	43.15	-
Bihar Percentage	27.20	1.66	11.49	16.82	42.80	-

Totals may not tally due to rounding off of figures to the nearest thousands in the source and due to conversion of figures from Acres in the source to Hectares for comparative purposes. Factor used is 2.471 Acres equals 1 Hectare.

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1961*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 44.

¹⁴ Rainfall has a bearing on all irrigation sources of irrigation. However, there is a difference between the farmers depending exclusively on rain to irrigate their fields and the water level in canals, reservoirs etc. falling due to poor rainfall. The low level of irrigation from man-made means such as canals, etc. indicate a poor development policy effort in the Jharkhand region..

is equally heavy in Bihar as a whole (42.80 per cent). However, the most important irrigation source in Bihar as a whole is government canals accounting for 27.20 per cent of irrigation potential. In the case of the Jharkhand region however, only 4.73 per cent of such irrigation is available. The marginalisation of the Jharkhand region in the scheme of planned development as far as irrigation potential was concerned, is evident.

A related issue which indicates the developmental level and tests the claims of the Jharkhandi leaders that *dikus* (outsiders) have gradually usurped all land in the Jharkhand region is the transfer of agricultural land. Table 27 shows the registered deeds of sale of *rayati* holdings with occupancy rights. Two trends are

Table 27: Figures for Registered Deeds of Sale in Respect of *Rayati* Holdings Having Occupancy Rights in Jharkhand 1961

	Entire				In Part			
	Number	Area Transferred (in Acres)	Annual Payable to Landlord (Rupees)	Consideration Money (Rupees)	Number	Area Transferred (in Acres)	Annual Payable to Landlord (Rupees)	Consideration Money (Rupees)
Jharkhand Average	187.50	349.66	325.8	1,961,395	9,008.50	7,867.50	58,997	4,895,026.20
Bihar Average	6,623.36	5,489.81	13,423	3,550,159.5	42,511.09	23,251.81	72,848.54	21,349,641.81

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1961*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 239.

evident. Firstly, there have been fewer transfers of lands (both entire as well as part holdings) in the Jharkhand region than in Bihar as a whole. The average number of transfers of entire holdings per district in the Jharkhand region is 187.5 compared with the Bihar average of 6,623.3. Similarly, the average area transferred in each district of the Jharkhand region is also far less.

However, the partial transfers in the Jharkhand region are far greater in number. Also salient is the fact that the average consideration money paid for both partial as well as entire transfers is far less in the Jharkhand region than similar average payment for similar transfers in the whole of Bihar. This indicates a certain degree of distress selling of land holdings in the Jharkhand region. It is likely that the poorer farmers in Jharkhand region transferred a part of their holdings to generate funds for paying off interest overdue on earlier borrowings from the moneylenders or for current needs. It is also equally likely that they were constrained to transfer parts of their lands when faced with a debt called in by the

moneylender. However, these statistics cannot be taken as wholly accurate since the transfer of land to non-tribal people has been forbidden in the Jharkhand region since the colonial times. At the same time, it is equally likely that these statistics reflect merely the tip of the proverbial iceberg. Any moneylender who calls in his loan can become *de facto* owner of the land without going in for the actual legal transfer of land title deed to his name (to avoid exposing himself to the questions of the official who will register his ownership), unless the moneylender himself is also a tribal. Consequently, these statistics need to be treated with caution.

As far as the issuance of moneylender's licenses the Jharkhand region was concerned, a total of 1,048 new licenses were issued in 1961-62 compared with 1,128 in 1950-51. The percentage of such licenses issued for the rural areas of the Jharkhand region represented about 10 per cent of the rural area licenses issued in the whole of Bihar and more than 15 per cent of such licenses were in force at the end of the year (Table 28). This is not a very high proportion for an area where a quarter of the population lived.

As far as disbursal of secured loans by moneylenders was concerned, there is a decline in the share of the Jharkhand region in all such loans disbursed in Bihar as

Table 28: Number of Moneylenders' Licenses Issued, Number of Licenses in Force and Moneys Advanced in Jharkhand 1961-62

	Number of Licenses Registered for the First Time		Number of Licenses in Force at the End of the Year		Amount of Loans Advanced (Rupees)			
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	With Security		Without Security	
					Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
Jharkhand Total	471	577	4,003	5,422	9,522,932	69,735,778	885,851	10,058,307
Bihar Total	2,264	5,396	15,574	35,254	1,600,528,478	1,046,522,741	47,147,432	66,277,446
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	20.80	10.69	25.70	15.37	0.59	6.66	1.87	15.17

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1961*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 241.

a whole from 5.36 per cent in 1950-51 to about 3 per cent in 1961-62. This pattern is also accompanied by a decline in the proportion of unsecured loans in the Jharkhand region from 26.45 per cent in 1950-51 to about 9 per cent in 1961-62. However, the actual amount of loans secured advanced in the Jharkhand region had

increased substantially from Rupees 8,215,177 in 1950-51 to 79,258,710 Rupees – almost a ten times rise. Keeping in mind the fact that land is most often the item of security in rural India, there may have been a serious threat of *de facto* alienation of tribal land. The decrease in available governmental agricultural finances surely had a role to play in this matter.

Other developmental indicators in the region of Jharkhand show a similar picture. The developmental profile had improved over the last decade but whenever the responsibility had fallen on the shoulders of the policy apparatus (such as construction of canals, making agricultural finance available at favourable terms, etc.) the performance had left much to be desired. The government's policy implementation machinery had not been performing well in the Jharkhand region.

Agricultural tax collection from the region of Jharkhand fell further due to poor performance of the agricultural sector compared with 1950-51. From 7.14 per

Table 29: Collection of Agricultural Income Tax in Jharkhand 1961-62

	Tax Collected (Rupees)
Jharkhand Total	326,665
Bihar Total	5,284,369
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	6.18

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1961*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 213.

Table 30: Collection of Sales Tax in Jharkhand 1961-62

	Tax Collected (Rupees)
Jharkhand Total	32,297,604
Bihar Total	74,443,528
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	43.38

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1961*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 215.

cent of the total agricultural income tax collected in 1950-51, the share of the Jharkhand region fell to 6.18 per cent (Table 29).

Sales tax collection however, increased in the Jharkhand region. While in 1950-51, the region contributed 36.81 per cent to the total sales tax collection in the whole of Bihar, in 1961-62 this rose to 43.38 per cent (Table 30). Clearly, the non-agricultural sector was doing better than the agricultural sector. However, there was not much contribution of governmental policy machinery in this aspect.

Admittedly, the mineral extraction from the region and some heavy industry was largely the result of governmental effort but apart from this, no major policy initiative was directed towards the development of non-agricultural activities in the region. This is reflected in the fact that despite comprising 45.78 per cent of the

Table 31: Length of PWD Roads in Jharkhand 1960

	Total Mileage of PWD Roads (Kilometres)
Jharkhand Total	2,609
Bihar Total	6,951
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	37.53

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1961*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 244.

total land area of Bihar and being at the centre of the state's non-agricultural activity, the Jharkhand region had only 37.53 per cent of PWD Roads (Table 31). Had the region not been so salient in the mineral policy of the government, the policy initiatives would perhaps have performed even less efficiently in this field as well.

Thus, after two Five-Year Plans, two general elections and a decade of independent Indian governance, the Jharkhand region was relatively worse off in many developmental profile indicators and showed only modest improvements in others. Clearly, the state of affairs had been improving but all the indicators that demonstrate a vibrant and efficient public policy in operation had not performed well in the Jharkhand region.

It is also noteworthy that the development profile of the Jharkhand region compared with the whole of Bihar had worsened over the first decade of independent Indian governance. It has been observed that the Jharkhand region had a better development profile in 1951 which worsened over this period. Some development indicators continued to be better than Bihar as a whole in 1961 but the rate of improvement in the decade of 1951-61 was faster in Bihar as a whole than the Jharkhand region.

This was also a period that saw the best popular support for the Jharkhand Party which virtually laid down the law in the region during the decade of 1951-61. The disillusionment with the party began with their failure to convince the SRC of the necessity of creating a state of Jharkhand and manifested itself in declining

electoral support in the 1957 and 1962 elections. After this decade, the sway of the Jharkhandi parties in the region declined and ended with the Jharkhand Party merging with the INC. This merger marked not only the nadir of the Jharkhand Party but also signalled the entry of national parties into the region.

III

The year 1967 marked a break in Indian politics in more ways than one. It was the time when the hegemony of the INC at the national level began to be challenged and a true multi-party system started emerging. The reflections of this trend can also be noticed in state level politics. Undoubtedly, the stranglehold that the INC had over national and state level politics did not simply disappear overnight, but the lines of dissension within the INC began to come in to the open. The INC started losing its umbrella character which had enabled it to tower above its opponents in the past. The states began to throw up new regional and other grassroots political organisations. Leftist politics that had hardly survived under Nehru began finding roots in various pockets in the country. The "Congress System"¹⁵ began to disintegrate.

Such profound political changes hardly left the Jharkhand region untouched. Apart from the fact that a multi-party system started to emerge in the area, there also emerged strong support for the leftist parties. These independent Marxist political organisations swiftly moved in to fill the political vacuum which had been created by the collapse of the Jharkhandi political formations. The period also noticed a rise in civil unrest in the industrial centres of south Bihar. Support for the Naxalite movement in the area also led to widespread lawlessness and disorder (see chapter II). Consequently, President's Rule was invoked in Bihar in June 1968. Soon after, a committee¹⁶ was appointed to enquire into the causes of growing unrest

¹⁵ Rajni Kothari, *Politics in India*, New Delhi, 1970.

¹⁶ It was made up of the secretaries to the Departments of Welfare, Labour & Employment, Education, Appointments and Political and submitted its report in November 1968.

in tribal Bihar. This committee cited the declining development profile as a major cause of the unrest. However, the committee was also of the opinion that the role played by the planning process in improving the developmental profile of the Jharkhand region as a whole and that of the Adivasi inhabitants in particular, could not be evaluated conclusively because:

the statistics in regard to the plan progress have not been kept on regional basis, . . . Therefore, it is difficult to make a precise estimate, . . . of the extent to which the tribal people have benefited, or failed to benefit, from the implementation of the three plans. Significant developments have, no doubt, taken place in the plateau region . . .¹⁷

The committee¹⁸ observed that the unrest in the Jharkhand region was rooted in the poor growth of opportunities for employment, vocational/ technical training, and education. The impact of these problems was accentuated, according to the committee, by "factors such as industrial development, educational advancement, rising prices, growth of political awareness, etc." The committee also noted the continual neglect by the government machinery and underlined the need for planned development of the area and improvement of facilities such as irrigation, drinking water supply, etc.

Further, the report acknowledged that the tribal people had the poorest levels of literacy in Bihar. Nevertheless, it also pointed to higher employment in the Jharkhand region compared with the rest of the state. It took particular note of the relatively greater employment level of women but was equally concerned about the continued over-dependence of the population on agricultural occupations in the Jharkhand region. These deductions of the committee are in consonance with the analysis of the development profile of the Jharkhand region in 1961 in the last section.

¹⁷ *A Report on the Situation in the Tribal Areas of Bihar*, Patna, 1968, p. 37.

¹⁸ *ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

The committee drew attention to the large-scale land-alienation near the industrial townships in the Jharkhand region and regarded it with concern. It was observed that inadequate governmental agricultural credit facilities in the Jharkhand region ensured that *diku* moneylenders thrived which resulted in land alienation and resultant unrest. It was critical of the policy of the government in this regard and recommended the extension of better agricultural credit facilities.

The absence of “responsive and responsible” leadership in the Jharkhand region was considered to be another important cause of unrest. The committee noted that the political vacuum had enabled “a number of political parties and individuals to fish in troubled waters of Chotanagpur”. Commenting on the demand for an autonomous state of Jharkhand, the committee felt that better educated persons in the region (a very small minority of them being Adivasi) would be the greatest beneficiaries of the creation of the state of Jharkhand or greater reservation for STs in jobs or educational institutions.

Hence, the conclusions of the Committee in 1968 attest to the conclusions arrived at in the last section. The next section examines the changes in the development profile of the region in terms of the number of people benefited during 1961-71.

IV

Although the political climate of the region had changed drastically between 1961 and 1971, the developmental profile hardly showed any sign of accelerated growth. The population of both Bihar as a whole and the Jharkhand region had grown since the 1961 Census. The decadal growth in the population of the Jharkhand region was 34.42 per cent whereas that of Bihar as a whole was 21.30

Table 32 Population in Jharkhand 1971

	Area (Sq. Kms.)	Total Population	Males	Females
Jharkhand Total	91,545	15,601,509	8,009,919	7,591,590
Bihar Total	173,876	56,353,369	28,846,944	27,506,425
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	52.64	27.68	27.76	27.59

Source: *Census of India 1971*, Series 4, Bihar Part II-A - General Population (Tables A-I, AII, AIII and PCA), Patna: Government Printing Press, n. d.

per cent. By 1971, 27.68 per cent of the total population of Bihar resided in the Jharkhand region (Table 32). Moreover, owing to the administrative reorientation of the districts which formed the Jharkhand region, the total land area of the Jharkhand region represented 52.64 per cent (up by approximately 7 per cent since 1961) of the total area of Bihar. The proportion of people living in the Jharkhand region increased by only 3 per cent. Thus, it is not possible to determine the relative growth rates of the population of the Jharkhand region and Bihar as a whole.

Besides, the Jharkhand region was gradually and increasingly becoming more cosmopolitan in character. The diminishing percentage of tribal population noticed earlier continued in this decade as well. In the decade 1961-71, the tribal component of the population of the Jharkhand region reduced from 33.92 per cent to 29.29 per cent (Table 33). This reduction cannot be attributed to the traditional

Table 33: Scheduled Tribes Population in Jharkhand 1971

	Total Population	Males	Females
Jharkhand Total	4,569,889	2,277,084	2,292,805
Bihar Total	4,932,767	2,462,265	2,470,502
Jharkhand as a Percentage of Bihar	92.64	92.47	92.80
Jharkhand Percentage	29.29	28.42	30.20

Source: *Census of India 1971*, Series 4, Bihar Part V-A SC-I IV (Part A & B) and SC-I-V (Part) - Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, Patna: Government Printing Press, n. d.

seasonal economic migration of tribal males to the rest of the country because there is an almost equal decline in both male and female ST population.

Moreover, the tribal population of Bihar still predominantly resided in the Jharkhand region. 92.64 per cent of the total tribal population of Bihar lived in the Jharkhand region in 1971 (Table 33) as compared with 93.6 per cent in 1961. This can be attributed to a substantially lower growth rate for the ST population during the last decade.

While in the period 1961-71, the demographic profile of the region had altered to some extent, the developmental profile of the region with a few noticeable exceptions, was not significantly different. An important indicator of the developmental profile is an analysis of the occupational pattern. This indicator attests to a mixed picture of development in the Jharkhand region. However, before

embarking on an analysis of this indicator, it must be pointed out that the figures for 1971 are artificially deflated owing to a redefinition of categories:

In the 1971 Census every person was asked what his main activity was . . . On the basis of this question, the population was divided into two broad streams of main activity as 'workers' and 'non-workers' . . . If the person had participated in any such regular work on any one of the days during this reference period [one week prior to the date of enumeration] and this had been his main activity, the person was categorised accordingly. In the case of seasonal workers, a person's main activity was ascertained with reference to such work in the last one year . . . The 1971 Census registered a sharp decline in the work participation rate . . . as compared to the 1961 Census.¹⁹

Therefore, a comparison of actual percentages of workers in agricultural and non-agricultural sectors in 1961 and 1971 is of little value.²⁰ The best that can be done is a comparison of the changes in the percentages of workers in Bihar as a whole that resided in the Jharkhand region. This will indicate if the availability of employment opportunity in the Jharkhand region had improved relative to Bihar as a whole.

Table 34 represents the distribution of workers in the two sectors. It shows that the total population gainfully employed in the Jharkhand region was only about 29 per cent of the total population whereas the same percentage for the whole of Bihar was approximately 31 per cent. In consonance with other development indicators, the availability of employment in Bihar as a whole was marginally better than in the Jharkhand region. Moreover, this table also confirms the industrial predominance of the Jharkhand region. Non-agricultural employment in the

¹⁹ *Census of India 1991*, Series 1, Paper 3 of 1991, Provisional Population Tables: Workers and their Distribution, New Delhi, 1991, para 2.3-2.5. As noted earlier, the 1961 Census had enumerated individuals as workers if (a) they were employed for one day over the past 15 days and (b) in case of seasonal work, if they found at least one hour of work over the "greater part of the 'working season'". This reduced the number of workers enumerated in the 1971 census compared with the 1961 Census.

²⁰ The higher number of workers enumerated by the 1961 Census leads to a misleading picture as the figures fell significantly when the category of workers was re-defined in 1971. However, the comparative analysis of the Jharkhand region and Bihar as a whole still holds true as the same definition was applied to both the regions.

Jharkhand region is higher than that in Bihar as a whole, as is the share of women employed in such activities.

Further, as far as the agricultural activities were concerned, 23.67 per cent of those employed in agricultural activities in Bihar as a whole resided in the Jharkhand region. This figure is slightly smaller than the percentage of population

Table 34: Occupational Patterns in Jharkhand 1971

	Agricultural and Related Activities ¹			Non- Agricultural Activities ²		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	23.67	23.26	25.94	37.96	37.47	43.87
Jharkhand Percentage	22.08	35.79	7.62	7.14	13.90	1.22
Bihar Percentage	25.82	42.72	8.10	5.20	10.17	0.77

¹ Includes Cultivators; Agricultural Labourers and those in Livestock, Forestry, Fishing, Hunting & Plantations, Orchards and allied activities.

² Includes those in Mining & Quarrying; Manufacturing, Processing, Servicing & Repairs; Construction; Trade & Commerce; Transport, Storage & Communications and Other services.

Source: *Census of India 1971*, Series 4 Bihar, Part II-B (i) - General Economic Tables (Tables B-I Part A and B-II), Patna: Government Printing Press, n. d.

that resided in the Jharkhand region. In the non- agricultural sector, the percentage of persons residing in the Jharkhand region increased from 31.82 per cent in 1961 to 37.96 per cent in 1971. Despite a sharp decline in the numbers of workers enumerated (owing to the redefinition of categories), the fact that the percentage of non-agricultural workers rose indicates a greater industrial vitality in the economy of the Jharkhand region. Clearly, the region of Jharkhand was consolidating as the industrial region of Bihar. Thus, a very mixed picture emerges about the occupational patterns in the Jharkhand region in 1971, but overall there were as a lower number of job opportunities in the Jharkhand region than Bihar as a whole in 1971. However, as pointed out earlier, owing to redefinition of categories, these deductions from this indicator are of limited use.

As far as the educational level of the working population of the Jharkhand region was concerned the picture is not very different (Table 35). In 1971, 81.27 per cent of the persons employed in agricultural activities and 44.00 per cent of the non- agricultural workforce was illiterate. The figures for female illiteracy in the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors alike were still higher at 98.48 per cent and

84.45 per cent, respectively. Although the level of female illiteracy in Bihar as a whole is quite similar, the figures for total illiteracy in the whole of Bihar are slightly better. In Bihar as a whole, 78.41 per cent of the agricultural and 42.28 per cent of the non-agricultural workforce was illiterate.

As is evident from Table 35, the patterns of education in Bihar as a whole and the Jharkhand region were poor. However, overall, Bihar as a whole offered a better picture of educational levels amongst the working population. In fact, as far as educational levels in non-agricultural activities in the whole of Bihar were

Table 35: Occupational Patterns by Educational Standards in Jharkhand 1971

Educational Standards	Agriculture-Related Activities ⁴			Non- Agricultural Activities ⁵		
	Person	Male	Female	Person	Male	Female
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar						
Illiterate	24.53	24.21	25.86	39.51	38.56	45.34
Literate*	20.07	19.88	38.41	29.88	29.85	32.92
Middle School¹	20.56	20.38	42.23	36.95	36.98	35.24
Matriculate	12.44	12.38	34.96	38.29	38.08	46.01
Intermediate²	17.34	17.25	41.66	42.55	43.23	28.62
Graduate and Others³	9.07	9.07	0	38.28	37.80	40.81
Jharkhand Percentage						
Illiterate	81.27	77.79	98.48	44.00	40.36	84.45
Literate*	6.69	7.89	0.77	11.63	12.54	1.81
Middle School¹	10.21	12.06	1.03	23.58	25.20	6.02
Matriculate	0.89	1.06	0.04	14.31	15.13	5.44
Intermediate²	0.05	0.06	0.002	0.95	1.01	0.35
Graduate and Others³	0.06	0.07	0	5.49	5.67	3.62
Bihar Percentage						
Illiterate	78.41	74.72	98.80	42.28	39.22	81.71
Literate*	7.89	9.23	0.52	14.78	15.74	2.41
Middle School¹	11.75	13.76	0.63	24.23	25.54	7.49
Matriculate	1.70	2.00	0.03	14.19	14.89	5.18
Intermediate²	0.06	0.08	0.001	0.85	0.87	0.55
Graduate and Others³	0.15	0.18	0.0004	5.45	5.62	3.25

* Without Educational Level.

¹ Includes Primary and Middle School.

² Includes Technical or Non-technical Diploma or Certificate not equal to Degree.

³ Includes those who hold a University Graduate or Postgraduate Degree or an Engineering and Technology, Medical, Agricultural, Veterinary and Dairying or Teaching Degree.

⁴ Includes Cultivators; Agricultural Labourers and those in Livestock, Forestry, Fishing, Hunting & Plantations, Orchards and allied activities.

⁵ Includes those in Mining & Quarrying; Manufacturing, Processing, Servicing & Repairs; Construction; Trade & Commerce; Transport, Storage & Communications and Other services.

Source: *Census of India 1971*, Series 4, Bihar Part II-B (ii) - General Economic Tables (Tables B-I Part B, B-II & B-VII to B-IX), Patna: Government Printing Press, n. d.

concerned, a better picture emerges. In all the categories, Bihar as a whole has a better educational profile than the Jharkhand region.

Clearly, the performance of public policy in the region of Jharkhand was poorer than in the whole of Bihar. Keeping in mind the fact that in 1951 the Jharkhand region had better educational levels of its population, it appears that in the last two decades there had been no concerted implementation of public policy in the region of Jharkhand with regard to the educational/ literacy policy component of policy planning. The education policy of the government was not able to even maintain the earlier standards, let alone improve the educational level of the workforce.

It is quite disturbing to find that after two decades of policy planning and implementation, approximately, two-thirds of the workforce²¹ was still illiterate. This cannot but significantly affect the economic opportunities available to the people in the region as well as retard the rate of economic growth. Other developmental indicators for the region do not paint a picture that would redeem the neglect of the region in the components of policy agenda that have already been discussed.

The falling share of the Jharkhand region in the total agricultural production of Bihar as a whole has been noticed earlier. However, no further comparisons of

Table 36: Area under Principal Crops in Jharkhand (in thousands of Hectares) 1974-75

	Paddy	Wheat	Gram	Barley	Maize	Masoor	Arhar	Khesri	Peas	Sugar cane	Potato	Tobacco	Jute #	Chilli
Jharkhand Total	1,687	74	53	25	191	6	36	15	2	9	23	*	*	1
Bihar	5,228	1,478	248	192	881	146	107	622	28	141	115	9	105	11
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	32.26	5.00	21.37	13.02	21.67	4.10	5.78	2.41	7.14	6.38	20.0	0	0	9.09

* Nil or less than 500 Hectares

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1978*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., pp. 46-7, 49.

²¹ Notwithstanding the redefinition of categories in 1971, even if the new categories are analysed without reference to the last Census, the conclusions hold true.

the agricultural output of the region can be made since the data available in the decade of 1970's does not provide the agricultural output of the districts concerned. Instead, the available data provides the total hectares under a specified crop (Table 36). It must be pointed out that a higher acreage under a certain crop does not necessarily mean a higher production level. This is particularly true in the case of the Jharkhand region where the majority of farmers continue to depend on rainfall alone. It seems that the government of Bihar was guilty of trying to cover up for the falling agricultural output of the Jharkhand region and Bihar as a whole by simply not publishing the relevant data.

However, this table makes it clear that there was little effort to produce cash crops in the Jharkhand region. The proportion of cropped area in the Jharkhand region under marketable crops such as sugarcane, jute, tobacco and potato is much smaller compared with subsistence crops like rice, gram/ paddy, barley or lentils. This indicates that the nature of agricultural activities in the Jharkhand region continues to be that of subsistence farming dependent on seasonal rainfall for its water requirements. This fact underlines the observations made during the fieldwork that a number of peasants have given up farming owing to minimal produce. They have not been able to find jobs elsewhere and therefore have no employment at all. This pattern of declining employment opportunities in the agricultural sector is not matched by an increase in employment in non-agricultural sector.

With an aim to compare the relative agricultural performance of the Jharkhand region and Bihar as a whole, another type of statistic available for 1974-75 has been used. The acreage under High Yielding Varieties (HYV) of crops

Table 37: Area under High Yielding Variety Crops in Jharkhand (in Acres) 1974-75

	Rice	Wheat
Jharkhand Total	176,449	91,754
Bihar Total	1,506,974	2,152,963
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	11.70	4.26

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1978*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 44.

would indicate the relative efforts undertaken by the planning machinery to increase agricultural production. As demonstrated in Table 37, the Jharkhand region, despite

producing a high percentage of the total paddy/rice production of Bihar in 1951 and 1961, in 1974-75 accounted for only 11.7 per cent of the total area under HYV of rice in Bihar as a whole. Since all HYVs require an efficient and plentiful irrigation system, it is pertinent to examine whether there were any improvements in the total irrigated area of the Jharkhand region and the sources of irrigation.

As Table 38 illustrates, in 1973-74 the Jharkhand region accounted for only 7.59 per cent of the total irrigated area of Bihar whereas in 1961-62 its share had been 11.87 per cent. There was in fact an actual decline in the total irrigated area in

Table 38: Area Irrigated from Different Sources in Jharkhand (in Hectares) 1973-74

	Government Canals	Private Canals	Tanks	Wells/ Tube-wells	Other Sources	Total Area Irrigated
Jharkhand Total	34,000	2,000	33,000	45,000	60,000	176,000
Bihar Total	896,000	4,000	82,000	717,000	621,000	2,316,000
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	3.79	50	40.24	6.27	9.66	7.59
Jharkhand Percentage	19.31	1.13	18.75	25.56	34.09	-
Bihar Percentage	28.68	0.17	3.54	30.95	29.81	-

Total may not tally due to rounding up of figures to the nearest 1,000 in the source.

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook, 1978*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., pp. 40-1.

the Jharkhand region from 230,675.87 hectares in 1961-62 to 176,000 hectares in 1973-74. This reduction in the irrigation capacity is noticeable across all the sources of irrigation with the exception of government canals and wells/tube-wells.

The percentage of land area irrigated in the Jharkhand region by government canals increased from 4.73 per cent in 1961-62 to 19.31 per cent in 1973-74. However, this four-fold increase in the percentage was not very significant in actual terms since only 24,000 more hectares were irrigated by government canals and the total irrigated area had fallen in real terms. Tanks formed a large source of irrigation in 1961-62 but by 1973-74, the extent of irrigation from tanks had also fallen considerably and formed only 18.75 per cent (compared with 39.12 per cent in 1961-62) of an already reduced total irrigated area. The fact that the total area irrigated in the Jharkhand region by government canals actually went up in real

terms is the only indicator of any efforts to improve the irrigation capacity of the region and thereby agricultural output.

The patterns for Bihar as a whole show a rather different picture. The area irrigated from all sources declined in Bihar as a whole except the area irrigated by government canals, yet there was net increase in the total irrigated area of Bihar with the result that over the last 13-14 years, the total irrigation capacity of the whole of Bihar had increased considerably. Thus, there seems to have been a greater success in the implementation of irrigation programmes in Bihar as a whole but quite the reverse in the Jharkhand region. This indicates a gross failure of policy implementation and a reduced effectiveness of public policy initiatives in the Jharkhand region.

Another related factor which has a bearing on the performance of public policy with regard to agriculture in the region is the availability of governmental

Table 39: Land Improvement Loans Advanced To Agriculturists in Jharkhand 1972-73[#]

	Loans Advanced (Rupees)
Jharkhand Total	9,223,910
Bihar Total	57,918,086
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	15.92

[#] Under the Land Improvement Loans Act, 1883, Natural Calamities Loan and Agriculturists' Loans Act, 1884.

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1978*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 152.

agricultural finance. The Committee on the Situation in Tribal Areas of Bihar in 1968 singled out this area for its critical remarks. Table 39 shows that a greater volume of governmental agricultural finance was available in the Jharkhand region in 1972-73, compared with the earlier period. From only 4.26 per cent in 1959-60, the percentage had risen to 15.92 per cent by 1972-73. This was a substantial rise in both actual as well as relative terms. However, it was still far below the amount required to improve agriculture in the region. The region of Jharkhand accounted for 52.6 per cent of the total land area of Bihar and more than a quarter of the total population of Bihar but the total agricultural finances disbursed by the government in the region was only about 15 per cent of the total. The figure becomes even more insignificant when the plateau landscape of Jharkhand is taken into account.

Despite the poor efforts at improving agricultural production in the region, the contribution of the Jharkhand region to the total agricultural income tax collection in Bihar as a whole had risen. By 1975-76, the agricultural income tax collected from the Jharkhand region formed 9.56 per cent (compared with 6.18 per cent in 1961-62) of the total. In fact, the actual figures had increased by almost two and half times (Table 40). Despite the modest amount of money involved (which is even smaller in real terms when inflation is taken into account); the above figures

Table 40: Collection of Agricultural Income Tax in Jharkhand 1975-76

	Tax Collected (Rupees)
Jharkhand Total	170,000
Bihar Total	1,778,000
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	9.56

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1978*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 159.

indicate a better realisation of agricultural revenues from the Jharkhand region compared with Bihar as a whole.

The high share of the Jharkhand region in the revenues collected in Bihar is also shown in Tables 41 and 42. Only 16 per cent of the total number of electrified villages in the whole of Bihar were in the Jharkhand region (Table 41). The

Table 41: Number of Electrified Villages in Jharkhand 1973*

	Total Number of Electrified Villages
Jharkhand Total	1,485
Bihar Total	9,280
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	16.00

* As on 31 March 1973.

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1978*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 234.

Table 42: Collection of Revenues under Electricity Act 1948 1975-76

	Tax Collected (Rupees)
Jharkhand Total	60,686,000
Bihar Total	86,256,000
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	70.35

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1978*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 159.

electrification of a village is pertinent in the developmental profile of the region because availability of electricity increases the access of the farmers to underground water for irrigation purposes.

As Table 38 shows, 6.27 per cent of the total irrigated area irrigated by wells/tube-wells in the whole of Bihar was in the Jharkhand region. This can be

explained by the low percentage of electrified villages that lie in the region. However, despite this poor level of electrification of villages, the contribution of the Jharkhand region to the tax collected on electricity was quite high. In the year 1975-76, the Jharkhand region contributed more than 70 per cent of the total taxes on electricity (Table 42). Due to poor scope of consumption of electricity for irrigation, most of the tax must have been collected from the industrial sector. However, in view of the fact that there was no substantial rise in the jobs in non-agricultural sector in the last decade or so, a chequered picture emerges. It seems that the region of Jharkhand had not only become the predominant industrial region in Bihar but had also become an internal colony of Bihar where there were poor public policy efforts at developmental investment, agricultural development and employment generation but high level of tax realisation.

This pattern of declining public policy performance in the Jharkhand region can also be noticed in the rate of expansion of the PWD road network. There was indeed, a larger network of roads in the Jharkhand region in 1977-78 (Table 43) but the region accounted for only 33.3 per cent of the total road length in Bihar as a

Table 43: Length of PWD Roads in Jharkhand 1977-78

	Total Length of PWD Roads* (in Kilometres)
Jharkhand Total	5,005
Bihar Total	15,026
Jharkhand as percentage of Bihar	33.30

* Includes State Highways, Major District Roads and other Divisional Roads. National Highways' district-wise break-up is unavailable.
Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1978*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 197.

whole (compared with 37.5 per cent in 1960). The rate of growth of road network in the Jharkhand region was slower than in Bihar as a whole.

Another facet in the maze of developmental problems in the Jharkhand region that had also deserved significant mention by the 1968 committee, is that of *rayati* transfers and the rate of land alienation amongst the tribal peasants of the Jharkhand region. Compared with 1961, there were a greater numbers of partial transfers of land in the Jharkhand region (Table 44) whereas in Bihar as a whole the number of partial transfers declined by 1974. This indicates a pattern of sale of a part of a landholding to secure resources to buy agricultural inputs for the rest of the land or possibly distress selling for current needs in the Jharkhand region.

In 1974, the average area of land transferred, as far as the partial transfer of land was concerned, was smaller in the Jharkhand region (Table 44) than in Bihar as a whole. The same pattern is repeated in the cases of transfers of the entire holdings. Keeping in mind the low amount of average rent payable to the landlords

Table 44: Figures for Registered Deeds of Sale in Respect of Rayati Holdings Having Occupancy Rights in Jharkhand 1974

	Entire				In Part			
	Number	Area Transferred (in Acres)	Annual Rent Payable to Land-lord (Rupees)	Consideration Money (Rupees)	Number	Area Transferred (in Acres)	Annual Rent Payable to Landlord (Rupees)	Consideration Money (Rupees)
Jharkhand Average	183.14	192.85	264.28	-*	25,619.71	11,907.14	18,634.57	-*
Bihar Average	3,036.14	1,417.48	5,711.90	-*	26,359.06	26,347.45	36,949.74	-*

* Figures for very few districts are available.

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1978*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 192.

and the general state of agricultural development in the region, it is more likely that there were not many buyers of the land. There is a likelihood that more peasants wanted to sell their holdings than those who wanted to buy agricultural land in such a region. In such a situation, alienation of land,²² whether legal or illegal, cannot be ruled out. Unfortunately, the statistics for moneylenders are not available for this period but keeping in mind the general pattern of the region till now and the declining state of agriculture in the region, it is quite plausible that there was a rise in distress selling or forced transfers. Many impoverished peasants were likely to sell part or whole of their holdings for current expenses or to pay for forced economic migration to other parts of India.

In sum, the decade of the 1960s saw almost an all round deterioration in the development profile of the Jharkhand region, both in itself as well as a proportion of Bihar as a whole. During the earlier decade, there were some indicators which had performed better than the others in Jharkhand. However, during this decade, most

²² It hardly matters whether this alienation is *de facto* or *de jure* as by now some tribal persons had also become rich moneylenders. The effect of any alienation is the same in the development profile of the Jharkhand region: some more tribal persons begin to look for the non-existent industrial employment.

development indicators worsened. The earlier scenario of the Jharkhand region contributing more than its fair share to the state exchequer but not receiving an equally high investment of development funds from the public policy machinery continued. As noted earlier, the Jharkhand region appears to have emerged as an internal colony of Bihar.

V

In the development scenario of the Jharkhand region, a brief analysis of the changes in the development profile of the ST population is important.²³ Although the ST population in the Jharkhand region was only about a third of the total population, the tribal people were still the most cohesive political group in the region. Furthermore, since the Jharkhand movement was premised on (and still draws upon) tribal history, culture, heritage and symbolism, it is pertinent to trace the developmental profile of the tribal people.

The Census of 1961 was the first to enumerate detailed socio-economic statistics for the tribal population. Hence, there is no detailed comparable data from 1951 apart from basic population figures. In 1961, more than 93 per cent of the tribal population of Bihar resided in the Jharkhand region which was an increase over the 1951 figures of 84.72 per cent (Tables 2 & 17). This indicates that the tribal population was increasingly concentrated in the Jharkhand region. The administrative reorganisation of the districts of the Jharkhand region also had a part to play in this concentration.

Besides, more than 90 per cent of the ST persons employed in agricultural as well as non-agricultural occupations in Bihar as whole were resident in the Jharkhand region (Table 45). As far as the ST males in the Jharkhand region were concerned, only 47.61 per cent of them (compared with 52.18 per cent of the ST women) worked in agricultural activities. The figures for women's occupational

²³ Since an overwhelming majority of the ST persons lived and worked in the Jharkhand region, it is of very little value to dwell on the employment patterns of ST population in the whole of Bihar.

patterns are higher in agricultural occupation. Presumably, more ST men had by now ventured out of the Jharkhand region in search of jobs leaving behind their families. Seasonal economic migration of tribal men to the rest of the country to work as labourers was nothing new. The higher non-agricultural employment of ST males also indicates that they were also looking for industrial employment in greater numbers than ST females.

As far as their occupational pattern in the Jharkhand region is concerned, Table 45 tells us that 49.47 per cent of the ST population was still working in agricultural occupations and a mere 7.03 per cent found non-agricultural employment. More ST women depended on agricultural occupations than men and

Table 45: Scheduled Tribes Occupational Patterns in Jharkhand 1961

	Agricultural and Related Activities ¹			Non- Agricultural Activities ²		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	90.51	85.67	95.34	90.47	89.96	91.55
Jharkhand Percentage	49.47	47.61	52.18	7.03	9.56	4.54
Bihar Percentage	51.65	51.98	51.33	7.27	9.93	4.65

¹ Includes Cultivators and Agricultural Labourers.

² Includes those in Mining, Quarrying, Livestock, Forestry, Fishing, Hunting & Plantations, Orchards and allied activities; Household Industry; Manufacturing other than Household Industry; Construction; Trade and Commerce; Transport, Storage and Communication; and Other services.

Source: *Census of India 1961*, vol. IV, Bihar Part V-A - Special Tables for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, Patna: Government Printing Press, n. d.

women's employment level in non-agricultural occupations was almost half than that of men. In sum, it is clear that the hopes expressed in the Constituent Assembly that within a decade aided by reservations and positive discrimination, the ST population would come up to the level of the rest of the population were belied.

The matters were not to change drastically during the next decade. The occupational pattern of Scheduled Tribes in the Jharkhand region in 1971 again indicates a pattern of a lesser number of occupational opportunities in the Jharkhand region. More than 92 per cent of the total ST population of Bihar and more than 96 per cent of those employed in agricultural or non- agricultural activities resided in the Jharkhand region (Tables 33 & 46). In the Jharkhand region, the over-dependence of the ST population on agricultural activities was once again, very evident. In 1971, 31.38 per cent of the ST population was engaged in agricultural

activities whereas only 3.12 per cent were employed in non- agricultural activities. Despite the redefinition of categories, this overwhelming pattern testifies to the above conclusions as it indicates that the ST population was not getting even the unskilled jobs in the industrial sector.

Table 46: Scheduled Tribes Occupational Patterns in Jharkhand 1971

	Agricultural and Related Activities			Non- Agricultural Activities		
	Total	Male	Female ³	Total	Male	Female
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	96.71	92.14	0.17	96.29	97.45	91.90
Jharkhand Percentage	31.38	50.66	12.23	3.12	5.02	1.24

¹ Includes Cultivators; Agricultural Labourers and those in Livestock, Forestry, Fishing, Hunting & Plantations, Orchards and allied activities.

² Includes those in Mining & Quarrying; Manufacturing, Processing, Servicing & Repairs; Construction; Trade & Commerce; Transport, Storage & Communications and Other services.

Source: *Census of India 1971*, Series 4, Bihar Part V-A SC-I-IV (Part A & B) and ST I-V (Part A & B), - Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, Patna: Government Printing Press, n. d.

Table 47: Scheduled Tribes Educational Levels in Jharkhand 1971

	Illiterate			Literate ¹			Middle School ²			Matriculate and Above		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	92.02	91.39	92.56	95.24	94.65	97.36	95.67	95.08	98.02	94.76	94.25	97.06
Jharkhand Percentage	87.76	80.59	94.89	5.74	8.93	2.57	5.52	8.81	2.26	0.71	1.17	0.26

¹ Without Educational Level

² Primary or Junior Basic

Source: *Census of India 1971*, Series 4, Bihar Part V-A (SCI-IV Part A & B; SCI-V Part) - Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, Patna: Government Printing Press, n. d.

The lack of success of the developmental policies for the ST population is also reflected in the figures for their educational levels (Table 47). Despite more than two decades of the operation of reservation and positive discrimination to secure rapid educational improvement amongst them, the majority of STs were still illiterate. In 1971, the figure was 87.76 per cent. The situation was worse in the case of women where 94.89 per cent were illiterate. Moreover, amongst the 12.24 per cent of the ST population that was thus literate or educated, 5.74 per cent were only literate without any further education level. It is likely that many of this group had acquired literacy by their own individual efforts and not because of successful implementation of the education policy component of the overall policy initiatives.

It is noteworthy that only 0.71 per cent of the total ST population was matriculate or above and 5.52 per cent was educated till the middle school. Further, only 2.57 per cent of ST women were literate and another 2.26 per cent were educated till the middle school. Only 0.26 per cent of the ST women were educated to matriculate level or higher. This indicates an extremely modest success of the policy of positive discrimination in favour of the ST population. The pattern that emerges from the above data indicates that not only there was a small improvement in the availability of employment opportunities for the STs, their educational levels had also shown only a modest improvement.

In the overall analysis, many development indicators had deteriorated in the Jharkhand region. Amongst the few that did show an improvement, the rate of growth was much slower than that of Bihar as a whole. The public policy machinery had failed to implement a sustainable and balanced development programme in the region during the period 1951-71.

Chapter V

Changing Patterns in the Development

Profile of the Jharkhand Region – II

The meagre impact of the operation of the developmental policies in the Jharkhand region during the period 1951-71 led to a heightening of socio-economic conflict and unrest in the late 1960s and early 1970s (see chapter II). Such societal and politico-economic unrest was undermining the legitimacy of the regime and the State was increasingly resorting to institutional and open coercion to implement its will. Consequently, the government realised the pressing need to ameliorate matters in the Jharkhand region. Consequently, beginning with the Fifth Five-Year Plan, there was a reorientation in the planning process which significantly affected the developmental profile of the ST population of the Jharkhand region. This reorientation of the development strategy began with the appointment of the Study Team on Tribal Development Blocks headed by Shilo Ao in 1969 to review the strategy for tribal development. The Study Team was scathing in its report about the state of tribal development in the country and its conclusions along with those reached by the committee on Situation in the Tribal Areas of Bihar, 1968 (see chapter IV) led to a reorientation in the strategy of development for the tribal population of Bihar.

I

The Fifth Five-Year Plan (1976-77 to 1980-81) accordingly sought to alter the approach to developmental activities in the Jharkhand region. A new method of delivery was adopted which sought to concentrate on the tribal population. This approach came to be called the Modified Area Development Approach (MADA). Under MADA, a predetermined percentage of the Plan expenditure outlay for Bihar was earmarked for the areas of high tribal concentration. This came to be called the Tribal Sub-Plan (TSP).

Under TSP, the districts of Ranchi and Singhbhum, Latehar subdivision and Bhandaria block of Garhwa subdivision of Palamau district, Dumka, Pakur, Rajmahal and Jamatra subdivisions and Sunarpahari and Boarijore blocks of Godda sub-divisions of Santhal Pargana districts were identified for the implementation of MADA. The idea behind MADA was to identify the pockets of these districts which had a tribal population concentration of more than 50 per cent and to undertake concentrated efforts to accelerate development in these areas. In all, 112 blocks were included, covering 43,792 square kilometres (25.18% of total area of Bihar), and were grouped into 14 Integrated Tribal Development Programmes (ITDP). Each ITDP was placed under a Project Officer. Advisory Committees made up of local officials and non-officials were set up to aid the Project Officers in the formulation and implementation of developmental schemes.

Another 43 pockets of tribal population concentration were identified in 41 blocks in Palamau (Non-TSP area), Santhal Pargana (Non-TSP area), Hazaribagh, Giridih, Dhanbad, Monghyr, Bhagalpur, Kathiar, Rohtas, and West Champaran districts to be brought under MADA. Between them, these areas covered approximately 4,255,000 tribal persons (86.25 per cent of the total tribal population of Bihar).

Efforts were also made to streamline the administration of the new approach to tribal development. A branch secretariat under the control of the Regional Development Commissioner was set up at Ranchi to ensure expeditious sanctioning of Sub-Plan schemes. This was applicable to 29 decentralised departments such as agriculture, animal husbandry, dairy, education, health, water supply, etc. Furthermore, additional heads of departments were posted to Ranchi to ensure speedy and efficient implementation of the programmes under the TSP. Originally, 14 per cent of the State Plan outlay was earmarked for the funding of the TSP schemes. In 1977-78 this was raised to 17 per cent. Table 48 shows the outlay and expenditure¹ incurred under TSP during the Fifth Five-Year Plan.²

¹ The plan allocation and expenditure figures are in lakhs of Rupees. One lakh equals 100,000.

While the Fifth Five-Year Plan was underway, a committee was appointed by the Planning Commission to evaluate the development policies and their effectiveness in the backward areas of the country called the National Committee on the Development of Backward Areas. It reported on the eve of the sixth plan in 1981 and its report on the Development of Tribal Areas is pertinent for our analysis

Table 48: Tribal Sub-Plan Component of the Bihar Fifth Five-Year Plan 1976-81

Year	Outlay (lakhs of Rupees)			Expenditure (lakhs of Rupees)		
	State Plan	TSP Outlay	Per cent of the State Plan	State Plan	TSP Outlay	Per cent of the State Plan
1976-77	25,514	3,627.15	14.0	24,945.91	3,236.86	13.0
1977-78	28,232	4,916.91	17.0	26,558.48	4,029.82	15.0
1978-79	34,285	6,000.00	17.0	31,346.10	3,764.93	12.0
1979-80	37,652	6,628.00	18.0	31,879.50	4,387.86	14.0
1980-81	47,661	9,008.90	19.0	Not Available	Not Available	Not Available
1976-77 to 1980-81 Total/Average	173,344	30,180.96	17.0	114,729.99	15,419.47	10.8

Source: *Draft Sixth Five Year Plan 1980-85*, Patna: Planning Department, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. xix.

not only in what it recommended but also in what it chose to say on the state of development till then. The National Committee concurred with the report of the Study Team on Tribal Development Blocks headed by Shilu Ao which had led to the TSP/ MADA approach to tribal development in the Fifth Plan and observed that

while it cannot be denied that much work has been done and considerable sums of money have been spent in the field of tribal welfare during the three plan periods, it is difficult to assess the success achieved . . . [due] to the absence of the data regarding per capita income or the indebtedness of tribal communities . . . what does appear clear to the Team after a study of the tribal development programmes, . . . is that progress is to be judged by what remains to be done to bring the tribals on par with the rest of the population, the leeway to be made up is still considerable and the delay in the implementation of considered recommendations . . . in the past . . . has worsened the position which these recommendations were

Contd.

² *Draft Sixth Five-Year Plan 1980-85*, Patna, n. d., p. xix.

intended to correct while the failure to pay attention to and profit by their advice on matters pertaining to the formulation and implementation of tribal development programmes has resulted in the failure of ambitious schemes and consequent wastage of valuable resources.³

The National Committee was also critical of the way in which the evaluation and implementation of development programmes for such areas was treated. It commented that

under the Constitution, the Union Government's responsibility for administration of the Schedule [Scheduled (sic)] Areas extends not only to supplementing of funds for their development but also in guiding the State Governments and giving directions to them. The Union Government have so far not issued any directive to the State Governments. They have relied only on persuading the State Governments to adopt appropriate policies for the development of the tribal areas. Further, the Governor is also required to submit to the President of India a Report annually regarding the administration of the Scheduled Areas in his State. These Reports, however, are rather irregular in submission. Also in course of time, they have tended to become routine administrative reports. The Governors in the light of the Constitutional provision have to act on the advice of the Council of Ministers. Thus, these annual reports are like 'State Reports'.⁴

Clearly, the Committee was unhappy with the way in which the development of tribal areas had been sidelined in the past Five-Year Plans leading to worsening of an already poor situation.

Moreover, the Committee was also critical of the approach of the TSP which aimed at tribal families. It was of the opinion that with regard to "programmes like agriculture, horticulture, forestry, soil conservation, minor irrigation, etc. Social Welfare Services, drinking Water, appropriate infrastructural programmes, etc." such an approach held little value. It opined that "the approach has to be an

³ *Report of the Study Team on Tribal Development* (Chairman Shilu Ao), quoted in the *Report on Development of Tribal Areas*, National Committee on the Development of Backward Areas, New Delhi, 1981, para 1.5.

⁴ *Report on Development of Tribal Areas*, National Commission on the Development of Backward Areas, New Delhi, 1981, para 1.3.

‘Integrated area Development Approach’”.⁵ On the performance of government’s agricultural and allied programmes it commented that such programmes “in these areas have so far followed the pattern adopted for the developed areas. Therefore, it has not touched even the fringe of the problem in these areas”.⁶ About educational improvements in the tribal areas, the National Committee pointed to the lacunae in the methods, content, organisation and implementation of the policy delivery mechanism. It was of the opinion that “the educational authorities and others sometimes tend to over simplify the issue by partial analysis of the problem and generally conclude the discussion with solutions which may be too idealistic or too expensive. There are no short cuts to effective administration and situation of organisational failure cannot be corrected by providing higher capital investments”.⁷

It was also critical of the administrative inability of the state governments to invest the relatively modest allocations which were made for development activities in such areas and pointed out the failure of the public policy mechanism to adapt the programmes to suit the individual tribal areas and an over-dependence on the sectoral allocation of programmes. It observed that “there have been savings even in the limited resources allocated for the Sub-Plan areas and funds have not been fully utilised.” Besides, the Committee was critical of the rate and method of disbursement of agricultural credit and the rate of land alienation. The Committee therefore, recommended administrative overhaul to ensure efficient and urgent utilisation of resources.

Hence, the Committee blamed the public policy delivery mechanism for the worsening developmental profile in the tribal areas. It almost called the entire public policy towards the tribal areas a failure. The authoritative conclusions of this Committee were broadly similar to the ones arrived at in chapter IV.

⁵ *ibid.*, para 4.20.

⁶ *ibid.*, para 4.21-4.27.

⁷ *ibid.*, para 191.

However, the impact of this rather radical review of the policy has yet to emerge. Without doubt, there was a declining development profile and whatever improvements have been noticed proved temporary and piece-meal in the long run. Despite the critical report, the TSP and MADA approach to tribal development continued unabated. A complete reorientation of the policy planning and delivery mechanism for development in the tribal areas was required but government chose to pump in more money despite the modest success of the MADA. The socio-political dimensions of the defects in development policy implementation in the Jharkhand region were not taken into account. Hence, the modest success rate achieved by the MADA and the TSP were not in consonance with the high levels of financial allocations.

The reorientation in the method of delivery by the public policy mechanism to this target group approach under the MADA did yield some results as far as the development profile of the region was concerned (details of the improvement in development profile due to operation of MADA have been discussed in the subsequent section of this chapter). In fact, the Tribal Sub-Plan was the only component of developmental planning that was yielding noticeable results. However, as has been discussed earlier, the tribal population was increasingly becoming a numerical minority in the Jharkhand region. Hence, these policy efforts to target the ST population only did not serve the developmental purpose of benefiting the majority of the population of the Jharkhand region. What was required perhaps, was an effort aimed at development of the entire Jharkhand region and all its population irrespective of their tribal origins or otherwise.

The TSP resulted in significant improvements in the tribal population's educational and employment standards in the period 1971-81 (examined in the next section of the chapter). Subsequently, owing to the noticeable success in addressing at least some of the problems of the tribal people in the Jharkhand region, the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1980-85) tried to reach out further under TSP. The allocation of funds for the TSP rose from 17 per cent of the Bihar State Plan in the Fifth Five-

Year Plan to 20.80 per cent in the Sixth Plan.⁸ The outlay under the Sixth Five Year Plan in Bihar and the outlay for the TSP under broad heads of development are listed in Table 49.

The largest allocation under the TSP in the Sixth Plan was made to irrigation and power which was clearly crucial for agricultural production and generation of

Table 49: Bihar State Plan Outlay and its Tribal Sub-Plan Component in Sixth Five-Year Plan 1980-85

Head of Development	Sixth Five Year Plan 1980-85 (lakhs of Rupees)		TSP Outlay as Percentage of Bihar Plan Outlay
	State Plan Outlay	Flow to TSP	
Agriculture & Allied Activities	55,588.38	16,169.50	29.08
Co-operation	2,675.00	875.00	32.71
Irrigation, Flood Control and Power	198,312.33	32,239.32	16.25
Industry and Minerals	16,025.06	3,313.50	20.67
Transport and Communication	39,519.00	7,385.25	18.68
Social and Community Services	58,347.75	17,154.45	29.40
Economic Services	380.00	67.00	17.63
General Services	4,550.00	898.00	19.73
Total	375,397.52	78,102.02	20.80

Source: *Draft Sixth Five-Year Plan 1980-85*, Patna: Planning Department, Government of Bihar n. d., pp. Lxvi - Lxix.

employment in both the agricultural as well as the non-agricultural sectors. Under this head, the majority of the funds were allocated to increasing irrigation potential which reflected the centrality of agricultural activities in the economic life of the TSP area and the poor availability of assured irrigation in the previous decades.

The second largest allocation of funds was for Social and Community Services.⁹ Under its sub-heads, the largest allocation was made to Education (more than 6,000 lakhs Rupees). The educational levels of the ST had been improving

⁸ *Draft Sixth Five-Year Plan 1980-85*, Patna, n. d., pp. xix-xx.

⁹ The head of Social and Community Services included the sub-heads of General Education, Art and Culture, Technical Education, Medical, Water Supply, Housing, Police Housing, Urban Development, Information and Publicity, Labour and Labour Welfare, Welfare of ST, SC and Other Backward Classes, Social Welfare and Nutrition.

significantly during the previous sub-plan and it seemed logical to invest in the area where the policy implementation apparatus had made some inroads. The second largest allocation was to the sub-head of water supply and the third largest to that of SC, ST and backward classes. The analysis of developmental profile till the 1971 in chapter IV reflected the dire need to provide safe drinking water in order to improve public health and hygiene and prevent the spread of curable diseases such as dysentery and diarrhoea which had a significant share in the total number of deaths in the Jharkhand region. Some improvements had been made in this area but a lot was left to be achieved. Thus, the largest financial allocation was being concentrated on those heads of development which had responded positively to the efforts of the TSP and were crucial in the development profile of the region (Table 49).

The third largest allocation in the flow to the TSP was to the head of agriculture and allied activities. The policy planners had realised the need to concentrate on agricultural activities since it still provided the largest source of employment to both tribal and non-tribal people in the Jharkhand region. Amongst the numerous sub-heads of allocation under this head,¹⁰ the largest sub-head in terms of money allocated was that of Minor Irrigation (more than 8,000 lakh Rupees). As has been noted earlier, the region of Jharkhand had been deteriorating in this area. The worsening of irrigation potential had meant poorer agricultural output as well as the remoteness of the possibility of using HYV seeds. This area was recognised as a thrust area by the planners. The second and third largest sub-heads were Forest and Crop Husbandry with an allocation of more than 1,270 and 1,180 lakhs Rupees, respectively. Both these sub-heads were also salient in the economic life because the occupations under this sub-head fall within agricultural occupations which employed most people in the Jharkhand region.

¹⁰ The sub-heads under 'Agriculture and Allied Activities' were Research and Education, Crop Husbandry, Land Reform, Minor Irrigation, Soil and Water Conservation, Animal Husbandry, Dairy Development, Fisheries, Forest, Investment in Agricultural Financial Institutions, Marketing, Storage and Warehousing, Special Programmes for Rural Development [Small Farmers Development Agency (SFDA), Drought Prone Areas Programme (DPAP) and Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP)], Community Development and Panchayats.

Development planning in Bihar as a whole and the Jharkhand region continued within the framework of MADA in the Seventh Five-Year Plan. Whether it was able to effect substantial changes in the development profile of the region is another matter. The observations made by the National Committee on the Development of Backward Areas had very little effect on the pace of development in the region. By this time, 42 such pockets spread over 38 development blocks had been identified for the implementation of the MADA, covering 83.1 per cent of the total tribal population of the state.¹¹ As far as development indicators such as educational and literacy levels of the tribal and general population, occupational patterns and demographic profile of the region were concerned, the Draft Seventh Five-Year Plan quotes from the Census of 1981 which presents a dismal picture.

Commenting on the infrastructural level of the region, the Draft Seventh Five-Year Plan points to the fact that only 20 per cent of the villages in the region had been electrified till 1984-85 and that "this position compared very unfavourably with the State as a whole where 48 per cent of the villages have already been electrified". Moreover, the Draft Plan points out that although the per capita level of the consumption of electricity in the region was highest in the state, "it is mainly because of consumption by several large and medium industries and mining complexes. As such the per capita consumption rate is not a correct indicator of the relative poverty or prosperity of the region. More attention is required to be paid to rural electrification in the tribal areas".¹² Clearly, one cannot hope for much development to have occurred in the region.

The Draft Plan does not provide detailed comparative data on the irrigation potential of the region. It merely points out that about 2.48 lakhs hectares of irrigation potential had been created by the Sixth Five-Year Plan in the TSP area. It also lists four irrigation projects which were launched under the Sixth Plan and

¹¹ *Bihar Tribal Sub-Plan 1985-90*, Mimeo, n. d., para 1.3.

¹² *ibid.*, para 1.24.

informs us that out of 24 minor irrigation projects that were under way, about 10 were completed.¹³

As far as health facilities are concerned, the Draft Seventh Plan lists the minor advances made in the existing and new health centres but acknowledged that “except at Jamshedpur the bed-strength in all Sub-Divisional hospitals is below norm”.¹⁴ About education, the Plan speaks of achieving the enrolment targets but does not enlighten us about student retention rates and the educational levels achieved by them.

The planned outlay under the TSP during the Seventh Five-Year Plan is tabulated in Table 50. The TSP component of the Bihar State Plan in terms of percentage of plan outlay was increased substantially from 20.8 per cent in the Sixth

Table 50: Outlay under various Development Heads for the TSP area in the Bihar Seventh Five-Year Plan 1985-90

Head of Development Sector/ Group	Seventh Five-Year 1985-90		TSP Outlay as Percentage of Bihar Plan Outlay
	State Plan Outlay (lakh of Rupees)	State Plan's contribution to TSP (lakh of Rupees)	
Agriculture and Allied Activities (including Minor Irrigation)	99,940.00	23,096.50	23.11
Co-operation	3,200.00	972.00	30.37
Water and Power Development	251,400.00	65,146.80	25.91
Industrial and Mineral Development	21,600.00	4,844.50	22.42
Transport and Communication	40,310.00	6,853.00	17.00
Social and Community Service	86,685.00	21,628.05	24.95
Miscellaneous	6,865.00	1,427.00	20.78
Total	510,000.00	123,967.85	24.30

Source: *Bihar Tribal Sub-Plan 1985-90*, Mimeo, n. d., para 6.4.

Five-Year Plan to 24.3 per cent in the Seventh Five-Year Plan (Tables 49 & 50). The reason for this rise cannot be ascertained conclusively although the better

¹³ *ibid.*, para 1.25-1.26, 17.77

¹⁴ *ibid.*, para 1.29.

performance of development policy (discussed in the next section of this chapter) amongst the tribal population under the MADA certainly had a role to play.

Like the last Plan, largest amount of money was allocated to the development of power and irrigation projects (Table 50). These projects were of prime importance to the region in encouraging both agricultural as well as non-agricultural economic activity. The second and the third largest allocation were to agricultural and allied activities and social & community services, respectively. These were the heads where expenditure was required to encourage agricultural production and thereby improve employment levels as well as to promote literacy, education and socio-economic development of the region.

The effect of this increased percentage allocation to developmental activities in the TSP area cannot be known due to absence of the detailed indicators for the later years. On the basis of available data, it can be inferred that the operation of the Seventh Plan did not alter the development profile of the region to a substantial extent. This has been confirmed by the data that has been published for the decade. The detailed socio-economic indicators of the region in 1991 have not yet been published but a preliminary pattern can be discerned.

Thus, despite the tall promises of the development policy planners and the policy machinery itself, the brief interlude of slightly faster growth in developmental indicators during 1971-81 was quickly reversed. By 1991, the development profile of the Jharkhand had all but returned to pre-1971 levels. It was clear that the success of public policy initiatives in the region was restricted to a very few sectors.

However, the policy planning mechanism showed a remarkable lack of ability to respond to the situation. It continued the old approach under the Eighth Five-Year Plan by allocating more money in an attempt to reverse the slowdown in the growth of development indicators (discussed in the next section of the chapter) during the Seventh Plan. The TSP approach continued during the Eighth-Five Year Plan (1990-95). A comparison of Tables 50 & 51 shows a small rise in the allocation of resources to the TSP. However, in its review of the Seventh Plan, the Draft Eighth Five-Year Plan does not overcome the deficiencies pointed out in such reviews earlier. It provides us with details such as the hike in scholarships for ST

students, the enrolment targets met at schools, number of hospitals established etc., but gives us no clue about the functioning of these schemes. It is not very useful to dwell on the details of the Draft Eight Five-Year Plans since it has been noticed earlier and also commented upon by the committees appointed to review the implementation of development programmes that higher allocation of resources does not automatically lead to a faster rate of change in the development profile.

However, the percentage of allocation and the increase or decrease in them may reflect the thrust areas of the State's policy machinery. Since detailed data is not yet available for the year 1991, it is not out of place to examine the percentages of allocation in the Eighth Plan.

Table 51: Outlay under various Development Heads for the TSP area in the Bihar Eight Five-Year Plan 1990-95

Head of Development	Total State Plan Outlay (lakh of Rupees)	Flow to TSP (lakh of Rupees)	TSP as percentage of State Plan Outlay
Agriculture and Allied Activities	91,136.00	32,654.00	35.82
Special Programmes for Rural Development	129,960.00	27,350.90	21.04
Special Area Programmes	8,046.00	2,180.00	27.09
Irrigation and Flood Control	329,110.00	109,260.00	33.19
Energy	222,550.00	26,468.72	11.89
Industry and Mineral	63,056.00	18,766.00	29.76
Transport	136,273.00	34,550.00	25.35
Science, Technology and Environment	5,140.00	1,384.00	26.92
General Economic Services	44,465.00	11,348.75	25.52
Social services	246,540.00	65,684.95	26.64
General Services	23,724.00	7,436.00	31.34
Total	1,300,000.00	337,083.32	25.92

Source: *Draft Eight Five Year Plan, 1990-92*, Patna: Mimeo, n. d., pp. xLvi- Liii.

As enumerated in Tables 50 and 51, a rise can be noticed in the percentage of State Plan Outlay that was to be invested in the TSP area under all the major heads of development. There was a particularly large rise in the percentage of agricultural funds earmarked for the TSP area. In the Seventh Plan, only 23.11 per cent of the Bihar State Plan's outlay for agriculture and allied activities was earmarked to be invested in the TSP areas. This figure had risen to a massive 35.82 per cent in the Eighth Plan. This indicates that as far as the public policy planners were concerned, they considered agriculture in the TSP regions to be reaching a

crisis point which is in consonance with the analysis in chapter IV and later in this chapter. Hence, more and more money was being allocated to this component of development planning for the Jharkhand region.

The ever increasing allocation of money has not yielded the corresponding results. The enormity of this failure of the public policy to put the money allocated to good use is reflected in the fact that only 4-10 per cent of the allocation is actually spent on development programmes in the Jharkhand region. In sum, the public policy machinery had shown a lack of ability to affect the development profile of the region. The modest improvements in some development indicators during one decade are soon squandered away in the next (see next section of the chapter). A coherent and efficient development policy is lacking. Very little improvement can be noticed in the development profile of the Jharkhand region over the last half-century, and even fewer can be attributed directly to the public policy machinery.

II

By the time the 1981 census was conducted, the Tribal Sub-Plan had been under way for nearly six years. The government was already drafting the Sixth Five-Year Plan of which the TSP was an important component. However, the TSP was the only component of public policy implementation that had resulted in some degree of improvement in the development profile of the Jharkhand region during the previous decade.

By 1981, the population of the Jharkhand region had increased to 17,612,069 or 25.19 per cent of the total population of Bihar (Table 52). Once again, the administrative boundaries of districts of Bihar had been re-oriented with the result

Table 52: Population in Jharkhand 1981

	Area (Sq. Kms.)	Total Population	Males	Females
Jharkhand Total	79,714	17,612,069	9,080,444	8,531,625
Bihar Total	173,887	69,914,734	35,930,560	33,984,174
Jharkhand Percentage	45.84	25.19	25.27	25.10

Source: *Census of India 1981*, Series 1, India Part II-B (i) - Primary Census Abstract, General Population, Patna: Government Printing Press, n. d.

that the percentage of land area that formed districts of the Jharkhand region now represented only 45.84 per cent (compared with 52.64 per cent in 1971) of the total. Due to the reorientation of district boundaries, it is not possible to compare the relative decadal growth rate of population during the period 1971-81. However, it can be deduced that the population of the Jharkhand region grew at a fairly fast rate since a reduction of about 7 per cent in the land area of the districts of Jharkhand led to a reduction of only a little over 2 per cent in the population.

The Scheduled Tribes component of the population of the Jharkhand region increased marginally to 30.25 per cent in 1981 from 29.29 per cent in 1971 (Tables 33 & 53). However, the percentage of the ST population which resided in the

Table 53: Scheduled Tribes Population in Jharkhand 1981

	Total Population	Males	Females
Jharkhand Total	5,329,283	2,669,825	2,659,458
Bihar Total	5,801,867	2,915,492	2,895,375
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	91.85	91.57	91.85
Jharkhand Percentage	30.25	29.40	31.17

Source: *Census of India 1981*, Series 4, Bihar (Part II-B) - Primary Census Abstract, Patna: Government Printing Press, n. d. and *Bihar Through Figures 1981*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1984.

Jharkhand region fell from 92.64 per cent in 1971 to 91.85 per cent in 1981. There seems to have been a slight increase in the ST mobility although more than 91 per cent of the ST population still resided in the Jharkhand region. The ST male population of the Jharkhand region, as in the earlier years, was lower than the ST females which indicates a significant level of seasonal economic migration of ST males.

As far as the developmental indicators of the region are concerned, very few are available for the year 1981. The government of Bihar has chosen not to publish

Table 54: In-door and Out-door Patients Treated in Public Medical Institutions Owned, Subsidised or Aided by Public Authorities in Jharkhand 1979*

	Number Indoor Patients Treated	Number Outdoor Patients Treated
Jharkhand Total	103,206	1,290,433
Bihar Total	448,098	5,861,169
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	23.03	22.01

* Figures are not available for Dhanbad, Ranchi and Singhbhum.

Source: *Bihar Through Figures 1981*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1984, pp. 164-5.

the infant mortality and birth and death rates after the mid-1970s. A similar case exists with regard to the causes of death. Consequently, it becomes increasingly difficult to analyse the state of health services in Bihar in 1981. The only figures that have been published are those of the number of patients treated in the various government aided medical institutions in the state in 1979 (Table 54). Of the total number of patients that were treated as indoor patients in Bihar as a whole, 23.03 per cent were in the Jharkhand region. Also, only 22.01 per cent of the total number of outdoor patients treated in Bihar as a whole resided in the Jharkhand region. Since the total population of the Jharkhand region was 25.19 per cent of the total population of Bihar, the figures for the patients treated reflect a relatively proportionate availability of health facilities in the region.¹⁵

As far as the other socio-economic indicators of development are concerned, some data is available. However, once again the picture that may emerge from a comparative examination of occupational patterns for 1971 and 1981 is not wholly accurate, as there was another redefinition of the category of workers in the later years. The 1981 Census divided the population firstly into workers and non-workers and then went on to divide the workers into main workers and marginal workers. Thus, "a trichotomy of persons into mutually exclusive groups of 'main workers', 'marginal workers' and 'non-workers' was introduced in the 1981 Census. A uniform reference period of 'one year' preceding the enumeration was adopted for recording activity status in the 1981 Census, irrespective of whether the activity was 'seasonal' or 'regular'.¹⁶ However, while formulating the economic questions for the 1981 Census, it was considered desirable to "obtain . . . a detailed profile of the working characteristics of the population without losing much of the comparability with 1961 and 1971 results . . ."¹⁷ On account of this and the fact that the figures for

¹⁵ Since the figures for Dhanbad, Ranchi and Singhbhum are not available, this reflection on the health services vis-à-vis Bihar as a whole must be treated with caution. However, the comparison, largely, holds true for the rest of the Jharkhand region since these figures are not included in the total for Bihar as a whole as well.

¹⁶ *Census of India 1991*, Series -1, Paper 3 of 1991 - Provisional Population Totals: Workers and their Distribution, New Delhi, 1991, para 2.6.

¹⁷ *ibid.*

marginal workers in the 1981 Census represent a minute percentage of the working population, the figures for 'main workers' have been utilised to examine the occupational pattern in the Jharkhand region in 1981.

As far as the relative position of opportunities of employment between the Jharkhand region as Bihar as a whole was concerned, there had been a small but significant change (Table 55). In 1981, approximately 37 per cent of the population of the Jharkhand region was employed in the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors together compared with 29 per cent in 1971. In Bihar as a whole, the same figure was approximately 32 per cent in 1981 compared with about 31 per cent in 1971. Hence, the opportunities of employment in the Jharkhand region as well as in Bihar as a whole increased over this period. Notably, the non-agricultural employment in the Jharkhand region had doubled from 7.14 per cent in 1971 to 15.61 per cent in 1981. There was a small decline in the agricultural employment in the Jharkhand region but not enough to indicate a shift from agricultural sector to non-agricultural sector.

As is demonstrated in Table 55, there was a slight decline in the percentage of persons who worked in the agricultural sector and lived in the Jharkhand region. In 1971, 23.67 per cent of such persons in Bihar as a whole resided in the

Table 55: Occupational Patterns of Main Workers in Jharkhand 1981

	Agricultural and Related Activities ¹			Non- Agricultural Activities ²		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	23.27	21.85	30.34	44.30	39.63	55.27
Jharkhand Percentage	21.68	32.91	9.72	15.61	19.01	12.00
Bihar Percentage	23.47	38.05	8.04	8.87	12.12	5.45

¹ Includes Cultivators and Agricultural Labourers.

² Includes those in Household Industry, Processing, Servicing, Repairs and Other workers.

Source: *Census of India 1981*, Series 1, India Part II-B (i) - Primary Census Abstracts, General Population, New Delhi: Census Commissioner of India, n. d.

Jharkhand region whereas in 1981 only 23.27 per cent did so. However, the proportion of women agricultural workers as a percentage of such workers in Bihar as a whole increased from 25.94 per cent in 1971 to 30.34 per cent in 1981. There seems to have been a higher employment rate for women. By 1981, in the non-

agricultural occupations, 44.30 per cent women workers in the whole of Bihar resided in the Jharkhand region, an increase over the 1971 figure of 37.96 per cent. This increase was in both male and female non-agricultural workers. In Indian conditions, this generally means poorer economic conditions. The higher rate of employment amongst women in the Jharkhand region relative to Bihar can also be attributed to the sociological factors such as the absence of a tradition of *purdah* amongst the women of the Jharkhand region. Also pertinent is the existence of a tradition of working women in the region which is perhaps a by-product of seasonal economic migration of the male population since the colonial period (see chapter II).

Table 56: Occupational Patterns of Main Workers by Educational Standards in Jharkhand 1981¹

Educational Standards	Agriculture-Related Activities ⁷			Non- Agricultural Activities ⁸		
	Person	Male	Female	Person	Male	Female
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar						
Illiterate	24.21	22.58	30.07	43.22	41.98	49.62
Literate²	22.27	21.98	35.20	35.89	35.94	34.10
Middle School³	23.22	22.74	54.35	42.22	42.26	40.57
Matriculate⁴	14.71	14.54	51.31	38.24	38.15	40.98
Intermediate⁵	11.64	11.57	28.05	37.12	36.93	40.44
Graduate and Others⁶	11.37	11.26	46.57	33.44	32.69	48.51
Jharkhand Percentage						
Illiterate	78.19	72.87	97.36	37.82	33.99	74.63
Literate²	6.87	8.47	1.12	8.42	9.10	1.95
Middle School³	12.83	15.80	2.13	21.20	22.95	4.42
Matriculate⁴	3.08	3.87	0.22	16.86	17.97	6.17
Intermediate⁵	0.33	0.41	0.01	5.60	5.82	3.46
Graduate and Others⁶	0.13	0.17	0.008	6.81	7.00	5.00
Bihar Percentage						
Illiterate	75.15	70.54	98.22	34.78	31.63	71.58
Literate²	7.18	8.43	0.96	9.33	9.89	2.72
Middle School³	12.86	15.19	1.19	19.95	21.22	5.18
Matriculate⁴	4.87	5.82	0.13	17.52	18.41	7.16
Intermediate⁵	0.66	0.79	0.01	5.99	6.16	4.07
Graduate and Others⁶	0.27	0.33	0.005	8.09	8.37	4.91

¹ Excludes Marginal workers

² Without Educational Level

³ Primary or Middle School.

⁴ Matriculation or Secondary

⁵ Includes Higher Secondary, Intermediate, Pre-University and Technical/ Non-technical Diploma not equal to Degree

⁶ Includes those who hold a University Degree, and above.

⁷ Includes Cultivators, Agricultural Labourers, and those in Livestock, Forestry, Fishing, Hunting, Plantations, Orchards and allied activities.

⁸ Includes those in Mining & Quarrying, Manufacturing, Processing, Servicing, Repairs, Construction, Trade & Commerce, Transport, Storage, Communication and Other services.

Source: *Census of India 1981*, Series 4, Bihar Part III-A & B (i) - General Economic Tables (Tables B-I to B-VI), Patna: Government Printing Press, n. d.

A similar, though less significant improvement can be noticed in the overall level of education in the Jharkhand region (Table 56). As far as the agriculture-related occupations were concerned, the percentage of illiterate persons fell from 81.27 per cent in 1971 to 78.19 per cent in 1981. It is a small decrease compared to the almost 8 per cent decrease in the decade of 1961-71.

The percentage of illiterate women had shown very little change from the 1961 and 1971 levels of more than 98 per cent to 97.36 per cent in 1981. This does not indicate a very effective public policy in the region as far as overall educational standards were concerned. In fact, the improvement in the percentage of illiterate persons in agricultural occupations was due to the rise of the percentage of persons, particularly male, who were either literate without educational level, middle-school qualified or matriculates. However, one cannot be too critical since it cannot be expected that a large percentage of the illiterate population will become graduates in a decade. Moreover, there was a small but significant level of improvement in all categories (Table 56).

As far as the literacy amongst the non-agricultural occupations was concerned, the pattern of the agricultural population is repeated. The percentage of illiterate persons in the non-agricultural workforce of the Jharkhand region fell slightly from 44 per cent in 1971 to 37.82 per cent. The decrease in the percentage of illiterate persons in non-agricultural occupations showed one major difference from the pattern among the agricultural population. There was a significant decline in illiteracy percentage of the male as well as female components of the non-agricultural workforce. The male illiterate figure fell from the 1971 figure of 40.36 per cent to 33.99 per cent in 1981 while the female illiteracy percentage decreased from 84.45 per cent in 1971 to 74.63 per cent in 1981.

Clearly, there was a greater availability of avenues of education in the Jharkhand region in this decade. Unlike the earlier decades, the decade of 1971-81 showed a significant improvement in almost all categories of education (Table 56) and not only in the literate category. It can be deduced that public policy was able to implement a small component of its proclaimed goals. It should be noted that the implementation of this policy was more efficient in the urban areas than the rural

since there is a more significant improvement in the educational levels of the non-agricultural workforce, especially in women's educational levels.

The patterns for the whole of Bihar follow this broad trend (Table 56) with the difference being that the population of Bihar as a whole was better educated than that of the Jharkhand region. The percentage of illiterate persons is lower in all categories of workers except for women in agricultural occupations. There are slight variations across categories but overall, the educational scenario was better in Bihar as a whole than the Jharkhand region.

Hence, although the education policy component of public policy showed signs of increased vigour in this period in both the Jharkhand region and Bihar as a whole, there was better performance in Bihar as a whole than the Jharkhand region. As far as the Jharkhand region was concerned, policy implementation with regard to improvement of educational levels was better in the case of STs (because of the operation of TSP) (discussed later in the chapter) and those in non-agricultural occupations. This would mean that the vast majority of the population of the Jharkhand region that resided in the rural areas and was not tribal was only marginally affected by the newly found vitality of public policy implementation in the Jharkhand region.

Among the indicators of agricultural produce, again the figures for agricultural production are not available for the period under analysis. The government of Bihar has only published the area under various crops and provides no details of agricultural production. However, rough estimates can be made of whether the government policy of maximising the available acreage under various crops was working. It can be noted from Table 57 that it was not the case. In 1974-

Table 57: Area under Principal Crops in Jharkhand (in thousands of Hectares) 1985-86

	Paddy / Rice	Wheat	Gram	Barley	Maize
Jharkhand Total	1,591	73	32	15	137
Bihar	5,335	1,835	191	83	669
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	29.82	3.97	16.75	18.07	20.47

Source: *Bihar Through Figures 1991*, Patna: Directorate of Statistics and Evaluation, Government of Bihar, n. d., pp. 90-3.

75, 32.26 per cent of the total land area under rice/ paddy was in the Jharkhand region (i.e. 1,687 thousand hectares in the Jharkhand region). This decreased to 29.82 per cent in 1985-86 (i.e. 1,591 thousand hectares in the Jharkhand region). Similarly, 5 per cent of the total area under wheat lay in the Jharkhand region (74 thousand hectares) in 1974-75; this declined to only 3.97 per cent (73 thousand hectares) in 1985-86 as did the proportion of land under gram and maize which fell from 21.37 per cent and 21.67 per cent, respectively in 1974-75 to 16.75 per cent and 20.47 per cent, respectively in 1985-86. However, the proportion of land under barley showed an increase from 13.02 per cent in 1974-75 to 18.07 in 1985-86. This increase in the percentage of land in the Jharkhand region under barley as a proportion of Bihar as a whole is due to decline in the total cropped area under barley in Bihar as a whole. In actual terms, the land area under barley in the Jharkhand region fell from 25 thousand hectares in 1974-75 to 15 thousand hectares 1985-86. A similar pattern was present in Bihar as a whole as well (Table 57).

The probable fall in agricultural production is also indicated by a pattern of shift from agricultural occupations to non-agricultural occupation in this period. In such a scenario, the probability of a rise in agricultural production was extremely remote. The other data about agricultural finances, land transfers and moneylenders in this period has also not been published.

As far as the performance of public policy over the effort to secure irrigation facilities and thereby increase in agricultural production was concerned, the Jharkhand region seems to be of marginal importance (Table 58). There was a

Table 58: Area Irrigated from Different Sources (in thousands of Hectares) 1980-81

	Government Canals	Private Canals	Tanks	Wells/ Tube-wells	Other Sources	Total Area Irrigated
Jharkhand Total	56	---	22	62	47	186
Bihar Total	1,094	96	96	994	767	2,953
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	5.11	-	22.91	6.23	6.12	6.29
Jharkhand Percentage	30.10	-	11.82	33.33	25.26	-
Bihar Percentage	37.04	3.25	3.25	33.66	25.97	-

^{*} Nil or less than 500 Hectares in each district.

Source: *Bihar Through Figures 1981*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1984, pp. 110-1.

modest increase of about 10 thousand hectares in the total irrigated area in the Jharkhand region, which increased from 176 thousand hectares in 1973-74 to 186 thousand hectares in 1980-81 (Table 58). Significantly, over the same period, there was an increase of more than 600 thousand hectares of irrigated area in Bihar as a whole. Clearly, there seemed to be little effort at securing larger irrigated potential for the Jharkhand region. Moreover, the Jharkhand region with an area of more than 45 per cent of the total, accounted for only 5.11 per cent of the total area irrigated by government canals in Bihar as a whole in 1981 (compared with 3.79 per cent in 1973-74).¹⁸

In fact, there was some growth in this source of irrigation over the last decades but the new figure was even lower than that of 1961-62. Moreover, the growth rate was too slow to be of much consequence as far as agricultural output was concerned. This is especially so in light of the fact that other sources of irrigation had significantly diminished. The proportion of wells showed a small rise but the small area that was so irrigated makes this rise insignificant. Moreover, the area irrigated by wells was larger than that irrigated by government canals. Overall there was a very small increase but the total area irrigated in the Jharkhand region was still lower than the 1961 levels. The agricultural output in the Jharkhand region would have fallen due to poor irrigation potential.

The shift in the occupational pattern also was probably the consequence of this declining ability of agriculture to support existing levels of employment. The overall growth of job opportunities was in fact, the contribution of the non-agricultural sector. Further, this growth in the non-agricultural sector was likely to be born out of private initiative rather than out of significant policy impetus. Therefore, the policy mechanism was able to deliver only limited results. Overall, there was no significant change in the level of effectiveness in public policy

¹⁸ It must be noted that in 1961-62, the Jharkhand region had a potential to irrigate 230,675 hectares, i.e., 11.87 per cent of the total irrigation capacity in Bihar as whole.

implementation in the Jharkhand region - a pattern that holds true for the decade 1981-91 as well.

III

The political dynamics of the Jharkhand region in the period 1981-91 was marked by economic blockade of mineral transportation under the leadership of the AJSU, demonstration and agitation led by the JCC and other politically effervescent activities. This ensured that the issue of Jharkhand came on to the national agenda and the national press vigorously pursued the poor state of affairs in the Jharkhand region. However, all the hectic political activity resulted neither in an accelerated pace of development in the region nor in any new reorientation of public policy initiatives. The developmental profile of the Jharkhand region therefore, was not much better in 1991. The issue of an autonomous state therefore, started finding greater popular support resulting in the creation of the JAAC in 1995.

The detailed socio-economic distribution of the population as enumerated by the 1991 census is yet to be published. However, on the basis of available data, broad patterns about the progress of the developmental indicators in the period 1981-91 can be discerned. There has been very little progress in the developmental profile in this decade as well.

As far as the demographic profile of the region is concerned, the demographic balance between Bihar as a whole and the Jharkhand region remained

Table 59: Population in Jharkhand 1991

	Area (Sq. Kms.)	Total Population	Males	Females
Jharkhand Total	79,732	21,848,860	11,354,210	10,494,650
Bihar Total	173,877	86,338,853	45,147,280	41,191,573
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	45.85	25.30	25.14	25.47

Source: *Census of India 1991*, Series 1, Paper 2 of 1991 - Provisional Population Tables: Rural- Urban Distributions, New Delhi: Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, 1991.

unaltered. Table 59 shows that the Jharkhand region continued to represented about 45 per cent of the land area and made up 25.30 per cent of the total population of Bihar. Only a very small rise in the proportion of population that resided in the

Jharkhand region can be discerned. The decadal growth rate of the population of the Jharkhand region during 1981-91 was 24.05 per cent whereas the same for the population of Bihar as a whole was slightly lower at 23.49 per cent.

More importantly, the ST component of the population of the Jharkhand region declined substantially. From 30.25 per cent in 1981, the ST component of the population of the Jharkhand region fell to only 27.66 per cent in 1991. As opposed to 24.05 per cent decadal growth rate of the total population of the

Table 60: Scheduled Tribes Population in Jharkhand 1991

	Total Population	Males	Females
Jharkhand Total	6,044,010	3,059,715	2,984,295
Bihar Total	6,616,914	3,357,563	3,259,351
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	91.34	91.12	91.56
Jharkhand Percentage	27.66	26.94	28.43

Source: *Census of India 1991*, Series 1, vol. I, India Part II-B (i), - Primary Census Abstract, General Population, New Delhi, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, n. d.

Jharkhand region, the ST population grew at the rate of only 13.41 per cent over the decade of 1981-91 (Table 60). This substantially altered the balance between the tribal and non-tribal population of the Jharkhand region. The concentration of ST population within the Jharkhand region continued with 91.34 per cent (91.85 per cent in 1981) of the ST population of Bihar as a whole residing in the Jharkhand region.

As far as the occupational patterns of the Jharkhand region and Bihar as a whole are concerned, the share of the Jharkhand region in the total agricultural workers in the whole of Bihar remained more or less static. There were 23.47 per

Table 61: Occupational Patterns in Jharkhand 1991

	Agricultural and Related Activities¹			Non- Agricultural Activities²		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	23.47	21.68	31.32	40.10	39.79	43.23
Jharkhand Percentage	22.22	32.12	11.50	9.12	15.83	1.87
Bihar Percentage	23.95	37.26	9.36	5.75	10.00	1.10

¹ Includes Cultivators & Agricultural Labourers.

² Includes all other workers including Marginal workers.

Source: *Census of India 1991*, Series 1, Paper 3 Of 1991 - Provisional Population Totals: Workers and their Distribution, New Delhi: Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, 1991.

cent of the agricultural workers of Bihar as a whole residing in the Jharkhand region (compared with 23.27 per cent in 1981), which was the equitable percentage since about 25 per cent of the total population resided in this region. The percentage of women agricultural workers increased slightly from 30.34 per cent in 1981 to 31.32 per cent in 1991 (Table 61).

As far as the Jharkhand region itself was concerned, about 31 per cent of the population was employed altogether in 1991 compared to over 37 per cent in 1981. There was, therefore, a lower availability of jobs in the Jharkhand region as was the case in Bihar as a whole. From about 32 per cent of the population working in 1981, by 1991 a little more than 29 per cent of the population was employed in the whole of Bihar. There seems to be an all round loss of job opportunities in Bihar as a whole as well as the Jharkhand region. Non-agricultural employment in the Jharkhand region declined from 15.61 per cent in 1981 to 9.12 per cent. A small increase in agricultural employment indicates that some people, those few who could, shifted back to agricultural occupations to earn a living. This would have shifted the load back to an already over-burdened agricultural sector. There is also a pattern of increasing industrialisation in Bihar as a whole. There were 44.3 per cent of non-agricultural workers of Bihar as a whole living in the Jharkhand region in 1981. By 1991, only 40.1 per cent of them lived in the Jharkhand region. The Jharkhand region was also losing its industrial edge over Bihar as a whole that had made it important to the policy planners at Patna. After a small but significant improvement in the employment scenario in 1971-81, the availability of jobs started to go downhill again in 1981-91.

Table 62: Literacy in Jharkhand 1991

	Literacy			Percentage of Literacy		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
Jharkhand Total	7,352,215	5,168,378	2,183,806	33.65	45.51	20.80
Bihar Total	26,854,389	19,176,364	7,678,025	31.10	42.47	18.63
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	27.37	26.95	28.44	-	-	-

Source: *Census of India 1991*, Series 5, Paper 1 of 1991 - Provisional Population Totals, Patna: Director of Census Operations, Government of Bihar, n. d.

The literacy rate¹⁹ of the Jharkhand region showed a slightly better rate of growth than Bihar as a whole. In 1981, the literacy rates for the Jharkhand region and Bihar as a whole were 27.87 per cent and 26.2 per cent, respectively. By 1991, the literacy rate of the Jharkhand region had increased to 33.65 whereas that of whole of Bihar was 31.10. Female literacy in the Jharkhand region increased from 14.97 to 20.80 per cent while in the whole of Bihar it rose from 13.6 to 18.63 per cent (Table 62). The education and literacy component of the public policy implementation was delivering what it had taken upon itself in a more efficient fashion in the Jharkhand region than Bihar as a whole.

Moving on to the question of agriculture, we are again constrained to analyse the area under principal crops rather than the actual production.²⁰ Table 63 attests to the fact that total area under principal crops in Bihar as a whole increased

Table 63: Area under Principal Crops in Jharkhand (in thousands of Hectares) 1988-89

	Paddy / Rice	Wheat	Gram	Barley	Maize
Jharkhand Total	1,518	53	12	106	23
Bihar	5,308	2,112	58	693	148
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	28.59	2.50	20.68	15.29	15.54

Totals may not tally since the figures have been rounded up to the nearest thousand in the source.

Source: *Bihar Through Figures 1991*, Patna: Directorate of Statistics and Evaluation, Government of Bihar, n. d., pp. 90-3.

marginally from 8,113 thousand hectares in 1985-86 to 8,319 thousand hectares in 1987-88 where as in the Jharkhand region it declined from 1,848 thousand hectares in 1985-86 to 1,712 thousand hectares in 1988-89. Thus, despite agriculture being a target area under the TSP since the Sixth Plan, the total cropped area in Jharkhand had declined. Hence, it is unlikely that there would have been a rise in agricultural output, especially in view of the falling irrigation potential.

¹⁹ The cross-tabulation between workers and educational levels for 1991 is not yet available. Consequently, the literacy figures for the entire population in 1991 have been compared with similar figures for 1981. Source: *Census of India 1991*, Series -5, Paper 1 of 1991 - Provisional Population Totals, Patna, n. d. The literacy figures for 1981 have been taken from *Bihar Through Figures 1981*, Patna, 1984, p. 48-9.

²⁰ Bihar government had not published the area under principal crops at the districts level in the statistics published after 1989.

Detailed data about irrigation potential is also unavailable. The Seventh Five-Year Plan sought to make a large investment and effort in increasing the irrigation potential of the region. However, in the absence of published data, only the

Table 64: Area Irrigated from Different Sources (in thousands of Hectares) 1988-89

	Government Canals	Private Canals	Total
Jharkhand Total	39	Not Available	39
Bihar	1,262	Not Available	1,262
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	3.09	-	3.09

Totals may not tally since the figures have been rounded up to the nearest thousand in the source.

Source: *Bihar Through Figures 1991*, Patna: Directorate of Statistics and Evaluation, Government of Bihar, n. d., pp. 149-51.

performance of government canals as a source of irrigation can be examined. In 1980-81, 5.11 per cent of the area irrigated by government canals in the whole of Bihar lay in the Jharkhand region. By 1988-89, this too had fallen to only 3.09 per cent. From 56 thousand hectares of land irrigated in the Jharkhand region by government canals in 1980-81, by 1988-89, only 39 thousand hectares were so irrigated in the Jharkhand region (Table 64). Despite the public policy effort at creation of additional irrigation potential by construction of minor and major power and irrigation projects as reflected in the plan allocation for the Seventh Plan, the irrigated area in the Jharkhand region actually declined. However, the irrigation potential in the whole of Bihar using government canals increased from 1,094 thousand hectares in 1980-81 to 1,262 thousand hectares in 1988-89. Hence, it might be said that the public policy efforts to create additional irrigation potential in the Jharkhand region had failed whereas it showed some signs of relative success in Bihar as whole.

It may be concluded that policy efforts in the Jharkhand region had not shown many results in the decade 1981-91. The public policy delivery machinery had not been able to make itself effective in its thrust areas such as agriculture and irrigation. It had relative success in areas such as education but it had already been successful in these areas in the earlier plans. There was actually a decline in some sectors such as employment and irrigation potential over the previous decade. The efforts to reorient the policy delivery mechanism to arrive at greater efficiency and effectiveness had not been successful in the Jharkhand region.

IV

It has been noticed that the ST component of the population of the Jharkhand region had declined during the decades 1981-91 after a modest increase during 1971-81. However, the development profile of the ST population in the Jharkhand region improved as a result of the concentrated efforts undertaken since the late 1970s under the TSP.

In the ST occupational levels there were some notable improvements. The TSP had sought to concentrate on the tribal population in predetermined pockets in the region of Jharkhand and this strategy had yielded some results. Table 65 shows

Table 65: Scheduled Tribes Occupational Patterns 1981

	Agricultural and Related Activities ¹			Non- Agricultural Activities ²		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	91.07	91.17	90.78	94.28	90.67	96.64
Jharkhand Percentage	32.20	47.31	17.02	13.88	9.43	18.34

¹ Includes Cultivators, Agricultural Labourers and those in Livestock, Forestry, Fishing, Hunting & Plantation, Orchards and allied activities.

² Includes those in Mining & Quarrying, Manufacturing, Processing, Servicing & Repairs, Construction, Trade & Commerce, Transport, Storage & Communications and Other services and Marginal workers.

Source: *Census of India 1981*, Series 4, Bihar Part IX (iii) - Special Tables for Scheduled Tribes (Tables ST-1 to ST-3), Patna: Government Printing Press, n. d.

that in 1981, most of the ST workers in Bihar as a whole (91.07 per cent of the agricultural ST workers and 94.28 per cent of the non-agricultural ST workforce) continued to work in the region of Jharkhand. In 1981, roughly 46 per cent of the ST population of the Jharkhand region was employed which is much better than the general level of employment in the region. It is also a significant improvement over the 1971 figure of about 35 per cent. Clearly, at least the TSP component of public policy had benefited the tribal population as far as availability of employment was concerned.

There was a shift in the concentration of tribal males from agricultural to non-agricultural occupations. That would have significantly reduced the pressure on

the declining agricultural production.²¹ There were 50.66 per cent of the tribal males in agricultural occupations in 1971 whereas only 47.31 per cent of them worked in agriculture-related jobs in 1981. The decline in the percentage of ST males in the agricultural sector did not mean a loss of job opportunities because of the fact that firstly, there was also a rise in ST males employed in the non-agricultural sector from 5.02 per cent in 1971 to 9.43 per cent in 1981. Secondly, there was a marginal increase in the total percentage of ST males who were employed from about 56 per cent in 1971 to about 57 per cent in 1981 (Table 65).

Furthermore, there was a significant improvement in the percentage of ST women who were employed from approximately 13 per cent in 1971 to more than 35 per cent in 1981. The concerted effort to generate employment amongst the ST population under the MADA/ TSP was delivering results. The level of employment amongst the ST population in the Jharkhand region was far outstripping the overall employment level in the Jharkhand region.

The improvement in the employment levels of the ST population in the

Table 66: Scheduled Tribes Educational Levels in Jharkhand 1981

	Illiterate			Literate ¹			Middle School ²			Matriculate and Above ³		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
Jharkhand Total	4,193,368	1,952,457	2,443,366	334,073	249,786	84,287	442,627	345,416	97,211	195,895	121,990	73,905
Bihar Total	4,823,470	2,152,519	2,670,951	356,388	268,018	88,370	474,773	370,323	104,450	162,242	129,640	32,602
Jharkhand Percentage	78.68	73.13	91.87	6.26	9.35	3.16	8.30	12.93	3.65	3.67	4.56	2.77

¹ Without Educational Level, including figures for Educational Level not classified.

² Primary, Middle or Junior Basic.

³ Higher Secondary, Intermediate/ Pre-University or Non-technical/ Non-technical Diploma or Certificate not equal to Degree and those who hold a University Degree, Postgraduate Degree, Technical Degree, Agriculture and Dairying, Veterinary Engineering and Technology, Medicine or an equivalent qualification.

Source: *Census of India 1981*, Series 4, Bihar Part IX (iv) - Special Tables for Scheduled Tribes (Tables ST-4 to ST-7), Patna: Government Printing Press, n. d.

²¹ Another interpretation of this pattern can be that the falling agricultural employment potential in the Jharkhand region was forcing the ST population to look for non-agricultural employment. In that event, it is more than likely that the non-agricultural employment which they would have found would be ill-paid unskilled jobs or highly dangerous jobs such as deep or open-cast mining. Therefore, these patterns must be treated with caution.

Jharkhand region was also accompanied by an improvement in the literacy and educational levels of the ST people in the region²² (Table 66). The overall illiteracy of ST population fell from 87.76 per cent in 1971 to 78.68 per cent. This was a major decrease and is also significant in the light of the fact that the overall percentage of persons educated to matriculate level or above increased from 0.71 per cent in 1971 to 3.67 per cent in 1981. The percentage of persons who were literate without any educational qualifications also increased from 5.74 per cent in 1971 to 6.26 per cent in 1981 as did the percentage of ST persons educated up to middle school level from 5.52 per cent in 1971 to 8.30 per cent in 1981. The educational level of ST women was still very poor with more than 91 per cent of the women still illiterate but at the other end of the spectrum; namely, the ST women who were matriculate or above, increased from 0.26 per cent in 1971 to 2.77 per cent. An improvement across all the categories can be noticed.

The development policy reoriented to target the ST population under TSP/MADA had shown signs of success during 1981-91. However, on account of the fact that just over a quarter of the total population in the Jharkhand region was of tribal origin, the public policy efforts were benefiting only a minority of the population. Consequently, this approach may have been successful in ameliorating some of the problems faced by the ST population of the region but the patterns of underdevelopment amongst the non-tribal population in the region were becoming more acute. The modest advances made in one decade were quickly reversed in the next. This intermittent public policy implementation no doubt, marginally improved some of the development indicators and has yielded some degree of betterment in the overall developmental profile of the Jharkhand region. However, the rate of improvement in the development profile of the Jharkhand region has been fast outstripped by a faster improvement in the development profile of Bihar as a whole. Hence, there is firm ground behind the popular perception in the Jharkhand region

²² The rising literacy and education levels amongst the ST population in the Jharkhand region would have probably led to better opportunities of employment in the non-agricultural sector.

that there is a north Bihar versus south Bihar divide as far as developmental profile is concerned.

The public policy machinery failed to benefit a significant majority of the population of the Jharkhand region. The remarkable insistence of the policy planners on investing an ever-increasing amount of money without examining the inefficiencies in the policy delivery mechanism contributed to the lack of success in the implementation of balanced plans.

This lack of growth in the developmental profile of Jharkhand, both as a region and in relation to the average for the whole of Bihar has fundamentally altered the dynamics of the political process in the Jharkhand region. The correlation between the political process in the region and the declining development profile has been analysed in the next chapter.

Chapter VI

Politics of Development, Identity and Autonomy in the Jharkhand Region

. . . हमारा [हमारे (sic)] पास अगर परिषद या अलग राज्य होगा तो . . . पाँच साल के अन्दर यह इलाका . . . सबसे अव्वल नम्बर प्रदेश में आएगा । हमारा [हमारे (sic)] पास जो खनिज सम्पदा है, हमारा [हमारे (sic)] पास जो मजदूर हैं, . . . अगर सदउपाय होता तो आज [हम] सबसे एक नम्बर के इलाका होते और यह हमारा राज्य देंगे न तो हम पाँच साल में [विकास] कर देंगे . . .¹

[. . . if we have a council or a separate state, this area will be counted as first amongst the number one regions. The mineral wealth that we have, the labourers that we have . . . if they had been utilised properly, this area would have been number one and if we are given our separate state we will develop the region within five years . . .]

विकास की दर से हमारा छोटा नागपुर बहुत पिछड़ा हुआ है ।
इसीलिए झारखण्ड मूवमेन्ट लोग निकाले हुए हैं . . .²

[In terms of the rate of development, our Chota Nagpur is very backward. That is why the people have come up with Jharkhand movement . . .]

The above quotes from interviews held with some of the politically aware individuals in the Jharkhand region indicate that the issues of autonomy for the region and the development profile are intertwined. The popular perception has

¹ Interview with Shailendra Bhattacharya, Member of the Central Committee and Working Committee and Officer In-charge of the Central Office of the JMM (S) at the JMM (S) Central Office, Ranchi in January 1996.

² Interview with a local schoolmaster and BJP activist at Ranchi in May 1996.

come to accept that a better rate of development activity in the region is possible only if adequate devolution of powers is made.

It has been noticed in chapters IV and V that there is almost a continuous decline in the major indicators of development of the Jharkhand region. There is a positive correlation between this decline in development indicators and the electoral support for the Jharkhandi parties, but the situation is in fact much more complex. The Modified Resource Dependence Model enables us to understand this correlation in a more accurate manner.

The leadership of the Jharkhand movement definitely sees a correlation between the progress of developmental programmes and political and administrative autonomy. However, the Jharkhandi political groups lack a concrete agenda for the developmental policies and programmes in the region. This is clear from their literature, which has no clear outline to be followed for a more speedy development of the region. It has also emerged in interviews conducted during the field-study. When asked if they had a plan or framework for developmental activities if and when a state of Jharkhand is created, Shailendra Bhattacharya, Member of the Central Committee of the JMM (S), responded that the government must first hand over the administration to them. The Jharkhandi political groups will then decide what to do. When pressed further, he responded: “यहाँ से उपलब्ध जो साधन हैं, उनको, उन साधनों को हम इस्तेमाल करेंगे, उनके [जनता के] विकास के लिए । . . . इसी माध्यम से विकास के काम करेंगे . . . ।”³ [We will utilise the resources available here for their (people's) development . . . we will work for development through this medium . . .].

In light of Jharkhandi leadership's emphasis on poor developmental profile of the Jharkhand region, the relationship between poor policy performance and electoral support for the political groups which demand autonomy must be analysed.

³ Interview with Shailendra Bhattacharya in January 1996.

This chapter therefore, maps out the patterns which indicate that failure of the State's policy delivery mechanism in the region has contributed to the crystallisation of the Jharkhandi identity. The conclusions reached will be of important policy relevance since there is an actual failure of the delivery mechanism (chapters IV and V) which has encouraged the resurgence and crystallisation of the nascent Jharkhandi identity.

I

In democratic developing countries such as India, the policies and programmes for the development of a region/ social group must address two related issues. First, they must endeavour to raise the living standard of the population of the target region/ social group. Secondly, there needs to be an effort to generate a popular feeling of betterment of living standards. Any achievements on the front of development policy implementation will not serve the purpose of containing socio-political conflict and the generation of increased legitimacy for the regime unless society views it as such. This leads us to a crucial issue in the relationship between articulation of ethnic identity and public policy implementation in India, particularly in the Jharkhand region.

It would be difficult to defend a contention that there has been no noticeable improvement over the last half-century in the overall living standards of the population as a direct result of the development policy of the Indian state. Respondents interviewed in the Jharkhand region⁴ during the fieldwork in 1996 agreed that over the past few decades, there has been a marked improvement in the living standards of most persons in the Jharkhand region. They also recognised the central role played by the government's development policy. Notwithstanding, they

⁴ For instance, the MP Ranchi, an INC party worker in Chaibasa and a woman forest produce collector in the rural interior of Dumka district, all agreed that "विकास तो हुआ है" [There has definitely been some development], interviews in the Jharkhand region in January 1996.

also expressed their stark disappointment with the slow pace and inefficiency of the State's development efforts. Evidently, the feeling of betterment amongst them was marginal. The successes of the development policy could have, and to some extent did generate a certain degree of legitimacy for the regime. However, this process has gradually been undermined over the last two decades. Thus, an effort to understand the reasons for this failure of the government to harness the legitimising effect of the improvement in general living conditions of the population is required. This leads us to another malaise in the model of development adopted in India.

"All plans of development have greater chances of success if the relevant cultural and social factors are integrated into planning . . . social and cultural factors must be so presented that they are plainly appropriate to the problem at hand and are clearly useful to the makers of development decisions . . ."⁵ The model of development adopted in India after independence had no place for socio-cultural factors because it did not have avenues for the involvement of local communities. The development model premised on centralised rational bureaucratic planning and implementation of industry-led development was hardly suited to the development requirements of the tribal and more backward regions. The absence of meaningful contributions by the local communities in the policy process in terms of addressing the local needs and utilising locally available resources led to plans being drawn that were unsuitable for a sustained development effort. Also pertinent in such a model of development are the high 'transaction costs' of the development effort. Since locally available resources were hardly utilised in the planning and implementation of development programmes, it was too expensive to sustain a long-drawn, coherent and vigorous development effort of the State, not to mention the possibilities of corruption that it engendered.⁶

⁵ S. Narayan, *Movements Development: Police and Judiciary in Tribal World*, New Delhi, 1988, p. 81.

⁶ *ibid.*

The overall consequence of this model of development was that the local communities became passive beneficiaries of the State's development policy instead of being an active partner. There were very few efforts, if any, to involve the local communities in the generation and maintenance of development programmes and projects. Consequently, there was no feeling of betterment and whenever matters worsened, the population simply looked up to the State for more hand outs instead of making joint efforts with the development policy machinery to ensure better availability and management of resources.

Consequently, there emerged a 'politics of development'. The political resources at the command of the local communities were channelled to secure an increasing amount of development funds as relief or short-term programmes and not as an investment into sustainable developmental activities.

An exchange of resources which could have occurred at an early stage between the local communities or identities and the State to generate a long-term development plan as well as legitimacy for the regime was delayed. An absence of due credence to the socio-cultural factors and participative local development structures in the State's policy mechanism meant that locally sustainable plans were relatively unknown. Consequently, the local communities gradually began to resort to agitational politics in order to generate some meaningful exchange of resources with the State.

The Jharkhand movement has therefore emerged as one of the avenues for this exchange of resources between the electorate of the region and the State. Since the Jharkhandi groups do not, for many reasons, command enough political influence in the executive and legislative structures of the State (chapter II), they demand political and administrative autonomy in order to deliver better development policy implementation in the region. Owing to the inability of the rationalist State to respond successfully to this movement based on tribal heritage, the demand for autonomy has been finding greater support.

The Jharkhandi leaders however, are not ready to divorce themselves from the issue of tribal identity. They have successfully managed to merge the issues of Jharkhandi identity with the poor performance of the development bureaucracy. They have successfully identified the defect of poor local participation in the development effort and therefore seek autonomy in order to implement policies that have greater local relevance. The issue of Jharkhandi identity is invoked to generate political support which is more inclusive than exclusive in nature. Despite being premised on tribal heritage and culture, the leadership is quick to include the non-tribal population of the Jharkhand region in the category of Jharkhandi because of the overall numerical minority of people of tribal origins:

झारखण्ड के विरोधी यह प्रचार करते हैं [कि] झारखण्ड प्रान्त बनने से बाहरी लोगों को भगा दिया जायेगा । यह प्रचार झारखण्ड की जनता की एकता को तोड़ने के लिए और झारखण्ड आन्दोलन में तोड़-फोड़ करने के उद्देश्य से किया गया है । . . . सैकड़ों जातियों के लोग झारखण्ड प्रदेश के मूल निवासी हैं लेकिन झारखण्ड सिर्फ इन्हीं लोगों का नहीं है । वे सभी लोग जो वर्षों से झारखण्ड में रह रहे हैं, . . . झारखण्ड उन सबों का भी उतना ही है जितना यहाँ के मूल निवासियों का है ।⁷

[The opponents of the Jharkhand propagate that after the creation of the Jharkhand state, the outsiders will be expelled. This propaganda is aimed at breaking the unity of the people of Jharkhand and at disrupting the Jharkhand movement. . . People of hundreds of *jatis* [here the term *jati* is used to mean tribes⁸] are original residents of the Jharkhand region but Jharkhand does not belong to them only. All those people who are living here for years. . . have the same claim to the region as the original residents.]

Thus, the leaders of the Jharkhand movement have used a peculiar mixture of tribal identity, populism and issues about the poor developmental profile of the

⁷ Siby Soren, 'झारखण्ड राज्य का सवाल' [The Question of Jharkhand state], in Narayan, S., ed., *Jharkhand Movement: Origin and Evolution*, New Delhi, 1992, pp. 20-1.

⁸ The term *jati* does not have a corresponding English equivalent. It is also used quite loosely in the Indian languages. It can mean race as well as tribe, depending on the context. In this extract it implies tribe.

region to seek electoral support. Whether the people of the region see any relation between the poor developmental profile of the region and the demand for regional autonomy is also important to understand the salience of the Jharkhandi identity in the politics of the region.

People in the Jharkhand region assert that the state government at Patna does not care to invest enough in the Jharkhand region and hence they want an independent state for faster economic development.⁹ Clearly, the identity of being a Jharkhandi is bolstered by this attitude since it defines another dimension in the “we” and “them” division.

II

By the time India gained independence in 1947, the Jharkhandi leaders had succeeded in the creation of a community in south Bihar. As discussed in chapter III, the autonomous form of community formation which had taken place at the national level, was replicated at the level of the Jharkhandi community. Tribal heritage and culture was seen as the foundation stone for this politically self-conscious community/ identity. By the time of independence, the Jharkhandis, or at least their leaders, were convinced of the existence of a Jharkhandi community (seen as akin to the Indian community created by the nationalist leadership), though at a lower ‘sub-national’ level. This conviction had become so strong by the late 1940s that they had also started to grapple with the rules of inclusion of non-tribal societal and political groups within this identity (as all identities premised on communal lines must do at some point or the other). The re-definition of the character of the Adivasi Mahasabha (see chapter II) and the opening of membership of the Jharkhand

⁹ This contention has been an important issue and is evident in most speeches and writings of the leaders in the Jharkhand region. For instance, in a speech at a public meeting the JMM Lok Sabha candidate for the 1996 election for Ranchi constituency said “बिहार सरकार हमारे विकास के लिये बहुत कम प्रयत्न करती है, इस लिये हम झारखण्ड राज्य की माँग कर रहे हैं,” [Bihar government makes little effort for our development, that is why we are demanding the creation of a Jharkhand state], Public Meeting in Sonahatu Block in May 1996.

Party (JHP) to the non-tribal population of the region provides proof that such a process had started as early as the late 1940s and early 1950s. This indicates that the leaders were convinced that the post-colonial Indian state would grant political recognition to the Jharkhandi identity and were eager to include non-tribal elements in their political strategies. Besides, the fact that only about 36 per cent of the population of the region was of tribal descent by 1951, such an inclusive policy indicates an astute political understanding of the operation of the new political system adopted in 1950.

Jharkhandi leaders such as Jaipal Singh had started to demand political recognition in a nascent form in the Constituent Assembly and later in various other public forums. The Jharkhandi leaders had hoped to engage in an exchange of resources with the independent Indian state in a manner similar to the nationalists. They hoped that the threat to the regime from political agitation would engage the State in a meaningful exchange of political, economic and information resources. However, the nationalistic, socialistic credentials of the Indian state gave it a degree of political legitimacy and support which the JHP was not able to undermine. The promises set out in the new Constitution were at least in the short term, enough to tilt the political balance in favour of the INC and the State. Also, the overwhelming control of the State over the economic and information resources skewed any exchange which might have taken place. The Jharkhandi community was clearly the recipient of the largesse which the State chose to allocate to them. Owing to their weak political position, the Jharkhandi leaders were unable to effectively lobby for a better resource allocation and development investment in the Jharkhand region. Consequently, they were unable to generate avenues for a meaningful exchange of resources between the State and the population of the region. Hence, the Jharkhandi population was constrained to depend on the plans that the State drew up for them instead of having a meaningful role in the development planning for the region.

Another feature of the politico-economic situation in Jharkhand in the early fifties was the relatively better development profile of the Jharkhand region vis-à-vis Bihar as a whole. As has emerged in the discussion in chapter IV, the development

profile of the Jharkhand region in 1951 was quite poor but it was so in most parts of India. However, it was better than that of Bihar as a whole.

The death, birth and infant mortality rate of the Jharkhand region were better than that of Bihar as a whole. The number of patients treated in government and aided hospital and the expenditure on such hospitals was in proportion to the population that resided in the region. It produced more than 42 per cent of the paddy and more than 20 per cent of the maize and *arhar* produced in the whole of Bihar. A significant proportion of loans disbursed for wasteland reclamation was spent in the Jharkhand region. In consonance with the mineral wealth of the region, more persons lived within urban areas in the Jharkhand region than Bihar as a whole. There was roughly 40 per cent employment in the Jharkhand region compared with 35 per cent in Bihar as a whole. It had more than 47 per cent literacy compared with about 29 per cent in Bihar as a whole.

However, all was not well in 1951. The proportion of sales Tax collected from the region as well as tax on electricity was quite high. On the other hand, agricultural tax collection was dismal.¹⁰ The agricultural loans available to farmers of the Jharkhand region represented only 16.4 per cent of the total amounts disbursed in the whole of Bihar. However, overall, as has been discussed in chapter IV, the development indicators in the Jharkhand region were slightly better than Bihar as a whole but left a lot to be desired.

In such conditions, the first general elections were held in 1952. The issue of the Jharkhand region had acquired some degree of mass appeal. Jaipal Singh and his JHP had begun to highlight the question of an autonomous territory for the Jharkhandis. The issue of a separate state of Jharkhand had mass support, which is confirmed by the results of the Lok Sabha elections.

¹⁰ From the point of view of the State but not from the potential taxpayers'.

Jharkhandi Parties managed to win three of the eight Lok Sabha seats in the Jharkhand region (Tables 67 & 68). What makes their victories significant is the percentage of votes polled in these constituencies. The JHP won the Chaibasa seat with 76.7 per cent of the votes polled. In the Ranchi West constituency, Jaipal Singh managed 60.9 per cent of the votes whereas a CSPJ candidate with 57.1 per cent of the votes won the Hazaribagh West seat. In these seats the Jharkhandi parties polled an average of 64.9 per cent of the votes cast.

Moreover, the Jharkhandi parties had a significant political presence in four other constituencies. In the constituencies where such parties had an electoral presence amongst the first five candidates, an average of 48.6 per cent of votes was

Table 67: Performance of Political Parties in Constituencies of Jharkhand in Lok Sabha Elections 1952

Constituency Name	Number of Candidates	Winner Party and Per cent of Votes Polled	Runner up Party and Percent of Votes Polled	III Party and Percent of Votes Polled	IV Party and Percent of Votes Polled	V Party and Percent of Votes Polled
Chaibasa	3	JHP 76.7 Kanu Ram Deogam	IND 13.9 Purno C. Birua	IND 9.4	-	-
Hazaribagh East	3	CPI 50.3 Nageshwar P. Sinha	CSPJ 37.7 Tara K Prasad	SP 12.0	-	-
Hazaribagh West	3	CSPJ 57.1 Ram N Singh	INC 35.5 Jhansi Ram	SP 7.5	-	-
Palamau cum Hazaribagh cum Ranchi	8	INC 20.7 Jithan Kharwar	INC 18.4 Gajendra P. Singh	JHP 15.9	JHP 15.0	CSPJ 11.2
Purnea cum Santhal Pargana	6	INC 25.2 Bhagwat Jha Azad	JHP 22.4 Jughar S. Paul	INC 22.4	JHP 18.4	SP 8.1
Ranchi North East	7	INC 32.6 Abdul Ibrahim	SP 24.1 Ajit N Banerjee	CSPJ 18.0	FBM 11.6	IND 5.4
Ranchi West	3	JHP 60.9 Jaipal Singh	INC 32.0 J.S. Manki	CSPJ 7.2	-	-
Santhal Parganas Cum Hazaribagh	6	INC 25.0 Ram Raj Jajware	INC 22.9 Lal Hembrom	IND 21.1	IND 13.9	IND 8.7

Three major delimitation of constituencies in 1952, 1957, 1967 and 1977 have altered the number, shape, size and demographic profiles of many constituencies in the Jharkhand region.

Source: David Butler, Ashok Lahiri and Pranoy Roy, *India Decides: Elections 1952-1991*, New Delhi, 1991 and various newspapers and magazines.

cast for them (Table 67 & 68). It is noteworthy that in some constituencies such as Palamau cum Hazaribagh cum Ranchi, the total votes polled by the Jharkhandi parties surpassed the votes polled by the victorious INC candidate. However, the

lack of unity within JHP and between JHP and other Jharkhandi political groups precluded their victory in such seats. Overall, the Jharkhandi parties polled 42.56 per cent of the total valid votes cast in the Jharkhand region.

The Jharkhandi political formations polled a high percentage of votes in the three constituencies which they won but faced mixed fortunes in the others. This indicates that most of their support was restricted to tribal pockets. Jaipal Singh and JHP had been emphasising the tribal characteristics of the region in the run-up to the

Table 68: Performance of Jharkhandi Political Parties in Lok Sabha Elections 1952

Election Year	Average Votes Polled by All Jharkhandi Parties in Constituencies with Electoral Presence	Average Votes Polled by All Jharkhandi Parties in all Constituencies of Jharkhand	Average Percentage of Votes Polled in Seats Won by Jharkhandi Parties	Seats Won Out of Total Seats in Jharkhand
1952	48.6	42.56	64.9	3 out of 8

elections. He and other tribal leaders had occasionally also talked of expelling the non-tribal *dikus* (outsiders) from the region. This campaign against the non-tribal inhabitants of the region when juxtaposed against the fact that only about a third of the total population of the Jharkhand region was classified as tribal (chapter IV), points to a not too practical political agenda. Any mobilisation on the basis of an exclusive tribal identity had mixed possibilities in a competitive political system in 1951. It was a time when most people believed in Nehru's vision of a modern, self-reliant and secular India and the credentials of the self-proclaimed socialistic State were yet to be tarnished.

It must also be noted that the 1952 elections was held at a time when the political climate of the country was quite different. There were major expectations from the newly independent Indian state and hopes were rife that the pace of development would soon accelerate to a level whereby a decade of concerted policy effort would solve most of the development-related problems. This is reflected in the fact that most of the constitutional provisions such as reservation for the Scheduled Castes and Tribes were conceived for a mere ten years. In this context it

is hardly surprising that other issues such as tribal identity were taking precedence over the developmental issues.

Undoubtedly, the vision of administrative autonomy for the region held considerable appeal for the tribal as well as the non-tribal voters in the initial phase. However, the slogans of "Jharkhand will come and outsider will be banished" and "Jharkhand for tribal people only" along with the politically significant trappings of tribal symbolism (see chapter II) ensured that whatever appeal the administrative autonomy vision might have held for the general population, it did not translate into a majority of parliamentary seats for the Jharkhandi groups (even though they had a significantly high share of the votes). In fact, the heavy leaning on the tribal heritage of the region was one of the contributory factors that were to gradually deprive the JHP and other Jharkhandi political groups of any significant political presence in the region after the 1957 general election.

However, as noted earlier, the level of development was not a significant issue for the Jharkhandi leaders in the 1952 elections. Their concern was to preserve the uniqueness and separateness of the tribal way of life, as is evident in their arguments in their memoranda to the States Reorganisation Commission. They had emphasised the lingual, cultural, and ethnic difference of the region. This point of view is reinforced when the large-scale demonstrations by Jharkhandi leaders and their largely tribal followers are taken into account. These demonstrations depended heavily on large numbers of the tribal population and tribal symbolism such as bows and arrows and the cock (see chapter II) in order to impress upon the State Reorganisation Commission the need to create a tribal state based on tribal separateness.

The Jharkhandi groups managed to win more seats in the 1957 elections though a slight decline in the percentage of votes that they polled is noticeable. The close contest with the INC in some constituencies is symptomatic of the gradual decline in popular support for the Jharkhandi groups which was to follow in the next

few years. Also noticeable in this election is the rising support for the Leftist politics in the region.

In the 1957 elections, the Jharkhandi parties won eight of the 12¹¹ seats in the region (Table 69). The Jharkhandi parties retained an overwhelming degree of

Table 69: Performance of Political Parties in Constituencies of Jharkhand in Lok Sabha Elections 1957

Constituency Name	Number of Candidates	Winner Party and Percent of Votes Polled	Runner up Party and Percent of Votes Polled	III Party and Percent of Votes Polled	IV Party and Percent of Votes Polled	V Party and Percent of Votes Polled
Chatra	2	CSPJ 66.0 Vijaya Raje (W)	INC 34.0 G Bhattacharya	-	-	-
Dhanbad	4	INC 48.1 Prabhat C Bose	CPI 20.4 Kanailal Pal	PSP 19.4	JHP 12.1	-
Dumka	7	JHP 25.6 Suresh C Chaudhary	JHP 22.9 Debi Soren	INC 16.6	INC 15.0	PSP 8.1
Giridih	4	CSPJ 51.3 Qazi S A Matin	INC 30.9 N P Sinha	CPI 11.4	PSP 6.4	-
Hazaribagh	3	CSPJ 67.7 L R Laxmi (W)	INC 24.1 Badruzzaman Khan	JHP 8.2	-	-
Jamshedpur	4	INC 35.5 Mohindra K Ghosh	JHP 29.5 Eric Da Costa	IND 19.0	IND 16.0	-
Lohardagga	4	JHP 43.9 Ignes Beck	INC 30.3 Jithan Kharwar	IND 16.6	IND 9.2	-
Palamau	5	INC 40.8 Gajendra P. Singh	CSPJ 24.1 Ramavtar Sharma	JHP 15.1	PSP 13.3	IND 6.7
Rajmahal	4	INC 47.7 Paika Murmu	JHP 45.1 Robert S. Basra	IND 4.9	IND 2.9	-
Ranchi East	7	JHP 34.6 Minoo R. Masani	INC 32.0 Ibrahim Ansari	IND 12.1	IND 10.9	IND 3.8
Ranchi West	5	JHP 60.3 Jaipal Singh	INC 25.2 C. Karketta	IND 6.0	IND 5.1	IND 3.4
Singbhum	5	JHP 51.8 Shambu C Godsora	IND 15.7 Sidui Hembrom	PSP 12.2	IND 12.0	IND 8.4

Three major delimitation of constituencies in 1952, 1957, 1967 and 1977 have altered the number, shape, size and demographic profiles of many constituencies in the Jharkhand region.

Source: David Butler, Ashok Lahiri and Prannoy Roy, *India Decides: Elections 1952-1991*, New Delhi, 1991 and various newspapers and magazines.

electoral support in these eight constituencies by polling an average of 50.15 per cent of the votes cast. In this election, the Jharkhandi parties had a noticeable electoral presence in every constituency and polled an average of 44.22 per cent of the votes in the whole region (Table 70). In the Lok Sabha elections of 1957, the Jharkhandi parties thus dominated the electoral results. Hence, it is correct to say that the 1957 election was the most glorious performance by the Jharkhandi groups.

Table 70: Performance of Jharkhandi Political Parties in Lok Sabha Elections 1957

Election Year	Average Votes Polled by All Jharkhandi Parties in Constituencies with Electoral Presence	Average Votes Polled by All Jharkhandi Parties in all Constituencies of Jharkhand	Average Percentage of Votes Polled in Seats Won by Jharkhandi Parties	Seats Won Out of Total Seats in Jharkhand
1957	44.22	44.22	50.15	8 out of 12

Despite the dominance of the Jharkhandi parties, national political parties started making inroads into the Jharkhand region with this election. The INC won 4 seats and its candidates were able to secure a decent electoral support of 35 per cent or more in these four seats. In this election, the Leftist parties also emerged on the electoral horizon of the Jharkhand region. The CPI candidates figured amongst the first five in two constituencies and gained significant electoral support. Beginning with this election thus, the Jharkhand region was gradually integrated into the national political system. As a result, the issue of the Jharkhand state took a back seat for some years and the poor performance of the developmental machinery ensured that the socio-economic issues gradually started taking precedence over the issue of a separate Jharkhandi identity.

The prospects of a meaningful and mutually beneficial exchange of resources between the State and the Jharkhandi population were remote in the political system dominated by Jharkhandi parties. The electorate offered substantial support to the

Contd.

¹¹ Three major delimitation of constituencies in 1952, 1957, 1967 and 1977 have altered the number, shape, size and demographic profiles of many constituencies in the Jharkhand region.

Jharkhandi parties in the 1952 and 1957 elections. Notwithstanding the degree of electoral support for them, the Jharkhandi parties failed to secure a separate province of Jharkhand or a better policy response to the development problems in the region. The perpetual divisiveness amongst the leaders had an important role to play in this failure of the Jharkhandi groups (see chapter II). The 1951-61 decade saw deterioration in the development profile of the region. The electorate realised that if they continued to extend electoral support to Jharkhandi parties, they would not be able to exploit other avenues for an exchange of resources with the State. Consequently, as will be analysed below, the electorate of the region gradually started attaching more importance to the developmental issues and paid less credence to the more ascriptive tribal identity issues.

III

The failure of JHP and other Jharkhandi groups to secure a Jharkhand state had not led the Jharkhandi electorate to withdraw their support for such political formations. This is evidenced in the large electoral support to the Jharkhandi groups in the 1957 elections. However, the immense popularity of the Jharkhandi groups started declining due to the falling development profile of the region. The electorate realised the inability of the Jharkhandi parties to engage in a mutually beneficial exchange of resources with the State and gradually shifted their support to other political groups. Moreover, the Jharkhandi parties still leaned heavily on the ST population for their electoral support. This was in a scenario of a declining ST component of the Jharkhand population. From 36.8 per cent in 1951, the population of scheduled tribes in the region diminished to only 33.92 per cent in 1961 (Chart 2).¹² Although 93.6 per cent of the total ST population of Bihar resided in the Jharkhand region in 1961 (up from 84.7 per cent in 1951), they were losing their

¹² In the interests of the continuity of the text and for ease of reference, all the charts have been included at the end of the chapter.

political dominance.¹³ This went on to affect the political success of the Jharkhandi groups which was premised on the region's tribal characteristics.

The immediate result of the reorganisation of states under the SRC report was that the Jharkhand region came to represent an even larger proportion of the total land area of Bihar. It now comprised of 45.78 per cent of the total land area of Bihar. Accordingly, there was also a slight increase in the percentage of population within the Jharkhand region. It now represented almost quarter of the total population of Bihar (see chapter IV and Chart II).

As far as the development indicators are concerned, the figures for 1961 offer a mixed picture. Agriculture remained the dominant source of livelihood in Bihar as a whole as well as the Jharkhand region. Total agricultural production in the Jharkhand region had not grown in the period 1949-50 to 1961-62. In the same period, the graph of agricultural production in the whole of Bihar climbed quite steeply (Chart 6). Moreover, in 1961-62, the Jharkhand region produced only 39.4 per cent of the paddy (42.28 per cent in 1949-50) and 14.64 per cent of maize (25.48 per cent in 1949-50). This indicates that growth in agriculture in Bihar as a whole was much faster than the Jharkhand region. Similarly, by 1961-62, only 11.8 per cent of the total irrigated area of Bihar was in the Jharkhand region compared with 18.53 in 1951-52 but the proportion of area irrigated by government canals in Jharkhand region increased. However, efforts to increase agricultural production had succeeded better in Bihar as a whole than the Jharkhand region. Charts 8 and 9 further amplify this picture of weaker effort in increasing agricultural output in the Jharkhand region. As is clear from Chart 8, the graph for agricultural loans

¹³ The decline in the overall popularity of the Jharkhandi groups was essentially due to the loss of support of the non-tribal tribal population of the region. This was partly due to the JHP's hard-line stance against outsiders (*diku*) after the 1956 SRC report (see chapter II). The tribal support for JHP had also declined but was still sizeable as reflected in the fact that in the 1962 elections, the JHP won 3 of the 5 seats reserved for the STs. The falling development profile of the region was an important factor in the decline of overall support for the JHP.

disbursed in the Jharkhand region shows a modest decline whereas the graph for Bihar as a whole displays a steep rise for the period 1950-51 to 1959-60.

The employment figures for 1961 indicate a rise in total employment rates in Bihar as a whole as well as the Jharkhand region. Total employment levels in the Jharkhand region rose to a over 50 per cent and to about 36 per cent in the whole of Bihar. However, in view of the fact that 1961 was the first year when data about workers was collected,¹⁴ the modest rise does not indicate a better economic scenario in the Jharkhand region. The proof of this argument is the fact that on the one hand we notice a poorer performance of agriculture whereas on the other hand, the total percentage of population employed in agriculture appears to have increased (Chart 4). Surely, a declining agricultural sector cannot provide gainful employment for a larger percentage of the population. This indicates that significant rise in employment rates is a statistical artefact and not a fact.¹⁵

Literacy and health seem to be the only two components of public policy that showed a better profile in 1961. Literacy rates in the Jharkhand region grew at a faster pace than Bihar as a whole (Chart 5). Besides, the figures for infant mortality and death rates in the Jharkhand region also show a better performance than Bihar as a whole (Chart 3).

The rate of investment in the Jharkhand region had noticeably fallen in the previous decade (such as investment in agricultural loans and in comparative investment in the government irrigation schemes) but tax collection from the industrial sector such as the tax on electricity consumption increased (Chart 10). This pattern indicates that the Jharkhand region had started to emerge as almost an internal colony of Bihar.

¹⁴ As explained in chapter IV, data for comparison with 1951 is not very accurate on account of the fact that such data was not collected in 1951. All that can be calculated is a rough estimate.

¹⁵ This is specially so in view of the redefinition of categories as discussed in chapter IV.

Thus, after two Five-Year Plans, two general elections and a decade of independent Indian governance, the Jharkhand region was relatively worse off in many indicators of developmental profile and had grown at a modest rate in others. A modest improvement can be noticed in some development indicators but other indicators that would point to the existence of a vibrant and efficient public policy in operation had performed poorly in the Jharkhand region over the last decade. Consequently, one may speculate that the modest improvements in the development profile (such as literacy, infant mortality and death rates) had been, to a large extent if not solely, dependent on private initiatives.¹⁶

In such conditions, the third general elections were held in 1962. Unlike the developmental profile of this period, the election results of the 1962 general elections showed a significant change in the popular support to various political parties in the region.

By 1962, the JHP had been in a state of decline (see chapter II). There was an atmosphere of doubt for the JHP as well as internal dissension in the ranks of the party. Even the tribal electorate of the region which was the mainstay of the JHP, started showing overt signs of political disenchantment. Moreover, the issue of a separate Jharkhandi state also declined in importance as it became clear that such a move would benefit the majority of the non-tribal sections of the population on account of the fact that they were more educated and exposed to governmental action. Consequently, it became clear that the issue of tribal identity and a separate state based on it (the main plank of the Jharkhandi groups) was to be relegated to the political backwaters of the region.

¹⁶ This conclusion is largely true for the Jharkhand region itself as well as the relative development profile of the region compared with the average for Bihar as a whole. The private initiatives which seem to have affected the modest improvements may have included factors such as individual effort at betterment of one's life-chances as well as more concerted efforts such as missionary organisations, voluntary agencies, etc.

Moreover, as the electorate became more experienced in the niceties of representative democracy, they realised that despite having won majority of the seats from the Jharkhand region in the last elections, the Jharkhandi groups were still a minority in the state and central legislatures. Hence they would not be able to derive any substantial policy measures for the region. Besides, the mainstream

Table 71: Performance of Political Parties in Constituencies of Jharkhand in Lok Sabha Elections 1962

Constituency Name	Number of Candidates	Winner Party and Percent of Votes Polled	Runner up Party and Percent of Votes Polled	III Party and Percent of Votes Polled	IV Party and Percent of Votes Polled	V Party and Percent of Votes Polled
Chatra	2	SWA 62.5 Vijaya Raje (W)	INC 37.5 Tribhuwan Nath	-	-	-
Dhanbad	7	INC 37.8 PR Chakravarti	SWA 25.6 S. Trigunait	IND 17.3	CPI 11.4	SP 4.2
Dumka*	3	INC 37.7 Satya Charan Besra	JHP 36.9 Debi Soren	IND 25.3	-	-
Giridih	5	SWA 40.6 Bateshwar Singh	INC 37.8 C Bhattacharya	CPI 10.8	PSP 5.7	IND 5.2
Godda	5	INC 42.7 P D Himatsingka	JHP 32.0 Mohan S Oberoi	SWA 11.2	CPI 10.2	IND 3.9
Hazaribagh	3	SWA 66.8 Basant N Singh	INC 28.4 M A Ansari	JHP 4.8	-	-
Jamshedpur	5	CPI 43.0 Udaikar Mishra	INC 31.6 N C Mukherjee	JHP 17.0	IND 4.6	SWA 3.9
Lohardagga*	3	SWA 44.2 David Munzni	INC 31.7 Kartik Oraon	JHP 24.1	-	-
Palamau	4	SWA 58.6 S Manjari (W)	INC 26.8 Gajendra P. Singh	PSP 7.5	JHP 7.1	-
Rajmahal*	3	JHP 52.8 Iswar Marandi	INC 39.6 Paika Murmu	IND 7.6	-	-
Ranchi East	8	SWA 32.3 Prashant K Ghosh	INC 28.5 Ibrahim Ansari	JHP 22.0	IND 7.6	IND 5.3
Ranchi West*	3	JHP 52.6 Jaipal Singh	SWA 26.7 Joseph Tigga	INC 20.8	-	-
Singbhum*	5	JHP 42.5 Haricharan Soy	INC 28.4 Lakho Bodra	IND 17.2	PSP 7.0	SP 4.9

*ST Constituency.

*SC Constituency.

Three major delimitation of constituencies in 1952, 1957, 1967 and 1977 have altered the number, shape, size and demographic profiles of many constituencies in the Jharkhand region.

Source: David Butler, Ashok Lahiri and Prannoy Roy, *India Decides: Elections 1952-1991*, New Delhi, 1991 and various newspapers and magazines.

parties also hi-jacked some of the effectiveness of the Jharkhandi agenda by talking of treating the developmental problem of the region in a way different from the rest of Bihar and the country.

Against this background the 1962 elections threw up a new set of political configurations. The state of disarray in the political resources of the Jharkhandi groups was so bad that they did not even bother to contest a seat that had traditionally returned a Jharkhandi candidate.

Jharkhandi groups managed to win only 3 of the 13 seats in the region (Table 71) with an average of 49.5 per cent of the votes in these three seats (Table 72). The votes polled by the Jharkhandi parties add up to an average of only 21.85 per cent in all the constituencies of the Jharkhand region. They no longer had an electoral presence amongst the first five candidates in rest of the constituencies of the Jharkhand region. The average votes polled by the Jharkhandi groups in the constituencies where they figured amongst the first five candidates were down to 28.41 per cent (Table 72). Besides, the sweeping majorities that the Jharkhandi candidates polled in the seats that they won were a thing of the past. Jaipal Singh and Iswar Marandi, two legendary figures of the Jharkhand movement, did manage to poll a majority of more than 50 per cent but it was a far cry from the three-fourths majority that they used to poll in the previous elections.

Thus, the declining development profile and the absence of any noticeable

Table 72: Performance of Jharkhandi Political Parties in Lok Sabha Elections 1962

Election Year	Average Votes Polled by All Jharkhandi Parties in Constituencies with Electoral Presence	Average Votes Polled by All Jharkhandi Parties in all Constituencies of Jharkhand	Average Percentage of Votes Polled in Seats Won by Jharkhandi Parties	Seats Won Out of Total Seats in Jharkhand
1962	28.41	21.85	49.5	3 out of 13

improvement as a result of government policy initiatives had their toll on the popular support which the Jharkhandi political formations, particularly the JHP, enjoyed. In many ways, this marked the end of an era of overwhelming popular

support enjoyed by the Jharkhandi groups. There are a number of other related reasons for the fall in popularity and electorate support for the Jharkhandi groups. The growing percentage of non-tribal population in the electorate of Jharkhand region combined with the growing political heterogeneity of the tribal population contributed their bit. In addition to this, there was an important role played by the poor performance of the policy implementation machinery. As has emerged in chapter IV, the development indicators had not improved in the Jharkhand region (in some cases the situation had worsened) during the hegemony of the Jharkhandi parties. The party had failed to translate their dominance in the region into political strength and secure a better allocation of development funds and initiatives. Hence, the decline of the party is not surprising.

This change in the popular support for the Jharkhandi groups can be understood within the framework of the Modified Resource Dependence Model. When faced with an inefficient and ineffective policy implementation, the popular electoral support (resources controlled by the electorate) was quickly withdrawn and was invested in another national party in the hope of securing a better policy environment and initiatives (resources controlled by the State and the political party in power). Thus, the electorate tried another avenue for a mutually beneficial exchange of resources with the State. As will be seen in the rest of the chapter, in years to come, this strategic use of the resource of political patronage enjoyed by the electorate is utilised by the population of the Jharkhand region in a number of ways. They have learnt to combine the resource of political patronage with another resource vested in their numbers; namely, the resource of political threat to the regime by agitational politics to secure a better public policy response. This strategic sharing of political resources vested in the general public has secured a better voice for the development problems of the region as well as secured some degree of autonomy.

IV

Soon after the 1962 general elections, the JHP merged with the INC. The latter realised that a stable support base in the Jharkhand region had to include the tribal population who had previously supported the JHP. On the other hand, the JHP realised that they had lost electoral support owing to their divisiveness and failure to secure a better policy intervention in the Jharkhand region. The merger of JHP with the INC provided the Jharkhandi leaders an opportunity to contain these cleavages amongst them by utilising the umbrella character of the INC.

Besides, the Jharkhandi leaders felt that the twin goals of creation of a separate state and a better public policy initiative for the Jharkhand region could be pursued better from within the INC than as one of the many parties in opposition. Within the INC, the Jharkhandi leaders had been accommodated as ministers and as heads of various developmental bodies but precious little was done on the developmental front. Gradually, the merger started showing signs of strain mainly due to dissension among the Jharkhandi groups within the INC. The erstwhile leaders of the JHP were caught up in the internal power struggles of the INC and failed to secure the efforts of the governmental machinery for development of their region, which led to further dissensions among them. The results of this intricate political game and the lack of effort on the developmental policy front further reinforced the trend towards multi-partyism in the Jharkhand region. The Jharkhandi groups (excluding those small splinter groups that were not a part of the INC and were therefore, members of the opposition) fared poorly in the 1967 elections. The electoral felt betrayed by the Jharkhandi leaders who were a part of the INC. The Jharkhandi parties did not carry much political legitimacy in the region any more.

Since JHP was a part of INC in the 1967 election, it is not possible to isolate the performance of the Jharkhandi political groups. However, there are some leaders who were renowned Jharkhandis and their fortunes can be analysed in this election.

Only three constituencies returned a distinctly Jharkhandi candidate. The constituency of Khunti once again, returned Jaipal Singh contesting under the INC

Table 73: Performance of Political Parties in Constituencies of Jharkhand in Lok Sabha Elections 1967

Constituency Name	Number of Candidates	Winner Party and Percent of Votes Polled	Runner up Party and Percent of Votes Polled	III Party and Percent of Votes Polled	IV Party and Percent of Votes Polled	V Party and Percent of Votes Polled
Chatra	5	IND 34.6 Vijaya Raje(W)	INC 23.1 S P Bhandari	SSP 18.9	BJS 15.7	PSP 7.7
Dhanbad	6	JKD 36.6 L R Laxmi (W)	INC 25.7 A P Sharma	SSP 12.0	CPM 10.1	BJS 9.3
Dumka*	5	INC 38.8 Satya Charan Besra	CPI 31.0 B Marandi	BJS 12.4	IND 10.7	IND 7.0
Giridih	4	INC 35.1 Imteyaz Ahmed	IND 33.2 M Oberoi	BJS 18.9	CPI 12.8	-
Godda	5	INC 38.2 P D Himatsingka	BJS 28.0 S Tulsian	IND 13.3	PSP 13.2	IND 7.4
Hazaribagh	4	IND 44.4 Basant N. Singh	INC 33.9 Damodar Pandey	BJS 14.8	CPI 7.0	-
Jamshedpur	6	INC 37.2 Shiva C Prasad	CPI 17.1 Udaikar Mishra	IND 16.5	BJS 17.1	CPM 11.4
Khunti *	9	INC 26.0 Jaipal Singh	IND 23.1 P Kachchap	BJS 16.6	SWA 13.7	IND 6.1
Lohardagga*	6	INC 39.8 Kartik Oraon	BJS 18.4 S. Baraik	IND 17.0	IND 11.1	SWA 10.1
Palamau #	5	INC 43.0 Kamla Kumari (W)	SSP 23.6 J Ram	JKD 14.8	BJS 11.5	IND 7.1
Rajmahal*	6	INC 27.9 Iswar Marandi	SWA 23.6 Robert S Basra	IND 18.5	BJS 15.4	IND 7.9
Ranchi	10	INC 19.6 Prashant K. Ghosh	BJS 17.1 A N Sinha	IND 13.4	IND 11.4	IND 10.5
Singbhum*	6	IND 23.4 Kolai Birua	BJS 20.7 M L Soy	INC 17.9	SSP 17.7	IND 12.4

*ST Constituency.

#SC Constituency.

Three major delimitation of constituencies in 1952, 1957, 1967 and 1977 have altered the number, shape, size and demographic profiles of many constituencies in the Jharkhand region.

Source: David Butler, Ashok Lahiri and Pranoy Roy, *India Decides: Elections 1952-1991*, New Delhi, 1991 and various newspapers and magazines.

banner but his majority was reduced to half and he secured only 26 per cent (as opposed to 52.6 per cent in 1962) of the votes. Singhbhum also elected a Jharkhandi leader as a Congress candidate. Here again, this candidate was elected with a much-reduced majority of 23.4 per cent (compared with the 1962 majority of 42.5 per

cent of the votes for the JHP candidate in 1957) (Table 73). The Rajmahal seat was also won by a Jharkhandi candidate representing the INC, Iswar Marandi, with 27.9 per cent of the votes (compared with the JHP candidate who had won the seat in 1962 with 52.8 per cent of the votes). The INC did manage to win 9 of the 13 Lok Sabha seats from the region but the overwhelming electoral majorities (in terms of the percentage of votes) that Jharkhandi leaders had enjoyed in the past was not extended to the INC candidates.

As is evident from the above analysis, there were two significant features of this election. In 1967, there was largely a pattern of voting against the sitting members of Parliament in the Jharkhand region as elsewhere in India. It was clearly a vote for change in representation. Some candidates who represented the same parties were most likely victorious on the basis of their personal reputations rather than the party/ issues which they represented. This is reflected in the fact that a few members of Parliament who chose to contest the elections as independent candidates rather than represent a party, retained their seats. For instance, Basant N. Singh in Hazaribagh and Vijaya Raje in Chatra, both retained their seats.

The second pattern, which is quite clear from the results of the 1967 elections is that the days of single party in the Jharkhand region (as in the rest of India, though not quite so clear yet) were over. The fact that the INC had won 9 of the 13 seats cannot be seen as one-party dominance because the percentage of votes polled by INC (even with Jharkhandi candidates representing it) was far lower than that enjoyed by the JHP and other Jharkhandi parties in their hey days. Besides, this election also offered a rare opportunity to the INC. It had managed to tap into a combination of support bases such as a vote for a change, Jharkhandi support base and personal reputation of the Jharkhandi leaders. It also benefited from the rational choice of the voters in favour of a party which was likely to form a stable government as they were tired of the divided JHP who had not managed to secure a better development initiative in the Jharkhand region. The INC as a party was not representing any Jharkhandi ideology but performed quite well. Also important is the increasing electoral support for the Leftist groups and parties. This also reflects

a growing confidence within the Jharkhandi electorate who were now willing to extend political patronage to any political group that was likely to have the capacity of engaging in a meaningful exchange of resources with the State and the rest of the political system.

Thus, starting from the 1962 elections and culminating in the 1967 elections the electorate clearly rejected the Jharkhand state as a solution to the issue of declining development profile. Although the aspiration for a separate state and the recognition of the Jharkhandi identity were not quite dead, the issue of a proper and efficient policy implementation and socio-economic development took priority rather than the creation of a separate state. The electorate used the most potent weapon they had in their arsenal; namely, the withdrawal of electoral support for the Jharkhandi parties (who had promised a lot but had not delivered much), to make their point.

Apart from a desire for change amongst the electorate, the 1967 election also reflects a redefinition of the terms of resource dependence which has had long-term consequences. It appears that the Jharkhandi electorate realised that the economic potential of the Jharkhand region was important for the entire country. Consequently, it was willing to engage in a national-level exchange of resources through the avenues offered by the INC. The fourth general election thus, marked the emergence of multi-party politics in the Jharkhand region and also significantly, the growing distrust and disenchantment of the electorate with the Jharkhandi leaders.

This era in Jharkhandi politics can also be understood within the operational dynamics of the Modified Resource Dependence Model, the electorate used the resources at their command, namely the electoral patronage of certain parties/candidates in the hope of being able to pressurise the State to share with them the resources which it commanded – developmental funds and efficient policy delivery. However, this does not mean that the electorate was able to secure an equitable share of the resources which the State commanded in the coming years. This

struggle to share resources under the control of the other became more intense in the coming years. The multiplicity of political parties and the continued inefficiency of the policy delivery mechanism led to an even more fluid political dynamics in the Jharkhand region.

V

After the 1967 elections, from the morass of the declining influence of the Jharkhandi groups in the region and divided political loyalties, there emerged numerous politically active 'groups'. All of them claimed to be the true representatives of the cause of Jharkhand and to be the true successor of the erstwhile JHP. Although the political climate of the region had changed drastically since the last Census, the developmental profile hardly showed any sign of accelerated growth.

By 1971, as discussed in chapter IV, the population in Bihar and the Jharkhand region had grown rapidly. This growth altered the demographic balance of the Jharkhand region as well as Bihar as a whole. By 1971, 27.68 per cent of the population of Bihar lived in the Jharkhand region as opposed to 24.98 per cent in 1961 (Chart 2). Also pertinent was the fact that the ST component of the population was reduced to 29.29 per cent (from 33.92 per cent in 1961). This change in the demographic profile had political repercussions in terms of still further reduced chances of success for particularistic tribal politics.

As far as the development indicators are concerned, the overall literacy rate had shown an improvement during the decade 1951-61. However, during 1961-71, the rate of growth in literacy had slowed down. Chart 5 and chapter IV tells us that in the Jharkhand region as well as in Bihar as a whole, there was hardly any improvement in literacy rates (Chart 5). This indicates a poorer rate of success in the implementation of public policy in both Bihar as a whole as well as the Jharkhand region. The health indicators also reflect a limited success. The patterns for death and infant mortality represented in Chart 3 indicate that by 1971 infant

mortality in the Jharkhand region had shown a substantial decline to 28.38 per 1,000 live births (from 58.95 in 1961). The same figures for Bihar as a whole were 32.54 in 1973 compared with 87.01 in 1961.

This picture of declining development profile continues with the occupational patterns for the Jharkhand region. The total percentage of population gainfully employed in the Jharkhand region in 1971 fell to about 30 per cent of the population from more than 50 per cent in 1961. This decline was in the agricultural as well as non-agricultural occupations¹⁷ (Chart 4). Similar patterns can be discerned for Bihar as a whole as well. Chapter IV had analysed the declining agricultural production in the Jharkhand region and the poor efforts to improve it in the decade 1961-71. This is reflected in the occupational patterns as well as in the irrigation potential of the region (Chart 7). As far as the investments in the agricultural sectors were concerned, the loans disbursed in the Jharkhand region rose modestly compared with the substantial hike in Bihar as a whole (Chart 8). These minor improvements fade into insignificance when compared with the strides made in Bihar as a whole.

Thus, while the developmental profile of the region had been going from bad to worse in the 1961-71 decade, the political agenda of the region was getting more and more complicated. The Jharkhandi leaders within the INC and elsewhere realised that the cause of a Jharkhand state and the development of the region had been injured by the divisions within their ranks. Thus, desperate measures undertaken in 1968 to salvage their political influence in the region led to the creation of a loosely united All India Jharkhand Party (AIJP). This new political entity, the AIJP, was rife with mutual rivalries from its very inception and was soon divided into two factions (see chapter II). On the other hand, the urban and

¹⁷ Such drastic fall is due to a statistical artefact resulting from the re-definition of categories in 1961 and 1971 (see chapter IV). Nevertheless, the falling potential for growth in employment opportunities in the agricultural occupations as witnessed in other indicators such as declining irrigation potential and falling cropped area points to a decline in employment capacity of the Jharkhand region, irrespective of the statistical artefact. Surely, a declining agricultural sector cannot gainfully support more agricultural workers.

industrial factions of the Jharkhand movement began emerging after the debacle of the 1967 elections and multiple groups emerged which tried to draw upon the legacy of the tribal heritage to further their political aims.

The rate of development in the region had worsened during the last decade or so and the popular support for the Jharkhandi groups reached a nadir by the fourth general election in 1967. This trend continued in the 1971 election. The

Table 74: Performance of Political Parties in Constituencies of Jharkhand in Lok Sabha Elections 1971

Constituency Name	Number of Candidates	Winner Party and Per cent of Votes Polled	Runner up Party and Percent of Votes Polled	III Party and Percent of Votes Polled	IV Party and Percent of Votes Polled	V Party and Percent of Votes Polled
Chatra	4	INC 43.2 Shankar D. Singh	JP 36.8 Vijaya Raje(W)	SSP 18.8	IND 1.2	-
Dhanbad	15	INC 46.4 Ram N Sharma	CPM 15.7 Vinod B Mahto	AIJP 10.3	CPI 7.0	BJS 5.3
Dumka*	8	INC 35.4 Satya Charan Besra	CPI 29.1 Satrugan Besra	BJS 16.5	IND 13.4	BPHJ 2.7
Giridih	6	INC 38.3 C Bhattacharya	INCO 35.9 Krishna B Sahay	CPI 18.4	IND 3.8	AIJP 2.7
Godda	6	INC 47.6 Jagdish N Mandal	INCO 22.6 P D Himatsingka	IND 9.7	BPHJ 9.0	IND 6.3
Hazaribagh	7	INC 32.8 Damodar Pandey	JP 26.5 L R Laxmi (W)	BJS 17.7	SSP 8.9	IND 8.9
Jamshedpur	12	INC 27.5 Swaran S Sokhi	CPI 27.4 Kedar Das	AIJP 17.1	BJS 12.7	IND 7.3
Khunti*	8	IND 30.5 Niral E. Horo	BJS 28.8 Karia Munda	AIJP 19.3	IND 16.5	IND 2.2
Lohardagga*	8	INC 53.8 Kartik Oraon	BJS 18.8 Ropna Oraon	IND 14.8	IND 3.8	AIJP 3.6
Palamau #	7	INC 51.3 Kamla Kumari (W)	BJS 30.7 Ramdeni Ram	SSP 9.5	IND 2.6	IND 2.2
Rajmahal*	8	INC 44.8 Iswar Marandi	BPHJ 29.8 Justin Richard	BJS 16.2	IND 3.3	IND 2.1
Ranchi	12	INC 43.3 Prashant K Ghosh	BJS 34.4 Rudra P Sarangi	IND 7.2	AIFB 6.7	AIJP 2.4
Singhbhum*	9	AIJP 40.7 Moran S Purty	IND 25.5 D N Champa	IND 13.2	IND 6.3	IND 4.2

*ST Constituency.

#SC Constituency.

Three major delimitation of constituencies in 1952, 1957, 1967 and 1977 have altered the number, shape, size and demographic profiles of many constituencies in the Jharkhand region.

Source: David Butler, Ashok Lahiri and Pranjoy Roy, *India Decides: Elections 1952-1991*, New Delhi, 1991 and various newspapers and magazines.

electorate had lost all faith in the promises of the Jharkhandi groups. In the fifth general election in 1971, the role played by the Jharkhandi group was at best marginal and at worse non-existent. Once again, the electorate sought to exercise the power vested in them by the democratic process and paid little heed to the appeals of the faction-riddled Jharkhandi groups. Individual Jharkhandi leaders such as Iswar Marandi who won the Rajmahal seat as an INC candidate and N E Horo who won the Khunti seat as an independent candidate, performed well but political formations representing the Jharkhandi ideology, on the whole, fared poorly (Table 74).

The Jharkhandi political groups were able to win only one (Singhbhum) of the thirteen Lok Sabha seats from the region reserved for STs. Even in this constituency, the AIJP candidate polled only 40.7 per cent of the votes (Table 75)

Table 75: Performance of Jharkhandi Political Parties in Lok Sabha Elections 1971

Election Year	Average Votes Polled by All Jharkhandi Parties in Constituencies with Electoral Presence	Average Votes Polled by All Jharkhandi Parties in all Constituencies of Jharkhand	Average Percentage of Votes Polled in Seats Won by Jharkhandi Parties	Seats Won Out of Total Seats in Jharkhand
1971	13.76	10.58	40.7	1 out of 13

compared to an average of about 49 per cent votes polled by Jharkhandi candidates in the seats won by them in 1962.

The same pattern of declining electoral support for the Jharkhandi groups was reflected throughout the region. Overall, the Jharkhandi political groups managed to poll an average of only 10.58 per cent of the votes in the entire Jharkhand region. In three constituencies the Jharkhandi political parties/ formations had no presence amongst the first five candidates. In the constituencies where they did, they polled an average of 13.76 per cent compared with 28.4 per cent in 1962. Clearly, the strong trend of reduced electoral support for the Jharkhandi groups in the region which had started in 1962, continued in 1971 (Chart 1). Furthermore, the constituency of Dumka (ST constituency) which had once been one of the more important centres of Jharkhandi support extended very little political support to the Jharkhandis in the elections of 1971. The only noticeable presence of the Jharkhandi

groups in this constituency was 2.7 per cent of the votes polled by one of the splinter groups under the banner of Bihar Prant Hul Jharkhand Party.

It is noteworthy that the leftist political groups enjoyed greater electoral support in the 1971 election than the Jharkhandi political formations. The relationship between the decline in popular support for the Jharkhandi groups and the developmental and socio-economic problems of the region is attested to by the fact that Leftist and socialist parties were commanding significant popular support. These leftist parties sought to address the very problems which had emerged due to the neglect of the developmental agenda of the region by the policy process. Undoubtedly, these parties did not win many seats in the Jharkhand region but their share in the percentage of votes is noteworthy and in a few constituencies, they emerged as the runner-up party (Table 74).

The centrality of development policy in this shift of electoral patronage is evident if the political stance of the INC vis-à-vis a separate state of Jharkhand is taken into account (see chapter VII). The fact that electoral support for the INC had improved (Table 74) despite its extreme reluctance to consider a separate state indicates the important place of the State's developmental effort in the politics of the Jharkhand region. The INC had used the political rhetoric of *garibi hatao* in the 1970s. This had yielded a rich electoral harvest for the INC throughout India and the Jharkhand region was no different. This reflects the value attached by the Jharkhandi electorate to a better public policy initiative for the development of the region. The fact that the INC had managed to win eleven of the thirteen seats demonstrates that the Jharkhandi electorate was eager to extend all possible political patronage to the INC in the hope of better policy response. The declining development profile over the past two decades had made the problems of the region acute and a better exchange of resources on the development policy front was clearly more important to the electorate than a separate state.

In sum, the desperate efforts made in 1969 to salvage the fast declining popular political support for the Jharkhandi groups did not pay off. The factionalism

that was rife within their ranks was one of the factors (see chapter II). Also important was the fact that the electorate had invested almost overwhelming trust in the Jharkhandi groups till 1957 but the overall developmental profile had worsened. The changing political profile of the region was reflected in the rising support for the leftist and national parties. The pattern of increasing support for the national parties which had emerged in the 1967 elections, was clear by the 1971 victory of the INC. The INC had won all the seats in the Jharkhand region except for two reserved seats. One of these was won by the AIJP and the other by the Jharkhandi leader N. E. Horo who had contested as an independent candidate.

The declining agricultural production, worsening educational levels and general under-development resulting in lower employment opportunities ensured that the issue of a separate state took a back seat. The electorate invested its support in the INC, which provided hope of a stable and efficient government at the state level and the centre.

The sixth general election was held against the backdrop of the Emergency (imposed under the INC government led by Indira Gandhi) which had been highly unpopular with the general population all over the country. The Jharkhand region was no different and the INC lost all the seats in the region. Although in the 1971 elections it seemed that the INC had come to stay in the region, the backlash of the electorate against the draconian measures and policies of the emergency era was swift and complete. All the INC candidates and Jharkhandi leaders who had aligned themselves with the INC lost their seats. This trend is reflected in the fact that Moran S. Purty, who had won the Singhbhum seat in 1971 Lok Sabha elections as an AIJP candidate (with 40.7 per cent of the votes), lost the seat to an AIJP candidate when he fought under the INC banner in 1977 and polled only 14.2 per cent of the votes.

Table 76: Performance of Political Parties in Constituencies of Jharkhand in Lok Sabha Elections 1977

Constituency Name	Number of Candidates	Winner Party and Percent of Votes Polled	Runner up Party and Percent of Votes Polled	III Party and Percent of Votes Polled	IV Party and Percent of Votes Polled	V Party and Percent of Votes Polled
Chatra	5	BLD 75.0 Sukhdeo P Verma	INC 22.2 Shankar D. Singh	IND 1.4	IND 0.8	IND 0.6
Dhanbad	13	IND 68.7 AK Roy	INC 21.3 Ram N Sharma	CPI 5.9	IND 0.7	IND 0.7
Dumka*	6	BLD 49.5 Bateshwar Hembram	INC 26.6 Prithivi C Kisku	CPI 16.6	PHJP 4.3	IND 1.8
Giridih	4	BLD 58.4 Ramdas Singh	INC 30.5 Imteyaz Ahmed	IND 8.7	JHP 2.5	-
Godda	5	BLD 70.0 Jagdambi P Yadav	INC 25.6 Jagdish N Mandal	IND 1.8	IND 1.5	PHJP 1.1
Hazaribagh	5	BLD 64.7 Basant N Singh	INC 15.6 Damodar Pandey	CPI 12.4	IND 4.4	IND 2.9
Jamshedpur	12	BLD 50.2 Rudra P Sarangi	INC 25.8 VGS Gopal	CPI 12.6	JHP 3.7	IND 1.9
Khunti*	5	BLD 50.0 Karia Munda	JHP 31.0 N E Horo	IND 16.6	IND 1.3	IND 1.1
Koderma	4	BLD 67.3 Reet Lal P Verma	INC 21.2 C Bhattacharya	CPI 8.5	IND 2.9	-
Lohardagga*	5	BLD 56.9 Lalu Oraon	INC 31.0 Kartik Oraon	IND 5.6	JHP 4.0	IND 2.6
Palamau #	7	BLD 77.6 Ramdeni Ram	INC 15.0 Kamla Kumari (W)	IND 2.7	IND 2.1	IND 1.2
Rajmahal*	3	BLD 68.2 Anthony Murmu	INC 25.8 Yogesh C. Murmu	BPHJ 6.1	-	-
Ranchi	13	BLD 49.0 Ravindra Verma	INC 25.5 Shiv Prasad Sahu	IND 8.5	CPM 5.1	IND 3.8
Singhbhum*	9	AIJP 73.3 Bagun Sumburi	INC 14.2 Moran S. Purty	JHP 4.4	IND 2.6	IND 1.7

*ST Constituency.

#SC Constituency.

Three major delimitation of constituencies in 1952, 1957, 1967 and 1977 have altered the number, shape, size and demographic profiles of many constituencies in the Jharkhand region.

Source: David Butler, Ashok Lahiri and Prannoy Roy, *India Decides: Elections 1952-1991*, New Delhi, 1991 and various newspapers and magazines.

Table 77: Performance of Jharkhandi Political Parties in Lok Sabha Elections 1977

Election Year	Average Votes Polled by All Jharkhandi Parties in Constituencies with Electoral Presence	Average Votes Polled by All Jharkhandi Parties in all Constituencies of Jharkhand	Average Percentage of Votes Polled in Seats Won by Jharkhandi Parties	Seats Won Out of Total Seats in Jharkhand
1977	16.3	9.3	73.3	1 out of 14

Despite the anti-INC feeling, the Jharkhandi groups failed to win any more seats in the 1977 elections. The AIJP won the Singhbhum seat with a majority (73.3 per cent) that was a reminiscent of the hey day of the JHP. However, this was the only seat which the Jharkhandi groups won from the 14 Lok Sabha seats in the region. The average votes polled by these parties in all the constituencies in the Jharkhand region fell once again, to a mere 9.3 per cent. The Jharkhandi parties had no presence amongst the first five candidates in 6 constituencies in the 1977 elections. This inflates the average votes polled by the Jharkhandi parties in the constituencies where they had electoral presence to 16.3 per cent (Table 76). However, their electoral appeal had declined both in terms of number of constituencies where they managed to secure some degree of electoral support as well as in terms of the percentage of the votes polled.

The 1977 election does not reflect a new political trend in the Jharkhand region. No doubt there was a large-scale support for the Bharatiya Lok Dal (BLD) but this was more an anti-INC sentiment than a pro-BLD vote. However, the declining electoral support for the Jharkhandi parties in this election is a continuation of a similar trend in the last few elections.

Another notable feature in the election of 1977 was that the Jharkhandi groups had a presence only in the constituencies reserved for the STs. In other constituencies, they did not figure in the tally of first five candidates. It appears that whatever little popular support was left for the political groups premised on the Jharkhandi ideology was restricted to pockets of the tribal population. Their political legitimacy did not mobilise even all the tribal people which is evident in the low level of support in the tribal constituencies. Moreover, there seems to have been a very limited degree of support for them in non-tribal pockets. Thus, the declining support for Jharkhandi groups which started in the 1960s, was noticed in this election as well. Faced with the electoral debacle, the JMM and the Jharkhand Alliance between the Jharkhandi and some leftist leaders of the region declined to the point of disappearing.

This election reflects another element in the changing dynamics of resource dependence in the region. By the mid-seventies, the JMM's agenda of social reform had started finding enthusiastic support amongst the masses (see chapter II). This indicates that the electorate was happy to respond to the agenda of social change and cultural revivalism that was proposed by the JMM but was unwilling to elect the uneasy alliance to represent them in the legislatures. In other words, the masses were unwilling to entrust them with a meaningful exchange of resources with the State.

Moreover, the lessons learnt in the events which led to the proclamation of Emergency in 1975, had taught the masses the value of agitational politics and strength in numbers. Consequently, starting from late 1970s the agitational agenda of the JMM had drawn substantial popular support which was reflected in the well-attended rallies and demonstrations. However, as far as electoral support was concerned, the masses chose to invest this element of the political resources at their command in the national political parties which were likely to be in a position to influence the developmental policy in the Jharkhand region.

The unstable government which was formed after the 1977 election did not last its full term and elections were held again in 1980. The Jharkhandi electorate were all too familiar with the factionalism in the Jharkhandi parties and its effects on the region. Consequently, the Indian National Congress (Indira) (INCI) was voted back and won six of the fourteen Lok Sabha seats in the region (Table 78).

The Janata Party (JP) which had emerged from the numerous mergers and factionalism, of which the BLD was a part, did not fare well in this election. Ironically, the political party that won the most number of the seats —INCI—was itself borne out of the second major split in the original the INC. Moreover, JP came second in 8 of the 14 seats in the region. However, a noteworthy feature of this election was an absence of predominance of any one political party/ group.

Table 78: Performance of Political Parties in Constituencies of Jharkhand in Lok Sabha Elections 1980

Constituency Name	Number of Candidates	Winner Party and Percent of Votes Polled	Runner up Party and Percent of Votes Polled	III Party and Percent of Votes Polled	IV Party and Percent of Votes Polled	V Party and Percent of Votes Polled
Chatra	12	INCI 40.0 Ranjit Singh	JP 22.9 Sukhdeo P. Verma	JPS 17.4	IND 7.5	IND 3.2
Dhanbad	20	IND 34.2 A K Roy	INCI 30.4 Yogeshwar Prasad	JP 19.6	JPS 6.9	IND 2.7
Dumka*	5	IND 37.5 Shibu Soren	INCI 36.4 Prithivi C. Kisku	JP 12.4	CPI 12.1	JHP 1.5
Giridih	11	IND 35.4 Bindeshwari Dube	JP 26.6 Ramdas Singh	IND 18.9	JPS 8.2	CPI 6.5
Godda	11	INCI 36.6 Saminuddin	JP 27.9 Jagdambi P Yadav	CPI 16.6	IND 9.5	JPS 5.0
Hazaribagh	10	JP 35.1 Basant N Singh	INCI 24.4 Azima Hussain (W)	CPI 19.0	JPS 11.1	IND 5.6
Jamshedpur	21	JP 29.2 Rudra P Sarangi	INCI 25.9 VGS Gopal	CPI 24.4	JHP 5.6	JPS 4.4
Khunti*	14	JHP 36.4 N E Horo	JP 26.7 Karia Munda	INCI 20.8	JPS 7.7	IND 1.3
Koderma	9	JP 40.7 Reet Lal P Verma	INCI 32.3 Javed Warsi	INCUI 11.8	IND 8.7	IND 2.2
Lohardagga*	13	INCI 51.5 Kartik Oraon	JP 23.8 Karma Oraon	JPS 10.0	JHP 4.5	IND 3.5
Palamau #	9	INCI 48.3 Kamla Kumari (W)	JP 31.3 Ramdeni Ram	JPS 8.9	IND 4.2	IND 1.7
Rajmahal*	8	INCI 40.4 Seth Hembram	JP 22.3 Palu Hasda	IND 20.1	JPS 11.0	IND 3.1
Ranchi	17	INCI 38.7 Shiv Prasad Sahu	JP 24.8 Shiv Kumar Sinha	JPS 9.7	AIFB 9.4	IND 8.9
Singhbhum*	11	JP 32.4 Bagun Sumburi	INCI 22.2 Theodore Bodra	IND 20.2	JPS 10.2	JHP 6.6

*ST Constituency, #SC Constituency

There have been three major delimitation of constituencies since 1952 in 1957, 1967 and 1977. As a result, the number of constituencies have changed as have their size and demographic profiles.

Source: David Butler, Ashok Lahiri and Prannoy Roy, *India Decides: Elections 1952-1991*, New Delhi, 1991 and various newspapers and magazines.

It must be noted that this fluidity in the political dynamics of the region did not do much to improve the electoral fortunes of the Jharkhandi political groups/parties. In the 1980 Lok Sabha elections, Jharkhandi parties once again won only one of the 14 Lok Sabha seats (Khunti) in the region with 36.4 per cent of the votes

polled (Tables 78). Some leaders of the Jharkhand Alliance had also won the seats that they had contested as independents. Shibu Soren, the head of JMM, had won the Dumka seat with 37.5 per cent of the votes and A. K. Roy was successful in Dhanbad with 34.2 per cent of the votes polled.

Table 79: Performance of Jharkhandi Political Parties in Lok Sabha Elections 1980

Election Year	Average Votes Polled by All Jharkhandi Parties in Constituencies with Electoral Presence	Average Votes Polled by All Jharkhandi Parties in all Constituencies of Jharkhand	Average Percentage of Votes Polled in Seats Won by Jharkhandi Parties	Seats Won Out of Total Seats in Jharkhand
1980	10.9	3.9	36.4	1 out of 14

However, it is likely that they had won their respective seats due to their roles in the Leftist politics in the Jharkhand region during the late 1960s and the 1970s and not due to any Jharkhandi ideology. The ideological fluidity of the Jharkhandi parties can also be noted in the fact that Bagun Sumburi had contested the Singhbhum seat in 1977 as an AIJP candidate but in the 1980 election, he won the same seat as a JP candidate. This also reflects the fact that personal reputation had come to weigh more than the ideological proximity in the minds of the voters.

The share of the votes polled by the Jharkhandi parties plummeted to an all-time low of 3.9 per cent. The Jharkhandi political groups figured amongst the first five candidates in only four of the fourteen constituencies. The average votes polled by these parties in such constituencies were 10.9 per cent (Table 79). Thus, the electoral decline of the Jharkhandi parties continued in the 1980 elections. However, there was a revival in the political fortunes of these groups as reflected in mass support to their agitational politics (chapter II). This however, did not translate into electoral support for these parties on account of the strategic utilisation of the resources controlled by the electorate.

It is also noteworthy that there had been numerous political splinter groups claiming to represent the cause of Jharkhand in the 1977 Election. Of them, only the JHP was noticeable in the results of the 1980 elections. Although the once dominant

JHP was struggling for survival in the electoral contest, national parties who had become major players in the region could not succeed in securing the political support and influence that the JHP had at one time enjoyed. There was an absence of widespread support for the INCI, CPI or JP. The results of this election were as mixed as the developmental scenario of Jharkhand.

The strategic use of the political resources controlled by the electorate in the 1977 and 1980 elections had not translated into a better development profile in the Jharkhand region. The electorate had shifted their political support from the Jharkhandi groups to the national parties in the hope of being able to derive policy initiatives from them. However, these national political parties had become as faction-riddled as the JHP (with probably the relatively least factionalism within the INCI). Consequently, various pockets of the Jharkhand region seemed to be trying parties of all political hues and colours.

VI

By the time the INCI government was formed in the year 1980, the Tribal Sub-Plan had been operational for nearly six years and the Sixth Five-Year Plan was being drafted with TSP as an important component. However, six years of operation of the TSP did not seem to have generated any major improvements in the development profile of the region.

Demographically, the balance tilted back to pre-1971 position with just over a quarter of the population residing within the Jharkhand region. The ST component of the population of the Jharkhand region also increased to 30.25 per cent (from 29.29 per cent in 1971). However, this improvement in the demographic balance was not due to any governmental policy but to administrative reorientation of the internal boundaries of Bihar by virtue of which the Jharkhand region represented only 45.84 per cent of the land area compared with 52.64 per cent in 1971 (see chapter V).

As far as the development profile of the Jharkhand region is concerned, very few indicators are available for the year 1981. However, literacy seems to be the only component of public policy to have shown positive growth. After almost no change in the previous decade, during 1971-81 there was a growth in literacy in the region from about 22 per cent in 1971 to almost 28 per cent in 1981 (Chart 5). There was also a modest growth in education in the Jharkhand region reflected in the greater percentage of workers educated up to middle school level (chapter V). The occupational pattern of the population of the Jharkhand region show a small decline in agricultural occupations but a doubling of the percentage of those in non-agricultural jobs. Overall, there was a rise in employment opportunities from about 30 per cent in 1971 to about 36 per cent of the population being employed in gainful activities in 1981 (Chart 4).

Despite the growth in the proportion of persons employed in non-agricultural activities in the Jharkhand region, the predominant majority still depended on agriculture for their livelihood. There is no indication of the availability of better agricultural facilities due to the extremely modest increase in the total irrigated area in the Jharkhand region (Chart 7). The total area irrigated by governmental canals showed a small increase but this increase is insignificant compared with similar increases in Bihar as a whole.

Further, as discussed in chapter V, TSP was the only component of public policy that had been showing results. The ST population thus, demonstrated a higher rate of education and employment. However, these improvements were also quite modest.

On the whole, the performance of public policy over the last decade had not shown any significant improvement. Further, as discussed in chapter V, Jharkhand region seems to have become an internal colony of Bihar. In such a development scenario, the political ferment in the Jharkhand region during the late 1970s and early 1980s is not surprising.

The advantage of the marginal improvements which were noticed in the 1971-81 decade (see chapter V), was garnered by the INC who performed handsomely in the region. The INC was the undisputed winner in the region in the 1984 elections winning every seat. The review of the developmental policies and the vision of the new future that it represented in the 1984 elections led the voters to

Table 80: Performance of Political Parties in Constituencies of Jharkhand in Lok Sabha Elections 1984

Constituency Name	Number of Candidates	Winner Party and Per cent of Votes Polled	Runner up Party and Percent of Votes Polled	III Party and Percent of Votes Polled	IV Party and Percent of Votes Polled	V Party and Percent of Votes Polled
Chatra	13	INC 56.4 Yogeshwar P Yogesh	ICJ 14.6 Sukhdeo P. Verma	BJP 14.4	IND 7.2	IND 2.3
Dhanbad	24	INC 41.4 Shankar D Singh	IND 28.7 A K Roy	BJP 14.3	JP 11.2	IND 0.6
Dumka*	8	INC 53.9 Prithivi C Kisku	JMM 27.7 Shibu Soren	CPI 15.2	IND 1.3	IND 0.8
Giridih	9	INC 53.5 Sarfraj Ahmed	IND 19.4 Binod B. Mahto	BJP 18.0	JP 3.3	JMM 1.9
Godda	12	INC 45.4 Saminuddin	BJP 17.0 Falguni P Yadav	JMM 16.3	CPI 14.6	LKD 1.7
Hazaribagh	13	INC 47.8 Damodar Pandey	CPI 31.4 B Mehto	BJP 7.1	JMM 4.9	JP 2.9
Jamshedpur	17	INC 45.7 Gopeshwar	CPI 30.4 Tikaram Manjhi	BJP 10.4	JMM 5.2	JP 3.3
Khunti	9	INC 41.1 Simon Tigga	IND 27.2 N E Horo	BJP 17.7	IND 9.1	IND 1.4
Koderma	13	INC 58.8 Tilak Dhari Singh	BJP 27.4 Reet Lal P Verma	IND 2.9	JP 2.8	IND 2.1
Lohardagga*	14	INC 59.6 Sumati Oraon (W)	BJP 20.9 Lalit Oraon	JP 7.4	IND 3.9	IND 1.5
Palamau #	6	INC 72.5 Kamla Kumari (W)	JP 19.9 Ram Sunder Das	ICJ 3.3	IND 2.2	IND 1.1
Rajmahal*	10	INC 50.1 Seth Hambram	JMM 24.5 Simon Mardi	CPM 12.6	BJP 8.2	JP 1.8
Ranchi	23	INC 49.5 Shiv Prasad Sahu	BJP 16.5 RT Chowdhary	JP 15.5	LKD 5.6	JMM 3.1
Singhbhum*	14	INC 44.5 Bagun Sumburi	IND 18.5 Devendra Manjhi	JMM 9.0	BJP 8.6	LKD 6.1

* ST Constituency

SC Constituency

Source: David Butler, Ashok Lahiri and Pranjoy Roy, *India Decides: Elections 1952-1991*, New Delhi, 1991 and various newspapers and magazines.

elect the INC.

It must be noted that the INC won this election by enthusiastic support of the electorate as reflected in the sizeable percentage of votes polled by its candidates in all the constituencies of the Jharkhand region and the size of its winning margin (Table 80). Clearly, there was an overwhelming support for the INC in the region in the eighth general election. It seems that the electorate supported the stability and relative lack of factionalism which the INC provided in order to further the slight improvement in the development profile.

However, the 1984 elections were not an unqualified success for the INC. There was indeed a massive electoral support for the INC but caution needs to be exercised while analysing this election as a part of a long-term electoral trend in the Jharkhand region. The reason for this caution is the fact that this election was truncated by the assassination of Indira Gandhi. Hence, this unprecedented result was partly due to a 'sympathy-vote' for the INC.

The performance of Jharkhandi groups in this election continued downhill. They failed to win any seats in the entire region in the 1984 elections (Table 80). Their presence in the first five candidates increased to eight constituencies and they polled an average of 5.4 per cent of the votes in the Jharkhand region (compared with 3.9 per cent in 1980). In the eight constituencies where the JMM had electoral presence within the first five candidates, they polled the same percentage of votes as in 1980, i.e. 10.9 per cent (Table 81).

Table 81: Performance of Jharkhandi Political Parties in Lok Sabha Elections 1984

Election Year	Average Votes Polled by All Jharkhandi Parties in Constituencies with Electoral Presence	Average Votes Polled by All Jharkhandi Parties in all Constituencies of Jharkhand	Average Percentage of Votes Polled in Seats Won by Jharkhandi Parties	Seats Won Out of Total Seats in Jharkhand
1984	10.9	5.4	0	0 out of 14

The electorate were unwilling to elect ineffective Jharkhandi leaders who had in the past failed to secure any public policy initiatives. The development profile of

the Jharkhand region had deteriorated the most when there had been sizeable support for the Jharkhandi leaders. Further, the shifting stances of the Jharkhandi leaders across the spectrum - from extreme left to centre - were not liked by the voters. They perhaps reasoned that it was better to vote for the INC who would form the government and therefore could be forced to engage in an exchange of public policy resources under its control in return for political support. The JMM or other such Jharkhandi political groups were closely aligned with the INC but were faction-ridden political entities. Consequently, they had very little political clout to engage in any meaningful exchange of resources with the INC-controlled government.

After the extremely poor performance of the Jharkhandi political interests in the elections of 1984, there was a regrouping (as after all elections) of the Jharkhandi leaders. One of the major weaknesses of the Jharkhandi movement in the past had been its propensity to splinter and form numerous, mutually exclusive and contesting political entities. As the movement draws heavily on the cultural heritage of the region, the necessity of joint action led to the formation of the Jharkhand Co-ordination Committee (JCC) to spearhead the struggle for a separate state of Jharkhand as well as to press for policy initiative for a faster development of the region (see chapter II). In the period between the eighth and ninth general elections, the JCC was active but failed to secure any long-term gains for the region. It staged some successful economic blockades to force the government to accede to their demand but soon its coherence and initiative slipped away. The JCC and its most vocal component, the AJSU, adopted the classic style of popular politics in India which may be summed up as 'agitate first, demand later'. The AJSU became a victim of its own success when other constituents of the JCC distanced themselves from it over the relatively more radical and extreme stance adopted by the ASJU. The Jharkhand movement once again fell into disarray and the political vacuum was filled by the BJP's grassroots organisation.

Meanwhile, the development initiative of the government in the region continued under the Seventh Five-Year Plan. Whether it was able to change anything in the development profile of the region, is another matter.

In accordance with the operation of the Modified Resource Dependence Model, the 1989 election demonstrated that the electorate was willing to experiment with newer political parties. After about a decade of enthusiastic support for the INC, the electorate decided that it was time to try other political parties. During the

Table 82: Performance of Political Parties in Constituencies of Jharkhand in Lok Sabha Elections 1989

Constituency Name	Number of Candidates	Winner Party and Percent of Votes Polled	Runner up Party and Percent of Votes Polled	III Party and Percent of Votes Polled	IV Party and Percent of Votes Polled	V Party and Percent of Votes Polled
Chatra	14	JD 49.6 U N Verma	INC 32.5 Y P Yogesh	IPF 7.8	IND 5.8	LKDB 1.3
Dhanbad	22	MCOR 38.8 A K Roy	BJP 36.6 S Singh	INC 18.6	IND 0.9	IND 0.7
Dumka *	8	JMM 61.0 Shibu Soren	INC 34.0 Prithivi C. Kisku	IND 1.5	IND 0.7	DDP 0.7
Giridih	6	BJP 33.9 Ramdas Singh	IND 32.2 Binod B Mahto	INC 27.6	JD 5.5	IND 0.5
Godda	11	BJP 54.2 Jagdambi Yadav	JMM 22.3 S Mandal	INC 21.2	JPJP 0.5	IND 0.3
Hazaribagh	11	BJP 44.0 Y Pandey	CPI 35.8 B Mehto	INC 11.6	IPF 4.1	IND 2.1
Jamshedpur	13	JMM 27.1 S Mahtoo	INC 25.4 C Bagghi	BJP 23.0	CPI 22.0	JKD 0.8
Khunti	8	BJP 33.2 Karia Munda	JKD 32.0 N E Horo	INC 28.6	IND 2.3	DDP 1.4
Koderma	8	BJP 45.5 R P Verma	INC 26.4 T P Singh	JMM 20.7	IND 5.7	DDP 0.6
Lohardagga*	11	INC 40.2 Sumati Oraon	BJP 29.6 Lalit Oraon	JD 18.7	JMM 4.8	JKD 2.4
Palamau #	8	JD 37.3 J Ram	BJP 28.6 Ramdeni Ram	INC 23.4	IPF 6.0	LKDB 2.1
Rajmahal*	7	JMM 58.1 S Marandi	IND 21.7 J Tudu	INC 17.1	IND 1.4	HJD 0.8
Ranchi	19	JD 35.2 S K Sahay	BJP 31.9 RT Chowdhary	INC 27.4	IND 1.0	JPJP 0.8
Singhbhum*	11	INC 30.6 Bagun Sumburi	JD 23.4 M S Lamaye	JMM 23.0	IND 17.2	JKD 2.4

*ST Constituency, #SC Constituency

There have been three major delimitation of constituencies since 1952 in 1957, 1967 and 1977. As a result, the number of constituencies have changed as have their size and demographic profiles.

Source: David Butler, Ashok Lahiri and Pranjoy Roy, *India Decides: Elections 1952-1991*, New Delhi, 1991 and various newspapers and magazines.

period 1984-89 the development profile did not make great strides as seen in the discussion of the development profile in 1991 (chapter V).

Consequently, the electoral results in 1989 shows a wide variety of parties finding political support in the Jharkhand region. The electorate voted for the whole political spectrum from the extreme left in the guise of the MCOR, to the right in the form of the BJP. Furthermore, the Janata Dal with its pro-poor and pro-weaker section policies began making inroads in the INC vote banks (Table 82).

The failure of the political process to generate adequate avenues for the exchange of resources between the Jharkhandi electorate and the State led the BJP to win five out of the fourteen seats in 1989. Apart from this, there is another important reason for the splendid performance by this relative newcomer to the political scene. Faced with a declining development profile and the failure to engage in any meaningful exchange of resources with the State through the avenues of the available political parties, the support for the demand for a separate state was again finding popular support. The support for the agitational politics of the JMM and the AJSU are a reminder of this. In this scenario, popular support for the BJP grew as it is the only national political party which has promised statehood within the Indian Union to the region.

The successful economic blockade by the JCC and AJSU in the late 1980s increased the political legitimacy of the Jharkhandi political groups which resulted in the revival of their electoral fortunes. One feature which started emerging in this period was that a number of parties were gradually adopting Jharkhandi stances of supporting autonomy for the region.

Table 83: Performance of Jharkhandi Political Parties in Lok Sabha Elections 1989

Election Year	Average Votes Polled by All Jharkhandi Parties in Constituencies with Electoral Presence	Average Votes Polled by All Jharkhandi Parties in all Constituencies of Jharkhand	Average Percentage of Votes Polled in Seats Won by Jharkhandi Parties	Seats Won Out of Total Seats in Jharkhand
1989	31.9	18.2	48.73	3 out of 14

After being unable to win any seats in the 1984 elections, the JMM won three of the fourteen Lok Sabha seats in the region (Table 82). In these seats, the JMM polled an average of 48.73 per cent of the votes. This represented an important turn around in its fortunes. However, the Jharkhandi parties still did not figure amongst the first five candidates in seven of the fourteen constituencies. However, in the other seven, they polled an average of 31.9 per cent of the votes (compared with 10.9 per cent in 1984). Overall, they polled 18.2 per cent in the Jharkhand region (Table 83).

Apart from bringing the Jharkhandi parties back into the electoral reckoning, this election represents an important landmark in the relationship of resource dependence. It was noticed that in the 1950s and 1960s, the failure of the JHP to secure a separate state had gradually led to a decline in its electoral fortunes to an extent that it disappeared from the political map. The electorate found the development issues more important than those of Jharkhandi identity and autonomy. Consequently, they tried to develop a meaningful relationship for exchange of resources with the State through the avenues offered by the various parties over the decades. However, on being met with failure, the electorate now feels that a faster and more efficient development initiative in the Jharkhand region is possible within an autonomous state.

The development profile in the decade 1981-91 did not improve. The demographic balance altered during this decade to make politics on tribal lines even more difficult since by 1991 only 27.66 per cent of the population of the Jharkhand region were of tribal origin. Very few development indicators are available for the year 1991. Literacy continued to represent the successful component of public policy in the region. By 1991, more than 33 per cent of the population of the region was literate. This growth in literacy was matched by a growth in further education as well (chapter V). The Jharkhand region continued to outperform Bihar as a whole as far as literacy was concerned.

There was a decline in employment in the Jharkhand region with just about 32 per cent of the population being employed in 1991 (over 36 per cent in 1981). There was an increased percentage of population depending on agriculture and a decline in percentage of population employed in the non-agricultural sector (Chart 4). Despite a rise in the number of persons employed in agricultural activities, there had been a decline in the irrigation potential of the Jharkhand region during the past decade. This decline can also be noticed in land irrigated by government canals (Chart 7). The overall development profile of the Jharkhand region had declined over the past two decades.

This falling development profile contributed another component to the dynamics of resource dependence in the Jharkhand region. The planners of development policy in the early 1950s had hoped that a vigorous development policy would weaken demands for autonomy on cultural lines. However, the poor implementation of the policy and the declining development profile had encouraged the electorate to demand an autonomous state precisely for the reason of a non-functional development policy under the present arrangements. Under these circumstances, the issues of Jharkhandi identity are raised to augment the political resources controlled by the electorate. The fortunes of the Jharkhandi groups who have stood for a separate state of Jharkhand reflect these dynamics.

The INC lost its legitimacy and the support which was generated by its pro-poor rhetoric and some concrete efforts at improving development. The population and the electorate of Jharkhand were willing to once again experiment with the various political parties that were present in the region, including the Jharkhandi political groups. The success of BJP can also be explained partially by this analysis. The BJP exploited the slogan “सब को देखा बार बार, हमको देखो एक बार” [‘You (the electorate) have tried all parties time and again, try us once’] to appeal to the electorate of the region who had been let down by all political groups in the region as far as their developmental requirements were concerned. BJP also started speaking of its own concept of a *Vananchal* (Forest State) to appeal to a cross-section of the electorate in the region.


The interplay between political dynamics and changing electoral support for the Jharkhandi political groups reflects the exasperation of the voters with the political choices available to them. It also partly explains the trajectory of decline and resurgence of the support for the national as well as Jharkhandi political groups over the past half-century.

VII


The failure of the political parties active in the Jharkhand region to offer avenues for the exchange of resources between the electorate and the State and the consequent decline in the development profile has also added another dimension to the relationship of dependence in region. In the nineties, the electorate is splitting the political resources which they control into three components. The 1991 and 1996 elections have shown that the state level electoral support goes to the Janata Dal, which is in office at the state level¹⁸ and can influence public policy implementation. In the Lok Sabha elections, BJP finds political support as it is the only national party that has promised the creation of a state in Jharkhand. The third component of the strategic use of political resources by the public at large consists of avenues to force the two parties to remember their promises during the term of office. This is manifested in the support for the agitational politics of the JMM, the JCC and the AJSU consisting of economic blockades and general strikes. This kind of agitational politics forces the State to take cognisance of the Jharkhandi electorate, since these agitations often require violence by the State in order to keep the mineral lifeline of the country running. Such violence undermines the legitimacy of the State and the regime. Consequently, the regime in office is forced to take urgent policy measures to contain future strife.

¹⁸ The Janata Dal split after the charges of corruption were levelled against the Chief Minister, Laloo Prasad Yadav. Consequently, he formed a new party called the Rashtriya Janta Dal (RJD) that is currently in office in Bihar with Rabri Devi as the Chief Minister.

This three-pronged approach in the late 1980s and the 1990s has yielded better profits for the people of the Jharkhand region than all others till now. This strategic use of political resources has led the State to engage in a more meaningful exchange of resources with the population of the Jharkhand region. As a result, a Committee on Jharkhand matters (COJM) was appointed and by 1995, Bihar Vidhan Sabha had legislated to create the Jharkhand Area Autonomous Council (JAAC). The splitting of political resources at the command of the electorate have thus forced the State to respond with better policy measures.



* In the 1967 election, the JHP was a part of the INC. Hence, the performance of the Jharkhandi political formations in this election cannot be calculated.







Chart 5
Growth of Literacy in Bihar and Jharkhand 1951-91









Chart 6
Total Agricultural Output of Principal Crops in Bihar and Jharkhand 1949-50 - 1961-62





* Rounded up to the nearest thousand in the source. # Area irrigated by means other than government canals is not available.





Chapter VII

Demand for Autonomy in the Jharkhand Region

The issue of administrative autonomy for the region of Jharkhand can be traced back to the British period. There were submissions before the Simon Commission which had pleaded for the creation of a new province in the Jharkhand region. However, the Commission did not advocate this course of action. Hence, although the province of Orissa was created under the constitutional reforms of 1935, the practice of exclusion of the region of Jharkhand from normal administration was continued. This was seen by the colonial administration as a paternalistic alternative to a separate province (see chapter III).

After independence, the issue of autonomy surfaced once again. Jaipal Singh and the JHP continued to try to persuade the various official forums of the need to create a state of Jharkhand premised on the tribal way of life and its separate heritage and culture. These efforts did not meet with any noticeable success till the 1990s when the question of a separate administrative structure for the region was taken seriously and the JAAC was created.

The Premises and Construction of the Jharkhandi Identity

Until recently, the Jharkhandi identity was premised on the uniqueness and separateness of the tribal population of south Bihar. Writers on the subject went to great lengths to trace the origin of the separate political existence of the Jharkhand region. The leaders of the movement sought to invoke the past political entity (real or imagined) so as to forge a politically significant modern identity. They argued that the Jharkhand region, with its unique tribal heritage and culture, had been an autonomous political actor in the past and hence should be created an autonomous state under the present system. The Jharkhandi leaders isolated relevant historical incidents and symbols to forge and sustain an identity. It may be commented that this exercise (like all similar ventures) verged on the edge of creation and correction of history.

A good example of this exercise can be seen in an article by a respected tribal figure, Bhagwat Murmu, who is a recipient of the Padma Shri award. In this article¹ he attempts to delineate the reasons for the growth of the Jharkhand movement and explores possible solutions. To begin with he briefly points out that 'Jharkhand' was an old term which was mentioned in the *Ain-i-Akbari* by Abul Fazl during the rule of the Mogul Emperor Akbar.² He does not dwell on this point for long, but the effort at historical legitimisation of the movement and identity is clear. The underlying point of this exercise is to examine the possible existence of the political entity of Jharkhand in the region during the Mogul rule. Murmu goes on to emphasise that the tribes despite being under-developed, lead peaceable and simple lives and are self-sufficient in their tribal way of life. He interprets the tribal way of life in traditional as well as modern terms:

इन आदिम जातियों में भाषा और रस्म [रस्म (sic)] रिवाजों में विभिन्नताएँ हैं। शैक्षणिक और आर्थिक स्तर कुछ को छोड़ कर कमोबेश समान हैं . . . जातियाँ शान्तिप्रिय हैं और इनका जीवन मुख्यतः कृषि पर आधारित है। अपनी सामाजिक परम्परा, भाषा और रस्म [रस्म (sic)] रिवाज के प्रति इनकी अटूट श्रद्धा है और इसकी सुरक्षा के लिये बड़ी से बड़ी कुर्बानियाँ देने के लिये सदैव तत्पर रहते हैं। . . . यह आक्रमक जातियाँ कभी नहीं रही हैं। . . . इनका सामाजिक संगठन विशुद्ध गणतंत्र पद्धति पर आधारित है तथा अत्यन्त मजबूत रहा है और वह अभी भी सम्पूर्ण समाज को एक सूत्र में बांधे हुए है।³

[These aboriginal *jatis*⁴ differ on the lines of language and traditions and customs. Educationally and economically, with a few exceptions, they are largely, similar . . . These *jatis* are peace loving and depend primarily on agriculture for their living. They have deep respect for their social traditions, language and customs and are ready for the greatest sacrifices to protect them . . . These have never been aggressive *jatis* . . . their social organisation is based on purely

¹ Bhagwat Murmu, 'झारखण्ड आन्दोलन - कारण और निदान' [Jharkhand Movement: Reasons and Solutions] in Narayan, S., ed., *Jharkhand Movement: Origin and Evolution*, New Delhi, 1992, pp. 37-47.

² *ibid.*, p. 37.

³ *ibid.*, p. 38.

⁴ Here the term *jati* has been used to mean tribes.

republican system and has been extremely strong. It is still able to keep the entire society united.]

On the one hand, the social autonomy of the tribals and their respect for their traditions and customs are emphasised. On the other hand, their 'modernity' is exalted by dwelling on the 'republican aspects' of their social systems. The sub-text seems to be based on a dichotomy of 'we' versus 'them'. The fact that Murmu thinks that the ancient social system of the tribal population of Bihar is inherently democratic points to the discourse that 'we' had developed a form of social organisation centuries before 'them'. Hence it is imperative that 'we' must be given the right to rejuvenate it by means of administrative autonomy. He also seems to be implying that the 'tribal democratic life' was borne out of an inherent democratic element in the social system (as opposed to political democracy) and hence was more stable.

The extract also dwells on the construction of an image of a typical tribe. It emphasises the point that tribal people are peaceful and simple and have few needs. Consequently, they were open to exploitation by the 'others'. Besides, this image is construed by Murmu to justify the need of administrative autonomy. Such an image of an independent and exclusive tribal society was the basis of the Jharkhand movement for a long time.

Simultaneously however, since the movement requires the political support of the non-tribal populace, the existence of a long-standing social intercourse between the tribes and the 'others' is emphasised as well:

प्राचीन काल से ही संताल [संथाल (sic)] समाज, अपने गाँव में अन्य पेशेवर जातियों को स्थान देता रहा है, . . . ये बिल्कुल अलग-एकानकी जीवन बिताने वाली जाति कभी नहीं रही है।⁵

[Since the ancient times the Santhal society has offered a place in their villages to the [non-tribal] functional/ occupational *jatis* . . .

⁵ *ibid.*

these *jatis* have never been the ones to spend their lives in total isolation.]

To this end, Murmu partially contradicts the claim he had made earlier about the uniqueness of the tribal society when he emphasises the similarities between the tribal and other people:

भाषा एवं रश्म [रस्म (sic)] रिवाजों में अन्य जातियों के साथ इनकी जो एकता है, उसे बढ़ावा न देकर दरकिनारा रखा गया अथवा नज़र अन्दाज़ किया गया . . . वास्तव में इस दृष्टि से देखा जाए तो इनकी भाषा और रश्म [रस्म (sic)] रिवाजों में अन्य जातियों के साथ एकता के ही तत्व अधिक हैं।⁶

[The similarities between the culture and traditions of the tribal *jatis* with other *jatis* have not been encouraged but have either been ignored or brushed aside . . . In fact, as far as this point of view is concerned, there are more elements of similarities between their customs and traditions and those of other *jatis*.]

Thus, a very curious mixture is created in which on the one hand, an effort is made to convince the people that the tribal population and their developmental needs must be recognised as different from the rest of the population. On the other hand, it is also stressed that the tribal population of the region has been engaged in social and economic intercourse with the rest of the population for centuries and consequently their customs and traditions are indistinguishable from the rest of the people. Jharkhand movement thus relies on multiple bases of political mobilisation which leads to ideological fluidity and opportunistic political stances of the leadership.

Murmu also criticises this opportunism of the leaders of the Jharkhand movement, their inability to put forward a creative agenda before the Jharkhandi population and the absence of any ideals or principles in the movement:

झारखण्ड आन्दोलन किसी सिद्धान्त या आदर्श पर आधारित आन्दोलन कभी नहीं रहा। इसका कोई भी नेता संघर्ष की अग्नि

⁶ *ibid.*, p. 39.

परीक्षा में से कभी नहीं गुजरा, फलस्वरूप शक्ति और सुविधा प्राप्त के प्रलोभन के अवसर आने पर वे आसानी से अपने पथ से विचलित हो गए। इस आन्दोलन ने ठोस रूप से आदिवासी समाज के सामने कोई रचनात्मक कार्यक्रम प्रस्तुत नहीं किया, यह बराबर जनता को [की (sic)] क्षणिक उत्तेजना और प्रलोभन की लहरों के साथ उठता और मन्द पड़ता रहा . . .⁷

[Jharkhand movement has never been a movement based on any principle or ideal. None of its leaders have passed through the tests of struggle and consequently, whenever a temptation of acquiring power and comfort arises, they have easily deviated from their goals. This movement has never put forward a constructive programme in a concrete form before the Adivasi society, this movement has been rising and falling on the waves of momentary excitement and temptation of the public . . .]

He goes further and attacks the perceptual shallowness and divisiveness in the movement. However, he does try to relate the unrest in the region to its developmental problems. Murmu points out:

यह निश्चित है कि झारखण्ड आन्दोलन को आदिवासी समाज की आर्थिक समस्याओं और इनके पिछड़ेपन तथा अशिक्षा से जीवन शक्ति प्राप्त होती है। अगर इन समस्याओं को कुछ अंश तक भी हल कर दिया जाए तथा हल करने का प्रयास भी ईमानदारी से किया जाए तो आन्दोलन के पैर तले के [की (sic)] धरती स्वतः खिसक जाएगी। खनीज [खनिज (sic)] सम्पदा की प्रचुरता के होते हुए भी यहाँ दरिद्रता का साम्राज्य है। . . . लोग परिश्रमी हैं, काम चाहते हैं, लेकिन वह उन्हें मिलता नहीं। आजादी के 45 साल बाद भी इनकी जमीन की समस्या हल नहीं हुई और जो जमीन इनके पास है उसमें न पानी ही पहुँच पाया।⁸

[It is certain that the Jharkhand movement finds its strength from the economic problems of the Adivasi society and their backwardness and illiteracy. If a fraction of these problems is solved or even an honest effort is made to solve these problems, then the very ground under the feet of the movement will slip away on its own. Despite the abundance of the minerals, poverty reigns . . . People are hard working, they want work but it is not available to them. Even after

⁷ ibid., pp. 40-1.

⁸ ibid., p. 41.

45 years of independence their problems of land have not been solved and irrigation facilities have not reached the land that is held by them.]

The foregoing analysis of the movement by a respected Jharkhandi figure all but sums up the premises of the movement. Almost all the published works have expressed similar points of view. The various writers, many of whom are also important political figures, emphasise the tribal basis of the movement in terms of the culture and heritage of the region. In this aspect of their argument, they attempt to historically legitimise the movement by drawing upon the agrarian revolts of the nineteenth century to emphasise a tradition of protest against exploitation. Although not many actual parallels can be drawn between the tribal revolts of the colonial period and the present day movement, the political and intellectual figures active in the movement have been trying to create and sustain a politically significant ethnic identity with the help of such historical legitimisation. However, they realise that the basis of the movement cannot be merely harking back to a bygone era of tribal abundance. Consequently, they are all quick to point to the development aspects and invariably end up by pointing to the region's poor development profile to add to the legitimacy of the movement. Moreover, they realise that the movement is likely to find more support if it can be related to the contemporary problems faced by the general population of the region instead of depending on tribal uniqueness only.

This approach of relating recent disturbances and demand-making by the politically active groups in Jharkhand to the poor development profile had a two-fold effect. It provided an opportunity to the government to officially translate the ethnic character of the movement into one premised on 'development-deficits' in the region. Such a formulation about the character of the movement by the government that the Jharkhand movement is essentially a protest against poor implementation of development policy in the region gave the leaders an avenue by which to legitimise their demands. This in turn was taken up by the government to minimise the implications of the demand for administrative and political autonomy.

Consideration of the Demands for Autonomy

As has been noted the demand for the creation of a separate state of Jharkhand predates independence (chapter III). After independence, a sizeable amount of political energy was invested in demanding the creation of separate states all over India. Although some amount of deliberation had gone into the principles and practices behind the organisation of the states in 1948 when the integration of the numerous princely states was being considered, the first large-scale review was undertaken in the years 1953-55. The States Reorganisation Commission (SRC) dealt with the issue comprehensively and reported against the creation of a state in the Jharkhand region. It had recommended creation of new states on lingual lines only, rather than on principles such as tribal cultural identities.⁹ On the lingual criterion the Jharkhand region had not qualified for a new state.¹⁰

The SRC acknowledged the good performance of the Jharkhand Party in the 1952 elections but noted that it had not secured an absolute majority in the region. It also pointed out that with the exception of the Jharkhand Party, no other political party in the region was in favour of the creation of a Jharkhand state.¹¹ The Commission also took note of the fact that the tribal population in the region was only a third of the total population and was divided into several linguistic groups. Therefore, it opined that "even if it is assumed that Adivasis are solidly in favour of the formation of a Jharkhand State, a major issue of this kind cannot, in our opinion, be decided on the basis of the views of the minority. There seems to be no warrant, however, for the assumption that even Adivasi opinion can be considered to be unanimous on this point".¹² Furthermore, the SRC pointed out that the creation

⁹ Although there has never been a revision of the criteria for the creation of a state, instances do exist where states have been created on the basis of regional and cultural identities such as Nagaland in 1963 and Mizoram in 1986.

¹⁰ This was so because of the multiplicity of languages spoken in tribal south Bihar. Moreover, these languages have only now begun to acquire some written form. Consequently, some people do not consider them languages but dialects.

¹¹ *Report of the States Reorganisation Commission*, New Delhi, 1955, n. d., para 617-8.

¹² *ibid.*, para 618.

of state of Jharkhand would affect the "entire economy of the existing state." It noted that "the plains are predominantly agricultural and Chota Nagpur plateau provides an industrial balance . . . The residual area can hardly afford to lose the benefits derived from this situation . . . [it] will upset the balance between agriculture and industry in the residual State which will be a poorer area with fewer opportunity and resources for development . . ." ¹³ The Commission found no deficiency in the development profile of the Jharkhand region and saw south Bihar as an industrial complement to the agricultural north Bihar.

The goal of this Commission was to recommend the reorganisation of states with a view that regional aspirations were satisfied but at the same time administrative convenience was retained. It did not see any grounds for a separate administrative set up for the tribal population in south Bihar, as they were a numerical minority in the region. Besides, it also pointed out that the goal of administration and development programme was economic and political advancement of the whole population and therefore, was generally satisfied with the existing administrative arrangements in the region.

Clearly, as far as the SRC was concerned, there was no drawback in the development profile of the region. As has emerged in chapter IV, the relative development profile of the Jharkhand region was better than that of Bihar as a whole in the 1950s. It was only from 1960s (despite the progress of the Five-Year Plans) that the relative development profile of the region deteriorated or did not advance at the same rate as Bihar as a whole.

The linking of the demand for a separate state of Jharkhand to the developmental issues had however, started. The SRC observed that it had been "suggested that Chota Nagpur is bound to benefit from the separation, because it has been neglected so far by the Bihar Government [but] . . . there is little evidence, on the whole, of lop-sided economic development . . ." ¹⁴

¹³ *ibid.*, para 619-20.

¹⁴ *ibid.*, para 621.

This view of the SRC indicates that the Government had started interpreting the problems thrown up by the articulation of identities in terms of developmental imbalances. This seems to be true of most such movements in India where the governmental response has been to pump in more developmental funds instead of trying to deal with the socio-political roots of the problems. Besides, it was the Jharkhandi leaders such as Jaipal Singh who had first started to emphasise the developmental problems of the region (real or perceived), as seen in the Constitutional Assembly debates (see chapter III). In the political climate of the 1950s, with high expectations from the independent Indian state and nationalistic euphoria running high, the Jharkhandi leaders used the argument of poor developmental avenues in the Jharkhand region and exploitation by Bihar as a means of legitimising their demand for a separate state. The demographic heterogeneity and absence of lingual contiguity in the region rendered the arguments used by Andhriles, Kannadas, Oriyas and others useless in the region. Therefore, the development argument would have been seen as secular and functional enough to be put forward as the basis of a new state. Thus, the issue of development became inextricably linked to the Jharkhandi identity.

The analysis in the previous chapters has shown that around the year 1951, the development profile of the region of Jharkhand was better than Bihar as a whole but gradually deteriorated over the years. It soon reached a point when the growth of development opportunities in the region became stagnant at best and negative at worst. Therefore, with the passing years, the issue of poor performance of the public policy delivery mechanism further entrenched the links between the issue of a separate state, the Jharkhandi identity and the developmental issues.

Apart from the States Reorganisation Commission, the Commission on Centre-State Relations chaired by Justice R. S. Sarkaria carried out the only other large-scale official review into the issue of state autonomy and other related issues and reported in 1987. Although the terms of reference of the Commission did not include the prospect of creation of new states, the report of this Commission is valuable in terms of what the respondents to its questionnaire had to say about the equilibrium between the states and the centre and their perception about the linkages between the issue of state autonomy and developmental issues.

The Jharkhand Mukti Morcha was the only registered party in south Bihar region at the time when the Commission was eliciting the views of the major regional political actors. While responding to the questionnaire, the JMM continued the discourse of linking regional imbalances created by development initiatives to the demands for administrative autonomy. Addressing the question whether JMM was in favour of greater decentralisation of powers, it responded that it was in favour of such an action "but the decentralisation should not itself be between centre and state, but also between district and districts considering the heterogeneity [,] uneven development and multicultural character of the state itself with specific mention of the hilly and tribal areas of Bihar now existing [as] a[n] internal colony of both the State and Centre".¹⁵ The practice of emphasising developmental imbalances as a basis for the demand of autonomy which had been quite important since independence, had now become predominant.

The questionnaire also asked whether the respondents knew of any actual existence of a federation where national and regional governments were co-ordinate and absolutely independent within their respective constitutional jurisdictions? In response to this question, the JMM responded that they believed that such a set up existed in the USSR.¹⁶ They seemed to be pointing to the nationality based political set-up in the erstwhile USSR. From this it may be deduced that the JMM was not ready to give up the cultural and tribal identity based articulation of the Jharkhandi identity. The general tone of its response to the Sarkaria Commission questionnaire shows that the JMM saw the issue of administrative autonomy for Jharkhand as akin to the nationality question in the erstwhile USSR. Thus, the effort at combining the cultural and developmental reasons for the demand of a separate state of Jharkhand had come full circle. The JMM was by now able to combine both issues in its discourse. It hoped that such a practice would fulfil its purpose of generating political support in both the tribal and the non-tribal sections of the population of the

¹⁵ Response of Jharkhand Mukti Morcha to the Questionnaire of the Commission on Centre-State Relations in *Report of the Commission on Centre- State Relations*, Part II, New Delhi, 1987, para 1.3.

¹⁶ *ibid.*, para 1.4.

region. At the same time, it was assumed that the underpinning of the demand for political autonomy with cultural aspects would also give the movement a sense of identity which would not only differentiate it from other demands for administrative decentralisation but also create a relatively more potent political force.

Another response by the JMM to the Sarkaria Commission questionnaire indicates their approach to the correlation between underdevelopment and demands for administrative autonomy. They were critical of the development model followed by the Indian state and commented that “. . . major difficulties would not be removed . . . as they are ingrained in this post colonial social structure and its ill advised capitalist mode of development vitiating the very motivation of the society, with suspicion and acquisitiveness”.¹⁷

The JMM further amplified this point with the comment that although the independence and unity of the country has paramount importance, “. . . [the] constitution has failed in the purpose as all the provisions of the directive principle of the States [Directive Principles of State Policy (sic)] have been violated or rendered dead letter”.¹⁸ This statement is valuable since it was the JMM's response to the question whether the unity and independence of India was of paramount importance. Clearly, the JMM saw the implementation of development aspirations as enshrined in the Directive Principles of State Policy (Articles 36-51 of the constitution), the best possible avenue of maintaining the independence and unity of India. The JMM appears to imply that these provisions of the constitution had been violated or rendered useless and therefore, there was a case for a redefinition of the structures of the state and the creation of the state of Jharkhand. Thus, the JMM leadership advocated a reorganisation of the administrative structures in India based on the development aspiration enshrined in the section on DPSP. Furthermore, in response to the question whether it supported the power of the Parliament to alter the states in any respect it deemed fit (Article 3), the JMM replied:

¹⁷ *ibid.*, para 1.5.

¹⁸ *ibid.*, para 1.6.

We support the power under Article 3 but . . . this has not been properly utilised for political consideration of the dominating section to ensure development of culture, language, identity of the oppressed nationalities as that residing in the area called Jharkhand, Chattisgarh, Uttarakhand and others in the country creating tensions between nationalities. A provision should be made in Article 3 to review with statutory commissions . . . to form any more states in the country, to ensure proper development . . .”¹⁹

This is another good example of the balance which Jharkhandi leaders have been able to create between their demand for autonomy based on the ‘nationalistic’ aspirations of the people of the Jharkhand region and their need for development, despite the fact that they have also criticised the model of development and poor implementation of that model. It seems that the JMM leadership has been arguing that the State’s model of development had failed owing to its inability to respond to the needs of a Jharkhandi society that is a politically self conscious identity. Therefore, according to the JMM leadership, there is an urgent need to grant autonomy to the Jharkhand region. Such an act will not only bring about faster development (since the development initiative will then be based on a model that is suitable to the socio-economic peculiarities of the region) but will also help in realising the legitimate political aspirations of the region. This will in turn, ensure a stronger commitment to the unity and independence of the country.

This model of development that the JMM seems to be proposing is based on an increasing degree of decentralisation of power. It is noteworthy that the JMM wanted the power of the union government to be restricted to defence, communications, currency, foreign affairs, inter-state relations and creation of new states. They also did not deem it fit for the Parliament to have any power to legislate in the national interest on subjects on the State List.²⁰ However, despite criticism that the All-India Services undermined the autonomy of the states, the JMM was in favour of creation of more All-India Services with the proviso that all such officers

¹⁹ *ibid.*, para 1.8.

²⁰ *ibid.*, para 2.2 & 2.3.

must be posted outside their native states.²¹ Interestingly, they had nothing to say about the undermining of the states' autonomy by the central technical agencies which it has been alleged, had become a parallel government in some states. This indicates that the JMM sought autonomy from the Bihar government and not the central government.

Further, the JMM's responses to the Financial Arrangements section of the Sarkaria Commission questionnaire were rather shallow and often incompatible with each other. Most of their responses in this section were general in nature. According to them "mismanagement, corruption, lack of planning and political will of the states run by political party which is also running the centre" were the prime cause of growing indebtedness of the states.²²

The JMM sought to reduce the role of the central government in the development administration in the states and demanded a total separation between the fiscal arrangements of the states and the centre. Besides, they were of the considered view that the regional imbalances born out of public policy implementation could be ameliorated only by "clear cut division of resources of the States enforced by the centre for its different regions with particular instances to the backward regions".²³ It wanted the centre and the Planning Commission to suggest to the state ways and means of developing their resources despite an earlier expressed wish that the states must be left alone to chalk out their own plans and implement them. On the other questions, the JMM suggested further consideration by a parliamentary committee or pointed to the need to strengthen certain sections of the administration. Overall, except for the first few questions, the responses of the JMM to the questionnaire indicate a state of confusion and lack of comprehensive understanding of the issues involved. They were quite clear and eloquent when answering questions about the relationship between identity, development and the

²¹ *ibid.*, para 4.8.

²² *ibid.*, 5.17.

²³ *ibid.*, para 5.3.

Directive Principles of State Policy but as far as the details of administration was concerned, they lacked coherent and original alternatives.

The Jharkhandi demand for autonomy has also been considered in some other forums since independence. This process of deliberations provided an opportunity for mutual sharing of resources between the State and the Jharkhandi political groups. An important document in this process of sharing of an information resource²⁴ by both the State and the Jharkhandi political groups is the Report of the Committee on Jharkhand Matters 1990 (COJM). This Committee was constituted by the union ministry of Home Affairs in an attempt to find a solution to the issue. It comprised all the major political figures of the Jharkhand movement irrespective of their official party affiliation.²⁵ The joint secretaries to the ministries of Rural Development, Tribal Development and Home Affairs represented the central government while the government of Bihar was represented by the secretaries in the ministries of Home Affairs and Tribal Welfare and the Regional Development Commissioner of the Jharkhand region. There were many other experts ranging from anthropologists to social activists who served on the COJM.

This report defined the Jharkhand movement in terms of developmental problems. It noted that:

apart from its other dimensions, basically, it is a socio-economic problem and that it has arisen as a response to the exploitation of the indigenous people inhabiting the Jharkhand region. Specifically, for the scheduled tribes people, measures have been undertaken by the Government of Bihar and the Central Government to effect improvement in their socio-economic conditions and to combat exploitation . . . Notwithstanding these and various other steps taken, it would appear that the discontent of the people of the region has not only continued to simmer, but has also shown a tendency to rise. The

²⁴ In this case the definition of the nature and character of the movement.

²⁵ The important political figures of the Jharkhand movement who were members of the COJM were Dr. R. D. Munda, Dr. A. K. Singh, N. E. Horo, Shibu Soren, B. B. Mahto, B. P. Kesri, S. S. Besra, Prabhakar Tirkey, Santosh Rana, Suraj Mandal, Shailendra Mahato and Prof. Stephen Marandi.

demand for a separate state of Jharkhand falls into that pattern²⁶ (emphasis added).

The Report also examined the process of conversion of the Jharkhand movement premised on ethnic factors into one that is primarily premised on the relative underdevelopment of the region. It regarded the movement as originating from the tribal ethnic characteristics but gradually losing its tribal heritage character to become merely an avenue for political action to demand better public policy delivery in the region. It pointed out that

. . . even though when Jharkhand movement as an ethnic movement has not been able to recapture its peak of electoral performance reached in the 1950s, the issues articulated by it centering on regional autonomy as a remedy against underdevelopment and inequality have been largely accepted by almost all parties and political forces in the region . . . MLAs and MPs . . . have repeatedly emphasised the need for autonomy and development. Wherever the Committee went, the Congressmen equally complained of neglect and underdevelopment of the region, even though they did not support separation. The Bharatiya Janata Party has supported the formation of Vananchal [the BJP's version of a Jharkhand state²⁷] comprising of 12 districts of Santhal Pargana and Chotanagpur. The CPI has favoured the formation of a separate state out of the Scheduled Areas of Chotanagpur and Santhal Pargana. The Lok Dal has supported the idea of carving out smaller states. A poll recently taken . . . has suggested the presence of sizeable support for autonomy amongst many sections of the population. We believe the reasons for this support arises from a widespread feeling of alienation among a large section of people of Chotanagpur, both tribal and non-tribal from the rest of Bihar . . .²⁸

The Committee thus felt that there was a political consensus about regional autonomy in the region due to widespread neglect of the region by development initiatives. It did not however, recognise the significant ethnic tribal components in the movement. It felt that the ethnic component was at its height in the 1950s and

²⁶ *Report of the Committee on Jharkhand Matters*, May 1990, New Delhi, n. d., chapter I, para 2.

²⁷ The original demand of a Jharkhand consisted of the 25 districts from tribal regions of four states – Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, West Bengal and Orissa. However, the BJP has proposed that a state called Vananchal be created comprising of the tribal districts of south Bihar only.

²⁸ *Report of the Committee on Jharkhand Matters*, op. cit., chapter III, para 19.

had since run out of steam. Thus, there appears to be a political consensus that the movement was a product of inefficiencies in the public policy delivery mechanism and the consequent underdevelopment and that the issue of an ethnic identity was not of primary importance.

The gradual decline of the ethnic component of the movement is further emphasised by the COJM by stressing its regional aspect in the observation that

in the early phases of the autonomy movement in Chotanagpur, the lead was given by the tribal people. They were also good reasons for it. They were more literate and articulate. They were also more conscious. They had primarily led uprising and movements in 19th century. Agrarian laws were enacted to confer special benefits on them. In the early years of the Adivasi Mahasabha and Jharkhand movement, in spite of the fact that some non-tribals joined them, the non-tribals as a whole kept out of such movements. The reason for this lies in the colonial policy of separatism. The missionaries and the colonial officers treated the tribes and non-tribes as two separate categories. The hang-over of this policy persisted even after Independence for many years, even though the operation of market forces and of economy in general and the surfacing of underlying cultural processes tended to mitigate such dichotomous perceptions . . . the distinction between the two categories became blurred and their perceptions of regional problems converged as both became victims of progress. A sense of neglect gripped them. Therefore, from the beginning of 1960s, the tribes and non-tribes started interacting more closely within the framework of the movements for autonomy and separation. In the process, they invoked cultural symbols and created myths and legends to provide cultural underlining of political movement . . . The movement is still dominated by major tribal groups . . . but others have also joined hands.²⁹

Such underplaying of the tribal heritage aspects of the movement and highlighting of the regional aspect has become the predominant character of the movement. The points of view expressed by the Report can be taken as the articulation of the Jharkhandi groups as well since all major political and social organisations of the region were represented on the COJM. These Jharkhandi leaders did not contest any major point of the Report with the exception of the

²⁹ *ibid.*, para 21, 24.

proposals for the new administrative arrangements and hence, this definition of the nature and character of the movement has become the dominant point of view across the political spectrum.

The cultural traits of the movement were further undermined when COJM expressed its view that over “the last forty years there has crystallized the concept of Jharkhand region . . . with a distinct identity, language, form, cultural traits, elements of material culture and historical development”³⁰ and recommended the creation of a cultural development authority for the overall cultural development of the region with possible autonomous powers and the introduction of tribal languages in the syllabi in schools and the development of a composite culture. This cultural development authority suggested by the COJM, if operationalised, would probably mean an institution akin to the existing national cultural academies. Thus, while the COJM found it salient to preserve and promote the cultural uniqueness of the region, it did not consider this uniqueness to be a pertinent premise for the creation of an autonomous state in the Jharkhand region.

Hence, against the views of the Jharkhandi representation in the Committee, the report did not recommend the creation of a separate state in the Jharkhand region. Consequently, in a Supplementary Note³¹ most of the major leaders of the region emphasised the need to create such a unit. Their major point of difference with the report of the COJM was the nature of the proposed administrative arrangements. After a brief paragraph on the cultural uniqueness of the region, this note of dissent swiftly went on to differ from the COJM on the ground that the experience of the past four decades had proved that adequate development of Jharkhand region was not possible within Bihar. Hence, a clear relationship emerged between the failure of policy delivery mechanism and the articulation of a politically pertinent ethnic identity in the Jharkhand region.

³⁰ *ibid.*, para 30.

³¹ Supplementary Note to COJM, *op. cit.*

All the major political interests therefore, agreed that the reason behind the demand for a separate state in the Jharkhand region was the poor developmental profile of the region. This is also a good example of the exchange of information resources between the societal political actors and the State which went on to alter the self-perception of the Jharkhandi identity. From a cultural identity, it evolved into one that has the poor developmental profile as the primary basis of its articulation and relegated the cultural aspects to the background. The State and the Jharkhandi political opinion have thus, gradually created an articulation of the ethnic identity that is acceptable to both of them. The report of the COJM thus amplified the clear correlation which was seen between the demand for the creation of a separate state in the Jharkhand region and the poor performance of public policy since independence.

Issue of Autonomy in Parliamentary Forums:

The growing developmental imbalance in the Jharkhand region led to some important developments in the agenda of Indian politics. The first consequence was that the Indian State's ability to resolve political conflict without resort to violence declined further. The ultra-leftist alignment of some Jharkhandi leaders in the 1960s and 1970s (see chapter II) provided the perfect excuse for the State to crack down on the Jharkhand Alliance. At the same time, popular support for the Jharkhandi groups was declining which was expressed in the loss of electoral support for them. Consequently, the ability of the movement to launch popular agitation for securing its demands was diminished. In sum, from being the foremost political force in the Jharkhand region, the Jharkhandi groups became increasingly marginalised. Hence, the Jharkhandi leaders sought to involve themselves in parliamentary politics in order to make their point heard. The parliamentary approach involved asking a series of questions in the Lok Sabha which kept the issue on the national agenda.

The opinions expressed in the parliamentary debates are of salience. They not only provide us with a rare coherent articulation of the Jharkhandi points of view but also indicate the response to it across the political spectrum. The issue of creation of the state of Jharkhand was raised in the Parliament a number of times without much consequence. For instance, Mukul Wasnik, Simon Marandi and Bir

Singh Mahto tabled an unstarred question on July 9 1992³² inquiring into the status of representation awaiting the demand for the creation of Jharkhand state. M. M. Jacob, the then Minister of State in the Ministry of Home Affairs, replied that a number of meetings had been held but “the Government of Bihar were requested to offer their comments on the recommendations of the Committee on Jharkhand Matters. Their comments are still awaited”. No substantial discussion took place on the issue. In the classic manoeuvre of parliamentary nicety, the persons who had asked the questions had something to tell their constituents about their efforts while the Government of India transferred the blame onto the Bihar government. In effect, the issue was put on the back burner for the time being.

Another such example was a question in the Rajya Sabha on 30 November 1992 which sought to find out whether the government was considering the appointment of another states reorganisation commission to examine the numerous demands for creation of separate states. The debate which followed indicates that there was a divide between the desirability of small states or large states. On the one hand, Ram Lala Rahi, the then Deputy Minister of Home Affairs surmised that large states were more self-sufficient due to their variety of produce whereas on other hand, other members pointed out the advantages of smaller states in terms of their better manageability. The BJP MP, Sushma Swaraj, raised a pertinent point:

. . . उत्तरांचल, वनांचल या विदर्भ की मांग को पृथक कश्मीर या खालिस्तान की मांग की श्रेणी में नहीं रखा जा सकता। पृथकतावादी मांगों से दुनिया का नक्शा बदलता है और छोटे राज्यों की मांग मान लेने से केवल भारत का आंतरिक नक्शा बदलता है। . . . कुछ राज्यों में यह मांग केवल प्रशासनिक प्रबंध के कारण उठ रही है।³³

[. . . the demand for Uttaranchal, Vananchal, or Vidarbh cannot be placed in the category of the demand for a separate Kashmir or Khalistan. Separatist demands change the map of the world whereas if the demands for smaller states are acceded to, only the internal

³² Question Number 304, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 9 July 1992, New Delhi, 1992.

³³ Question Number 87, *Rajya Sabha Debates*, 30 November 1992, New Delhi, 1992.

map of India will change . . . In some states this demand is emerging only due to their administrative (mis) management.]

The view expressed by the BJP MP is significant since the BJP has been able to generate substantial following in the Jharkhand region, both amongst tribal as well as non-tribal sections of the population. This statement is in consonance with the dominant viewpoint and traces the roots of such demands to administrative mismanagement but significantly, it also seeks to categorise and differentiate between the demands for an independent sovereign state (such as Khalistan) and that for a separate state within the Indian Union.

This differentiation is significant when viewed in light of resistance to the creation of new states on grounds of national unity and integrity. It seems to be an obsession with the INC that no further states should be created in order to protect the unity and integrity of the country. The Deputy Minister's reply expresses this point of view:

. . . सरकार का नजरिया हमेशा व्यापक रहा है , राष्ट्रीय हित में रहा है , राज्यों के हित में रहा है और राज्यों के विभिन्न क्षेत्रों में जो निवास करने वाले लोग हैं , उनकी समस्याओं की तरफ हमेशा उनका ध्यान रहा है । इसी दृष्टिकोण को लेकर हम चाहते हैं कि हम राष्ट्रीय एकता को मजबूत करने का और लोगों के विकास करने का काम करें . . . ³⁴

[. . . the Government's point of view has always been broad, in national interest, in states' benefit and in the benefit of those who live in the various regions of the states, its attention have always been towards their problems. From this point of view, we wish to strengthen national unity and work towards their development . . .]

Apart from the misplaced emphasis on the unity of the country, the view of the government also carries the undertone of 'we know what is best for all of you'. Further, it does not recognise the difference between separatist movements which may require a repressive response from the State and movements for autonomy such

³⁴ ibid.

as the demand for the state of Jharkhand within the Indian Union that require political and public policy- based solutions.

Nevertheless, the government underlined the construction of the demand for autonomy as being dependent on the level of development. S. B. Chavan, the then Home Minister, intervening in the same debate, said “if there is an economic blockade, it becomes my responsibility to call them and request them to call it off because it would harm the entire country. I do not agree that there has been a proper development of the Jharkhand area. In fact, the entire demand has arisen because of the fact that it was a totally neglected area in spite of the fact that resources are very rich in the area . . . the kind of development which should have been there is not there”.³⁵

As is evident in the above extract, the government continues to see a direct correlation between the demands for a separate Jharkhand state and the level of development in the region. This viewpoint has become so dominant by now that the rest of the discussion on the creation of a state in Jharkhand focuses on whether small or large states are better to foster speedy development. There is very little reference to the cultural aspects of the Jharkhand movement. It is noteworthy that MPs who had almost no relationship with the Jharkhand movement conducted the entire discussion. The leaders from Jharkhand did not intervene at any point to emphasise that their movement was a cultural one as well. This by default indicates that the Jharkhandi leaders were not unhappy with the ‘development deficit’ definition of the movement.

This direct correlation between autonomy and development was further emphasised in the *Resolution Regarding Creation of New states of Uttaranchal and Vananchal* tabled by Jagat Vir Singh Drona on 5 March 1993 in the Lok Sabha. The resolution sought to recommend to the government that the two states (Uttaranchal and Vananchal) be created. In the opening statement itself, Jagat Vir Singh Drona drew a direct relationship between the two issues and observed that

³⁵ *ibid.*

even after these 45 years of independence, there has been very little or negligible development in the hill areas of Uttar Pradesh and in the 16 districts under Chota Nagpur and Santhal Pargana area of Bihar. The people of the area have been expressing their resentment on the issue from time to time . . . Since the independence no educational and medical facilities have been provided to the residents of these areas . . . It becomes the duty of the Central government to do so . . . Jharkhand Mahaparishad proposal was mooted to the effect that efforts were being made to form a Jharkhand state . . . wherever various State Governments participate in such areas . . . the situation becomes complicated . . . So, the proposal for formation of Jharkhand state [by] carving out some district from four States is not practicable nor it is in the interests of the country and the people of the area because difference of opinion will crop up from time to time which will stall the development schemes. In this connection, it is the well-considered opinion of my party [the BJP] that all the 16 districts in Chotanagpur and Santhal Pargana areas have their own [own (sic)] culture, their own thinking and their own language and a state by the name of Vananchal may be formed comprising of these 16 districts.³⁶

The above extract reflects two important points which explain the recent improvement in political support for the BJP in the Jharkhand region. Firstly, the BJP was the first national party that offered a practical alternative to the demand for a Jharkhand state. It pointed out that the political possibility of carving out a new state comprising 25 districts spread over 4 states verges on improbability owing to the differences of opinion amongst the four states concerned. Consequently, the likelihood of creation of such a state was remote. It argued that in such a scenario of continuing disagreement, development work in the region would suffer. Thus, it raised a bogey of even worse development policy effort if the demand for a separate state was continued in the present form. At the same time, the BJP was also able to alter the way in which the demand for a Jharkhand state had been articulated since independence by postulating that the region of Santhal Pargana and Chota Nagpur was in some way, the 'real Jharkhand' by dwelling upon the separateness and uniqueness of the region. The electorate, faced with the already poor development performance of the public machinery, was quick to understand this message. In a surprisingly short time, all the major political opinions had accepted this approach.

³⁶ Debate on the Resolution Regarding Creation of New States of Uttaranchal and Vananchal, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 5 March 1993, New Delhi, 1993, col. 418-427.

Today even the most conservative of Jharkhandi groups have, unofficially, watered down their demand to the districts of south Bihar only.

Jagat Vir Singh Drona continued his rather lengthy speech and emphasised that south Bihar region was contributing disproportionately to the economy of Bihar and India and was getting very few returns. He painted a dismal picture of the region in terms of absence of educational and medical facilities and employment opportunities and added that "it is obvious that unless a separate state is formed, the people there, will not have political approach . . . They will not be able to think seriously over the problems of their area personally in [a] practical way . . ."³⁷ Clearly, a direct link was constructed between the creation of a Jharkhand state and improvement of the development profile of the region.

Cutting across the political spectrum, various members expressed similar views. They differed marginally in their views but there was a common thread in their speeches. All the speakers concurred on the view that the demand for autonomy was due to imbalances in the development of the region. All of them quoted cultural factors such as language and cultural uniqueness but soon went on to emphasise that south Bihar was rich in mineral and forest resources and that the speed of development in the region was not in consonance with its contribution to the economy of Bihar and India.

Suraj Mandal, one of the JMM MPs, intervened in the debate and read out a catalogue of ills that have plagued the region. However, he did not point out any cultural factor as the basis of the JMM's demand for a separate state. He emphasised the mineral wealth of the region but also brought up a new issue which had not been underlined till then. He asked for sharing of power with the people of the Jharkhand region: ". . . no development of the area was done. The people were not allowed sharing of power. Rather colonialism was no [on (sic)] the rise after exploiting of its mineral resources and establishing factories . . ."³⁸

³⁷ *ibid.*

³⁸ *ibid.*, col. 437-443.

No other political group had brought up this issue of sharing of power with the populace of the Jharkhand region. The general trajectory of the debate on the Jharkhand issue until then had been on the course of action that was best for speedy development of the people of the Jharkhand region. It essentially involved a greater sharing of developmental resources. However, this intervention by Suraj Mandal points to the fact that the Jharkhandi groups were no longer happy to share economic resources only, they wanted to share power as well. This is another good example of the operation of the Modified Resource Dependence Model. The Jharkhandi leaders, after failing to force the State to share its largesse of policy recourses and after losing political patronage of the electorate, were now demanding a slice of power. Since this political group had failed to bargain effectively for other kinds of resource sharing, it was now seeking a new kind of resource sharing in order to achieve some degree of control over other kinds of resource. It can be argued that this new element in the discourse of political autonomy reflects desperation on the part of the Jharkhandi leaders in the face of a shrinking support base. However, in some ways this new demand speaks of an increasing maturity and confidence of the Jharkhandi groups. Over the years they have come to realise that any meaningful exchange of resources between the Jharkhandi electorate and the State could occur only if the resources controlled by the electorate (apart from mere political patronage) becomes crucial to the Indian State (which controls vast amount of political, economic and information resources). This exercise of demanding a share of governmental power by decentralisation of the administrative apparatus of the State is an effort to improve the resource-base of the electorate. A greater local control over the economic and information resources by the populace of Jharkhand would also augment their political influence. This would in turn, secure a better policy response from the State due to the region's mineral deposits.

The protracted debate on the Resolution led to a consensual view about the nature and character of the Jharkhand movement. The remarks of Chitta Basu on 19 March 1993 seem to summarise mainstream opinion:

. . . there is no basic question of ethnicity, language or culture for the demand of creation of Jharkhand State. The basic issue or the basic emotion or the basic sensitivity for the demand of creation of

Jharkhand state is a regional disparity of development . . . and because of regional disparity in development, the question of having a separate state has arisen and not on the basis of language, not on the basis of culture and not on the basis of ethnicity because even if Jharkhand State is created, it will be a multi-lingual State . . . , it will be a multi-ethnic State; . . . it will be a multi-cultural State . . . [The problem exists because] there has been exploitation, that there has been a backwardness; and that backwardness has been a planned backwardness . . . The grievance is even if some resource is transferred to the State by the centre, the appropriate proportion does not go [to] the Jharkhand area and therefore, there should be an autonomous council which should be guaranteed with wide powers of administration and legislative business and also guaranteed with statutory financial resources both from the centre and State. This can be reasonable, rational and satisfactory solution to the Jharkhand problem . . .³⁹

Such an emphasis on the developmental problems in the region by both the Jharkhandi groups as well as the government altered the character of the demand for autonomy itself. Increasingly, there emerged a consensus in favour of decentralised developmental machinery in the region but not a separate state. This occurred despite there being a largely consensual view that small states were better for the developmental effort as well as for efficient administration of the area concerned. There were some members who voiced their concerns about the state of exploitation in the Jharkhand region continuing, even becoming worse or new forms of exploitation emerging in a new Jharkhand state. Hence, the government did not see it prudent to create smaller states as solutions to the bottlenecks in poor implementation of public policy. Here, it is pertinent to speculate that if so much emphasis had not been laid on the developmental problems in the Jharkhand region, the issue of a separate state might not have been overtaken by an autonomous council although perhaps, it would not have enjoyed cross-party support in any other form.

It is noteworthy that these debates in the Lok Sabha have been used by the JMM in a way that is rather unknown in the political life of India. The JMM has

³⁹ Continuation of debate on the Resolution regarding Creation of New States of Uttanchal and Vananchal, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 19 March 1993, New Delhi, 1993, col. 380-6.

published extracts from the debates in the form of little booklets which are distributed to the general population in the Jharkhand region. These booklets contain the interventions by Suraj Mandal and Shibu Soren in the Lok Sabha. By way of these booklets the JMM is making an effort to point out to the local populace that despite being a small parliamentary group, the JMM is trying its best to put forward the points of view of the Jharkhandi people in the highest forums of power. This action is in consonance with the earlier point made by Suraj Mandal that the Jharkhandi population now wants a sharing of power. The availability of parliamentary debates to the common man performs this exact function of giving the impression that their access to power has improved through their JMM representatives.

It must also be noted that the parliamentary debates as well as the debates in the Constituent Assembly (see chapter III) seem to indicate that the government believes that it is possible to evolve an objective set of criteria for the creation of a new state within the Indian Union. While some movements such as the Jharkhand movement seek a separate state to secure political recognition of their tribal/ cultural identity, the national mainstream opinion seems to be searching for a set of non-ascriptive criteria to create such states. The issue of poor rate of development in a region within an existing state seems to have been accepted as this objective criterion. Political parties across the political spectrum, including the JMM and other Jharkhandi political groups, seem to have come to accept that a faster pace of development (however defined) is desirable. They also seem to believe that administrative reorganisation of states (or creation of new states) must be made in a way that secures a faster and more efficient public policy implementation. It follows from this that the only objective (and politically acceptable) ground for the creation of a new state in the Jharkhand region is the fact that within the existing arrangements, the development profile of Jharkhand has declined over the last 50 years. Therefore, some degree of autonomy for the region is essential if speedy development is to be fostered.

Political Parties' Approach to Autonomy of the Jharkhand Region:

The demand for an autonomous state in the Jharkhand region is a complex political process in which the political parties are key players in the exchange of resources between the State and the electorate. The political parties active in the region influence the demand for autonomy by not only shaping the opinions of the general population of the Jharkhand region but also by playing a significant role in articulating these opinions. The manifestos published by various parties for the elections are important in this respect. These manifestos are also important because the political parties attempt to seek political patronage from the region based on the promises in them. In this sense, they form an important linkage in the resource dependence relationship between the electorate and political parties (and through them, the State).

The election manifestos of the JMM are the only set of manifestos of a regional political party which has been analysed below. The others are all published by national parties. There are a number of reasons for this. The first reason is availability of manifestos. The manifestos of older Jharkhandi political parties (such as the JHP, the CSPJ, the PSHJ and such like) which had a brief, sometimes meteoric existence on the political horizons of Jharkhand between 1950 and the 1980s are not available. Most of these parties no longer exist. This makes it extremely difficult to decipher their political viewpoint vis-à-vis the demand of a Jharkhand state.

Besides, the creation of a separate state in the Jharkhand region falls within the domain of the Union Parliament. Consequently, the opinions expressed in the political manifestos of national parties are relevant. Only a national political party that is able to secure a sufficient majority in the Parliament can ensure that a bill for the creation of the state of Jharkhand is passed. The analysis of the manifestos of national parties is also significant on account of the fact that the national parties also compete for popular support regionally. An analysis of these manifestos will indicate how the political parties have been treating the issue of a new Jharkhand state when going to the electorate for election to the Lok Sabha.

An analysis of the manifestos of the CPM is also pertinent because of its electoral presence and influence in the region as well as due to the fact that they represent a significant viewpoint. CPM may not have any reasonable chance of forming the central government but its opinions are politically relevant. Its manifestos not only reflect the analyses and opinions of a section of liberal-Left intelligentsia of India but are also important in a scenario when the CPM is a part of a coalition government at the centre (as was the case in the Eleventh Lok Sabha during 1996-97).

The older political manifestos of most political parties are not very enlightening about the Jharkhand issue. Moreover, it is only after the early 1980s that the Jharkhand movement became politically volatile in terms of economic blockades. When the JCC, the JMM and the AJSU were successful in holding up transportation of minerals from the region, national attention was forced on to the problems of the Jharkhand region. Therefore, the 1980s are probably most significant for the movement in terms of the definition of its character and demands.

(a) Jharkhand Mukti Morcha:

There have been a number of political parties in the Jharkhand region which have attempted to align themselves with the demand of a separate state in the hope of greater political and electoral legitimacy. However, in the continuous process of political realignments in the region, many of them have vanished from the active political scene. As has been outlined in chapter II, constant splits and mergers have left the JMM as the only politically active Jharkhandi party in south Bihar.

It has been seen in the preceding pages that the Jharkhandi political groups played a marginal role in the creation of the Jharkhand Area Autonomous Council (JAAC). For instance, in the parliamentary debates, the JMM MPs did not play a central role in the debate on the resolution regarding 'Creation of New States of Uttaranchal and Vananchal'. In fact, the resolution was not even tabled by a JMM MP. Another good example of this marginal role is the fact that the JMM's contribution to COJM was restricted to a note of dissent in the report against the creation of an autonomous council. It was unable to influence the COJM in any major way. However, this fact did not preclude their attempt to claim benefit for it

in their manifesto⁴⁰ for the 1995 Vidhan Sabha elections. This starts with the slogan “परिषद लिया है चोट से, अब राज्य लेगे वोट से”⁴¹ [We have obtained the Council by force, now we will obtain the state with the help of votes].

The JMM manifesto clearly claimed credit for the creation of the JAAC:

झारखण्ड मुक्ति मोर्चा ‘स्वशासी परिषद’ को अपनी उपलब्धि मानते हुए बिहार की जनतादल सरकार की झारखण्ड विरोधी नीतियों, कार्यक्रम और दृष्टिकोण की भर्त्सना करती है जिसके कारण (1) ‘स्वशासी परिषद’ को पर्याप्त और समुचित वित्तीय और प्रशासनिक अधिकार नहीं मिले और (2) ‘स्वशासी परिषद’ के गठन में जरूरत से ज्यादा देर हुई।⁴²

[Jharkhand Mukti Morcha considers the ‘Autonomous Council’ as its achievement and criticises the anti-Jharkhand policies, programmes and view-points of the Janata Dal government of Bihar due to which (1) ‘Autonomous Council’ was not given adequate and necessary financial and administrative powers and (2) undue delays were made in the formation of the ‘Autonomous Council’.]

This document is also interesting and important in the light of the Modified Resource Dependence Model. The Manifesto goes on to say:

झारखण्ड मुक्ति मोर्चा अलग झारखण्ड राज्य के लिए संघर्षरत झारखण्ड [की] जनता को बधाई देती है कि उसके सतत संघर्ष और आंदोलन को ‘झारखण्ड स्वशासी परिषद’ के रूप में मान्यता मिली है।⁴³

[Jharkhand Mukti Morcha congratulates the population of Jharkhand which has been engaged in the struggle for the Jharkhand state. Its continuous efforts and struggle has been recognised in the form of ‘Jharkhand Autonomous Council’]

⁴⁰ Election manifestos for elections other than the Vidhan Sabha elections of 1995 and the Lok Sabha election of 1996 are not available even at the Central Office of the JMM.

⁴¹ *Manifesto of the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha for the Bihar Vidhan Sabha Election 1995*, Ranchi, 1995, p. 1.

⁴² *ibid.*

⁴³ *ibid.*

This statement in the JMM manifesto demonstrates the fact that the movement depended on the State's recognition for the legitimisation of their demand. The resource dependence of the movement (governmental recognition of the demand) on the State is clear. In tacit terms, this action on the part of the government also amplifies the fact that the developmental profile of the Jharkhand region had left much to be desired. The JAAC was seen as a body which would promote speedy and efficient implementation of the developmental programmes with the help of local resources and manpower. This is a clear recognition of the fact that till date the performance of the developmental machinery in the region had been far from efficient. The creation of the JAAC bestowed the long elusive legitimacy on the movement. In the past all the considerations of the demand had seen no case for the creation of any new representative developmental body in the Jharkhand region.

The JMM's point of view carries the undertone that the JMM sees itself as the vanguard of the Jharkhandi interests in the region. In some ways, this is correct. There is now no major politically active party in the region which clearly aligns itself with the creation of the state of Jharkhand from parts of the 4 states, as the JMM does:

झारखण्ड मुक्ति मोर्चा ने हमेशा से 'झारखण्ड स्वशासी परिषद' को झारखण्ड राज्य की राह का पड़ाव माना है। हमारा अंतिम लक्ष्य ओडिसा, बंगाल, बिहार और मध्य प्रदेश के झारखण्डी भूभाग वाला 'झारखण्ड राज्य' है। राज्य के लिए अपने संघर्ष की प्रतिबद्धता का वचन ज़ामुमो देती है।⁴⁴

[Jharkhand Mukti Morcha has always considered the 'Jharkhand Autonomous Council' as a stepping stone on the road to the Jharkhand state. Our ultimate goal is the 'Jharkhand state' comprising the Jharkhandi landmasses in Orissa, Bengal, Bihar and Madhya Pradesh. JMM pledges its commitment to continue the struggle for the state.]

It is noteworthy that the issue of tribal identity did not appear in the manifesto of the JMM in 1995. Perhaps, the necessity to increase the political base

⁴⁴ ibid.

forced the JMM to include all the people living in the geographical region in its appeal:

झारखण्ड मुक्ति मोर्चा झारखण्ड क्षेत्र के सभी समुदायों, वर्गों, शोषित, पीड़ित मानवता का एक ऐसा संगठन है जिसे इस क्षेत्र के मजदूरों, किसानों, छात्रों, नौजवानों, महिलाओं, बुद्धिजीवियों, व्यापारियों और खिलाड़ियों ने अपना राजनीतिक संगठन माना है और इस जिम्मेदारी को पूरा करने के लिए झारखण्ड मुक्ति मोर्चा प्रतिबद्ध है।⁴⁵

[Jharkhand Mukti Morcha is an organisation of all groups, classes, exploited, tortured humanity of this region and it has been considered as their own political organisation by the labourers, farmers, students, youth, women, intellectuals, merchants and sportsmen of this region and Jharkhand Mukti Morcha is committed to fulfilling this responsibility.]

It sought to highlight the developmental problems of the region rather than underlining its tribal character:

झारखण्ड मुक्ति मोर्चा मानती है कि पर्याप्त और समुचित वित्तीय और प्रशासनिक अधिकार के बिना सदियों से शोषित, और उपेक्षित झारखण्डी जनता की शोषण मुक्ति और विकास की गति में वह तेजी नहीं आ पाएगी जो इस पिछड़ा क्षेत्र को समता और सम्पन्नता युक्त राज्य बनाने के लिये अनिवार्य है।⁴⁶

[Jharkhand Mukti Morcha believes that without adequate financial and administrative powers it will not be possible to ameliorate the centuries of exploitation and marginalisation of the Jharkhandi population. These powers are essential to accelerate development to a rate which is required to convert this backward region into an equitable and prosperous state.]

Thus, the whole question of the autonomy of the Jharkhand region came to acquire more geographical, regional and development-related overtones. The issue of the tribal identity of the region was lost in emphasis on the developmental

⁴⁵ ibid.

⁴⁶ ibid.

problems, both by the governmental agencies as well as the political groups of the region.

However, in the best tradition of the ideological fluidity of the Jharkhandi movement, by the 1996 Lok Sabha elections, the issue of the unique cultural identity was back in the JMM manifesto. The motto of the 1996 election manifesto was:

अपनी धरती, अपनी नीति, अपनी पहचान, अपनी संस्कृति ।
अपनी भाषा, अपनी परंपराएं, झारखण्ड अपना सुखमय बनाए ।⁴⁷

[Our land, our policy, our identity, our culture.
Our language, our traditions; let's make our Jharkhand happy and prosperous.]

The inability of the JMM to increase its electoral support, as well as its inability to secure any substantial progress from the Bihar government on the JAAC, had a lot to do with this reorientation. The Bihar Vidhan Sabha had passed the Act constituting the JAAC in 1994 but the necessary financial resources and administrative powers had still not been transferred to the JAAC. In fact, the Act itself was notified only in March 1995. Consequently, once again, the JMM tried to resurrect the cultural aspects of the Jharkhandi identity in order to mobilise political support. This was done to persuade the Bihar government to convert the JAAC into an effective developmental body with an overall control of developmental activities in the region based at Ranchi and not Patna.

This manifesto invoked a mixture of emphases on the historical tradition and culture of the Jharkhand region and developmental issues. The manifesto began with the familiar emphasis on the historical construction of the Jharkhandi identity. However, the emphasis on the developmental factors as well as efforts to reassure the non-tribal population of the region remained of prime importance. It correlated the need for development to this historical construction and reassured the non-tribal populace in the following manner:

⁴⁷ *Manifesto of the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha for the Lok Sabha Election 1996*, Ranchi, 1996, p. 1.

शोषण से मुक्ति के लिए झारखण्ड मुक्ति मोर्चा की अवधारणा है कि राजनीतिक दृष्टिकोण, प्रशासनिक व्यवस्था, वित्तीय व्यवस्था और समग्र विकास की नीति झारखण्ड की आवश्यकता के अनुरूप निर्धारित हो। . . . यह सभी जानते हैं कि झारखण्ड मुक्ति मोर्चा झारखण्ड के सभी वर्गों के नागरिकों की सशक्त आवाज है, उनके संघर्ष का प्रथम साथी है। झारखण्ड मुक्ति मोर्चा झारखण्ड के नागरिकों के संघर्ष के हर मुद्दे पर, उनके साथ हुंकार भरने के लिये वचनबद्ध है।⁴⁸

[Jharkhand Mukti Morcha is of the firm belief that for freedom from exploitation, political viewpoint, administrative arrangements, financial arrangements, and policies for all-round development must be framed according to the needs of Jharkhand . . . Everyone is aware of the fact that Jharkhand Mukti Morcha is the strong voice of the citizens of Jharkhand from all classes and their best friend in their struggle. Jharkhand Mukti Morcha is resolved to join the citizens in their battle cry for struggle on all issues.]

Further on, the manifesto listed a long charter of promises without many specifics. It promised to start agitation on a number of issues without any concrete goals or programmes. The only specific matter mentioned was that they would 'struggle' for the transfer of adequate administrative and financial powers to the JAAC.

Thus, the leaders of the JMM have been eager to keep all the elements of the Jharkhandi movement as part of their political manifesto. On the one hand, they have been invoking the historical tradition of the region which was essentially tribal but on the other hand, they were equally keen to garner support from all sections of the Jharkhandi society. Simultaneously, the JMM was not willing to give up the development-based demand, since the poor development profile of the region had succeeded in securing governmental (the State's) recognition to their demands in the form of at least the legislative creation of the JAAC. However, the JMM has also been keen to point out that their acceptance of the JAAC has been a tactical withdrawal only. As the Central Committee Member of the JMM, Shailendra Bhattacharya, pointed out time and again in the interviews with him in January and

⁴⁸ *ibid.*, pp. 4-5.

May 1996, they wish to use the JAAC as an example to prove that the Jharkhandi leaders were capable of administering their own affairs. As explained by him, once the JMM and other Jharkhandi leaders have shown their mettle in administration they would seek the creation of a state. This point of view was also reflected in the JMM manifesto for the 1996 Lok Sabha election.

Thus, the overall articulation of Jharkhandi identity as reflected in its poll promises was a mixture of a number of issues in which the developmental angle was always predominant. The identity of a Jharkhandi was hence, made up of a mixture of a number of unspecified themes such as culture, heritage and tradition. Nonetheless, the JMM did succeed in creating a politically significant identity, even if only for the purpose of securing a better share of developmental funds.

(b) Bharatiya Janata Party:

The BJP is comparatively a new entrant to the electoral scene of the Jharkhand region. However, it has been able to secure considerable popular support in the region as in other parts of India. In fact, the BJP has proposed some fresh alternatives to the demand for the creation of a new state of Jharkhand which is finding increasing political support in the Jharkhand region.

The BJP portrays itself as a political party seeking to ensure equity, progress and social justice. Its manifesto for the Lok Sabha elections of 1989 began with the following words:

भारतीय जनता पार्टी . . . कानून और व्यवस्था, सामाजिक न्याय और आन्तरिक तथा बाह्य सुरक्षा की समर्थक है। यह गरीबों तथा पद्धतियों के उत्थान के लिए समर्पित है।⁴⁹

[Bharatiya Janata Party . . . supports law and order, social justice and internal and external security. It is devoted to the uplift of poor and downtrodden.]

⁴⁹ *Manifesto of the Bharatiya Janata Party for Lok Sabha Election 1989*, New Delhi, n. d. p. 5.

However, such clichés are nothing new in Indian politics and none of the mainstream political parties offer anything different. All of them promise to improve the lot of the poor, backward classes and the downtrodden.

As far as the question of autonomy is concerned, the 1989 BJP manifesto does not provide us with any insight. It may be significant that it isolated cases such as those of the north-east, Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab and made some limited promises for these regions. There is almost no mention of the issue of the Jharkhand region or the question of its autonomy. However, the Jharkhandi-minded supporters of the BJP in south Bihar may have taken heart from what the manifesto had to say in the brief section entitled “सत्ता का विकेन्द्रीकरण”[Decentralisation of Power]:

भारतीय जनता पार्टी पंचायतो तथा अन्य स्थानीय स्वशासन की संस्थाओं को सुनिश्चित रूप से संवैधानिक दर्जा प्रदान करेगी और उन्हें संसाधनों में सुनिश्चित रूप से भागीदार बनायेगी जिससे कि उन्हें राज्य अथवा केन्द्र सरकार की कृपा पर निर्भर न रहना पड़े।⁵⁰

[Bharatiya Janata Party will confer constitutional status on the panchayats and other local self-government institutions and make them a partner in the sharing of resources in a well-determined manner so that they are not at the mercy of state or central governments.]

This promise in the manifesto may have been used by the local BJP activists to argue that if a BJP government took office, it would favourably consider the demand for the Jharkhand state. As emerged in the interview with the BJP MP from Ranchi, this promise was interpreted as the willingness of a future BJP government to create the state of Jharkhand. About the tribal population in India, the manifesto said that schemes would be framed so that the tribal people could be saved from exploitation, alienation of land and indebtedness. Additionally, it also promised to amend the forest produce laws so as to enable a better realisation of forest rights of the tribals. It also promised a sub-plan to ensure the economic development of the

⁵⁰ *ibid.*, p. 15.

tribal people.⁵¹ These are a few of the many similar general promises made in the manifesto. As far as autonomy for the region of Jharkhand was concerned, there were no concrete promises. In fact, the above proposals are in line with the general policy of the Indian State since independence.

Subsequently however, the BJP election manifesto for the mid-term Lok Sabha polls in 1991 stated a clear policy towards the region of Jharkhand as a part of its policy of smaller states:

The BJP recognises that regional imbalances have developed in some states because of their size. The party would appoint a commission to report on formation of smaller states which are economically and democratically viable. Initially, BJP will have Uttaranchal, Vananchal and Union Territory of Delhi as three new states of the Indian Union; . . .⁵²

It is significant that the thrust of this observation/ promise in the BJP manifesto was on the regional imbalances borne out of the large sizes of the existing states. It made no mention of the identity aspect of the Jharkhandi region and sought to emphasise the developmental-deficit line of argument. It is also noteworthy that the BJP has practically hijacked the issue of a Jharkhand state with its Vananchal proposals. The JMM's and other Jharkhandi parties' leaders have a vision of a Jharkhand comprised of 25 districts from four states. The BJP on the other hand, has proposed the creation of a state called Vananchal from the 16 (now 18 due to internal reorganisation) districts of south Bihar only. The new proposals of the BJP offered an alternative that was simpler to implement since it is administratively and politically easier to divide a state into two than to carve out portions of four states to create a new state. The political mileage which the BJP drew from this proposal in the region of south Bihar was of such significance that by now, except for a few hard-liners, most mainstream JMM leaders have accepted the fact that any hope of

⁵¹ *ibid.*, pp 29-31.

⁵² *Manifesto of the Bharatiya Janata Party for Lok Sabha Election 1991*, New Delhi, n. d. p. 3.

seeing a separate Jharkhand state will materialise only if they restrict their demand to the districts of south Bihar only.⁵³

The fact that this alternative offered by the BJP was premised wholly on the 'poor developmental profile' argument does not bother anyone in the region because they have been using the same argument since independence and by now, one suspects all the Jharkhandi leaders also believe it. Moreover, emphasis on the tribal identity is likely to displease the sizeable non-tribal element in the region. Hence, even JMM uses the terms like culture and heritage in a general way so as to also appeal to about three-quarters of the population of the region which is of non-tribal origins.

Returning to the 1991 manifesto, it is noteworthy that as far as the BJP was concerned, the whole issue of a separate state for the Jharkhand region was part of its favoured design of smaller, more manageable states. As one BJP MP argued, the whole issue of creating the state of Jharkhand is contingent on the fact that the large size of the state of Bihar has led to imbalances in development. Creating smaller and more efficiently manageable states will ensure that local needs would be handled in a more efficient manner.⁵⁴ Consequently, as far as the BJP was concerned, it may be safely deduced that the Jharkhand issue was a development issue and not that of an identity demanding political recognition. This fact is also reflected in the fact that its 1991 manifesto referred to unrest in the north-east, Punjab, Ladakh, and even Telangana under separate sections but the issue of the Jharkhand region found mention only as a part of its policy of smaller and more manageable states.

The 1996 manifesto of the BJP went one step further again and promised to "carve out Uttaranchal, Vananchal, Vidarbha and Chattisgarh and give them full statehood. We will further consider setting up a Commission to examine the formation of smaller states."⁵⁵ By this time the BJP had established its views about

⁵³ The JMM manifesto still lays claim to a 'Greater Jharkhand' as their final goal. However, their leaders doubt the political practicability of such a proposal.

⁵⁴ Interview with R. T. Singh, the BJP MP for Ranchi, in May 1996.

⁵⁵ *Manifesto of the Bharatiya Janata Party for Lok Sabha Election 1996*, New Delhi, 1996. p. 10.

the Jharkhand region in the national political life. The BJP had regarded the issue of Jharkhand as emanating from the poor performance of the policy delivery mechanism in large, poorly managed states. The fact that there had emerged almost a consensus in the parliamentary debates that the poor development profile of the region demanded the creation of a state, added to the validity of its views on the issue. Besides, any political opposition to the BJP's proposal of creation of a state of Vananchal from the districts of south Bihar was blunted by it by also promising a creation of a state of Chattisgarh from the tribal regions of Madhya Pradesh. That left only a few districts of Orissa and West Bengal from the original demand of the Jharkhandi groups which would not attain some form of autonomy under the proposals of the BJP. Any opposition from the tribal elements in the Jharkhand region had been taken care of by constant promises of "social equality for all Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes through political and economic empowerment".⁵⁶

The fact that the BJP had been consistently clubbing SC and ST together since their first manifesto indicates that they did not see any question of a tribal identity existing in the region of south Bihar or elsewhere. Their base line seems to be that all social and political unrest was rooted in poorly managed and inefficient implementation of public policy in large, unmanageable states. They do recognise *vanvasis* as a societal group but the undertone of this recognition is reminiscent of the viewpoints of one strand of the colonial discourse and the early social reformers of the 19th century which saw tribes at a lower level of evolution waiting to be absorbed into the larger Hindu fold (see chapter III).

Nonetheless, the BJP's version of the issue of Jharkhand did catch the popular imagination. During the field study in January and May 1996, it was noticed that the BJP has sizeable following in the Jharkhand region. Also significant is the fact that, unofficially, JMM has gradually scaled down its stance of not settling for anything less than a state carved out of the four states concerned and accepted the JAAC with its jurisdiction over the districts of south Bihar only.

⁵⁶ *ibid.*, p. 60.

Following the same political logic, the geographical jurisdiction of the JAAC would become that of a future state of Jharkhand.

(C) Indian National Congress:

The INC manifesto for the Lok Sabha elections 1984 talked more of its achievements during the 1980-84 term of office than what it had to offer in the next five years. The general tone of the manifesto was that the INC government had done a splendid job in the past five years and would review its policies in order to find ways to improve them. Consequently, it had nothing to say about the Jharkhand movement. About the scheduled tribes in the country, the INC manifesto for 1984 elections promised to:

- Implement effectively the strategy of the tribal sub-plan with stress on human resource development with particular reference to women, beneficiary-oriented schemes, drinking water supply, health services, general and technical education and technological improvement of agriculture, animal husbandry fisheries, village and cottage industries and forestry.
- Protect the distinctive culture and way of life of tribal communities.
- Protect the rights of tribal communities to forest produce.⁵⁷

As is clear from the above extract, the INC decided to continue its emphasis on the developmental problems faced by the tribal population as the mainstay of their policies towards the Scheduled Tribes. The now well-known and modestly successful tribal sub-plan continued to be their central plank. However, the INC was perhaps, the only mainstream national political party which took some note of the tribal and cultural components of the movement. It sought to protect the 'distinctive culture and way of life of the tribal community', but this effort was in consonance with the general policy towards the tribes since independence. It did not make any concessions to the effect that a tribal identity might also seek political autonomy. Since independence, the general approach of the INC had been based on the developmental model adopted by the Indian state. The INC sought to minimise the

⁵⁷ *Indian National Congress (I) Election Manifesto 1984*, New Delhi, n. d., p. 18.

effect of political demand-making by the Jharkhand movement through a more intensive developmental effort.

There were very few differences between the 1984 and 1989 manifestos of the INC as far as policies towards the Jharkhand region were concerned. The INC government was re-elected to office in 1984 and consequently, there was a need for them to defend their policies during the 1984-89 period. The whole issue of an autonomous administrative arrangement in the region was conspicuous by its absence. A greater amount of financial investment in public policy initiative towards the tribal population was again promised. It drew attention to the fact that "a National Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Finance and Development Corporation, with an authorised capital of Rs. 75 crores [Rs. 750 Million] has been established to develop and assist schemes of employment generation for SC/ST communities . . . a Tribal Co-operative Marketing Development Federation [TRIFED] has been set-up as a multi-state co-operative society to provide remunerative prices to the tribals for minor forest produce . . ." ⁵⁸ For the future years, the INC promised that "future programmes for Harijan and Adivasi welfare will consolidate the large number of initiatives already taken. In addition, programmes will be designed for specific occupation groups. Schemes under agriculture and irrigation will be given priority . . ." ⁵⁹

Thus, as far as the INC was concerned, it continued to believe that political problems like the demand for separate state or autonomy can and must be dealt with greater financial outlay and more intensive policy efforts. Ironically, the INC leaders, despite a long experience in governance, were not alive to the fact that although it may be possible to contain the sharpening of political identities, to a certain degree by intensive and efficient policy initiatives, efforts to satisfy the political demands of already articulated identities by similar action are unlikely to yield significant results. The existing channels of exchange of resources between the

⁵⁸ *Election Manifesto of the Indian National Congress (I): General Election 1989* New Delhi, n. d., p. 26.

⁵⁹ *ibid.*, pp. 26-7.

State and the societal and political groups in the Jharkhand region had not worked in the last half-century. The INC seemed to be conveniently unconcerned about the overall declining development profile of the Jharkhand region which was a result of this skewed exchange of resources and instead sought to concentrate its policy efforts at the ST population only. It carried on with its emphasis on a more intensive rationalist and bureaucratic policy implementation with the target group approach to deal with political problems.

The INC manifestos with their over-emphasis on tribal development, did not consider the fact that the Jharkhand region as a whole (which included more non-tribal than tribal persons) might require some solution. This was in a situation where the JMM was straining to assure the Jharkhandi electorate that the Jharkhand movement represented all sections of the Jharkhandi society and the BJP was reinforcing this picture by promising a state on regional/ geographical basis. The INC on the other hand, showed a remarkable lack of ability to respond to new reality with new policy mechanisms. It went on flogging the older policies of direct support to the ST population in the region, even though the ST and non-ST populations were equal victims of developmental imbalances. This fact must be interpreted in light of the fact that ST population was actually a minority in the region of Jharkhand (even if all the ST persons are seen as a monolithic political bloc which they are not). Besides, political action by the JMM and the AJSU in the last few years had secured support from almost all sections of the Jharkhandi population. All this makes the INC's policy out of touch with reality.

The INC manifesto of 1991 has only one major difference from that of 1989. It had a substantial section which underlined the follies, according to the INC, committed by the National Front governments of V. P. Singh and Chandrashekhar. This section was followed by a list of achievements of the INC in its last term in office. As far as the future was concerned, in its characteristic way the INC promised to review and strengthen the programmes that it had already started before 1989. About the ST population, it promised to extend and strengthen the various ongoing programmes.

The 1991 manifesto of the INC also promised to invest the SC/ST Commission with statutory powers of enforcement. Additionally, it promised to set up special courts "in adequate numbers in all tribal areas of the country to protect tribal interests, including protection against arbitrary acquisition by forest officials, ensure the handing over of forest lands to genuine tribal owners, and safeguard customary tribal laws and practices".⁶⁰

The INC continued to show its sensitivity to the existence of some uniqueness of culture and practices in the tribal regions of the country but failed to come up with any new solutions to the movements that were sprouting in almost every tribal area in India. It did not succeed in devising any practical political solution to political demands in the Jharkhand region.

The INC manifesto for 1996 elections once again, listed a catalogue of achievements in the past five years and promised stability. However, as the results of the elections of 1996 showed, stability and status quo were not good enough for most of the electorate of India and they wanted change, while all that the INC promised was more investment in the ongoing programmes. As far as tribal development was concerned, the INC pointed to the ten-fold increase in the turnover of TRIFED established in 1987. However, faced with persistent demands from most tribal areas in the country, the INC made a small concession by promising that "Tribal Commission under Article 339(1) of the Constitution will be constituted soon to report on the administration of Scheduled Areas and welfare of Scheduled Tribes in States".⁶¹

Despite considerable unrest with regard to the question of autonomy in the Jharkhand region and serious disturbances in the transportation of minerals from the region due to the economic blockades, the INC did not think it important to reconsider its approach towards the region. The debates in Parliament over the

⁶⁰ *Election Manifesto of the Indian National Congress (I): General Election 1991*, New Delhi, n. d., p. 27-8.

⁶¹ *Election Manifesto of the Indian National Congress (I): General Election 1996*, New Delhi, n. d., p. 18.

resolution tabled by the BJP, the creation of the JAAC, the furores over the non-notification of the JAAC Bill and other similar events did not lead it to re-examine its approach. It continued its approach of pumping in an ever-increasing amount of developmental funds in the region, although this made almost no difference to the region's development profile. Policies intended to target the tribal population for development initiatives were not able to fulfil their intended purpose. It seems that the INC also failed to realise that the Jharkhand issue was no longer an issue of tribal identity but had emerged as a regionalist aspiration of the entire Jharkhandi population.

(d) Communist Party of India (Marxist):

The political value of the CPM manifestos lies in the fact that Leftist political parties/ groups had a considerable degree of influence on the political life of south Bihar in the 1960s and 1970s. In fact, most of the present leaders of the JMM have flirted with Leftist ideology at one point of time or another (see chapter II). Moreover, the CPM and some ultra-Leftist political groups still command some political support in the region of Jharkhand. Often, the support for these parties does not fully express itself in the electoral results but the vigorous efforts by leftist activists to educate the populace were noticed in the field study. The vaguely Marxist rhetoric of the Jharkhandi political groups also makes the view of the CPM relevant. Moreover, as was the case with the government during the term of the Eleventh Lok Sabha (1996-97), the CPM may exercise some degree of influence over the policy formulation by being a part of a coalition government.

The CPM is one of the few political parties in India which regularly publishes an analysis of the political situation in India. In 1981, their analysis of the problems in tribal areas was as below:

. . . [reservations] have proved farcical and the Scheduled Tribes have been less successful than Harijans in reaping minimum benefits from reservations . . . the process of expropriation from land has gone apace, notwithstanding pious legislations preventing transfer of land to non-advansi . . . in the adivasi areas, endowed with mineral reserves, the Adivasis get the lowest paid jobs . . . in the interior also, the slogan of separate state - Jharkhand, etc. - are being raised for a long time. But the Congress (I) government would not think of

an autonomous district or region . . . 'Drive out non-Adivasi from the Adivasi areas' is also the slogan in Bihar tribal areas . . .⁶²

Clearly, the CPM saw a close relationship between the poor development profile and the demand for autonomy in the Jharkhand region. The election manifesto of the CPM for the 1991 Lok Sabha elections continues with this analysis:

The tribal areas in the country are in turmoil. Centuries of oppression have been heightened by the rapacious loot of contractors and traders. Their lands are snatched away, their traditional rights in the forests blocked; their women folk sold into prostitution and the men forced to work in slave conditions. Their struggle to assert their tribal identity, linguistic-cultural distinctiveness meets with cruel repression.⁶³

Despite the fact that it is slightly strongly worded and tries to imply that there has consistently been a negative growth in the development profile of the region over the past half-century, the manifesto is the only one that does not pull its punches. The CPM has been able to come to terms with the fact that the tribal regions were (and still are) looking for political solutions to their problems and not merely an ever-increasing allocation of resources, of which most will never reach the intended beneficiaries. The manifesto opined elsewhere that "without giving more powers to states and ensuring autonomy for the ethnic and tribal minorities within states, where necessary, to fulfil their aspirations of development of their linguistic-cultural identity and economic progress, the Centre will fail to counter the growing separatist and divisive threats to the country".⁶⁴ Therefore, the CPM has been able to recognise that the demands for a separate state were arising not only due to poor developmental initiative but also due to a desire on the part of socio-cultural identities to assert themselves. The exploitation of regions or social groups was likely to result in political demand-making for separate administrative units.

⁶² *The CPM Central Committee's Report on Political Development*, New Delhi, 1981, pp. 31-33.

⁶³ *Election Manifesto of the Communist Party of India (Marxist)*, New Delhi, 1991, pp. 8-9.

⁶⁴ *ibid.*, p. 6.

The CPM manifesto also pointed out the worsening conditions of the lower sections of the population, exploitative working conditions and poor growth of educational and employment opportunities. It desired urgent and effective policy measures to ameliorate the situation to contain political and social strife and ensure peace and progress. In this way, it was also addressing the situation of the worsening developmental profile in the Jharkhand region as observed in chapters IV and V.

Owing to the political configuration in which that the CPM found itself, instead of promises, it put forth a set of demands to be placed before the next government. It desired the electorate to vote for its candidates so that those demands could be pursued effectively in the Parliament. Concerning the tribal regions, it demanded that steps must be taken to ensure "protection of the land, culture and language of tribal people. Autonomy for compact, contiguous, tribal majority areas within states where necessary".⁶⁵ This emphasis of the CPM on autonomous administrative structures for tribal pockets was quite different from the Jharkhandi demand for a separate state and the scope of creating such areas of tribal autonomy was remote. Besides, the resultant arrangement would be undesirable as well as impractical as there are hardly any exclusively tribal regions left and it is improbable that the creation of tribal autonomy in small compact tribal pockets was a plausible course of action. Moreover, the desirability of separating the tribal population from the rest of the population of the region and allowing them to become 'national tribal parks', is questionable. However, the views of the CPM have some merit since it recognised the need to seek solutions to the Jharkhandi problem at a political level.

The 1996 manifesto of the CPM continues with similar analyses and demands. It did not support the JMM's demand for a separate state. The party continued its demand for "prevention of atrocities against tribals; protection of land,

⁶⁵ *ibid.*, p. 17.

culture and language of tribal people; granting of autonomy for compact contiguous tribal majority areas within the framework of existing states".⁶⁶

Before ending the analysis of the CPM's political stance, it must be noted that the CPM has been quite vocal in its demand for greater state autonomy vis-à-vis the central government. It has also been demanding greater autonomy for the tribal areas. However in West Bengal, the CPM despite being in office for twenty years, has not extended any substantial measure of autonomy to the Gorkha areas which could have been a beacon for other regions demanding autonomy. In fact, there are no references to the Gorkhaland issue in their manifesto. This indicates that the CPM also has only been paying lip service to the cause of autonomy like most other political parties.

(e) National Front/ Janata Dal:

The last few years have seen the rise of the Janata Dal and National Front (of which an important constituent was the Janata Dal). The National Front has had two stints in office at the centre and the Janata Dal was in office in Bihar.⁶⁷ Consequently, the views expressed by this party are of some consequence.

The 1989 election manifesto of the National Front presented a new dimension to the problems in the tribal areas of the country. It listed this issue under the section of "Regional Aspirations" and was of the view that "regional aspirations of the submerged groups residing in such underdeveloped areas as the eastern tribal belt call for fulfilment by appropriate measures".⁶⁸

It is significant that National Front was the first political party in India with perhaps, the qualified exception of the JMM, to publicly recognise that the issue of Jharkhand was no longer a tribal issue and had over the years, acquired a regional

⁶⁶ *Manifesto of the Communist Party of India (Marxist): Eleventh Lok Sabha Elections*, New Delhi, 1996, p. 14.

⁶⁷ Presently, Rashtriya Janata Dal is in office in Bihar which was formed after a split in the Janata Dal in 1997.

⁶⁸ *Manifesto of the National Front: Lok Sabha Elections 1989*, New Delhi, n. d., p. 13.

character. The JMM and other Jharkhandi groups have some degree of responsibility for this change in the character of the movement, which no longer perceives itself as a movement for a tribal state. By the late 1980s, many of the people of Jharkhand were in favour of a Jharkhand state irrespective of their origin. It had truly become a regional aspiration.

However, despite its recognition of the regional character of the Jharkhand movement, the National Front sought to ensure that the tribal population of the region was not crushed under the majoritarianism of the non-tribal populace. It said that:

the tribals' interests will be fully protected and various hardships and evictions, which they face owing to ill-conceived forest laws and arbitrary actions of forest officials, will be removed. Their customary laws will be respected and observed . . . their special needs will be attended to in the formulations and execution of forest policies and they will be made active participants in the process of massive afforestation.⁶⁹

This recognition by the National Front that even after the creation of a state of Jharkhand, the tribal and other backward social groups would require active policy support indicates that its leaders had a good grasp of realities in Bihar. However, the overemphasis on forest rights vis-à-vis the tribal population underplays the fact that the tribal population of Bihar is no longer dependent on forest produce alone and requires active public policy intervention in their lives at the same level as any other poor and weak social group.

However, with the Janata Dal government in office in Bihar, the election manifesto of National Front for the 1991 election had softened its stance with regard to the Jharkhand issue. Whereas in the 1989 manifesto the National Front had promised 'appropriate measures' to deal with the regional aspiration of the people in the 'eastern tribal belt', by the 1991 election the 'appropriate measures' had boiled

⁶⁹ *ibid.*, p. 26.

down to the JAAC. The 1991 manifesto mentioned Jharkhand by name and promised:

राष्ट्रीय मोर्चा झारखण्ड के लोगो की आकांक्षाओ के प्रति सहानुभूति रखता है। हमारे आदिवासी भाईयो के लम्बे शोषण ने उन्हें अब तक बेहद गरीबी की स्थिति में रखा है। उनकी तकलीफो और यातनाओ को संवेदन शून्य व अति केन्द्रीकृत प्रशासन ने और अधिक बढ़ाया है।

उनकी उचित आकांक्षाओ का आदर करते हुए बिहार में जनता दल सरकार ने हाल ही में वही के विकास व अन्य गतिविधियो को संभालने व तुरत राहत देने के उद्देश्य से एक विकास-परिषद की स्थापना की है। राष्ट्रीय मोर्चा एक अलग राज्य की मांग पर सर्वसहमति बनाने का प्रयास करेगा।⁷⁰

[National Front sympathises with the aspirations of the people of Jharkhand. Long drawn exploitation has kept our tribal brethren in extreme poverty. Their problems and pain has been aggravated by an insensitive and over-centralised administration.]

With a view of respecting their legitimate aspirations, maintaining developmental and other activities, and for immediate relief, the Janata Dal government in Bihar has recently established a development council. National Front will attempt to build a consensus on the demand of a separate state.]

This manifesto needs to be viewed in light of the fact that the then Janata Dal Chief Minister of Bihar, Laloo Prasad Yadav, had declared that he would allow the creation of a separate state in Jharkhand only over his dead body. Additionally, despite the Bill creating the JAAC having been passed in 1994, the first election to the JAAC has not yet been held and the powers allocated to it have not been transferred. In such a situation, the promise of meeting the aspirations for autonomy in the region made by the National Front in 1989 with the Janata Dal as one of its main constituents, amounts to little more than political rhetoric.

However, the other promises made by the National Front in the manifesto vis-à-vis the ST population do not have many new or original strands. They follow

⁷⁰ *Manifesto of the National Front: Lok Sabha Elections 1991*, New Delhi, n. d., p. 14.

the well-known promise of more investment in the development of the ST population. The analyses in the last three chapters indicate that despite continuous increase in the money allocated, there has not been a proportionate improvement in the rate of growth of the developmental profile of either the region as a whole or the ST population.

It is also noteworthy that the National Front did not see the issue of Jharkhand as an identity-based movement. It was politically astute to recognise that the movement has acquired a regionalist character but it continued to view the movement as a product of developmental imbalances. The reason provided for the creation of the JAAC definitely leads to this interpretation (The JAAC Act has been discussed later in the chapter).

The National Front did not last till the next elections in 1996. The constituent parties fought the elections as different parties. It is another matter that after the elections, 13 of them joined together to form an unstable coalition government which was in office during 1996-97 with the outside support of the INC to give it necessary majority in the Parliament.

The Janata Dal manifesto of 1996 did not refer to the issue of Jharkhand at all, although it dwelt on the question of smaller states, probably to counter the BJP's promise of smaller states. On this issue it simply promised to set up another commission to enquire into the matter:

Demands have been raised for several decades for the creation of smaller States in view of economic backwardness of certain regions within the respective States, aspirations for regional identity and large size of certain States, which causes difficulties to the people in dealing with State level administration. Janata Dal will appoint a Commission to go into these demands and make appropriate recommendations.⁷¹

The Janata Dal was of the opinion that new states must be created to improve administrative convenience. The fact that cultural identities may aspire for a

⁷¹ *The Janata Dal Election Manifesto for the Lok Sabha Election 1996*, New Delhi, n. d. p. 21.

separate state seems incidental to the Janata Dal. Further, the tone of the manifesto indicates that as far as the Janata Dal was concerned, the issue of Jharkhand had been settled for good with the creation of the JAAC. With relation to the ST population of the country, it repeats many of its developmental promises from the 1991 manifesto.

There is one factor that is common to all the above parties. All of them club Scheduled Tribes and the Scheduled Castes together. The fact that regional/ tribal-cultural identity may have a significant input into political demand-making which is presently being witnessed in India, does not seem to be central to any political manifesto. Further, the above delineation of the election manifestos of the various political parties seems to indicate that all the parties believe that the only justification for the creation of a new state is the prospect of better administrative convenience to improve public policy delivery. In this sense most political parties still seem to believe that narrower ascriptive identities will be subsumed into the national identity under the impetus of a faster and efficient development. The viewpoint of political actors hardly seems to have evolved since the time of independence.

With regard to the Jharkhand region, all the political parties (including the JMM) lay a lot of emphasis on its poor developmental profile. The fact that the Jharkhandi identity has become politically significant was secondary for all of them. As far as the single-purpose party – JMM – was concerned, they did not want to over-emphasise the identity aspect since the political system has been unable to evolve mechanisms to deal with such demands. Too much emphasis on the distinct identity of the Jharkhand region could lead to State repression. Also, the 'development-deficit' argument was secular and non-controversial enough to draw cross party support. The various political points of view could differ over the remedy of underdevelopment – from an autonomous council to a state to the panchayati raj system – but no one could disagree that urgent action was required to devolve power to the local communities so that development could be accelerated. It is curious that other similar demands in the country which had adopted violence and separatism (for instance, Assam and Punjab) drew a lot of condemnation but also political attention whereas demands such as that of a separate state of Jharkhand

could only secure marginal reference and consideration, if any. It seems that the political system has lost all its will and capability to attempt resolution of socio-political conflict without resort to violence. In this sense, the system has neglected a fundamental aspect of its responsibility.

This unwillingness and inability on the part of the political system to provide enough political space for political differences with a view to resolving them before such political demand-making groups take up arms also speaks of the instability of the State and leads to what some commentators have called the 'crisis of governability'.⁷²

The Jharkhand Area Autonomous Council Act, 1994

The incessant struggle on the part of the Jharkhandi political parties and social groups and the accompanying economic blockade of minerals in the south Bihar region in the 1980s and 1990s succeeded in bringing the necessity of new politico-administrative arrangements for the Jharkhand region onto the national agenda. There were considerable differences of opinion across the political spectrum about the shape of the proposed politico-administrative body. The options ranged from a new state as demanded by the JMM, to a mere revamping of the public policy delivery mechanism as suggested by the INC. Amongst the national political parties, the question of a new state had found favour only with the BJP whereas other political parties have suggested merely a development council. Nonetheless, despite the differences in opinion about the structure, all political parties concurred with the view that the Jharkhand movement was premised on the poor track record of development policy in the region of south Bihar. If the movement was at all seen as one premised on an identity, it was a regional identity united by poverty and underdevelopment. The possibility of the existence of a tribal identity in the region had become of least importance.

⁷² Atul Kohli, *Democracy and Discontent: India's Crisis of Governability*, Cambridge, 1990.

Accordingly, the Jharkhand Area Autonomous Council Act, 1994 (JAAC) was passed on the presupposition of a regional, development- based demand. Taking a look at the very first sentence of the Act reinforces this point of view:

An Act To establish An Autonomous Council for all round accelerated development of the Jharkhand Area. Be it enacted by the Legislature of Bihar . . .⁷³

The then Janata Dal government of Bihar in accordance with the position proclaimed in the manifesto, viewed the whole issue of Jharkhand as one born out of developmental imbalances that could be ameliorated by devolution of administrative powers. The Act sought to do precisely that.

The Act created the Council as a legal entity with not more than 162 directly elected and eighteen nominated members.⁷⁴ As far as the structure of the Council is concerned, it follows the pattern of the state legislative assemblies all over the country, with seats reserved for both Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Curiously, unlike most developmental council models in the country, the local MPs, MLAs, or heads of other developmental bodies such as panchayat heads have no ex-officio rights to sit in the Council. The eighteen nominated seats are filled up in the following manner:

1. the Speaker of the Bihar Vidhan Sabha has the power to appoint not more than 8 MLAs from the region to the JAAC;
2. the state government could also appoint two MPs from the region to the Council;

⁷³ Jharkhand Area Autonomous Council Act 1994 (Bihar Act 13, 1994), *Bihar Gazette Extraordinary*, 8 March 1995, Patna, 1995.

⁷⁴ *ibid.*, section 3(1).

3. the state government is empowered to appoint not more than eight persons with experience of public works, urban works, rural development or social welfare who live in the area to the JAAC.⁷⁵

This provision seriously undermines the autonomy of the Council. If the state government thinks that the JAAC is functioning too independently for its liking, it can utilise these provisions to interfere with the business of the Council. Moreover, the scope of such independent action on part of the Council is remote. The state Governor has discretionary powers to dissolve the Council and take over all its functions through an officer not below the rank of an additional secretary in the Government of India who shall be appointed for the purpose.⁷⁶ In this sense, the Council is no more than a developmental body with some degree of elected representation. Its continued existence depends on the discretion of Governor⁷⁷ and therefore is susceptible to pressures from the state government. In terms of autonomy for the region, this model is not of much consequence. The JAAC turns out to be nothing more than a glorified municipal government.

The only recognition to the tribal character of the region in the Act is that the Chairman elected to preside over the meetings of the JAAC meetings must be a tribal.⁷⁸ As far as all other provisions are concerned, the JAAC could be a developmental body in any other part of the country (such as Panchayati Raj institutions) with a regional scope. Apart from a couple of entries in the subjects to be transferred to the JAAC concerning tribal welfare and development, there is no recognition of the unique culture and tradition of the region that the JMM is so fond of pointing out.

⁷⁵ *ibid.*, section 13(1).

⁷⁶ *ibid.*, section 12.

⁷⁷ In this context, the discretion of the Governor effectively means that of the Chief Minister and the Government of Bihar as JAAC is a creation of the Bihar Vidhan Sabha and therefore, the Governor will normally act in accordance with the advice of the Chief Minister. However, keeping in mind the discretionary powers of the Governor under the constitutional arrangements in India, we will have to wait until this provision is operationalised and then challenged in a court of law. The judicial interpretation will clarify this point.

⁷⁸ JAAC Act, *op. cit.*, section 15.

The essentially developmental character of its activities and the overall control of the state government over it is highlighted by the powers and functions assigned to the Council:

Subject to the general guidelines of the State Government, the Council shall have the following powers and functions on the subjects specified in Schedule 3:-

- (a) to fix priority and prepare plans for development programmes;
- (b) to formulate projects;
- (c) to sanction projects;
- (d) to get projects executed;
- (e) to sanction Central Plans relating [to] the Area and to get it executed;
- (f) to review, supervise, co-ordinate and monitor the projects.⁷⁹

The above provisions make it amply clear that the Council was conceived as nothing more than a plan implementation body. It followed the general assumption that major political problems could be solved by greater and more intensive policy investment with some degree of local representation. Owing to the fact that the state government could exercise tight control over all the activities of the Council, the realisation of the regional aspirations of the Jharkhandi leaders and population (as promised by the Janata Dal manifesto) was realised only as far as minor adjustments to the general developmental policy of Bihar government were concerned. At best, it could act as a local public policy implementation department and at worst become a powerless political window dressing.

The Act certainly did not grant the Council any greater degree of autonomy even with regard to developmental programmes in the region. In fact, the state government's control is clearly spelled out in sections 42 & 44. Section 42 requires that "the Council in the discharge of its functions, shall be guided by such direction on policy matters as may be given to it from time to time by the State Government".⁸⁰ Section 44, instead of designating Patna High Court as the arbitrator in matters of dispute, provides that "if in the interpretation of the provision of the

⁷⁹ *ibid.*, section 29(3).

⁸⁰ *ibid.*, section 42.

Act, there is a difference of opinion between the State Government and the Council, it shall be settled by the Governor".⁸¹ There thus seems to be no actual devolution of power.

With regard to the executive power of the JAAC, the office of the Council is to be headed by a Chief Executive Officer appointed by the Governor of Bihar after consultation of the Chief Executive Councillor (Chairman of the Council and ex-officio head of the Executive Council). All staff recruited for the JAAC are subject to budgetary and other controls of the state government. It is empowered to discipline only class three and four staff. All disciplinary powers with respect to other staff rest with the state government. Further, all administrative postings of the staff are subject to guidelines issued by Bihar government.⁸² Thus, the executive power of the JAAC is also under the control of the state government.

As far as financial powers are concerned, the Council has been promised "a minimum of 25 percent of the State's Annual Plan".⁸³ However, as a member of the Central Committee of JMM complained in May 1996, the actual transfer of powers and resources to the JAAC was still awaited. Even the elections to the JAAC had not been held and at present the JAAC consists of appointees of the state government. Besides, with almost total control by the state government over its activities, there is very little scope for the JAAC to actually reallocate this money to projects which it deems to be of greater importance in the region. Furthermore, the numerous instances of centrally sponsored schemes (CSS) in the states which have undermined the developmental autonomy of the states show that the Bihar government has ample scope of undermining the limited developmental autonomy granted to the region in the form of the JAAC.

The powers devolved to the JAAC are not much more than those which had been devolved to the panchayats under the Constitution (Seventy-third Amendment)

⁸¹ *ibid.*, section 44.

⁸² *ibid.*, section 32.

⁸³ *ibid.*, section 34(7).

Act, 1992. A comparison of the subjects devolved has been made in the annex at the end of the chapter. If the comparison is pursued, it becomes clear that almost all the powers that Bihar government intends to devolve to the JAAC had already been devolved to the panchayats by the Parliament in 1992. It would not be untrue to hold that Bihar government devolved those powers which it no longer possessed after the Seventy-third Amendment to the Constitution. The only exceptions are subjects that are peculiar to the region, such as bee keeping, sericulture, minor minerals, tribal sub-plan & welfare and tribal welfare.

Some other subjects are not in the Eleventh Schedule but are present in the JAAC Act such as regional planning and implementation, urban development, and municipal corporations. Such subjects could not have been included in the panchayat structure created by the Seventy-third Amendment since it was meant to deal mainly with rural village conditions whereas the JAAC Act deals with a region which has a larger geographical scope. The subjects that have been included in the Eleventh Schedule of the Constitution of India by the Seventy-third Amendment but not in the JAAC Act are fuel and fodder, non-conventional energy, adult & continuing education and public distribution system. It could also be argued that these powers conferred greater initiative on the panchayats compared with the JAAC.

The powers delegated to the JAAC under regional planning and implementation are a major item in principle but in practice all planning of developmental programmes has been centralised in the Planning Commission with even the states having very limited powers over this area. The present initiative of indicative planning by the Planning Commission could lead to a substantial role for the JAAC. However, if the indicative planning initiative does go on to actually decentralise development planning, the JAAC will be no greater beneficiary than the panchayati institutions. If the devolution of planning does not go ahead, the JAAC will end up as a line agency implementing state and central plans.

Thus, it would not be an exaggeration to state that the JAAC seems to be a panchayat with a much larger geographic scope and consequently, greater financial and developmental allocations. Such an administrative structure cannot be seen to fulfil the 'legitimate regional aspirations' of the people of the Jharkhand region. The

people of the region wanted a separate state but what they got was in fact a glorified panchayat. Jharkhandi leaders and population expected some degree of regional autonomy under the JAAC. However, all they were granted was a regional municipal council.

Identity and Autonomy

It may also be questioned whether the tribal-cultural identity survives in the Jharkhand region anymore. The experience in the interviews with the ordinary men and women of Jharkhand indicates that they might not be too concerned about the Jharkhandi identity premised on a shared history and culture but all of them would like to see their developmental affairs administered from Ranchi and not from Patna. Even the local INC activists and leaders in the region admitted (it must be borne in mind that the INC has not supported the creation of a Jharkhand state) that Jharkhandi governance must rest in Ranchi. A bicycle mechanic in the region emphatically put it: “सरकार तो रंची में होना ही चाहिये” [Government must definitely be at Ranchi]. It was noticed that many of the common persons of the region did not understand the complicated political reorientation that has become the hallmark of Jharkhandi politics; some of them thought that the old Jharkhand Party still exists. However, they seemed to be of the firm opinion that if the affairs of the Jharkhand region were administered from Ranchi, it would benefit them immensely. Not all of the respondents were able to provide a reason for this belief but their responses can be summarised as follows:

- (a) The closer the government is, the simpler it is to influence and control it. If officials personally known to the general population are in control of the affairs of the government, then there is a better chance of efficient delivery by the policy mechanism.
- (b) Some respondents believed that geographical proximity of the government would make it easier for them to pursue matters that otherwise take months to be processed.

(c) Apart from the very involved political activists, no respondents from the general population pointed to the unique identity of the region. However, their emphatic responses to the question if they wanted the government to be based at Ranchi, indicates that they are aware of the difference of the region from the rest of Bihar. They are also acutely aware of their distance – both physical and psychological – from the existing government at Patna and New Delhi. The populace no doubt has a feeling of alienation and regards the government and its policy machinery as remote and inaccessible.

The political leaders of the regions support some degree of political autonomy irrespective of their party affiliations. Some of them seem to think that it would be better to have a union territory, others support a separate state while yet others seek greater autonomy within Bihar. Marxist leaders point to the fundamental flaws in the whole structure of economic relations whereas the JMM leaders seek to secure a state by demonstrating the scope of development with the help of the JAAC. The fact remains that no one seems to be satisfied with the present arrangements. In fact, dissatisfaction over the way in which the whole question of the JAAC has been treated by the Bihar government has already set in. The JMM leaders pointed out in 1996 that election to the Council have not been held despite more than a year having passed. In the meantime, the Council is composed of Bihar government's nominees and the powers and funds earmarked for it have not been transferred. Shibu Soren, the current Chairman of the Executive Committee of the JAAC and the leader of the JMM has been threatening another economic blockade over the issue of transfer of economic and financial powers to the JAAC. The involvement of some of the JMM MPs, including Soren, in a corruption scandal has harmed their position and it has been losing electoral and popular support to the BJP which has been promising a separate state.

The political dynamics of Bihar and the Jharkhand region have been changing very fast in the last year or so. After the field trip, some crucial developments have taken place. The Chief Minister who was so adamant against the creation of a state in Jharkhand, Laloo Prasad Yadav, was charged with corruption and arrested. During the events leading to his arrest, the Janata Dal split and he formed a new party called Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD). For this new RJD

government to survive, the support of Jharkhandi MLAs was crucial. Consequently, the JMM MLAs supported the new government and in return secured the passing of a resolution in the Vidhan Sabha which recommended to the Union government that a separate state must be created in Jharkhand. This resolution was passed on 23 July 1997.⁸⁴

On the development front, there seems little likelihood of major improvements under the still powerless JAAC. The structure of the JAAC ensures meddling by Patna which will fuel the demands for a separate state. The unrest over the JAAC promises to fester for a long time. In the political climate of unstable and corruption ridden governments, the only thing that stays constant is the demand for greater autonomy culminating in a separate state.

⁸⁴ Times of India, Internet edition at <http://www.timesofindia.com>.

Annex to Chapter VII

Subjects devolved to the JAAC under the JAAC Act 1994 and its Corresponding Entry in the Eleventh Schedule of the Constitution

JAAC Act ⁸⁵		Eleventh Schedule of the Constitution ⁸⁶	
Entry Number on the List and Subject		Entry Number on the List and Subject	
1.	Public health	23	Health and Sanitation including Hospitals, Primary Health Centres and Dispensaries
2.	Hospital, Dispensary and Nurses Training		Partly included in number 23.
3.	Tourism		Partly included in number 29
4.	Vocational Education	18	Technical Training and Vocational Education
5.	Agriculture	1	Agriculture including agricultural extension
6	Construction and Maintenance of Rural Roads	13	Roads, culverts, bridges, ferries, water ways and other means of communication
7.	Cremation and burial Grounds		Partly included in number 29
8.	Hat, Market and Fairs	22	Market and fairs
9.	Minor Irrigation	3	Minor Irrigation, Water Management and Watershed development
10.	Public Health, Engineering and Sanitation	11	Corresponds to section 23 Drinking Water
11.	Dairy Development	4	Animal Husbandry, Dairying and Poultry
12.	Fisheries	5	Fisheries
13.	Bee-Keeping	-	-
14.	Sericulture		
15.	Primary and Secondary (up to plus two) Education	17	Education including Primary and Secondary Schools
16.	Management of Land and Building under the ownership of the Council	2	Land Improvement, Implementation of Land Reforms, Land Consolidation and Soil Conservation
17.	Rural Development	14 10 16	Rural electrification including distribution of electricity Rural housing Poverty alleviation programme
18.	Small and Cottage Industries	8 9	Small Scale industries including Food Processing Industries Khadi, Village and Cottage Industries
19.	Minor Minerals	-	-
20.	All Programmes of Welfare Department	24 25 26 27	Family Welfare Women and Child Development Social Welfare including welfare of the handicapped and the mentally retarded Welfare of the Weaker Section and in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes

⁸⁵ Jharkhand Area Autonomous Council Act, 1994, op. cit., Schedule 3.

⁸⁶ *The Constitution (Seventy-third Amendment) Act 1992*, New Delhi, 1993.

21.	All Programmes relating to Urban Development	-	-
22.	Repairs, Renovation and maintenance of Medium and Minor Irrigation Projects		Included in number 3.
23.	Forest (excluding settlement)	6 7	Social forestry and farm forestry Minor forest produce
24.	The use of Canal Water for Irrigation purposes, excluding canals which pertain to medium and major projects		Included in number 3.
25.	Recommendation for the settlement of available Government land for Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, Government Primary, High and plus two schools, Government Hospitals and Cottage and Small Scale Industries		Partly corresponds to number 4
26.	Cattle pound	-	-
27.	Implementation of Externally aided projects relating to specified subjects of the Council and Regional Planning	-	-
28.	Tribal Sub-Plan and Welfare	-	-
29.	Cultural Affairs including Theatre and Drama	20 21	Libraries Cultural Activities
30.	Sports		
31.	Youth Welfare		Included in number 26
32.	Animal Husbandry		Included in number 4.
33.	Vital Statistics	-	-
34.	Weights and Measures		
35.	Local Transport		
36.	Food and Civil Supplies		
37.	Flood Control for Village protection		Included in number 3.
38.	Tribal Welfare	-	-
39.	Public Works		Included in numbers 3 & 29 as well in some others
40.	Municipal corporation, Improvement Trust, District Board and Other Local Self-government and Village Administration	-	-
41.	Panchayats	-	-
42.	Recommendation to the State Government with regard to Electricity		Included partially in numbers 14.
		12	Fuel and Fodder
		15	Non-conventional energy sources
		19	Adult and non-formal education
		28	Public distribution system
		29	Maintenance of community assets

Chapter VIII

Conclusions

This study of the relationship between the dynamics of development policy implementation and the crystallisation of an ethnic identity using the Modified Resource Dependence Model has yielded significant insights into the avenues by which State action influences formation and/ or crystallisation of ethnic identities. It also points to significant maladies in the process of development planning and implementation in India.

The Jharkhandi identity draws upon cultural differences premised on a collection of selected historical facts and constructs and is rooted in the political discourse which emerged in the colonial and post-colonial India under the influence of nationalist thought. The autonomous forms of community formation by the nationalist leaders during the anti-colonial struggle had repercussions for 'sub-national' ethnic communities who utilised cultural premises and symbolism similar to the ones utilised by the nationalist leadership at the national level to create a politically pertinent identity. Such a process occurred in the Jharkhand region where the educated elite created a Jharkhandi identity which was premised on the uniqueness of the tribal cultural heritage and way of life. The Jharkhandi community was seen as distinct from all other such communities (for instance, the lingual communities that emerged in many parts of India) and sought political recognition (as had been extended to the lingual communities). This identity showed a remarkable ability to respond to new ground realities as witnessed in the redefinition of a *diku* due to the changing demographic profile of the region. The premise of tribal culture and heritage was construed to represent all the inhabitants of the geographical region of Jharkhand and not merely the tribal inhabitants. Thus, the identity became more inclusive than exclusive (unlike most other identities which are more exclusive than inclusive). The Jharkhandi identity also successfully utilised

other grounds for political mobilisation, notably the declining development profile of the Jharkhand region, to tap into the tribal and non-tribal popular support.

The post-colonial state in India adopted a rationalist-integrationist model of administration. The new administrative structures were framed with the objective of achieving the same ideals that the nationalist leadership had learnt to cherish from the colonial discourse. Consequently, significant strands of the colonial discourse continued in the independent Indian administration. However, this rationalist-integrationist premise of the post-colonial administrative structures also meant that the State was unable to respond adequately to the political demands from the newly articulated political identities premised on cultural factors. The lingual criterion of reorganisation of states adopted by the SRC was intended to enable a more efficient implementation of the rationalist-integrationist development planning and implementation. However, in some ways the criterion of language was a compromise between rational reorganisation and the need to give political recognition to some of the many 'sub-national' communities which had crystallised in independent India.

In the case of Jharkhand, another factor was to intervene in the politics of identity, i. e. the issue of development imbalances in the region. The support for the Jharkhandi parties was high in the first decade of independence as the development profile of the Jharkhand region was marginally better than Bihar as a whole during this period and there was popular support for the politics of the Jharkhandi identity. By the end of the 1950s, the developmental profile of the region became stagnant and sluggish. As the development problems became acute, popular support for the Jharkhandi political parties with a single-point agenda of the creation of a separate state, began to deteriorate. Hence, it can be deduced that the electorate chose faster development over the political recognition of the Jharkhandi identity, although the Jharkhandi leaders would have argued (and do so even today) that a separate state would not only lead to political recognition of the Jharkhandi identity but also to better long-term development prospects.

The avenues for exchange of resources offered by the Jharkhandi parties were too narrow to yield a meaningful exchange of political, economic and information resources between the State and the electorate. Even if the electorate had invested all the political resources at its command in the Jharkhandi parties, the institutional arrangements in India precluded the possibility of their being able to secure a better policy response from the State.

The declining development profile of the region undermined the issue of a separate state and autonomy by the 1962 election. Hence, it is not out of place to speculate that if the state policy machinery had performed well after this period, the demand for autonomy might have been marginalised even further. However, since the politics of identity does not always operate on such rational lines, nothing can be said conclusively.

The entry of national parties onto the political stage of Jharkhand beginning in the 1960s, coincided with a period of declining development profile. The electorate invested a great deal of political support in the national parties, especially the INC, in the hope of securing a better public policy response to the development problems in the region. However, there were only brief periods of relatively improved performance of the policy machinery, that too in certain development indicators only. Besides, during such periods as well, public policy demonstrated a better performance in Bihar as a whole than the Jharkhand region except with regard to the ST population under the TSP. The TSP approach began in the mid-1970s when the issue of underdevelopment was a problem for the entire region and not just the ST population. Moreover, the ST population was just over a quarter of the total population of the Jharkhand region. Hence, the new policy initiatives failed to quell the political aspirations of the Jharkhandi identity which by now had become a peculiar mixture of regional, cultural and ethnic identity with the declining development profile providing additional grounds for political mobilisation. The hope of a more balanced exchange of resources between the electorate and the State within the avenues offered by the national parties did not show adequate results. Furthermore, the Jharkhand region gradually came to contribute a very large proportion to the state exchequer without receiving reciprocal investment in

developmental activities. What made the Jharkhandi electorate even more resentful was the fact that the Jharkhand region, with its vast mineral reserves, contributed substantially to the economic well being of the entire country but was being treated like an internal colony.

Ironically, the same developmental imbalances which had earlier overshadowed the issues of identity and autonomy in the 1960s and 1970s, were the reason for a renewal in the popular support for a separate state in the mid-1980s. There emerged a strong correlation between the declining development profile and this new phase of demand for a separate province in the Jharkhand region. In some ways, this is reminiscent of the anti-colonial struggle. The population of the Jharkhand region came to see the Bihar government as an oppressive regime from which redemption is possible only with the creation of a separate state.

The State sought to underplay the threat to its legitimacy from the Jharkhandi identity by interpreting the movement as having its base in the developmental imbalances in the Jharkhand region. The over-sensitivity of the Indian state to what it perceives as a threat to national integrity had a role to play in this. It has not been able to reconcile to the fact that regional cultural identities do not necessarily threaten the national identity and it is possible for individuals and communities to have multiple identities. The Jharkhandi identity has however, been able to arrive at a balance between the regional-cultural ethnic identity and national identity which is expressed in the JMM's slogan: *Jai Jharkhand, Jai Bharat* [Glory to Jharkhand, Glory to India]. The two identities are thus construed as mutually complementary.

The rationalist-integrationist bureaucratic State's inability and unwillingness to respond to the political aspirations of the Jharkhandi identity has resulted in its attempts to interpret the Jharkhand movement in purely developmental terms. The question of development is no doubt, closely linked to the Jharkhandi identity because popular support for the demand for autonomy had re-emerged due to the failure of the public policy mechanism to fulfil its part of the exchange of resources. Further, the Jharkhandi political opinion was quick to point out that the failure of the developmental policy in the existing political and administrative arrangements

provided even more grounds for the creation of a separate province. The exchange of information resources between the State and the Jharkhandi political opinion which followed led to the 'development-deficit' definition of the character of the Jharkhand movement being adopted by the Jharkhandi political formations as well. It not only provided them with an additional basis for the mobilisation of the non-tribal component of the population of the region but this acceptance on the part of the State that all was not well in the Jharkhand region also bestowed the long eluding political legitimacy on the movement. The falling development profile, changing demographic balance in Jharkhand and legislative impotence of the Jharkhandi political groups led the Jharkhandi identity to become inextricably linked to the developmental profile of the region.

The population of Jharkhand has experimented in vain with political parties of all hues and colours in the hope of securing a balanced exchange of resources. However, the political machinery has let them down once too often. Consequently, during the current phase of identity articulation since mid-1980s, they have not been too enthusiastic in extending all their electoral support to the Jharkhandi parties. The electorate of Jharkhand therefore, has adopted a three-pronged approach as a part of a strategic exchange of resources. It continues to extend political patronage to the national parties in the elections for the parliamentary seats as only the Parliament has the powers to create a new state. Some of this patronage is also extended to the Jharkhandi parties to represent the Jharkhandi opinion in the Parliament. At the state level, sizeable support is extended to the party that is likely to enter office at Patna in the hope of securing a better public policy response pending the creation of a territorial state in the Jharkhand region. However, the third strand of the political resources at the command of the electorate is invested in the agitational politics of the JCC, the JMM and the AJSU. The demonstrations and agitations draw the support of a large number of the Jharkhandi populace. This was witnessed in the economic blockades of the late 1980s and early 1990s. The disruption in the transportation of vital minerals from the region had often been met by coercive actions of the State which in turn, undermined the legitimacy of the regime. Consequently, the State was forced to seek out a mutually acceptable public policy

response to the situation. Thus, a more meaningful exchange of resources emerged. This three-pronged strategic investment of political resources by the population of the Jharkhand region has yielded better results. The JAAC was created as a result of this phase of the exchange of resources.

However, the creation of a regional developmental council is not the end of either the developmental problems or the politics of identity in the region. The Jharkhand issue promises to fester for sometime due to two broad reasons. Firstly, the creation of the JAAC is not an adequate devolution of powers to the local level. Hence, it can neither ensure an improved delivery by the public policy machinery nor satisfy the regionalist aspirations of the Jharkhandi population. Secondly, the fundamental imbalances in the existing bureaucratic delivery mechanism have been the absence of infrastructure to utilise the financial allocations and the lack of avenues for significant local inputs into the process of development planning. The new arrangements do not significantly alter this state of affairs. Therefore, even if a separate state is created in the Jharkhand region, unless a large-scale reorientation of delivery mechanisms is undertaken, the developmental problems of the region are unlikely to be solved.

As far as the politics of identity in the Jharkhand region is concerned, the creation of a separate state seems to be the only alternative as the population has lost faith in the ability and desire of Bihar government to effect significant improvements. The population of the region does not wish to continue living in an internal colony. The leadership of the JMM has made this amply clear:

झारखण्ड राज्य का निर्माण कर इस क्षेत्र की जनता के ह्वाथों में शासन सत्ता दिया जाए ताकि यहाँ की जनता अपना विकास खुद कर सके . . . झारखण्ड क्षेत्र की जातियों के लिए स्वायत्ता का अधिकार — झारखण्ड प्राप्त दिया जाना चाहिए ।¹

¹ Siby Soren, 'झारखण्ड राज्य का सवाल' [The Question of Jharkhand state] in Narayan, S., ed., *Jharkhand Movement: Origin and Evolution*, New Delhi, 1992, p. 19.

[The power of governance of this region must be transferred into the hands of the population of this region by creating the Jharkhand state so that the population of this region can bring about its own development . . . The right to autonomy for the *jatis* of Jharkhand region – Jharkhand province must be given.]

The dynamics of public policy implementation and the political process of the region have come to such a pass that nothing short of a new political unit with adequate autonomy will be able to solve the cause of unrest in the Jharkhand region. On 8 September 1992, the then Union Home Minister, S. B. Chavan, said at Pune that the “formation of either a separate state or a Union Territory is the only solution to the Jharkhand problem”.² This statement does not reflect the official position of the government or the INC but it certainly reflects the political reality of the region.

² Quoted in S. Narayan, ‘Introduction’ in Narayan, S., ed., *Jharkhand Movement: Origin and Evolution*, New Delhi, 1992, p. 17.

Annex 1

Statistical Annex

District-wise Population in Jharkhand 1951

District	Area (Sq. Miles)	Total Population	Males	Females
Santhal Parganas	5,452	2,322,092	1,172,594	1,149,498
Dhanbad	790	731,700	410,140	321,560
Hazaribagh	7,016	1,937,210	981,264	955,946
Palamau	4,896	985,767	498,564	487,203
Ranchi	7,159	1,861,207	938,255	922,952
Singbhum	4,508	1,480,816	752,424	728,392
Jharkhand Total	29,821	9,318,792	4,753,241	4,565,551
Bihar Total	70,330	40,225,947	20,223,675	20,002,272
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	42.40	23.16	23.50	22.82

Source: *Census of India 1951*, vol. V, Bihar Part II-A (Tables A, C, D & E series) – General Population Tables, Patna: Government Printing Press, n. d.

District-wise Scheduled Tribes Population in Jharkhand 1951

District	Total Population	Males	Females
Dhanbad	114,529	57,137	57,392
Hazaribagh	267,552	137,647	129,878
Palamau	172,027	82,401	89,626
Ranchi	1,125,802	566,507	559,295
Santhal Pargana	1,037,167	516,516	520,651
Singbhum	713,522	347,313	366,209
Jharkhand Total	3,430,599	1,707,521	1,723,051
Bihar Total	4,049,183	2,017,414	2,031,769
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	84.72	84.63	84.80
Jharkhand Percentage	36.81	35.92	37.74

Source: *Census of India 1951*, vol. V, Bihar Part II-A (Tables A, C, D & E series) – General Population Tables, Patna: Government Printing Press, n. d.

District-wise Infant Mortality and Birth & Death Rates in Jharkhand 1950

Districts	Total number of Live Births ¹	Total number of Deaths ¹	Infant Mortality ²	Infant Mortality Rate ² (per 1000 live Birth)	Birth Rate ³ (per 1000 Population)	Death Rate ³ (per 1000 Population)
Hazaribagh	25,062	16,362	1,491	59.49	14.31	9.34
Manbhum	37,990	23,036	1,372	36.11	18.69	11.34
Palamau	21,965	13,705	1,697	77.25	24.07	15.02
Ranchi	31,350	24,284	2,416	77.06	18.71	14.49
Santhal Pargana	23,161	19,843	1,784	77.02	10.36	8.50
Singbhum	18,729	12,050	931	49.70	16.36	10.53
Jharkhand Total/ Average	158,257	109,280	9,691	62.77	17.08	11.54
Bihar Total/ Average	714,376	461,335	57,945	81.11	19.01	12.36
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar/ Average	22.15	23.68	16.72	-	-	-

¹ Registered.

² Provisional Figures.

³ Based on 1941 calculations.

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1951*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1953, p. 46.

District-wise Output of Principal Crops (in thousands of tons) in Jharkhand 1949-50

Districts	Paddy	Wheat	Gram	Barley	Maize	Masoor	Arhar	Khesri	Peas	Sugar cane	Potato	Tobacco	Jute	Chilli
Santhal Pargana	345	2	8	4	35	0	7	21	2	1	2	0	1	0
Ranchi	323	1	3	1	4	0	5	0	0	0	2	0	0	0
Palamau	64	3	14	11	22	1	8	4	1	3	1	0	0	0
Hazaribagh	258	4	3	3	29	0	4	1	1	2	14	0	0	0
Manbhum	386	0	0	0	10	0	3	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Singhbhum	207	0	1	0	5	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
Jharkhand Total	1583	10	29	19	105	1	27	27	4	7	20	0	1	0
Bihar	3744	357	296	213	412	87	129	468	71	265	219	12	76	15
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	42.28	2.80	9.79	8.92	25.48	1.14	20.93	5.76	5.63	2.64	9.13	0	1.31	0

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1951*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1953, p. 22.

District-wise Land Improvement Loans Advanced To Agriculturists in Jharkhand 1950-51¹

District	Loan Advanced (Rupees)
Hazaribagh	286,012
Manbhum	503,817
Palamau	265,700
Ranchi	58,992
Santhal Pargana	589,978
Singhbhum	564,423
Jharkhand Total	2,268,922
Bihar Total	13,826,343
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	16.41

¹ Under the Land Improvement Loans Act, 1883, Agriculturists' Loans Act, 1884, Natural Calamities Loans Act and Gratuitous Relief.

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1951*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1953, p. 116.

District-wise Loans Disbursed for Reclamation of Wasteland and Areas of Wasteland Reclaimed in Jharkhand 1951-52

District	Land Improvement Loans Disbursed (Rupees)	Area of Waste Land Reclaimed (Acres)	
		By Manual Labour	By State Tractors
Dhanbad	50,200	401	-
Hazaribagh	72,539	282	-
Manbhum	145,247	1,451	-
Palamau	123,775	792	-
Ranchi	35,014	1,000	-
Santhal Pargana	754,484	3,255	-
Singhbhum	180,229	795	-
Jharkhand Total	1,361,488	7,976	-
Bihar	2,804,286	37,208	3,602
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	48.55	21.43	-

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1951*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1953, p. 27.

District-wise Distribution of In-door and Out-door Patients Treated in Public Medical Institutions Owned, Subsidised or Aided by Public Authorities in Jharkhand 1947

District	Number Indoor Patients Treated	Number Outdoor Patients Treated
Hazaribagh	5,317	224,267
Manbhum	5,265	270,838
Palamau	2,655	166,268
Ranchi	7,930	196,434
Santhal Pargana	3,822	190,441
Singhbhum	2,779	143,053
Jharkhand Total	27,768	1,191,301
Bihar Total	127,844	5,620,869
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	21.72	21.19

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1951*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1953, p. 70.

**District-wise Expenses of Public Medical Institutions Owned, Subsidised or Aided by Public Authorities in Jharkhand
1947**

District	Income (Rupees)	Expenditure (Rupees)
Hazaribagh	258,843	197,266
Manbhum	275,303	226,404
Palamau	53,084	47,962
Ranchi	290,802	275,724
Santhal Pargana	1,28,296	90,325
Singhbhum	127,154	121,317
Jharkhand Total	1,033,483	958,998
Bihar Total*	10,797,502	4,712,237
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	9.57	20.35

* Figures for Saharsa are not available.

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1951*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1953, p. 70.

District-wise Municipal Councils' Income and their Expenditure on Primary Education in Jharkhand 1949-50

District	Number of Municipalities	Population within Municipal Limits	Total Income (excluding opening balance) (Rupees)	Total Expenditure (Rupees)	Percentage of Total Expenditure on Primary Schools to Total Income
Hazaribagh	3	60,003	387,052	284,447	35.10
Manbhum	4	68,337	597,382	457,045	33.60
Palamau	1	14,198	218,718	219,895	37.80
Ranchi	3	92,425	734,021	720,407	33.50
Santhal Pargana	4	68,412	581,754	559,642	26.63
Singhbhum	4	184,033	464,753	448,671	43.90
Jharkhand Total/Average	19	487,408	2,920,680	2,690,107	35.92
Bihar Total	58	1,653,346 *	12,399,875	10,284,678	24.97
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	32.7	29.48	23.55	26.15	-

* Excludes Dehri Notified Area Committee.

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1951*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1953, p. 75.

Circle-wise Collection of Agricultural Income Tax in Jharkhand 1950-51

District	Tax Collected (Rupees)*
Dhanbad	4,969
Hazaribagh	55,471
Manbhum	75,417
Palamau	45,348
Ranchi	112,262
Santhal Pargana	154,281
Singhbhum	51,230
Jharkhand Total	498,978
Bihar Total	6,986,079
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	7.14

* Provisional figures.

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1951*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1953, p. 101.

Circle-wise Collection of Revenues under Electricity Act 1948 in Jharkhand - 1950-51

Circle	Tax Collected (Rupees)*
Dhanbad	156,906
Santhal Pargana	11,896
Ranchi	47,275
Hazaribagh	80,063
Palamau	7,021
Manbhum	20,956
Singhbhum	255,691
Jharkhand Total	579,808
Bihar Total	1,085,565
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	53.41

* Provisional figures

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1951*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1953, p. 109.

Circle-wise Collection of Sales Tax 1950-51

Circle	Tax Collected (Rupees)*
Dhanbad	3,670,516
Santhal Pargana	1,243,132
Ranchi	1,115,259
Hazaribagh	1,547,494
Palamau	503,529
Manbhum	1,050,705
Singhbhum	5,895,783
Jharkhand Total	15,026,418
Bihar Total	40,814,811
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	36.81

* Provisional figures

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1951*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1953, p. 103.

District-wise Number of Moneylenders' Licenses Issued and Moneys Advanced in Jharkhand 1950-51

District	Number of Licenses Issued	Amount of Loan Advanced (Rupees)		
		With Security	Without Security	Total
Hazaribagh	70	3,564,652	447,767	4,012,419
Manbhum	202	2,904,771	174,360	3,079,131
Palamau	51	348,917	19,888	368,805
Ranchi	115	728,840	301,945	1,030,785
Santhal Pargana	291	223,309	266,205	489,514
Singhbhum	399	444,688	322,321	767,009
Jharkhand Total	1,128	8,215,177	1,532,486	9,747,663
Bihar Total*	4,996	153,090,492*	5,792,081	158,882,573
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	22.57	5.36	26.45	6.13

* Figures from Muzzafarpur and Darbhanga include the figures for loans advanced without security as well.

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1951*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1953, p. 130.

District-wise Livelihood Classes in Jharkhand 1951*

Districts	Agricultural and Related Activities			Non- Agricultural Activities		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
Santhal Parganas	2,131,032	1,067,743	1,063,289	191,060	104,851	86,209
Dhanbad	352,943	177,666	175,277	378,757	232,474	146,283
Hazaribagh	1,650,708	822,075	828,633	286,502	159,189	127,313
Palamau	898,191	451,250	446,941	87,576	47,314	40,262
Ranchi	1,666,917	833,297	833,620	194,290	104,958	89,332
Singhbhum	1,107,657	547,927	559,730	373,159	204,497	168,662
Jharkhand Total	7,807,448	3,899,958	3,907,490	1,511,344	853,283	658,061
Bihar Total	34,611,254	17,189,156	17,422,098	5,614,693	3,034,519	2,580,174
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	22.55	22.68	22.42	26.91	28.11	25.50
Jharkhand Percentage	83.78	82.04	85.58	16.21	17.95	14.41
Bihar Percentage	86.04	84.99	87.10	13.95	15.00	12.89

* The 1951 Census differed from the earlier ones because "the 1941 table gave distribution of population of each district by the main communities, this table gives distribution of population of each district according to . . . livelihood classes. . ." [*Census of India 1951*, vol. I - India, Patna, n. d., p.333] It classified the population according to Self-supporting, Non-earning Dependent and Earning Dependent in Agricultural and Non-agricultural sectors. This figure is for the total population and not workers only as in later years.

Source: *Census of India 1951*, vol. V, Bihar Part II-B Tables - Economic Tables, Patna, Government Printing Press, 1953.

District-wise Occupational Patterns in Jharkhand 1951*

Districts	Agricultural and Related Activities			Non- Agricultural Activities		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
Dhanbad	131,227	90,103	41,124	189,133	158,766	30,367
Hazaribagh	572,900	410,979	161,921	99745	78,113	21632
Palamau	306,513	216,659	89,854	29,513	23,073	6,440
Ranchi	603,076	392,413	210,663	59,413	47,753	11,660
Santhal Parganas	1,064,026	637,688	426,338	89,372	59,488	29,884
Singbhum	413,364	278,056	135,308	132,267	110,132	22,135
Jharkhand Total	3,091,106	2,025,898	1,065,208	599,443	477,325	122,118
Bihar Total	12,451,892	8,605,463	3,846,429	1,892,303	1,486,559	405,744
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	24.82	23.54	27.69	31.67	32.10	30.09
Jharkhand Percentage	33.17	42.62	23.33	6.43	10.04	2.67
Bihar Percentage	30.95	42.55	19.22	4.70	7.35	2.02

*The 1951 Census differed from the earlier ones because "the 1941 table gave distribution of population of each district by the main communities, this table gives distribution of population of each district according to . . . livelihood classes. . ." [*Census of India 1951*, vol. I - India, Patna, n. d., p.333] It classified the population according to Self-supporting, Non-earning Dependent and Earning Dependent in Agricultural and Non-agricultural sectors. This figure is for the total population and not workers only as in later years. Therefore, these figures have been arrived at by subtracting Non-earning Dependents from the figures for the categories of Agricultural and Non-agricultural classes. This is the closest figure that can be calculated for the category of workers in the two sectors in the year 1951.

Source: *Census of India 1951*, vol. V, Bihar Part II-B Tables - Economic Tables, Patna: Government Printing Press, 1953.

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District-wise Livelihood Classes by Educational Standards in Jharkhand 1951*

District/ Educational Standards	Agriculture-Related Activities			Non- Agricultural Activities		
	Person	Male	Female	Persons	Male	Female
Bihar Total						
Literate	3,053,967	2,671,054	382,913	1,133,318	856,850	276,468
Middle School	265,033	234,797	30,236	205,991	171,255	34,736
Matriculate	54,869	50,798	4,071	94,502	84,056	10,446
Intermediate	10,408	9,713	695	26,348	23,335	3,013
Graduate and Others #	27,310	25,340	1,970	50,107	45,701	4,406
Jharkhand Total @						
Literate	539,007	451,214	87,793	613,303	532,367	80,936
Middle School	50,595	39,447	11,148	47,446	38,786	8,660
Matriculate	9,481	8,279	1,202	34,800	30,757	4,043
Intermediate	1,283	1,126	157	6,133	5,321	812
Graduate and Others #	2,732	2,587	145	10,856	9,652	1,204
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar						
Literate	17.64	16.89	22.92	54.11	62.13	29.27
Middle School	19.09	16.80	36.86	23.03	22.64	24.93
Matriculate	17.27	16.29	29.52	36.82	36.59	38.70
Intermediate	12.32	11.59	22.58	23.27	22.80	26.94
Graduate and Others #	10.00	10.20	7.36	21.66	21.11	27.32
Jharkhand Percentage						
Literate	6.90	11.56	2.24	40.57	62.39	12.29
Middle School	0.64	1.01	0.28	3.13	4.54	1.31
Matriculate	0.12	0.21	0.03	2.30	3.60	0.61
Intermediate	0.01	0.02	0.004	0.40	0.62	0.12
Graduate and Others #	0.03	0.06	0.003	0.71	1.13	0.18
Bihar Percentage						
Literate	8.82	15.53	2.19	20.18	28.23	10.71
Middle School	0.76	1.36	0.17	3.66	5.64	1.34
Matriculate	0.15	0.29	0.02	1.68	2.76	0.40
Intermediate	0.03	0.05	0.003	0.46	0.76	0.11
Graduate and Others #	0.07	0.14	0.01	0.89	1.50	0.17

*The 1951 Census differed from the earlier ones because "the 1941 table gave distribution of population of each district by the main communities, this table gives distribution of population of each district according to . . . livelihood classes. . ." [*Census of India 1951*, vol. I, India, Patna, n. d., p.333] It classified the population according to Self-supporting, Non-earning Dependent and Earning Dependent in Agricultural and Non-agricultural sectors. This figure is for the total population and not workers only as in later years. This Table has therefore, used the Tables on Livelihood Classes 1951 to calculate the proportion of population in various educational categories amongst the Agricultural and Non-agricultural Livelihood Classes. Therefore the cross-tabulation for Educational Levels is available only for the entire population and not the working population, as in later Censuses.

Includes Graduate, Postgraduate, Teaching, Engineering, Commerce, Agriculture, Veterinary, Legal, Medical and other qualifications.

@ Totals for the Jharkhand region have been arrived at by adding the relevant categories for each district of the region.

Source: *Census of India 1951*, vol. V, Bihar Part II-A Tables (A, C, D, & E series), Patna: Government Printing Press, n. d.

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District-wise Area Irrigated by Different Sources in Jharkhand (in Hectares) 1949-50

District	Government Canals	Private Canals	Tanks	Wells	Other Sources	Total Area Irrigated
Hazaribagh	Nil	404.69	1,214.08	5,665.72	1,214.08	8,093.88
Manbhum	Nil	Nil	228,652.37	2,428.16	Nil	231,080.53
Palamau	Nil	Nil	*	2,832.86	404.69	3,237.55
Ranchi	Nil	*	5,665.72	4,451.63	13,759.61	23,876.97
Santhal Pargana	Nil	22,258.19	82,152.97	5,665.72	31,566.16	141,643.06
Singbhum	Nil	*	10,522.05	*	809.38	11,736.13
Jharkhand Total	Nil	22,662.89	328,207.20	21,044.11	47,753.94	419,668.15
Bihar Total	403,480.37	259,004.45	465,398.62	260,623.23	875,758.80	2,264,265.50
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	0	8.75	70.52	8.07	5.41	18.53
Jharkhand Percentage	0	5.40	78.20	5.01	11.37	-
Bihar Percentage	17.81	11.43	20.55	11.51	38.67	-

* Negligible.

Totals may not tally due to rounding off of figures to the nearest thousands in the source and due to conversion of figures Acres in the source to Hectares for comparative purposes. Factor used is 2.471 Acres equals 1 Hectare.

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1951*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1953, p. 15.

District-wise Population in Jharkhand 1961

District	Area (Sq. Miles)	Total Population	Males	Females
Dhanbad	1,114	1,158,610	646,597	512,013
Hazaribagh	7,016	2,396,411	1,203,503	1,192,908
Palamau	4,925	1,187,789	598,600	589,189
Ranchi	7,047	2,138,565	1,076,251	1,062,314
Santhal Pargana	5,470	2,675,203	1,351,149	1,324,054
Singbhum	5,191	2,049,911	1,045,801	1,004,110
Jharkhand Total	30,763	11,606,489	5,921,901	5,684,588
Bihar Total	67,196	46,455,610	23,301,449	23,154,161
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	45.78	24.98	25.41	24.55

Source: *Census of India 1961*, Paper I of 1962 - Bihar, Patna: Government Printing Press, n. d.

District-wise Scheduled Tribes Population in Jharkhand 1961

District	Total Population	Males	Females
Dhanbad	128,385	66,890	61,495
Hazaribagh	270,693	137,295	133,398
Palamau	228,589	113,901	114,688
Ranchi	1,317,513	650,668	666,845
Santhal Pargana	1,023,078	511,188	511,890
Singbhum	969,807	473,077	496,730
Jharkhand Total	3,938,065	1,953,019	1,985,046
Bihar Total	4,204,770	2,087,994	2,116,776
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	93.65	93.53	93.77
Jharkhand Percentage	33.92	32.97	34.91

Source: *Census of India 1961*, Paper I of 1962 - Bihar, Patna: Government Printing Press, n. d.

District-wise Infant Mortality and Birth & Death Rates in Jharkhand 1961

Districts	Total number of Live Births	Total number of Deaths	Infant Mortality	Infant Mortality Rate (per 1000 live Birth)	Birth Rate (per 1000 of Population)*	Death Rate (per 1000 of Population)*
Dhanbad	11,906	4,640	373	31.32	10.27	4.00
Hazaribagh	25,231	10,129	1,361	53.94	10.52	4.22
Palamau	18,658	9,028	2,058	110.30	15.71	7.60
Ranchi	23,086	12,411	1,822	78.92	10.79	5.80
Santhal Pargana	21,047	11,295	936	44.47	7.86	4.22
Singhbhum	17,459	6,533	607	34.76	8.51	3.16
Jharkhand Total/ Average	117,387	54,036	7,157	58.95	10.61	4.83
Bihar Total/ Average	458,442	229,442	39,891	87.01	9.86	4.94
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	14.87	23.55	17.94	-	-	-

*Mid-year population.

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1961*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 96.

District-wise Causes of Death in Jharkhand 1961-62

Districts	Cholera	Small Pox	Plague	Fever	Dysentery & Diarrhoea	Respiratory	Injury	All other Causes	Total
Dhanbad	34	6	0	2,801	238	145	158	2,258	4,640
Hazaribagh	162	102	10	7,439	259	291	240	1,626	10,129
Palamau	114	6	1	7,108	269	84	152	2,294	9,028
Ranchi	175	81	9	8,103	704	195	232	2,912	12,411
Santhal Pargana	118	34	13	8,240	223	589	165	1,913	11,295
Singhbhum	7	49	7	4,195	196	319	115	1,645	6,533
Jharkhand Total/ Average	610	278	40	37,886	1889	1623	1062	12,648	54,036
Bihar Total	8,883	786	78	158,155	5,101	5,189	3,246	48,004	229,442
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	6.86	35.36	51.28	23.95	37.03	31.27	32.71	23.34	23.55
Jharkhand Percentage	1.12	0.51	0.07	70.11	3.49	3.00	1.96	23.40	-
Bihar Percentage	3.87	0.34	0.03	68.93	2.22	2.26	1.14	20.92	-

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1961*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 97.

District wise Number of Children at School in Jharkhand 1961-62

District	Total	Males	Females
Dhanbad	202,118	152,017	50,101
Hazaribagh	179,424	148,235	31,189
Palamau	105,307	83,673	21,634
Ranchi	230,781	166,577	64,204
Santhal Pargana	231,635	182,676	48,859
Singhbhum	105,861	84,533	21,328
Jharkhand Total	1,055,126	817,711	237,315
Bihar Total	4,152,641	3,324,292	828,349
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	25.40	24.59	28.64

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1961*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 118.

District-wise Occupational Patterns in Jharkhand by Educational Standards in Jharkhand 1961

Districts/ Educational Standards	Agriculture-Related Activities ³			Non- Agricultural Activities ⁴		
	Person	Male	Female	Person	Male	Female
Jharkhand Total*						
Illiterate	4,006,423	1,851,523	2,154,900	897,371	632,792	264,579
Literate ¹	427,803	401,188	26,615	332,383	327,536	4,847
Middle School ²	103,657	95,155	8,502	117,603	114,123	3,480
Matriculate and above	6,808	6,689	119	111,356	108,206	3,150
Bihar Total						
Illiterate	12,231,525	7,029,907	5,201,618	2,846,728	1,916,005	930,723
Total Educated/ Literate	2,549,946	2,471,414	78,532	1,598,203	1,546,242	51,961
Literate ¹	2,060,789	1,993,749	67,040	981,999	948,537	33,462
Middle School ²	425,925	414,724	11,201	316,171	304,306	11,865
Matriculate and above	63,232	62,941	291	300,033	293,399	6,634
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar						
Illiterate	32.75	26.33	41.42	31.52	33.02	28.42
Literate ¹	20.75	20.12	39.70	33.84	34.53	14.48
Middle School ²	24.33	22.94	75.90	37.19	37.50	29.32
Matriculate and Above	10.76	10.62	40.89	37.11	36.88	47.48
Jharkhand Percentage						
Illiterate	88.17	78.66	98.39	63.30	55.37	95.22
Literate ¹	9.41	17.04	1.21	23.44	28.66	1.74
Middle School ²	2.28	4.04	0.38	8.29	9.98	1.25
Matriculate and above	0.14	0.28	0.005	7.85	9.46	1.13
Bihar Percentage						
Illiterate	82.75	73.99	98.51	63.91	55.45	93.16
Literate ¹	13.94	20.98	1.26	22.04	27.45	3.34
Middle School ²	2.88	4.36	0.21	7.09	8.80	1.18
Matriculate and above	0.42	0.66	0.005	6.73	8.49	0.66

* The Jharkhand Total has been arrived at by adding up the relevant categories of all the districts of the area.

¹ Without Educational Level.

² Primary or Junior Basic.

³ Includes Cultivators and Agricultural Labourers.

⁴ Includes those in Mining, Quarrying, Livestock, Forestry, Fishing, Hunting & Plantations, Orchards and Allied activities; Household Industry; Manufacturing other than Household Industry; Construction; Trade and Commerce; Transport, Storage and Communication; and Other services.

Source: *Census of India 1961*, vol. IV, Bihar Part II-B (i) - General Economic Tables (Tables B-I to B-IV & B-VII), Patna: Government Printing Press, n. d.

District-wise Occupational Patterns in Jharkhand 1961

District	Agricultural and Related Activities ¹			Non- Agricultural Activities ²		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
Dhanbad	252,431	130,439	121,992	312,937	270,899	42,038
Hazaribagh	895,412	471,297	424,115	264,836	215,928	48,908
Palamau	474,735	269,447	205,288	92,610	72,600	20,010
Ranchi	1,014,637	496,804	517,833	190,282	143,067	47,215
Santhal Pargana	1,157,835	618,079	539,756	245,431	187,996	57,435
Singhbhum	748,632	367,480	381,152	311,413	249,167	62,246
Jharkhand Total	4,543,682	2,353,546	2,190,136	1,417,509	1,142,657	277,852
Bihar Total	14,780,446	9,500,296	5,280,150	4,454,119	3,455,113	999,006
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	30.74	24.77	41.47	31.82	33.07	27.81
Jharkhand Percentage	39.14	39.74	38.52	12.21	19.29	4.88
Bihar Percentage	31.81	40.77	22.80	9.58	14.82	4.31

¹ Includes Cultivators and Agricultural Labourers

² Includes those in Mining, Quarrying, Livestock, Forestry, Fishing, Hunting & Plantations, Orchards and Allied activities; Household Industry; Manufacturing other than Household Industry; Construction; Trade and Commerce; Transport, Storage and Communication; and Other services.

Source: *Census of India 1961*, vol. IV, Bihar Part II-B (i) - General Economic Tables (Tables B-I to B-IV & B-VII), Patna: Government Printing Press, n. d.

District-wise Output of Principal Crops in Jharkhand (in thousands of tons) 1961-62

Districts	Paddy	Wheat	Gram	Barley	Maize	Masoor	Arhar	Khesri	Peas	Sugar cane	Potato	Tobacco	Jute [#]	Chilli
Dhanbad	118	*	*	*	4	*	*	*	*	2	4	*	*	*
Hazaribagh	294	3	2	2	24	*	2	1	1	89	9	*	*	*
Palamau	105	8	19	14	20	*	6	10	1	78	2	*	Nil	*
Ranchi	335	1	2	*	6	*	4	1	*	3	4	*	*	*
Santhal Pargana	469	4	9	5	58	2	4	11	1	84	7	*	7	0
Singhbhum	387	1	2	*	9	*	1	2	*	1	*	*	*	*
Jharkhand Total	1708	17	34	21	121	2	17	25	3	257	26	--	7	*
Bihar	4335	513	296	253	826	75	89	521	54	6229	219	13	1264	14
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	39.40	3.31	11.48	8.30	14.64	2.66	19.10	48.07	5.55	4.12	11.87	0	0.5	0

[#] In thousands of bales of 400 pounds each.

* Less than 1000 tons.

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1961*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 49.

District-wise Land Improvement Loans Advanced To Agriculturists 1959-60[#]

District	Loans Advanced (Rupees)
Dhanbad	181,600
Hazaribagh	163,985
Palamau	103,126
Ranchi	93,090
Santhal Pargana	136,042
Singhbhum	715,000
Jharkhand Total	1,392,843
Bihar	32,663,478
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	4.26

[#] Distributed under Land Improvement Loan Act 1883, and Agriculturists' Loans Act, 1884.

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1961*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 267.

District-wise Loans Disbursed for Reclamation of Wasteland and Areas of Wasteland Reclaimed 1959-60

District	Land Improvement Loans Disbursed (Rupees)	Area of Waste Land Reclaimed (Acres)	
		By Manual Labour *	By State Tractors/ Private Enterprise/ Other Means
Dhanbad		163.53	Nil
Hazaribagh		73.70	330.31
Palamau		369.17	Nil
Ranchi		259.75	Nil
Santhal Pargana	136,042	235.95	Nil
Singhbhum		290.02	186.28
Jharkhand Total		1392.12	510.59
Bihar Total	32,663,478	7,638.70	510.59
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	36.25	18.22	100

* With assistance of Land Improvement Loans.

Totals may not tally due to rounding off of figures to the nearest thousands in the source.

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1961*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 55.

District-wise Net Area Irrigated from Different Sources (in Hectares) in Jharkhand 1961-62

District	Government Canals	Private Canals	Tanks	Wells	Other Sources	Total Area Irrigated
Dhanbad	*	*	3,642.25	809.38	404.69	4,856.33
Hazaribagh	809.38	*	6,879.80	9,712.66	4,856.33	22,258.19
Palamau	4,856.33	*	3,642.25	3,642.25	59,490.09	71,630.92
Ranchi	404.69	*	1,014.08	4,451.63	5,665.72	11,736.14
Santhal Parganas	809.38	1,618.77	59,894.78	8,498.58	23,472.28	94,293.81
Singhbhum	4,046.94	404.69	14,973.69	809.38	5,665.72	25,900.44
Jharkhand Total	10,926.75	2,023.47	90,246.87	27,923.91	99,554.84	230,675.87
Bihar Total	528,531.02	32,375.56	223,391.36	236,993.16	831,647.20	1,942,938.30
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	2.06	6.25	40.39	8.53	11.97	11.87
Jharkhand Percentage	4.73	0.87	39.12	12.10	43.15	-
Bihar Percentage	27.20	1.66	11.49	16.82	42.80	-

* Less than 404.69 Hectares.

Totals may not tally due to rounding off of figures to the nearest thousands in the source and due to conversion of figures from Acres in the source to Hectares for comparative purposes. Factor used is 2.471 Acres equals 1 Hectare.

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook*, 1961, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 44.

District-wise Figures for Registered Deeds of Sale in Respect of Rayati Holdings Having Occupancy Rights in Jharkhand 1961

District	Entire				In Part			
	Number	Area Transferred (in Acres)	Annual Payable to Landlord (Rupees)	Consideration Money (Rupees)	Number	Area Transferred (in Acres)	Annual Payable to Landlord (Rupees)	Consideration Money (Rupees)
Dhanbad	1	1	3	500	9,518	4,989	5,827	5,598,740
Hazaribagh	6	30	42	10,600	23,619	16,282	22,318	9,407,757
Palamau	77	182	335	50,443	6,123	10,028	11,967	2,882,697
Ranchi	8	46	36	18,500	4,978	8,630	9,066	6,384,515
Santhal Pargana	1,031	1,836	1,535	1,094,644	3,701	3,555	4,744	1,586,921
Singhbhum	2	3	4	2,150	6,112	3,721	5,081	3,509,527
Jharkhand Total	1,125	2,098	1,955	1,176,837	54,051	47,205	59,003	29,370,157
Jharkhand Average	187.50	349.66	325.8	1,961,395	9,008.50	7,867.50	58,997	4,895,026.20
Bihar	73,982	62,486	149,608	40,228,591	473,734	259,491	860,337	264,216,217
Bihar Average	6,623.36	5,489.81	13423	3,550,159.5	42,511.09	23,251.81	72,848.54	21,349,641.81

Totals may not tally due to rounding off in the source.

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1961*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 239.

Contd.

District-wise Number of Moneylenders' Licenses Issued, Number of Licenses in Force and Moneys Advanced in Jharkhand 1961-62

District	Number of Licenses Registered for the First Time		Number of Licenses in Force at the End of the Year		Amount of Loans Advanced (Rupees)				Total
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	With Security		Without Security		
					Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	
Dhanbad	100	141	575	788	561,211	766,008	40,006	79,300	1,446,525
Hazaribagh	72	87	441	308	340,948	348,416	35,091	253,471	977,926
Palamau	31	23	336	274	113,897	415,584	N/A	900	530,381
Ranchi	64	129	780	592	625,818	1,251,631	737,003	1,474,007	4,088,459
Santhal Pargana	30	176	591	3,323	7,252,402	66,811,776	3,221	8,249,389	82,316,788
Singhbhum	174	21	1,280	137	628,656	142,363	70,530	1,240	842,729
Jharkhand Total	471	577	4,003	5,422	9,522,932	69,735,778	885,851	10,058,307	90,202,808
Bihar Total	2,264	5,396	15,574	35,254	1,600,528,478	1,046,522,741	47,147,432	66,277,446	2,760,476,097
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	20.80	10.69	25.70	15.37	0.59	6.66	1.87	15.17	3.26

Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1961, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 241.

Circle-wise Collection of Agricultural Income Tax in Jharkhand 1961-62

District	Tax Collected (Rupees)
Dhanbad	22,215
Hazaribagh	102,109
Palamau	9,683
Ranchi	65,103
Santhal Pargana	122,693
Singhbhum	4,862
Jharkhand Total	326,665
Bihar Total	5,284,369
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	6.18

Totals may not tally due to rounding off in the source.

Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1961, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 213.

Circle-wise Collection of Sales Tax in Jharkhand 1961-62

Circle	Tax Collected (Rupees)
Dhanbad	10,867,816
Hazaribagh	2,400,294
Palamau	740,806
Ranchi	3,164,869
Santhal Pargana	1,354,414
Singhbhum	13,769,405
Jharkhand Total	32,297,604
Bihar Total	74,443,528
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	43.38

Totals may not tally due to rounding off in the source.

Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1961, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 215.

District-wise Length of PWD Roads in Jharkhand 1960

District	Total Mileage of PWD Roads (Kilometres)
Dhanbad	154
Hazaribagh	652
Palamau	363
Ranchi	600
Santhal Pargana	505
Singhbhum	335
Jharkhand Total	2,609
Bihar Total	6,951
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	37.53

Up to March 31.

Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1961, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 244.

District-wise Population in Jharkhand 1971

District	Area (Sq. Kms.)	Total Population	Males	Females
Dhanbad	2,994	1,466,417	818,460	647,957
Giridih	6,907	1,374,376	693,699	680,677
Hazaribagh	18,060	3,020,214	1,526,193	1,494,021
Palamau	12,677	1,504,350	766,257	738,093
Ranchi	18,331	2,611,445	1,323,303	1,288,142
Santhal Pargana	14,129	3,186,908	1,627,014	1,559,894
Singhbhum	18,447	2,437,799	1,254,993	1,182,806
Jharkhand Total	91,545	15,601,509	8,009,919	7,591,590
Bihar Total	173,876	56,353,369	28,846,944	27,506,425
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	52.64	27.68	27.76	27.59

Source: *Census of India 1971*, Series 4, Bihar Part II-A - General Population (Tables A-I, AII, AIII and PCA), Patna: Government Printing Press, n. d.

District-wise Scheduled Tribes Population in Jharkhand 1971

District	Total Population	Males	Females
Dhanbad	155,645	79,145	76,500
Hazaribagh	331,798	165,220	166,578
Palamau	287,150	145,353	141,797
Ranchi	1,516,698	753,615	763,083
Santhal Pargana	1,154,281	576,734	577,547
Singhbhum	1,124,317	557,017	567,300
Jharkhand Total	4,569,889	2,277,084	2,292,805
Bihar Total	4,932,767	2,462,265	2,470,502
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	92.64	92.47	92.80
Jharkhand Percentage	29.29	28.42	30.20

Source: *Census of India 1971*, Series 4, Bihar Part V-A Tables SC-I - IV (Part A & B) and SC-V (Part) - Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, Patna: Government Printing Press, n. d.

District-wise Occupational Patterns in Jharkhand 1971

District	Agricultural and Related Activities ¹			Non- Agricultural Activities ²		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
Dhanbad	174,629	159,014	15,615	317,934	292,653	25,281
Hazaribagh	689,376	587,530	101,846	209,061	192,089	16,072
Palamau	434,669	357,987	76,682	49,498	46,206	3,292
Ranchi	669,653	553,688	115,965	161,586	146,347	15,239
Santhal Pargana	911,552	774,612	136,940	132,406	120,641	11,765
Singhbhum	565,482	434,007	131,475	243,688	222,404	21,284
Jharkhand Total	3,445,361	2,866,838	578,523	1,114,173	1,020,340	92,933
Bihar Total	14,554,384	12,324,644	2,229,740	2,934,495	2,722,660	211,835
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	23.67	23.26	25.94	37.96	37.47	43.87
Jharkhand Percentage	22.08	35.79	7.62	7.14	13.90	1.22
Bihar Percentage	25.82	42.72	8.10	5.20	10.17	0.77

¹ Includes Cultivators; Agricultural Labourers and those in Livestock, Forestry, Fishing, Hunting & Plantations, Orchards and allied activities.

² Includes those in Mining & Quarrying; Manufacturing, Processing, Servicing & Repairs; Construction; Trade & Commerce; Transport, Storage & Communications and Other services.

³ There is a discrepancy in the Census data here since the Total population of Female Workers in Agriculture related activities in Bihar adds up to less than that of Jharkhand.

Source: *Census of India 1971*, Series 4 Bihar, Part II-B (i) - General Economic Tables (Tables B-I Part A and B-II), Patna: Government Printing Press, n. d.

District-wise Occupational Patterns by Educational Standards in Jharkhand 1971

Districts/ Educational Standards	Agriculture-Related Activities ⁴			Non- Agricultural Activities ⁵		
	Person	Male	Female	Person	Male	Female
Bihar Total						
Illiterate	11,412,858	9,209,797	2,203,061	1,240,979	1,067,887	173,092
Literate*	1,149,627	1,137,945	11,682	433,803	428,682	5,121
Middle School ¹	1,710,601	1,696,400	14,201	711,280	695,401	15,879
Matriculate	248,457	247,702	755	416,452	405,463	10,989
Intermediate ²	10,009	9,973	36	25,014	23,847	1,167
Graduate and Others ³	23,118	23,108	10	160,058	153,165	6,893
Jharkhand Total						
Illiterate	2,800,082	2,230,324	569,758	490,321	411,833	78,488
Literate*	230,738	226,250	4,488	129,655	127,969	1,686
Middle School ¹	351,863	345,865	5,998	262,818	257,221	5,597
Matriculate	30,930	30,666	264	159,479	154,422	5,057
Intermediate ²	1,736	1,721	15	10,645	10,311	334
Graduate and Others ³	2,098	2,098	0	61,274	57,909	3,365
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar						
Illiterate	24.53	24.21	25.86	39.51	38.56	45.34
Literate*	20.07	19.88	38.41	29.88	29.85	32.92
Middle School ¹	20.56	20.38	42.23	36.95	36.98	35.24
Matriculate	12.44	12.38	34.96	38.29	38.08	46.01
Intermediate ²	17.34	17.25	41.66	42.55	43.23	28.62
Graduate and Others ³	9.07	9.07	0	38.28	37.80	40.81
Jharkhand Percentage						
Illiterate	81.27	77.79	98.48	44.00	40.36	84.45
Literate*	6.69	7.89	0.77	11.63	12.54	1.81
Middle School ¹	10.21	12.06	1.03	23.58	25.20	6.02
Matriculate	0.89	1.06	0.04	14.31	15.13	5.44
Intermediate ²	0.05	0.06	0.002	0.95	1.01	0.35
Graduate and Others ³	0.06	0.07	0	5.49	5.67	3.62
Bihar Percentage						
Illiterate	78.41	74.72	98.80	42.28	39.22	81.71
Literate*	7.89	9.23	0.52	14.78	15.74	2.41
Middle School ¹	11.75	13.76	0.63	24.23	25.54	7.49
Matriculate	1.70	2.00	0.03	14.19	14.89	5.18
Intermediate ²	0.06	0.08	0.001	0.85	0.87	0.55
Graduate and Others ³	0.15	0.18	0.0004	5.45	5.62	3.25

* Without Educational Level.

¹ Includes Primary and Middle School.

² Includes Technical or Non-technical Diploma or Certificate not equal to Degree.

³ Includes those who hold a University Graduate or Postgraduate Degree or an Engineering and Technology, Medical, Agricultural, Veterinary and Dairying or Teaching Degree.

⁴ Includes Cultivators; Agricultural Labourers and those in Livestock, Forestry, Fishing, Hunting & Plantations, Orchards and allied activities.

⁵ Includes those in Mining & Quarrying; Manufacturing, Processing, Servicing & Repairs; Construction; Trade & Commerce; Transport, Storage & Communications and Other services.

Source: *Census of India 1971*, Series 4, Bihar Part II-B (ii) - General Economic Tables (Tables B-I Part B, B-II & B-VII to B-IX), Patna: Government Printing Press, n. d.

District-wise Area under Principal Crops in Jharkhand (in thousands of Hectares) 1974-75

Districts	Paddy	Wheat	Gram	Barley	Maize	Masoor	Arhar	Khesri	Peas	Sugar cane	Potato	Tobacco	Jute #	Chilli
Dhanbad	69	1	*	*	6	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Giridih	100	2	1	*	21	*	1	*	*	*	3	*	*	*
Hazaribagh	131	7	3	2	26	*	2	1	*	2	6	*	*	*
Palamau	100	20	28	17	47	3	16	6	1	3	2	*	*	1
Ranchi	478	12	6	1	15	*	11	2	1	3	6	*	*	*
Santhal Pargana	4532	27	11	5	65	3	5	2	*	1	5	*	*	*
Singbhum	356	5	4	*	11	*	1	4	*	*	1	*	*	*
Jharkhand Total	1,687	74	53	25	191	6	36	15	2	9	23	*	*	1
Bihar	5,228	1,478	248	192	881	146	107	622	28	141	115	9	105	11
Jharkhand as Percentage Of Bihar	32.26	5.00	21.37	13.02	21.67	4.10	5.78	2.41	7.14	6.38	20.0	0	0	9.09

* Nil or less than 500 Hectares

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1978*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., pp. 46-7. 49.

District-wise area under High Yielding Variety Crops in Jharkhand (in Acres) 1974-75

District	Rice	Wheat
Dhanbad	1,097	1,020
Giridih	6,862	2,049
Hazaribagh	801	6,399
Palamau	9,275	11,787
Ranchi	67,702	13,175
Santhal Pargana	66,507	52,989
Singhbhum	24,205	4,365
Jharkhand Total	176,449	91,784
Bihar Total	1,506,974	2,152,963
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	11.70	4.26

Total may not tally due to rounding off of figures in the source.

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1978*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 44.

District-wise Net Area Irrigated from Different Sources in Jharkhand (in Hectares) 1973-74

District	Government Canals	Private Canals	Tanks	Wells/ Tube-wells	Other Sources	Total Area Irrigated
Dhanbad	-- *	-- *	1,000	-- *	1,000	2,000
Giridih	-- *	-- *	1,000	4,000	-- *	6,000
Hazaribagh	1,000	2,000	2,000	9,000	3,000	16,000
Palamau	5,000	-- *	5,000	11,000	39,000	62,000
Ranchi	12,000	-- *	1,000	13,000	4,000	30,000
Santhal Pargana	7,000	-- *	16,000	7,000	11,000	41,000
Singhbhum	9,000	-- *	7,000	1,000	2,000	19,000
Jharkhand Total	34,000	2,000	33,000	45,000	60,000	176,000
Bihar Total	896,000	4,000	82,000	717,000	621,000	2,316,000
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	3.79	50	40.24	6.27	9.66	7.59
Jharkhand Percentage	19.31	1.13	18.75	25.56	34.09	-
Bihar Percentage	28.68	0.17	3.54	30.95	29.81	-

* Nil or less than 500 Hectares

Total may not tally due to rounding off of figures in the source.

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook, 1978*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., pp. 40-41.

District-wise Land Improvement Loans Advanced To Agriculturists in Jharkhand 1972-73

District	Loans Advanced (Rupees)
Dhanbad	577,160
Giridih	0
Hazaribagh	1,580,912
Palamau	1,059,430
Ranchi	2,627,875
Santhal Pargana	2,764,813
Singhbhum	613,720
Jharkhand Total	9,223,910
Bihar Total	57,918,086
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	15.92

* Under the Land Improvement Loans Act, 1883 and Agriculturists' Loans Act, 1884.

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1978*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 152.

Circle-wise Collection of Agricultural Income Tax in Jharkhand 1975-76

Circle	Tax Collected (Rupees)
Bokaro	1,000
Chaibasa	6000
Deoghar	119,000
Dhanbad	5,000
Giridih	1,000
Hazaribagh	2,000
Palamau	18,000
Ranchi	6,000
Singbhum	12,000
Jharkhand Total	170,000
Bihar Total	1,778,000
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	9.56

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1978*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 159.

District-wise Number of Electrified Villages in Jharkhand 1973*

District	Total Number of Electrified Villages
Dhanbad	207
Giridih	111
Hazaribagh	268
Palamau	336
Ranchi	134
Santhal Pargana	343
Singbhum	86
Jharkhand Total	1,485
Bihar Total	9,280
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	16.00

* As on 31 March 1973.

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1978*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 234.

Circle-wise Collection of Revenues under Electricity Act 1948 in Jharkhand 1975-76

Circle	Tax Collected (Rupees)
Bokaro	3,193,000
Chaibasa	2,879,000
Colliery	11,714,000
Dhanbad	6,452,000
Giridih	3,967,000
Hazaribagh	2,636,000
Palamau	503,000
Ranchi	4,879,000
Santhal Parganas (Deoghar)	889,000
Singbhum	23,574,000
Jharkhand Total	60,686,000
Bihar Total	86,256,000
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	70.35

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1978*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 159.

District-wise Length of PWD Roads in Jharkhand 1977-78

District	Total Length of PWD Roads ¹ (in Kilometres)
Dhanbad	226
Giridih	502
Hazaribagh	569
Palamau	779
Ranchi	1,006
Santhal Pargana	1,149
Singbhum	774
Jharkhand Total	5,005
Bihar Total	15,026
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	33.30

¹ Includes State Highways, Major District Roads and other Divisional Roads. National Highways' district-wise break-up is unavailable.

Source: *Bihar Statistical Handbook 1978*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 197.

District-wise Figures for Registered Deeds of Sale in Respect of Rayati Holdings Having Occupancy Rights in Jharkhand 1974

District	Entire				In Part			
	Number	Area Transferred (in Acres)	Annual Rent Payable to Landlord (Rupees)	Consideration Money (Rupees)	Number	Area Transferred (in Acres)	Annual Rent Payable to Landlord (Rupees)	Consideration Money (Rupees)
Dhanbad	0	0	0	0	26,491	7,530	9,272	26,356,173
Giridih	0	0	0	0	34,798	13,135	20,780	21,030,239
Hazaribagh	0	0	0	0	43,148	25,537	40,111	3,933,341
Palamau	1,268	1,350	1,850	2,514,634	22,988	1,546	19,565	31,877,998
Ranchi	0	0	0	0	16,489	13,535	14,061	43,395,342
Santhal Pargana	0	0	0	0	11,305	13,252	12,920	14,290,636
Singhbhum	0	0	0	0	24,119	8,815	13,733	22,702,355
Jharkhand Total	1,268	1,350	1,850	2,514,634	179,338	83,350	130,442	163,586,084
Bihar Total	94,129	43,942	177,069	141,953,017	817,131	816,771	1,145,442	1,443,940,925
Jharkhand Average	181.14	192.85	264.28	-	25,619.71	11,907.14	18,634.57	-
Bihar Average	3,036.14	1,417.48	5,711.90	-	26,359.06	26,347.45	36,949.74	-

Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1978, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 192.

District-wise Scheduled Tribes Occupational Patterns in Jharkhand 1961

	Agricultural and Related Activities ¹			Non- Agricultural Activities ²		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	90.51	85.67	95.34	90.47	89.96	91.55
Jharkhand Percentage	49.47	47.61	52.18	7.03	9.56	4.54
Bihar Percentage	51.65	51.98	51.33	7.27	9.93	4.65

¹ Includes Cultivators and Agricultural Labourers.

² Includes those in Mining, Quarrying, Livestock, Forestry, Fishing, Hunting & Plantations, Orchards and allied activities; Household Industry; Manufacturing other than Household Industry; Construction; Trade and Commerce; Transport, Storage and Communication; and Other services.

Source: Census of India 1961, vol. IV, Bihar Part V-A - Special Tables for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, Patna: Government Printing Press, n. d.

District-wise Scheduled Tribes Occupational Patterns in Jharkhand 1971

District	Agricultural and Related Activities ¹			Non- Agricultural Activities ²		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
Dhanbad	37,315	31,954	5,361	17,981	13,047	4,934
Hazaribagh	93,027	79,787	13,240	14,933	11,200	3,733
Palamau	93,313	78,325	14,988	3,796	3,203	593
Ranchi	445,147	365,511	79,636	46,674	38,860	7,814
Santhal Pargana	402,496	327,792	74,704	14,460	11,123	3,337
Singhbhum	362,881	270,346	92,535	44,952	36,913	8,039
Jharkhand Total	1,434,179	1,153,715	280,464	142,796	114,346	28,450
Bihar Total	1,563,065	1,252,056	311,009	148,285	117,329	30,956
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	96.75	92.14	90.17	96.29	97.45	91.90
Jharkhand Percentage	31.38	50.66	12.23	3.12	5.02	1.24

¹ Includes Cultivators; Agricultural Labourers and those in Livestock, Forestry, Fishing, Hunting & Plantations, Orchards and allied activities.

² Includes those in Mining & Quarrying; Manufacturing, Processing, Servicing & Repairs; Construction; Trade & Commerce; Transport, Storage & Communications and Other services.

Source: Census of India 1971, Series 4, Bihar Part V-ASC-I-IV (Part A & B) and ST I-V (Part A & B) - Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, Patna: Government Printing Press, n. d.

District-wise Scheduled Tribes Educational Levels in Jharkhand 1971

District	Illiterate			Literate ¹			Middle School ²			Matriculate and Above		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
Dhanbad	132,246	56,932	75,314	6,986	6,272	714	4,729	4,319	410	629	567	62
Hazaribagh	312,069	148,328	163,741	10,671	9,139	1,532	7,725	6,745	980	1,333	1,008	325
Palamau	261,100	123,388	137,712	16,136	13,724	2,412	8,926	7,388	1,538	988	853	135
Ranchi	1,250,651	563,715	686,936	118,250	81,780	36,470	129,969	94,578	35,391	17,837	13,551	4,286
Santhal Pargana	1,070,062	505,496	564,566	43,685	36,628	7,057	37,104	31,623	5,481	3,430	2,987	443
Singhbhum	984,840	437,368	547,472	66,665	55,813	10,852	64,121	56,026	8,095	8,681	7,810	871
Jharkhand Total	4,010,968	1,835,227	2,175,741	262,393	203,356	59,037	252,574	200,679	51,895	32,898	26,776	6,122
Bihar Total	4,358,575	2,007,955	2,350,620	275,481	214,845	60,636	263,997	211,058	52,939	34,714	28,407	6,307
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	92.02	91.39	92.56	95.24	94.65	97.36	95.67	95.08	98.02	94.76	94.25	97.06
Jharkhand Percentage	87.76	80.59	94.89	5.74	8.93	2.57	5.52	8.81	2.26	0.71	1.17	0.26

¹ Without Educational Level

² Primary or Junior Basic

Source: *Census of India 1971*, Series 4, Bihar Part V-A (SCI-IV Part A & B; SCI-V Part) - Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, Patna: Government Printing Press, n. d.

District-wise Population in Jharkhand 1981

District	Area (Sq. Kms.)	Total	Males	Females
Dhanbad	2,996	2,115,010	1,166,126	948,884
Giridih	6,892	1,731,462	876,172	855,290
Hazaribagh	11,165	2,198,310	1,121,263	1,077,047
Palamau	12,749	1,917,528	979,955	937,573
Ranchi	18,266	3,070,432	1,563,821	1,506,611
Santhal Pargana	14,206	3,717,528	1,899,410	1,818,118
Singhbhum	13,440	2,861,799	1,473,697	1,388,102
Jharkhand Total	79,714	17,612,069	9,080,444	8,531,625
Bihar Total	173,887	69,914,734	35,930,560	33,984,174
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	45.84	25.19	25.27	25.10

Source: *Census of India 1981*, Series 1, India Part II-B (i) - Primary Census Abstract, General Population, Patna: Government Printing Press, n. d.

District-wise Scheduled Tribes Population in Jharkhand 1981

District	Total Population	Males	Females
Dhanbad	192,777	99,280	93,497
Giridih	224,878	113,298	111,580
Hazaribagh	198,792	101,231	97,561
Palamau	351,432	177,229	174,203
Ranchi	1,732,032	859,862	872,170
Santhal Pargana	1,367,868	690,213	677,655
Singhbhum	1,261,504	628,712	632,792
Jharkhand Total	5,329,283	2,669,825	2,659,458
Bihar Total	5,801,867	2,915,492	2,886,375
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	91.85	91.57	91.85
Jharkhand Percentage	30.25	29.40	31.17

Source: *Census of India 1981*, Series 4, Bihar Part II-B - Primary Census Abstract, Patna: Government Printing Press, n. d. and *Bihar Through Figures 1981*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1984.

District-wise Distribution of In-door and Out-door Patients Treated in Public Medical Institutions Owned, Subsidised or Aided by Public Authorities in Jharkhand 1979

District	Number Indoor Patients Treated	Number Outdoor Patients Treated
Dhanbad	Not Available	Not Available
Giridih	42,551	124,088
Hazaribagh	22,254	192,741
Palamau	16,809	354,403
Ranchi	Not Available	Not Available
Santhal Pargana	21,592	619,201
Singhbhum	Not Available	Not Available
Jharkhand Total	103,206	1,290,433
Bihar Total	448,098	5,861,169
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	23.03	22.01

Source: *Bihar Through Figures 1981*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1984, pp. 164-5.

District-wise Occupational Patterns in Jharkhand 1981

District	Agricultural and Related Activities ¹			Non- Agricultural Activities ²		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
Dhanbad	153,962	136,044	17,918	480,819	426,935	53,884
Giridih	339,468	288,817	50,651	249,941	150,497	99,444
Hazaribagh	421,255	348,079	73,176	325,889	213,681	112,208
Palamau	527,745	410,160	117,585	152,610	94,107	58,503
Ranchi	802,313	579,887	222,426	479,676	248,011	231,665
Santhal Pargana	988,297	804,612	183,685	524,741	245,789	278,952
Singhbhum	586,016	421,570	164,446	536,877	347,344	189,533
Jharkhand Total	3,819,056	2,989,169	829,887	2,750,553	1,726,364	1,024,189
Bihar Total	16,409,058	13,674,163	2,734,895	6,208,027	4,355,278	1,852,749
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	23.27	21.85	30.34	44.30	39.63	55.27
Jharkhand Percentage	21.68	32.91	9.72	15.61	19.01	12.00
Bihar Percentage	23.47	38.05	8.04	8.87	12.12	5.45

¹ Includes Cultivators and Agricultural Labourers.

² Includes those in Household Industry, Processing, Servicing, Repairs and Other workers.

Source: *Census of India 1981*, Series 1, India Part II-B (i) - Primary Census Abstracts, General Population, New Delhi: Census Commissioner of India, n. d.

Contd.

District-wise Occupational Patterns of Main Workers by Educational Standards in Jharkhand 1981¹

Educational Standards	Agriculture-Related Activities ⁷			Non- Agricultural Activities ⁸		
	Person	Male	Female	Person	Male	Female
Jharkhand Total						
Illiterate	2,986,465	2,178,429	808,036	653,132	531,476	121,656
Literate ²	262,722	253,406	9,316	145,516	142,333	3,183
Middle School ³	490,228	472,491	17,737	366,154	358,944	7,210
Matriculate ⁴	117,778	115,928	1,850	291,177	281,119	10,058
Intermediate ⁵	12,657	12,526	131	96,727	91,078	5,649
Graduate and Others ⁶	5,196	5,128	68	117,675	109,516	8,159
Bihar Total						
Illiterate	12,332,523	9,646,037	2,686,486	1,511,132	1,265,996	245,136
Literate ²	1,179,332	1,152,872	26,460	405,353	396,020	9,333
Middle School ³	2,110,370	2,077,737	32,633	867,049	849,279	17,770
Matriculate ⁴	800,656	797,051	3,605	761,267	736,729	24,538
Intermediate ⁵	108,644	108,177	467	260,558	246,590	13,968
Graduate and Others ⁶	45,687	45,541	146	351,819	335,003	16,816
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar						
Illiterate	24.21	22.58	30.07	43.22	41.98	49.62
Literate ²	22.27	21.98	35.20	35.89	35.94	34.10
Middle School ³	23.22	22.74	54.35	42.22	42.26	40.57
Matriculate ⁴	14.71	14.54	51.31	38.24	38.15	40.98
Intermediate ⁵	11.64	11.57	28.05	37.12	36.93	40.44
Graduate and Others ⁶	11.37	11.26	46.57	33.44	32.69	48.51
Jharkhand Percentage						
Illiterate	78.19	72.87	97.36	37.82	33.99	74.63
Literate ²	6.87	8.47	1.12	8.42	9.10	1.95
Middle School ³	12.83	15.80	2.13	21.20	22.95	4.42
Matriculate ⁴	3.08	3.87	0.22	16.86	17.97	6.17
Intermediate ⁵	0.33	0.41	0.01	5.60	5.82	3.46
Graduate and Others ⁶	0.13	0.17	0.008	6.81	7.00	5.00
Bihar Percentage						
Illiterate	75.15	70.54	98.22	34.78	31.63	71.58
Literate ²	7.18	8.43	0.96	9.33	9.89	2.72
Middle School ³	12.86	15.19	1.19	19.95	21.22	5.18
Matriculate ⁴	4.87	5.82	0.13	17.52	18.41	7.16
Intermediate ⁵	0.66	0.79	0.01	5.99	6.16	4.07
Graduate and Others ⁶	0.27	0.33	0.005	8.09	8.37	4.91

¹ Excludes Marginal workers

² Without Educational Level

³ Primary or Middle School.

⁴ Matriculation or Secondary

⁵ Includes Higher Secondary, Intermediate, Pre-University and Technical/ Non-technical Diploma not equal to Degree

⁶ Includes those who hold a University Degree, and above.

⁷ Includes Cultivators, Agricultural Labourers, and those in Livestock, Forestry, Fishing, Hunting, Plantations, Orchards and allied activities.

⁸ Includes those in Mining & Quarrying, Manufacturing, Processing, Servicing, Repairs, Construction, Trade & Commerce, Transport, Storage, Communication and Other services.

Source: *Census of India 1981*, Series 4, Bihar Part III-A & B (i) - General Economic Tables (Tables B-I to B-VI), Patna: Government Printing Press, n. d.

District-wise Literacy in Jharkhand 1981

District	Literate			Percentage of Literacy		
Dhanbad	828,000	608,000	220,000	39.1	52.1	23.2
Hazaribagh	516,000	399,000	117,000	23.5	35.6	10.9
Giridih	414,000	328,000	86,000	23.9	37.4	10.0
Palamau	391,000	306,000	85,000	20.4	31.20	9.1
Ranchi	965,000	669,000	296,000	31.4	42.8	19.6
Santhal Pargana	827,000	636,000	191,000	22.2	33.5	10.5
Singhbhum	990,000	692,000	298,000	34.6	46.9	21.5
Jharkhand Total/ Average	4,931,000	3,638,000	1,293,000	27.87	39.92	14.97
Bihar Total/ Average	18,321,000	13,691,000	4,630,000	26.2	38.1	13.6
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	26.91	26.57	27.92	-	-	-

* Some totals do not tally because the Figures have been rounded up to the nearest 500 in the source.

Source: *Bihar Through Figures 1981*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1984., pp. 48-9.

District-wise Area under Principal Crops in Jharkhand (in thousands of Hectares) 1985-86

Districts	Paddy / Rice	Wheat	Gram	Barley	Maize
Deoghar	66	5	1	0	4
Dhanbad	59	1	0	0	3
Dunka	153	5	0	0	17
Giridih	101	4	0	0	11
Godda	68	7	5	1	10
Gumla	198	3	2	0	2
Hazaribagh	132	11	2	1	24
Lohardagga	42	4	0	0	5
Palamau	91	21	14	12	36
Ranchi	226	5	2	0	6
Sahebganj	115	5	4	1	11
Singhbhum	340	2	2	0	8
Jharkhand Total	1,591	73	32	15	137
Bihar Total	5,335	1,835	191	83	669
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	29.82	3.97	16.75	18.07	20.47

Totals may not tally since the figures have been rounded up to the nearest thousand in the source.

Source: *Bihar Through Figures 1991*, Patna: Directorate of Statistics and Evaluation, Government of Bihar, n. d., pp. 90-3.

District-wise Net Area Irrigated from Different Sources in Jharkhand (in Hectares) 1980-81

District	Government Canals	Private Canals	Tanks	Wells/ Tube-wells	Other Sources	Total Area Irrigated
Dhanbad	---	---	---	1,000	---	1,000
Giridih	---	---	1,000	7,000	1,000	9,000
Hazaribagh	1,000	---	3,000	12,000	1,000	18,000
Palamau	8,000	---	5,000	13,000	28,000	53,000
Ranchi	9,000	---	1,000	18,000	7,000	35,000
Santhal Pargana	28,000	---	8,000	10,000	8,000	54,000
Singhbhum	10,000	---	4,000	1,000	2,000	16,000
Jharkhand Total	56,000	---	22,000	62,000	47,000	186,000
Bihar Total	1,094,000	96,000	96,000	994,000	767,000	2,953,000
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	5.11	-	22.91	6.23	6.12	6.29
Jharkhand Percentage	30.10	-	11.82	33.33	25.26	-
Bihar Percentage	37.04	3.25	3.25	33.66	25.97	-

* Nil or less than 500 Hectares

Totals may not tally as figures have been rounded off in the source to the nearest thousand.

Source: *Bihar Through Figures 1981*, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1984., pp. 110-1.

District-wise Population in Jharkhand 1991

District	Area (Sq. Kms.)	Total Population	Males	Females
Deoghar	2,497	918,323	480,683	437,640
Dhanbad	2,996	2,709,170	1,477,768	1,231,402
Dumka	6,212	1,497,266	765,653	731,613
Giridih	6,892	2,224,006	1,146,906	1,077,100
Godda	2,110	858,678	446,656	412,022
Gumla	9,077	1,153,557	580,041	573,516
Hazaribagh	11,165	2,838,836	1,468,083	1,370,753
Lohardagga	1,491	288,585	146,315	142,270
Palamau	12,749	2,451,048	1,269,276	1,181,772
Ranchi	7,698	2,205,034	1,144,385	1,060,649
Sahibganj	3,405	1,297,391	669,565	627,826
East Singhbhum	3,533	1,617,170	848,015	769,155
West Singhbhum	9,907	1,789,796	910,864	878,932
Jharkhand Total	79,732	21,848,860	11,354,210	10,494,650
Bihar Total	173,877	86,338,853	45,147,280	41,191,573
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	45.85	25.30	25.14	25.47

Source: *Census of India 1991*, Series -1, Paper 2 of 1991 - Provisional Population Tables: Rural- Urban Distributions, New Delhi: Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, 1991.

District-wise Scheduled Tribes Population in Jharkhand 1991

District	Total Population	Males	Females
Deoghar	119,085	60,945	58,140
Dhanbad	225,282	116,569	108,713
Dumka	621,484	314,616	306,868
East Singhbhum	466,572	236,318	230,254
Giridih	271,924	139,560	132,364
Godda	216,047	109,314	106,733
Gumla	816,988	408,004	408,984
Hazaribagh	250,586	129,321	121,265
Lohardagga	162,964	82,045	80,919
Palamau	443,266	226,486	216,780
Ranchi	964,422	490,510	473,912
Sahibganj	507,321	257,135	250,186
West Singhbhum	978,069	488,892	489,177
Jharkhand Total	6,044,010	3,059,715	2,984,295
Bihar Total	6,616,914	3,357,563	3,259,351
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	91.34	91.12	91.56
Jharkhand Percentage	27.66	26.94	28.43

Source: *Census of India 1991*, Series 1, India, Part II-B (i), vol. I - Primary Census Abstract, General Population, New Delhi; Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, n. d.

Contd.

District-wise Occupational Patterns of in Jharkhand 1991

District	Agricultural and Related Activities ¹			Non- Agricultural Activities ²		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
Deoghar	204,897	172,644	32,253	66,850	60,670	6,180
Dhanbad	201,056	171,869	29,187	508,522	473,860	34,662
Dumka	457,721	335,036	122,685	81,895	71,604	10,291
East Singhbhum	242,592	170,876	71,716	261,671	235,062	26,609
Giridih	452,259	368,372	83,887	173,150	158,873	14,277
Godda	247,816	196,250	51,556	33,912	29,703	4,209
Gumla	383,377	264,237	119,140	43,251	35,279	7,972
Hazaribagh	566,750	444,252	122,498	248,594	229,218	19,376
Lohardagga	87,929	55,906	32,023	15,353	13,332	2,021
Palamau	649,880	504,514	145,366	107,676	98,578	9,098
Ranchi	494,492	338,142	156,350	232,703	206,375	26,328
Sahibganj	360,933	282,831	78,102	81,240	62,109	19,131
West Singhbhum	505,991	343,102	162,889	139,391	123,005	16,386
Jharkhand Total	4,855,693	3,648,031	1,207,652	1,994,208	1,797,668	196,540
Bihar Total	20,680,521	16,824,720	3,855,801	4,972,048	4,517,478	454,570
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	23.47	21.68	31.32	40.10	39.79	43.23
Jharkhand Percentage	22.22	32.12	11.50	9.12	15.83	1.87
Bihar Percentage	23.95	37.26	9.36	5.75	10.00	1.10

¹ Includes Cultivators & Agricultural Labourers.

² Includes all other workers including Marginal workers.

Source: *Census of India 1991*, Series 1, Paper 3 Of 1991 - Provisional Population Totals: Workers and their Distribution, New Delhi: Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, 1991.

District-wise Literacy in Jharkhand 1991

District	Literacy			Percentage of Literacy		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
Deoghar	281,540	210,835	70,705	30.65	41.86	16.15
Dhanbad	1,270,469	876,029	394,440	46.89	59.28	32.03
Dumka	418,200	309,292	108,907	27.93	20.65	14.88
East Singhbhum	815,130	516,931	298,199	50.40	60.95	38.76
Giridih	638,142	485,195	152,947	28.69	42.30	14.19
Godda	237,188	176,998	60,190	27.62	39.62	14.60
Gumla	371,593	243,186	128,407	32.21	41.92	22.38
Hazaribagh	856,552	625,133	231,389	30.17	42.58	16.88
Lohardagga	93,311	63,824	29,487	32.33	43.62	20.72
Palamau	596,049	448,096	147,953	24.31	35.30	12.51
Ranchi	919,274	606,029	313,245	41.68	52.95	29.53
Sahibganj	281,307	198,257	83,050	21.68	29.60	13.22
West Singhbhum	573,460	408,573	164,887	32.04	44.85	18.75
Jharkhand Total/Average	7,352,215	5,168,378	2,183,806	33.65	45.51	20.80
Bihar Total/Average	26,854,389	19,176,364	7,678,025	31.10	42.47	18.63
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	27.37	26.95	28.44	32.81	42.72	20.35

Source: *Census of India 1991*, Series 5, Paper 1 of 1991 - Provisional Population Totals, Patna: Director of Census Operations, n. d.

District-wise Area Under Principal Crops in Jharkhand (in thousands of Hectares) 1988-89

Districts	Paddy / Rice	Wheat	Barley	Maize	Gram
Deoghar	64	3	-	4	-
Dhanbad	60	-	-	4	-
Dumka	151	3	-	-	-
Giridih	100	4	-	11	1
Godda	66	5	1	9	2
Gumla	201	2	-	2	1
Hazaribagh	126	8	1	20	3
Lohardagga	41	2	-	2	-
Palamau	83	17	9	33	10
Ranchi	203	3	-	5	2
Sahebganj	104	5	-	10	3
Singhbhum	319	1	1	6	1
Jharkhand Total	1,518	53	12	106	23
Bihar	5,308	2,112	58	693	148
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	28.59	2.50	20.68	15.29	15.54

Totals may not tally since the figures have been rounded up to the nearest thousand in the source.

Source: *Bihar Through Figures 1991*, Patna: Directorate of Statistics and Evaluation, Government of Bihar, n. d., pp. 90-3.

District-wise Net Area Irrigated from Different Sources in Jharkhand (in Hectares) 1988-89

Districts	Government Canals	Private Canals	Total
Deoghar	Not Available	Not Available	Not Available
Dhanbad	Not Available	Not Available	Not Available
Dumka	6,000	Not Available	6,000
Giridih	Not Available	Not Available	Not Available
Godda	2,000	Not Available	2,000
Gumla	1,000	Not Available	1,000
Hazaribagh	3,000	Not Available	3,000
Lohardagga	1,000	Not Available	1,000
Palamau	9,000	Not Available	9,000
Ranchi	5,000	Not Available	5,000
Sahebganj	2,000	Not Available	2,000
Singhbhum	10,000	Not Available	10,000
Jharkhand Total	39,000	Not Available	39,000
Bihar	1,262,000	Not Available	1,262,000
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	3.09	Not Available	3.09

Totals may not tally since the figures have been rounded up to the nearest thousand in the source.

Source: *Bihar Through Figures 1991*, Patna: Directorate of Statistics and Evaluation, Government of Bihar, n. d., pp. 149-51.

District-wise Scheduled Tribes Occupational Patterns in Jharkhand 1981

District	Agricultural and Related Activities ²			Non- Agricultural Activities ³		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
Dhanbad	34,497	29,190	5,307	35,475	24,008	11,467
Giridih	61,605	52,070	9,535	28,397	11,546	16,851
Hazaribagh	43,718	36,140	7,578	32,614	19,120	13,494
Palamau	121,940	91,275	30,665	25,465	8,524	16,941
Ranchi	569,609	405,598	164,011	223,132	62,094	161,038
Santhal Pargana	479,932	367,984	111,948	197,143	47,210	149,933
Singhbhum	404,803	281,023	123,780	197,572	79,304	118,268
Jharkhand Total	1,716,104	1,263,280	452,824	739,798	251,806	487,992
Bihar Total¹	1,884,324	1,385,531	498,793	784,639	277,715	504,924
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar	91.07	91.17	90.78	94.28	90.67	96.64

¹ Includes Seeking/ available for work

² Includes Cultivators, Agricultural Labourers and those in Livestock, Forestry, Fishing, Hunting & Plantation, Orchards and allied activities.

³ Includes those in Mining & Quarrying, Manufacturing, Processing, Servicing & Repairs, Construction, Trade & Commerce, Transport, Storage & Communications and Other services and Marginal workers.

Source: *Census of India 1981*, Series 4, Bihar Part IX (iii) - Special Tables for Scheduled Tribes (Tables ST-1 to ST-3), Patna: Government Printing Press, n. d.

District-wise Scheduled Tribes Educational Levels in Jharkhand 1981

District	Illiterate			Literate ¹			Middle School ²			Matriculate		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
Dhanbad	165,038	75,166	89,872	10,133	8,841	1,292	12,115	10,849	1,266	3,952	3,422	530
Giridih	2,045,28	95,295	109,233	9,027	7,864	1,163	8,959	8,248	711	1,827	1,563	264
Hazaribagh	174,249	81,592	92,657	9,947	8,043	1,904	10,655	8,804	1,851	3,160	2,398	762
Palamau	299,614	133,387	166,227	23,396	19,653	3,743	23,381	19,985	3,396	4,457	3,781	676
Ranchi	1,329,90 2	579,430	750,472	127,660	86,026	41,634	198,210	137,723	60,487	99,095	42,396	56,699
Santhal Pargana	1,187,10 3	542,885	644,218	81,174	63,474	17,700	75,253	65,243	10,010	17,951	15,692	2,259
Singhbhum	1,035,38 9	444,702	590,687	72,736	55,885	16,851	114,054	94,564	19,490	31,381	27,128	4,253
Jharkhand Total	4,193,36 8	1,952,45 7	2,443,36 6	334,073	249,786	84,287	442,627	345,416	97,211	161,823	96,380	65,443
Bihar Total	4,823,47 0	2,152,51 9	2,670,95 1	356,388	268,018	88,370	474,773	370,323	104,450	126,213	102,306	23,907
Jharkhand Percentage	78.68	73.13	91.87	6.26	9.35	3.16	8.30	12.93	3.65	3.67	4.56	2.77

¹ Without Educational Level, including figures for Educational Level not classified.

² Primary, Middle or Junior Basic.

³ Higher Secondary, Intermediate/ Pre-University or Non-technical/ Non-technical Diploma or Certificate not equal to Degree and those who hold a University Degree, Postgraduate Degree, Technical Degree, Agriculture and Dairying, Veterinary Engineering and Technology, Medicine or an equivalent qualification.

Source: *Census of India 1981*, Series 4, Bihar Part IX (iv) - Special Tables for Scheduled Tribes (Tables ST-4 to ST-7), Patna: Government Printing Press, n. d.

Annex 2

Fieldwork Interview Schedule

Dear Sir/ Madam,

I am conducting this survey as a part of my PhD thesis. I shall be obliged if you could discuss the following questions with me. I must assure you that your responses will be kept confidential and will be used for academic purposes only.

Thank you for your co-operation in advance.

Yours sincerely,

(AMIT PRAKASH)

Interview Schedule

Background Information

Name: _____

Age: _____

Gender: _____

How is the interviewee linked to the Jharkhand movement:

Government Official: _____

Party Functionary: _____

National Level: _____

Regional Level: _____

Local Level: _____

General Population: _____

Level of Education: _____

Source of Income: _____

Level of Income: Rs.

(a) 0 – 1,000

(b) 1,001 – 5, 000

(c) 5, 001 - 10,000

(d) 10, 000 and above

Social strata to which the respondent belongs:

(i) Original Inhabitant of the Jharkhand area: _____

If yes, are you of

(a) Tribal origin: _____

(b) Non-tribal origin: _____

Ancestor arrived from outside the Jharkhand area: _____

Government Officials:

- What, in the Government's opinion, is the Jharkhand issue?
- What is the origin of the issue?
- Does the Government see the Jharkhand issue as a problem?
- What kind of problem is the Jharkhand issue? For example, a threat to law and order/ developmental fallout/ political fallout? or any other?
- Why has this problem become so acute over the past decade or so?
- How far does the Government see the Jharkhand issue as fallout of the development imbalances?
- If developmental imbalances are a factor in the sharpening of the Jharkhandi identity, why has this process become so important over the last decade or so?
- If development has no or marginal role to play, what factors does the Government see as being in the root of the recent Jharkhandi mobilisation?
- Why has the area known as Jharkhand not been very high on the Government's development agenda despite being one of the most backward areas in India?
- What does the Government plan to do to accelerate poverty alleviation and employment generation in Jharkhand?
- How does the Government see these efforts in relation to the demands made by the Jharkhandis?
- How does the Government perceive the demands made by the Jharkhandis?
- To what extent is their demand genuine and to what extent is their demand a mere bargaining stance?
- How far is the Government ready to go with their demands?
- Does the Government agree that the issue might not have acquired this proportion if adequate developmental efforts had been made in the area?
- How does the Government perceive the demand of autonomy by the Jharkhandis?
- How would the present limited regional autonomy proposal effect the issue?
- Does the Government see a demand for complete autonomy as a reality in the near future?

Party Functionaries and the General Population:

- Does the Government have any policy of employment generation and poverty alleviation in Jharkhand?
- If yes, which ones?
- Have you or anyone you know benefited from these policies?
- If yes, in what ways?
- If no, why not?
- What kind of policies are needed in the Jharkhand region for poverty alleviation and employment generation or how can the existing policies (if you think such policies exist) be modified to make them more useful?
- What kinds of policies are more likely to succeed in Jharkhand and why? (e.g. area-oriented versus target-group oriented versus community-group based policies?)
- How would you and most people you know like the policies to be administered? : from Delhi/ Patna/ district capital/ locally (panchayati institutions)?
- How do you and others perceive the problem of employment generation and poverty eradication in Jharkhand and what role do you see for the Government in it?
- Have the Government efforts helped to improve the state of employment and poverty?
- If yes, how?

- If no, why not?
- Will the formation of Jharkhand state help in this regard?
- Are you a member of JMM or any other such regional party?
- If yes, in what capacity?
- If no, do you know about the existence of such parties?
- What are the policies and aims of these parties?
- Who told you about such a party?
- What, according to you, are the goals and aims of this party?
- How would the fulfilment of these goals help you and others?
- In what way do you and others think that supporting JMM and other such organisations will help remove poverty and generate employment?
- Do you meet the leaders regularly?
- How often?
- How do the leaders propose to improve conditions in the area?
- How do you and others see such proposals?
- How do *dikus* (outsiders) affect your employment prospects?
- What do you and others think would be the effect of regional autonomy on such issues?

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Interviews:

The interviews conducted during the 1995-96 field study were important in shaping my understanding of the political and development dynamics of the region. More than 25 hours of these interviews with the following categories of individuals were recorded on tapes.

- Interviews with government officials such as the Regional Development Commissioner, Ranchi; Joint Secretary (in-charge of Bihar), Government of India, New Delhi; Director, Planning Department, Government of Bihar and members of the local development bureaucracy including Sarpanchs, Block Development Officers and Secretary to the JAAC.
- Interviews with the political actors in the Jharkhand region such as the Member of Parliament for Ranchi; candidates of political parties for the 1996 elections; political activists of BJP, INC, JD, JMM and other political parties and politically aware individuals such as school teachers, retired government officials and local political opinion leaders.
- Interviews with the general population of the region across the urban areas and the rural interior. Particular emphasis was laid on interviewing women, youths and members of the ST (Christians as well as non-Christians).